Dhvanyalokalocana 84

English (machine translation) 84

Language: English

84.2

The appropriate employment of meaning and word
in conformity with aesthetic relish and the rest—
these are established as the two kinds of stylistic modes. //

For "employment" is what is called a stylistic mode. Among them, that employment based upon the expressed meaning which conforms to aesthetic relish and possesses appropriateness constitutes these [dramatic] modes such as the kaiśikī. And those based upon expressing words are [the poetic modes] such as the upanāgarikā. For stylistic modes, when introduced with a view to aesthetic relish and the rest as their ultimate purport, impart a certain singular charm to drama and poetry. For aesthetic relish and the rest are the soul of both; the plot and other elements, however, are merely the body.

84.4

On this point some say: "The relationship of quality and qualified is fitting for aesthetic relish and the rest together with the plot and other elements, but not the relationship of soul and body; for the expressed meaning appears as consisting of aesthetic relish and the rest, not as separate from aesthetic relish and the rest." To this it is answered: If the expressed meaning consisted of aesthetic relish and the rest just as the body consists of fair complexion, then, just as when the body appears its fair complexion necessarily appears to everyone, so aesthetic relish and the rest too would appear alongside the expressed meaning to the sensitive reader and the insensitive reader alike. But this is not the case; and this was already demonstrated in the first flash.

84.5

One might think: just as the genuineness of jewels is to be perceived only by a qualified knower, so too the nature of expressed meanings as aesthetic relish and the rest is perceptible only by a particular perceiver. This is not so. For just as when a jewel appears as genuine, nothing other than the essential nature of the jewel itself is observed, so aesthetic relish and the rest too would be observed as nothing other than the expressed meaning in the form of determinants, consequents, and so on. But this is not the case; for no one understands that aesthetic relish is merely the determinants, consequents, and transitory emotions. And for this very reason, the perception of aesthetic relish and the rest is inseparable from the perception of determinants and the rest; therefore, because these two perceptions stand in a cause-and-effect relation, a sequence is inevitable. But because of its swiftness it is not noticed; therefore it was stated that "aesthetic relish and the rest are suggested meanings precisely of imperceptible sequence."

84.6

[Objection:] Surely the word itself, delimited by contextual factors and the like, produces simultaneously the perception of both the expressed and the suggested meaning; so what is the point of postulating a sequence there? For the consideration of the word's expressed meaning is not the sole basis of suggestiveness; to explain, there is manifestation of aesthetic relish even from sounds such as singing, where there is no intermediate consideration of an expressed meaning.

84.7

To this also we reply: we certainly agree that the suggestiveness of words occurs through the delimitation of contextual factors and the like. However, that suggestiveness of theirs is based sometimes on their specific phonetic form, and sometimes on their expressive capacity. Among them, in the case of those whose [suggestiveness] is based on their expressive capacity, if that were accomplished by the perception of their phonetic form alone without any perception of the expressed meaning, then it would not be based on their expressive capacity. If, on the other hand, it is based on that [expressive capacity], then it inevitably follows that the perception of the suggested meaning occurs after the perception of the relation between expressing word and expressed meaning.

84.8

If that sequence is not noticed because of its swiftness, what can be done? Furthermore, if the perception of aesthetic relish and the rest could be accomplished merely by the word delimited by contextual factors and the like without any perception of the expressed meaning, then it would occur even for perceivers who have not grasped the context and are unlearned in the relation of expressing word and expressed meaning, merely upon hearing the poetry. And in the case of simultaneity, the perception of the expressed meaning would be useless; or if it is useful, there is no simultaneity. Even for those things whose suggestiveness is caused by the perception of their specific form, such as the sounds of singing, there is also an invariable sequence between the perception of the form and the perception of the suggested meaning. But that temporal sequence of the word's operation is not perceived in the case of aesthetic relish and the rest, which are distinct from any other denotation and not in conflict with the expressed meaning, when its effects—which can be accomplished by nothing else—are brought about rapidly.

84.9

In some cases, however, [the sequence] is indeed observed, as in cognitions of suggested meaning that take the form of resonance. If it is asked how that is so even there, it is explained: First, in suggestion where the suggested meaning takes the form of resonance based on the power of the meaning, the two cognitions—that of the directly expressed meaning and that of the meaning implied by its power—are extremely distinct, because [the latter] is distinct from any other expressed meaning; hence the relation of cause and effect between them cannot be denied, so that the sequence of prior and posterior there is quite obvious, as in the Prakrit verses cited in the first flash to establish the implicit meaning. And in such a scope, because the expressed meaning and the suggested meaning are completely distinct, one cannot say that the cognition of the one is the very same as that of the other. In suggestion where the suggested meaning takes the form of resonance based on the power of the word, on the other hand, in examples such as "May the cows / rays of the pure ones generate for you the utmost supreme pleasure...", when two meanings are verbally understood, the cognition of the relation of standard and object of comparison between the two meanings is implied through the force of the meaning in the absence of an explicit word expressive of simile; therefore, even there, the sequence of prior and posterior between the cognition of the directly expressed meaning and that of the suggested poetic figure is easily observed. Even in suggestion where the suggested meaning takes the form of resonance based on the power of the word revealed by an individual word, the connecting of a qualifying word capable of connecting with both meanings—although not conveyed verbally, in the absence of an explicit connecting word—stands established by implication; therefore here too, as before, the sequence of prior and posterior between the cognitions of the directly expressed meaning and of the poetic figure alone implied by its power remains well established. And the cognitive grasp, although arising from meaning in such a context, is considered to be based on the power of the word, because it is generated by the power of words capable of connecting with both meanings.

84.10

In suggestion with unintended expressed meaning, however, the manifestation of another meaning occurs only after the cognition of turning away from its well-known proper domain; therefore, the sequence is necessarily present. There, precisely because the expressed meaning is unintended, an inquiry into the sequential cognition of the suggested along with the expressed was not undertaken. Therefore, just as between the cognitions of the designator and the designated, so too between the cognitions of the expressed meaning and the suggested meaning, the sequence necessarily occurs because of their relation of cause and effect. But, according to the argument stated, that [sequence] is observed in some cases and not observed in others.

84.11

Thus, when the varieties of suggestion have been defined from the perspective of the suggestive element, someone might say: "What is this suggestive character? Is it the revealing of the suggested meaning? For suggestive character is nothing else. And that suggested character of the meaning is dependent on establishing the suggestive element. And establishing the suggestive element is with reference to the suggested. Thus, because of mutual dependence, there is no settled ground." [To this we reply:] Is it not the case that the establishment of the suggested meaning as distinct from the expressed meaning was already demonstrated earlier, and establishing the suggestive element depends on that establishment? So what occasion is there for this objection?

84.12

[Opponent:] This is true indeed. By the arguments stated earlier, the establishment of a reality distinct from the expressed meaning has been accomplished. But why is that meaning designated solely as 'suggested'? And where it does not abide as subordinate, there it ought properly to be designated as 'expressed' alone, since the sentence is devoted to that [meaning]. And for this reason, the function of the sentence illuminating that [meaning] is simply the expressive function. What is the use of postulating another function for it? Therefore, whatever meaning is the object of the speaker's intention is primarily the expressed meaning. As for the cognition of another expressed meaning that occurs midway in such a case, it is merely a means for the cognition of that [intended meaning], just as the cognition of word-meanings is [a means] for the cognition of the sentence-meaning.

84.13

To this it is said: Where a word, while expressing its own meaning, conveys another meaning, is there identity or difference between its expressing its own meaning and its being the cause of conveying that other meaning? First, there is no identity; because those two operations are perceived indeed as having different scopes and different forms. For the operation defined as direct denotation has the word's own meaning for its scope, whereas that defined as indicating has another meaning for its scope. Nor can the distinction between own and other in the expressed meaning and the suggested meaning be denied, since the one is apprehended as a direct relatum and the other as the relatum of a relatum. For the expressed meaning is directly related to the word, whereas the other, implied by the force of what is expressed, is the relatum of a relatum. And if it were directly related to itself, there would be no talk at all of its being another meaning. Therefore, difference of scope between those two operations is well established. Difference of form also is indeed well known. For the capacity to denote is not the very same as the capacity to convey [another meaning], since we observe the apprehension of meanings such as aesthetic relish even from words of song and the like which are not denotative, and the revelation of a particular meaning is well known even from non-verbal bodily gestures and the like. For thus in the verse beginning: “With bowed face through modesty...”, a particular gesture is indeed shown by the good poet to be the cause of revealing a meaning. Therefore, because of having different scopes and having different forms, the difference between a word's expressing its own meaning and its being the cause of conveying another meaning is perfectly clear. If there is a difference, then it is not proper now to designate as expressed that other meaning which is conveyed and implied by the force of what is expressed.
Moreover, that it is an object of verbal operation is indeed accepted by us, but only as suggested, not as expressed.
And because that other meaning is apprehended as being fit to be connected with other well-known denotative words, the statement of “revealing” alone is fitting with regard to its being made an object by another word expressing its own meaning.
Nor does the principle of word-meaning and sentence-meaning apply to the expressed and suggested meanings. For some scholars maintain that the apprehension of word-meaning is unreal. Even by those who do not accept its unreality, the principle of the pot and its material cause must be accepted with regard to sentence-meaning and word-meanings. For just as when a pot is produced there is no separate perception of its material causes, so too when a sentence or its meaning is apprehended, there is no separate perception of the words and their meanings; if they were perceived separately at that time, the very cognition of sentence-meaning would vanish. But this is not the principle of the expressed and suggested meanings; for when the suggested meaning is being apprehended, the cognition of the expressed meaning does not vanish, because its manifestation is invariably accompanied by the appearance of the expressed meaning. Therefore, the principle of the pot and the lamp applies to them: just as when cognition of a pot arises by means of a lamp, the light of the lamp does not disappear, so it is with the appearance of the expressed meaning during the apprehension of the suggested meaning. But what was said in the first flash, “just as by means of word-meanings...” (1.10) and so forth, was intended as an analogy merely on account of its being an expedient.

84.14

Objection: In this way, a sentence would be connected with two meanings simultaneously, and if that were so, its very nature as a sentence would disintegrate, because a sentence is defined by singleness of meaning. Reply: This is not a fault; for they are situated in a relation of subordinate and principal. For sometimes the suggested meaning has prominence and the expressed meaning has subordinate status; sometimes the expressed meaning has prominence and the other has subordinate status. In that regard, when the suggested meaning is prominent, it has already been called suggestion; but when the expressed meaning is prominent, another category will be pointed out. Therefore, this stands established: even when poetry is intent on the suggested meaning, the suggested meaning does not have expressibility, but rather suggestedness alone.

84.15

Moreover, when the suggested meaning is not intended to be prominent, you must not accept it as expressed, because the word is not intent upon it. Thus there is indeed some suggested scope of words. Where it does have prominence, why is its essential nature denied even there? Thus, first of all, suggestive capacity is completely distinct from denotative capacity; and suggestive capacity is distinct from denotative capacity also because denotation rests on word alone, whereas the other rests on word and rests on meaning, since suggestive capacity has been demonstrated in both word and meaning.

84.16

Secondary signification, however, by virtue of transference and secondary application, rests on both. But even from that, suggestive capacity differs both in essential form and in scope. The difference of form is this: secondary signification is well known as an operation of a non-primary character; suggestive capacity, on the other hand, is an operation of the word of an entirely primary character. For the apprehension of the triad of suggested meanings from a meaning is not perceived to be non-primary in the slightest.

84.17

And here is another difference of essential nature: secondary signification is said to be merely denotation established in a non-primary manner, whereas suggestiveness is utterly distinct from denotation; and this has been demonstrated. And here is another difference of form: in secondary signification, when one meaning indicates another meaning, it becomes transformed into the very nature of the meaning to be indicated, as in 'a hamlet on the Gaṅgā' and the like. But in the path of suggestiveness, when a meaning illuminates another meaning, it is apprehended as revealing the other while manifesting its own nature, like a lamp; as in 'Pārvatī counted the petals of her sport-lotus' and the like. And if figurative indication were applied to cases where a meaning whose own apprehension is not superseded indicates another meaning, then, this being so, figurative indication would turn out to be the primary verbal function, since sentences mostly illuminate a meaning that is the object of intended import distinct from the expressed [meaning].

84.18

Objection: Even on your view, when the meaning reveals the triad of suggested meanings, what kind of operation does the word have then? Reply: That kind of suggestive capacity of the meaning operates solely by virtue of the word as delimited by context and so forth; so how can the utility of the word therein be denied?

84.19

The difference of scope between secondary signification and suggestive capacity is also evident. For the scope of suggestive capacity is three-fold: aesthetic relish and the like, specific poetic figures, and subject matter delimited by the form of the suggested. In that regard, the apprehension of aesthetic relish and the like is not called secondary signification by anyone, nor can it be so called. Apprehension of a suggested poetic figure is likewise. That which is intended to be conveyed without being expressed by its own word, for the purpose of communicating the charm of the subject matter, is the suggested. And not all of that is the scope of secondary signification, since the use of secondary words is observed even in deference to convention. That has been stated previously. And even what is the scope of secondary signification is so through the penetration of suggestive capacity. Therefore, suggestive capacity is entirely distinct even from secondary signification. And although distinct from denotation and secondary signification, it is established as having both of them as its basis.

84.20

For suggestiveness operates in some cases by relying on primary denotation, as in suggestion where the expressed meaning is intended but subservient to another; in other cases, however, [it operates] by relying on secondary signification, as in suggestion where the expressed meaning is unintended. It is precisely in order to demonstrate that it relies on both that the two primary subdivisions of suggestion were set forth at the very beginning. And because it relies on both, it cannot be said to be identical with either one alone: for it is not identical with primary denotation alone, since in some instances it operates by relying on indication; nor is it identical with indication alone, since elsewhere it is established by relying on primary denotation. Nor is it simply that it is not identical with either one because it possesses the nature of both: it is also because it is a property of sounds that are devoid of the nature of primary denotation, indication, and the like. For musical notes also possess suggestiveness with respect to aesthetic relish and the like, and in them no primary denotation or indication is observed in any way. Since suggestiveness is observed even in domains other than verbal sound, it is improper to say that it is merely a variety of verbal properties such as denotation. And if suggestiveness, although distinct from the recognized varieties of verbal functions such as primary denotation and indication, is assumed to be a variety [of them], why is it not assumed to be a variety of verbal sound itself?

84.21

Thus, in verbal communication there are three modes: primary denotation, secondary signification, and suggestiveness. Among these, in suggestiveness, when the suggested meaning is primary, there is suggestion; and its two primary subdivisions—namely, that in which the expressed meaning is unintended and that in which the expressed meaning is intended but subservient to another—have been enumerated, and were fully determined at the very beginning.

84.22

An opponent might say: Is it not correct what is said, that in suggestion where the expressed meaning is intended but subservient to another there is no secondary signification? For where the apprehension of another meaning is preceded by the apprehension of the expressed meaning and the expressive word, how could there be the operation of secondary signification? For in secondary signification, [it occurs] either when a word is metaphorically transferred to another referent through some motive, having its own meaning completely set aside—as in "The boy is fire" and so forth—or when, without abandoning its own meaning entirely, it reaches another referent by virtue of a relation to it—as in "A hamlet on the Ganges" and so forth; then [only] is unintended expressed meaning appropriate. And for this very reason, in suggestion where the expressed meaning is intended but subservient to another, both the expressed meaning and the expressive word are observed to be apprehended in their own form, and another meaning is understood; hence the application of the term 'suggestiveness' accords with logic. An entity that illuminates another while revealing its own form is called 'suggestive'; in such a domain, suggestiveness belongs precisely to primary denotation, so the application of the term 'secondary signification' cannot possibly be made. But how is suggestion where the expressed meaning is unintended different from secondary signification? For in its two subdivisions, identity with the two subdivisions of secondary signification is clearly perceived.

84.23

This also is not a defect. For suggestion where the expressed meaning is unintended, although it follows the path of secondary signification, is not identical in nature with secondary signification itself. For secondary signification is seen even when devoid of suggestiveness, whereas suggestiveness does not exist without a suggested meaning that causes the charm previously mentioned. But secondary signification can occur as a metaphorical identification based merely on properties of the expressed meaning or based solely on a suggested meaning: as in "The boy is fire" due to sharpness, and "Her face is the moon itself" due to delightfulness, and so on; and as in "Toward a beloved person there is no tautology" and so forth. Even the secondary signification that takes the form of indication can occur merely on the basis of a connection with the indicated meaning, even without the apprehension of a charming suggested meaning, as in the case of "The platforms are shouting" and the like.

84.24

Where, however, it is the cause of the apprehension of a charming suggested meaning, even there [it functions] solely through the entry of suggestiveness, just like primary denotation. And where an impossible meaning is used, as in "The earth with golden flowers" and the like, the apprehension of a charming suggested meaning alone is the motive; therefore, even in such a case, although secondary signification is present, the designation 'suggestion' alone accords with logic. Therefore, in both subdivisions of suggestion where the expressed meaning is unintended, secondary signification is qualified by a particular suggestiveness and is not identical with it, because it is the cause of an apprehension that delights the heart of the sensitive reader and is implicit, whereas in other contexts it is seen to be devoid of that nature. And all of this, although already indicated earlier, has been stated again for the sake of clearer comprehension.

84.25

Moreover, that attribute of words and meanings whose nature is suggestiveness conforms to their well-known relation, and therefore should not be an object of disagreement for anyone. For that operation characterized as suggestiveness, which only operates in conformity with the well-known relation of words and meanings termed the relation of the expresser and the expressed, operates conditionally because of a connection with an additional totality of causal factors. For this very reason, it differs from denotative power. Denotative power, indeed, is a fixed nature of a specific word, because from the time of linguistic convention it is well known to be in invariable concomitance with it. But this [suggestiveness] is not fixed, because it is conditional, since it is cognized only as delimited by context and so forth, and not otherwise.

84.26

"Well, if it is not fixed, what is the point of examining its nature?" There is no error here, because its lack of fixity concerns the verbal essence, and not its own domain, which is characterized as the suggested meaning. And the principle of an inferential sign is observed in this nature of being suggestive: just as being an inferential sign appears as not fixed in its substrates because it depends upon human intention, and yet is non-deviating with respect to its own object, / exactly so is this suggestiveness, as has been shown. And precisely because it is not fixed in the verbal essence, it cannot be conceived as a mode of denotative power. For if it were a mode of denotative power, it would also be fixed in the verbal essence, just like denotative power. And such a conditional attribute of words must necessarily be admitted by one who asserts an innate relation between word and meaning, who understands the truth of sentences, and who maintains a distinction between human and non-human sentences. For if it were not admitted, there would be no distinction between human and non-human sentences in conveying meaning, even while the relation between word and meaning is eternal. / But when it is admitted, human sentences, having additional conditional operations superimposed [upon them] in accordance with human intention, can even be false, though without abandoning their connection to their own denotation.

84.27

For it is observed that entities, even while not abandoning their own nature, perform contrary effects through additional conditional operations produced by the concurrence of an additional totality of causal factors. To explain: it is well known that the cool-rayed moon and the like, while retaining their cooling nature which refreshes the whole world of living beings, cause torment when looked upon by people whose minds are burning in the fire of separation from their beloved. Therefore, one who wishes to establish the falsity of human sentences, even while an innate relation to meaning exists, must explicitly state some conditional form distinct from denotative power. And that is nothing other than suggestiveness. For suggestiveness is the illumination of a suggested meaning. And human sentences primarily illuminate only the speaker's intention. And that [intention] is only suggested, not denotable, because there is no relation characterized as that between the expresser and the expressed between it and the expression.

84.28

"Well, by this principle, the designation of suggestion would wrongly apply to all worldly sentences, because all [of them] are suggestive by this principle." This is true; however, that suggestiveness which consists in illuminating the speaker's intention is common to all worldly sentences without distinction. But that does not differ from denotative power, for the suggested [intention] exists there by invariable necessity, and not as being intended to be communicated. But the suggestiveness whose suggested meaning exists as being intended to be communicated is the criterion for the designation of suggestion. As for the suggested meaning in the form of a specific intention which is illuminated by word and meaning, that is intended to be communicated, being illuminated as the main purport. But that alone is not the criterion for the designation of suggestion, which has an unlimited scope, because it is under-pervasive. Thus, all that is manifested by main purport, whether in the form of an intention or not in the form of an intention, possessing the three-fold variety that has been shown, is the criterion for the designation of suggestion; and so, in the definition of suggestion as a specific kind of suggestiveness as stated, there is neither over-pervasion nor under-pervasion. Therefore, according to the doctrine of those who know the truth of sentences, the verbal operation characterized as suggestiveness is not contradictory, but on the contrary is seen to be entirely favorable.

84.29

This practice of suggestion has proceeded relying precisely upon the doctrine of those wise men who have determined the uncorrupted Word-Brahman; what need is there to consider contradiction or non-contradiction with them? As for those who maintain an artificial relation between word and meaning, who know logical reasoning, this suggestive nature of words is established simply through experience, just like [that of] other things, and there is no contradiction; thus it does not descend to the status of being refutable.

84.30

For let the disputes of the dialecticians arise regarding denotative power—whether this [power] of words is natural or conventional, and so on. But regarding suggestiveness, which follows upon that [denotative power], is common to other entities, and is well known in the ordinary world as it is experienced, what room is there for disagreements? For all the disagreements of dialecticians arise with regard to trans-empirical objects, not worldly ones. For they are never seen to disagree with one another regarding real objects like blue, sweet, and so on, which are within the domain of the senses of all people and free from sublation. Indeed, when someone calls an unsublated blue 'blue', he is not contradicted by another saying, 'This is not blue, this is yellow.' In the very same way, who can deny that suggestiveness of denotative words, of non-denotative musical notes, and of non-verbal forms such as gestures, which is established by the experience of everyone? For various utterances and bodily actions, both composed in poetry and uncomposed, pointing to a charming, non-verbal meaning, are experienced in assemblies of the cultured. / What sensible person, avoiding making a fool of himself, would contest them?

84.31

Now [an opponent] might say: There is an opportunity for a counter-attack. The suggestiveness of words is their capacity to make something known, and that is nothing other than being an inferential sign (liṅga); consequently, the apprehension of the suggested meaning is simply the apprehension of an inferable object (liṅgin). Therefore, their relation as suggested and suggestive is nothing but the relation of inferable object and inferential sign, and nothing else. And this must inevitably be acknowledged, because you yourself have just now explained suggestiveness with reference to the speaker's intention, and the speaker's intention is indeed of an inferable nature.

84.32

To this it is answered: Well, even if that were so, what harm is done to us? We have accepted that there is a verbal function defined as suggestiveness, distinct from primary denotation and secondary signification; and even in that case, no damage is done to it. For let that suggestiveness be the nature of an inferential sign or something else; in every way, it is distinct from the well-known verbal modes and it is the province of a verbal function, so there is no dispute between us at all. But this is not the ultimate truth—that suggestiveness is always an inferential sign alone, and that the apprehension of the suggested meaning is always merely the apprehension of an inferable object.

84.33

As for what you repeated from our statement to establish your own position—that since the speaker's intention is accepted as something suggested, words act solely as inferential signs in illuminating it—let it be explained with proper distinction exactly as we stated it; listen: The object of words is twofold: inferable and to be conveyed. There, the inferable object is characterized by the desire to speak. And the desire to speak is of two kinds: the desire to utter the intrinsic form of the word, and the desire to convey the meaning through the word. Among these, the first is not an auxiliary to verbal communication, for its result is merely the cognition that [the speaker] is a living being. The second, however, though separated [from the utterance] by the determination of specific words, is the foundation of communication through the instrument of speech. Both of these are the inferable object of words. But the object to be conveyed is the thing made the object of the speaker's intention to convey a meaning.

84.34

And that [object to be conveyed] is twofold: expressed and suggested. For a speaker sometimes wishes to illuminate a meaning through its own designating word, and sometimes, with an eye to some specific purpose, as something not designated by its own word. But that twofold object to be conveyed by words does not present itself in its own form as an inferable object, but rather through another relation, whether conventional or non-conventional. For the fact that that meaning is the object of the desire to speak is apprehended through words as an inferable object, but its own intrinsic form is not. For if the function of words in that regard operated by way of being an inferential sign, disputes regarding correctness, falsity, and so forth concerning the word's meaning would not arise at all, just as in the case of other inferable objects inferred from an inferential sign such as smoke. And the suggested meaning, being implied by the power of the expressed meaning, is indeed related to the word just like the expressed meaning. For the directness or indirectness of a relation is not determining. And that suggestiveness relies on the relation of expressed and expressing has already been shown earlier. Therefore, the operation of words by way of being an inferential sign applies only to the suggested meaning that consists of the speaker's intention, whereas it applies to what is made its object by way of being conveyed. With respect to that implicit meaning—whether consisting of an intention or not consisting of an intention—the operation is neither through denotation nor through another relation. It is not through denotation, as stated earlier. Through another relation, it is precisely suggestiveness. Nor is suggestiveness solely of the nature of an inferential sign, because it is observed otherwise in the case of light and the like. Therefore, the object of words to be conveyed is not related as an inferable object, just like the expressed meaning. For that object which is related to them as an inferable object, as shown, is not apprehended as an expressed meaning, but as a limiting condition. And if the object to be conveyed were an inferable object, there would result the absence of disputes regarding that object which are carried out by ordinary people—and this has already been stated.

84.35

And just as in the domain of the expressed meaning, when an apprehension of correctness is produced somewhere through the corroboration of another means of knowledge, there is no loss of its being the province of verbal function even though it is the object of another means of knowledge, so it is with its suggested meaning as well. Moreover, in the realm of poetry, the determination of truth and falsity of suggested apprehensions is simply irrelevant, so an investigation into the operation of another means of knowledge there turns out to be merely ridiculous. Therefore, it cannot be said that the apprehension of the suggested meaning is everywhere merely the apprehension of an inferable object.

84.36

As for the suggestiveness of words that pertains to a suggested meaning of an inferable nature, that is irrelevant to the standard practice of suggestion (dhvani); rather, it was adduced to demonstrate that a verbal function characterized as suggestiveness must be admitted even by a proponent of the inherent relation between word and meaning. For that suggestiveness—sometimes by way of being an inferential sign, sometimes through another form—in words that are denotative and non-denotative, cannot be rejected by any theorist; thus this effort was undertaken by us. Thus, suggestiveness is universally distinct from the modes of words such as secondary signification, primary denotation, and the like. Even if it were forcibly asserted to fall within them, this setting forth of suggestion (dhvani), its specific form, undertaken to remove misconceptions or for the enlightenment of sensitive readers, is altogether irreproachable. For the rejection of definitions of useful species cannot be accomplished merely by a definition of the genus. For if it were so, once a definition of mere existence were formulated, there would be the unwanted consequence that definitions of all existing entities would be redundant. Thus:

84.37

That variety of poetry designated as suggestion (dhvani), / which was always an object of dispute among scholars, its true nature unknown, / has thus been revealed. ||