[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [釋摩訶衍論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1668) › 4.47 # 釋摩訶衍論 4.47 釋摩訶衍論 4.47 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [4.47](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1668.4.47) 論曰：就此文中即有二重。云何為二？一者總標略示門、二者標釋俱成門。第一門言依不覺故生三種相與彼不覺相應不離者，即是顯示末相承賴本體之氣力故而得成立，復彼本體為受末相之枝養故而得止住。譬如父子互相為因得成立故，是故說言相應不離。若如是說，八地已上諸菩薩等，應斷無明同妙覺耶？是事不爾。雖斷麁相，微細三相猶未斷故。自此已下釋第二門。此三相中第一業相，能見所見無有差別，心王念法不可分析，唯由精動隱流之義故名為業。如是動流只由不覺，若覺不動，動即有苦。所以者何？業相之初果不離無明之初因故。如本一者無明業相以依不覺故心動說名為業，覺則不動動則有苦，果不離因故故。第二轉相，以業相念為所依故，轉作能緣流成了相。若無業相動念之分位，當無了別轉相之見分，依此動作彼轉名為轉相。如本二者能見相以依動故能見不動即無見故。第三現相以了別轉為所依故，戲論境界具足現前，所緣相分圓滿安布。若離了別現識之分位，即無所緣境界之塵相，依此見分現彼相分。譬如依明鏡故現諸色像名為現相。如本三者境界相，以依能見故境界妄現離見則無境界故。如是三相，雖名字別，同是本識，前決擇中已廣說故。此中三相，初能及所同體無別，中唯能見則無所見，後能與所具足圓滿。根本無明復有何別？此何所疑？無明自體不明了故。所謂若言心體無動，就此時故名無明者，此事即不然。所以者何？三相分言以依不覺故心動，說名為業故。若言動是業識分位非無明者，此事亦不爾。所以者何？校量分言以不達一法界故，心不相應忽然念起名為無明故。動起二文皆就業識作如是說，非彼無明。所以者何？能動能起根本無明，隨動隨起即是業識，以此義故無相違過。若爾，根本無明自體，如何能動心體能起諸念？此處難了，十地非境、三賢不量，唯佛窮了，不可妄說。然依經說，假言強稱，但曰不覺。得有因緣，次決擇中自當顯說。業相細念能所未分，相及境界不可分別，何因緣故立動名字釋業相耶？此事亦復不可妄說，唯依經說作如是言：業相本識，無能了作、無所了作，不可分析、不可隔別，唯由精動隱流義故，名為鍵摩而已。若有眾生須種種辭，綺語此處、咄哉終日，不堪了說。 > The treatise says: In this passage, there are two tiers. What are the two? First is the gate of general indication and brief exposition; second is the gate of the joint establishment of indication and explanation. Regarding the statement in the first gate, 'by relying on non-awakening, three kinds of characteristics are produced, which are associated with and not apart from that non-awakening': this reveals that the branch characteristics are established by depending upon the energy and power of the root substance, and further, that root substance abides in order to receive the branching sustenance of the branch characteristics. For example, father and son are established by being causes for each other; therefore, it is said that they are 'associated with and not apart.' If it is spoken of in this way, should all the bodhisattvas above the eighth ground have severed avidyā and be identical with wondrous awakening? This is not so. Although they have severed the coarse characteristics, the three subtle characteristics are not yet severed. From here on, the second gate is explained. Among these three characteristics, in the first, the characteristic of karma, there is no difference between perceiver and perceived; the mental king and mental factors cannot be analyzed; it is named karma solely by virtue of the meaning of subtle movement and hidden flow. Such movement and flow are only due to non-awakening; if there is awakening, there is no movement; if there is movement, there is suffering. Why is that? Because the initial fruit of the characteristic of karma is not apart from the initial cause of avidyā. As the root text says: 'First is the characteristic of the karma of avidyā: because of relying on non-awakening, the mind moves, which is termed karma. When there is awakening, there is no movement; when there is movement, there is suffering, for the fruit is not apart from the cause.' Second, the characteristic of transformation: because it takes the thoughts of the characteristic of karma as its support, it transforms into an apprehending consciousness that flows into a cognizing characteristic. If there were no stage of the moving thoughts of the characteristic of karma, there would be no perceiving aspect of the characteristic of transformation that discriminates; relying on this movement, that transformation is produced, hence named the characteristic of transformation. As the root text says: 'Second is the characteristic of the perceiver: because of relying on movement, there is perception; without movement, there is no perception.' Third, the characteristic of manifestation: because it takes the discriminating transformation as its support, the objective realms of prapañca fully manifest before it, and the apprehended objective aspect is completely arranged. If one were apart from the stage of discriminating manifesting consciousness, there would be no dust-like characteristics of the apprehended objective realm; relying on this perceiving aspect, that objective aspect manifests. For example, it is just like various forms and images manifesting by relying on a clear mirror, hence named the characteristic of manifestation. As the root text says: 'Third is the characteristic of the objective realm: because of relying on the perceiver, the objective realm falsely manifests; apart from perception, there is no objective realm.' These three characteristics, although different in name, are equally the fundamental consciousness, for this was already explained extensively in the previous resolution. Among these three characteristics, the first is such that the perceiver and the perceived are of the same substance without distinction; the middle is only the perceiver without the perceived; the latter is completely endowed with both perceiver and perceived. What further distinction is there with fundamental avidyā? What doubt could there be in this? It is because the self-substance of avidyā is not clear. Namely, if one says that the mind-substance has no movement and is named avidyā with respect to this moment, this is not correct. Why is that? Because the section on the three characteristics says: 'Because of relying on non-awakening, the mind moves, which is termed karma.' If one says that movement is the stage of the karmic consciousness and not avidyā, this is also not correct. Why is that? Because the section on comparative evaluation says: 'Because one does not penetrate the one dharmadhātu, the mind is non-associated, and suddenly a thought arises, which is named avidyā.' Both passages on movement and arising are spoken with respect to the karmic consciousness, not that avidyā. Why is that? What can move and can cause to arise is fundamental avidyā; that which moves in accordance and arises in accordance is precisely the karmic consciousness. Because of this meaning, there is no fault of contradiction. If so, how can the self-substance of fundamental avidyā move the mind-substance and give rise to various thoughts? This place is difficult to comprehend: it is not the realm of the ten grounds; it is beyond the measure of the three \[stages of\] worthies; only a Buddha exhausts and comprehends it; it cannot be spoken of falsely. Yet, relying on the sūtras, it is nominally forced into designation and merely called 'non-awakening.' That it has causes and conditions will naturally be clearly expounded in the subsequent resolution. The subtle thoughts of the characteristic of karma do not yet divide perceiver and perceived, and its characteristics and objective realms cannot be distinguished; by what causes and conditions is the name 'movement' established to explain the characteristic of karma? This matter also cannot be spoken of falsely. Relying only on the sūtras, it is said: in the fundamental consciousness of the characteristic of karma, there is no agent of cognition and no object of cognition; it cannot be analyzed and cannot be separated; solely by virtue of the meaning of subtle movement and hidden flow, it is named karma, and nothing more. If there are sentient beings who require various phrases to speak elaborately about this point, sighing throughout the day, it cannot be fully explained. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 4.46](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1668.4.46) - [Next: 4.48](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1668.4.48) - [Up: 4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1668.4) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1668~en-mt.4.47) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1668.4.47](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1668.4.47) · Pramāṇa