Muslim supremacism, not traditionalism, is the issue

Mamdani has praised Anwar Al-Awlaki (an al-Qaeda propagandist) and appointed al-Qaeda’s defense lawyer in 9/11 (not a public attorney but someone who explicitly said his role was a moral calling)—he has repeatedly spread malicious blood libel about Hindus, his aides are on video telling Muslim voters that voting for Mamdani is a form of Jihad, he wrote a love letter to Umar Khalid (a terrorist who instigated the deadly 2020 Delhi riots in India) and met his father (a former member of SIMI, a designated terror group in India). But sure, his wife showed some skin so he’s obviously not an Islamist.

I can understand Americans making this argument, because their introduction to Jihad was dehātī suicide-bombers yelling Allahu Akbar, but for Indians to be so delusional is inexcusable: we literally had two Islamist states carved out of us with great bloodshed by Jinnah, an alcohol-drinking pork-eating “secular Muslim” whose wife’s low-cut dresses used to make the British uncomfortable. Before that we had brutally oppressive Muslim empires whose nobles openly had gay sex and flaunted it in literature and paintings (figure 5.1¹).

1. Jihad, i.e. terrorism, mass child-rapes, persecution and genocides of non-Muslims in Muslim-ruled states, other atrocities.

2. Muslim supremacism, i.e. ideology that holds the demands of Muslims above the will and sovereignty of all other people. As described in section 3.1.V, this does not even just mean putting the feelings of Muslims over all the lives of countless others, but actually putting Jihad over the lives of countless others; rewarding, legitimizing and running cover for it.

Together these comprise Political Islam or “Islamism”. The point of using this term is not for the sake of “not all Muslims” virtue-signalling, but to pinpoint exactly the problem we have with Islam. Even their theological or metaphysical errors (to say the least) or their many practices we find repulsive and dysgenic, are not the cause of political conflict—India has always been exceedingly tolerant in all such matters. Certainly we do have objection to those Muslim traditional practices that are rooted in Muslim supremacism (e.g. the hijab, a symbol of perversion toward non-Muslim women), but it is only because of that supremacist ideology that we take issue with it.

Bending the foreign policies of host nations toward Islamist causes—e.g. the U.S. toppling Sheikh Hasina’s government in Bangladesh at the behest of Islamists—is Muslim supremacism. Support for a cause as obviously morally rotten as the Palestinian one (or similarly the Khilafat movement in pre-colonial times)—without sparing a thought for Hindus and Christians in Muslim countries, is Muslim supremacism. Forbidding Hindus from building, out of our own money, a simple temple on the birthplace of our lord is Muslim supremacism. Turning every anniversary of 9/11 into talking about “Islamophobia due to 9/11” (which is not even historically accurate) is Muslim supremacism. Rioting on the streets to stop India from providing refuge to persecuted Hindus and Christians in Pakistan and Bangladesh is Muslim supremacism. Ummah, i.e. transnational loyalties that place Muslim interests above those of the nation, is Muslim supremacism. And while certainly certain elements of Muslim orthodox culture are also rooted in Muslim supremacism (the hijab, belief in the Quran itself, the teachings in Madrassas and Mosques)—these remaining elements are equally present among “liberal/secular” Muslims.

Continuing on the example of Zohran Mamdani: even though his community (Gujarati Shias) has produced several influential Islamist figures like Jinnah owing to its human capital, it is actually still overall one of the few relatively sensible Muslim communities in the world: with about 30% of them even voting for the BJP, prioritizing economic development over any goals of Political Islam. Yet Zohran (and his father) are virulent Islamists, far more so than one would predict from his community background—because they are Leftists.

Essentially the entire “Conservative vs Liberal Muslim” spectrum corresponds only to the most hardline section of Hindutva, with Conservative Muslims corresponding to Traditionalists and Liberal Muslims corresponding to Savarkarites. In both cases, the latter (Liberal Muslims/Savarkarites) are actually much more potent than the former (Conservative Muslims/Traditionalists) despite being less religiously orthodox. The difference is:

1. Leftists and Muslims realize this, which is why they target Savarkarite/Saṅgh right-wing rather than Hindu traditionalists (who don’t even meaningfully exist anymore); while right-wingers foolishly make epic dunks like “haha poor Muslims are so conservative while elite Muslims drink alcohol and get bhagwa love tapped” and use stupid slurs mocking them for poverty or circumcision rather than focusing on the actual problem we have with them.

2. All of Muslim society falls into this spectrum, and accept the basic premise that their people should be sovereign—the disagreement is on what policies they should then adopt, on their own volition, as sovereign people.

Whereas among Hindus it is only a small number of clear-minded Hindutvādīs who even think in these terms. The treasonous liberal nominal-Hindu, or even the Lay Hindutvādī who hasn’t thought things through with as much clarity, has no analog on the other side.