Kavyalankara 5: pañcamaḥ paricchedaḥ

Now that which is defective through being devoid of the thesis, logical reason, and so on is described / in brief according to rule, for the sake of understanding that subject alone.

Because of its difficulty to understand, the dull-witted generally dread technical treatise; / for their enticement, this collection of a fraction of reasons and logical method [is offered].

They assimilate even technical treatise when mixed with the sweet aesthetic sentiment of poetry, / just as those who have first tasted honey drink bitter medicine.

There is no word, no meaning, no logical method, and no art / that does not become an auxiliary to poetry; oh, how great is the burden of the poet!

Entities and the like [are known] through two means of knowledge: direct perception and inference; / their scope is said to be the particular and the universal respectively.

Some claim that direct perception is free from conceptual construction [and arises] from that object, / and that conceptual construction is the association of name, genus, and so forth.

Such is their superimposition, and that has a real object as its basis; / if genus and the rest are excluded, where is the operation, where is the particular, and whence does it come?

And when those exclusions are made, it is likewise established as an object of the intellect; / if direct perception is without an object, it is false, for direct perception operates on reality.

If a portion of consciousness is held to be differentiated into object grasped and grasping subject, / its distinction from the resemblance of mere consciousness is conceptual construction.

[It arises] solely from the object, namely form and the rest; solely from that, not from another; / otherwise, the cognition of a pot would be designated by something else.

Some understand inference to be knowledge arising from a sign having three characteristics, / while others know it as the perception of an object that is inextricably connected with that.

The subject qualified by the property under dispute / is the subject of the proposition, and the statement of that is called the thesis.

It is defective if it conflicts with its own meaning, the reason, established doctrine, or all sacred texts, / or if it has an already established property, or is sublated by direct perception.

The conflict with its own meaning by that very [thesis] is as follows: / "An ascetic from childhood is my father, whose legitimate son I am."

"The self or primordial matter exists" is to be known as denying the logical reason; / because this subject is unestablished, its property too will not be established.

With respect to an established subject, sound, as to whether it is "eternal or non-eternal," / a dispute concerning difference arises between two disputants.

That which is in conflict with one's own established doctrine is to be known as contradictory to it, / as if a follower of Kaṇāda were to declare sound to be imperishable.

Because of conflict with all treatises, it is in conflict with all sacred texts, / as for instance: "The body is pure," or "The three means of knowledge do not exist."

Having a qualification given by an undisputed property down to children, / it is considered to have an already established property, as: "Sound is graspable by the ear."

That which is sublated by direct perception is sublated by that very means of knowledge, / as: "Fire is cold," "Form does not exist," "The moon is hot."

Existing in two, established in the similar, and excluded from its contrary, / the logical reason is to be known as having three characteristics; a pseudo-reason is by inversion.

As for "existing in two," that which is established in one's own proposition and in the counter-proposition, / the subject has unbroken characteristics; this is twofold due to the difference of results.

If the counter-proposition is not accepted and its presence is not exemplified, / how can the status of the pseudo-reason unestablished for either party be maintained?

Through following the property to be proved, that which is similar and present there, / even though different, is treated metaphorically as one because of the universal.

The contrary case is dissimilar to that, and is excluded where it is indeed absent; / thus, positive concomitance in two and exclusion in one constitute the correctness of the mark.

An example is said to be established by the property to be proved and the proving property, / or else by their inversion; a pseudo-example is due to their absence.

The positive concomitance of the mark with the property to be proved, and its absence in its absence, / are made known by that; that example is said by others to be twofold.

Refutation is the statement of deficiency and the like; deficiency is [omission] of the reason and so forth. / And because debate has it as its root, a deficiency in the thesis is not approved.

Futile rejoinders are false refutations, such as balance in similarity and the like. / Their detailed elaboration is not stated here because of their vastness.

Another definition of logic, dependent on poetry, will be stated; / but this is how it is expressed in poems containing theoretical treatises:

‘Now, the cause seen in the world is necessarily connected with the eternal: / if it is a cause, it is not eternal; if it is eternal, it is not a cause.’

The characteristic of defects of usage by this division of method / is stated otherwise in the treatises for the non-establishment of the proof such as the thesis.

By those who know this, it is manifested otherwise in poetic usages; / in that regard, poetry relies on the world, while the traditional scriptures look to the truth:

‘The sky resembles a sword; sound is far-reaching; / the water of rivers is ever-present; ah, the stability of the great flame!’

‘Just as a substance, the substratum of color and the like, perishes’— / they acknowledge a thesis as the acceptance of an intended undertaking.

Depending on dharma, wealth, pleasure, and anger, it is of four kinds. / As, having vowed, ‘I shall bear this old age of my father,’ / it was borne by Pūru just so—that [thesis] would be based on dharma.

Having vowed at his master’s command, ‘I myself shall find Sītā,’ / she was found by Hanumān—thus it is based on purpose.

Having made the vow, ‘I will carry off that daughter of Mahāsena today,’ / she was carried off by the Vatsa king—thus it is based on desire.

‘Having crushed my brother's enemy, I will drink his blood in battle’— / having made this vow, as Bhīma did it, helpless with rage.

The employment of a thesis should never be made elsewhere; / nor should an abandonment of these four ever be made.

As Suyodhana, having vowed to fast unto death, / rose up again for the sake of kingship—this [abandonment] contradicts dharma.

Having made a compact, ‘Summoned, I will not turn back from gambling,’ / Yudhiṣṭhira played with Śakuni—this [abandonment] frustrates purpose.

Which Bhīṣma made for his father’s pleasure: ‘From today onward / I will live like an ascetic by [my] word’—that [abandonment] frustrates desire.

As Rāma, having conquered the son of Jamadagni in battle, / made him abandon [the vow] based on slaying all Kṣatriyas—that should be known as frustrating anger.

Now, the occurrence of an admission without an explicit acceptance of a compact: / where one admits from the sense even what is unstated, as it is said:

‘What should be known by the enemy of the senses? Who is repulsed by foes? / Or who does not swiftly give transient wealth to supplicants?’

Now, this insinuation using ‘what’ demonstrates ease [of understanding]. / Even in poetry, the reason is considered by the wise to have only three characteristics.

For positive and negative concomitance alone serve for establishing the fact, / as: ‘All around the expanse of the forest there is this great lake, / because of the crying of the ospreys and because of the fragrance of the lotuses.’

Even a property belonging to another produces that proof through a connection, / like the inference of a place possessing fire from cloud-scraping smoke.

Even when the probandum is not separated, the reason is recognized here, / just as there is comprehension of the meaning even without positive and negative concomitance:

‘The night became brightly lamp-lit, the sun having set.’ / Here, possessing bright lamps is the reason for the setting of the sun.

Even of that, the three defects previously stated are recognized by the wise, / as caused by ignorance, doubt, and error; as:

‘These kāśa grasses captivate the heart because of the fragrance of flowers; / these are to be known as heron-birds because of being near water.’

‘Let this be grasped as a cakora bird because its eyes have white corners; / prove its being a cakora because it is unseen in the same genus.’

An example is an illustration that reflects a stated fact. / ‘Could it not be that a simile is just an inference?’ No, because of the non-statement of a reason.

The statement of the probandum and the proof is not desired anywhere other than what is stated; / in ‘the face is like a lotus’, what is the probandum, and what is the proof?

Thus of usage: as, ‘Even in the Kali age you are here / superior because of being instructed by elders, as in the former Golden Age.’

Where probandum and proof are revealed merely by the example, / they call that a pure example, as it is manifested by that alone; as:

‘You are Bharata, you are Dilīpa, you alone are Aila Purūravas, / you alone, O hero, are Pradyumna, you alone are Naravāhana.’

‘How could these qualities of his be revealed with just a single word?’— / so some good [poets], afraid of prolixity, employ it.

A single good word is better, not a modern composition; / through its contrary nature, it causes the ruin even of fame.

Unpleasing, impenetrable, unrefined despite having aesthetic sentiment— / that poetry which is like an unripe wood-apple, such is of some [poets], as:

‘O site of abundant fame, whose feet are worshiped by the heads of kings, the best and supreme among people! / The conduct of you alone, an enemy of snakes, a lotus, having the abode of water’s foe, is not of another son.’

And with radiant jewels, and with trees bent low with fruit, / and with blossoming flowers, others embellish their speech, as:

‘He stood on the ridge of Mount Meru, variegated with splendid emeralds and rubies, having abundant lovely trees with fruit and sprouts, adorned with many flowers, accompanied by gods, sages, and Siddhas.’

Ornaments, gardens, and garlands are adorned by these elements; / an expression of words with oblique meaning serves for the ornamentation of utterances.

Others, through a desire for length, make poetry / full of contradictory words, lacking self-contained sense, with many fillers, and confused, as:

‘Rich in cardamom, clove, nāga-trees, blooming bakula creepers, sandalwood, and spandana-trees, its shore covered with pearls, camphor, aggregates of aloe, and paste of realgar, filled with hosts of conches, its spreading waves teeming with shoals of whales and crocodiles within—whose ocean bore fair renown pure as the moon, white water-lily, nectar, and milk.’

Thus those various ornaments of speech have been spoken by me / after examining the manifold works of others and reflecting by myself. / Good men of renowned speech who are experts are the authority here; / for others, the mind of those of weighty intellect is not easily pleased by the uncultivated.

Thus ends the fifth chapter in Bhāmaha’s Ornament of Poetry.