[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [金剛般若疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699) › 1.10 # 金剛般若疏 1.10 金剛般若疏 1.10 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [1.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699.1.10) 第五、辨經宗。問：此經以何為宗？答：釋者不同。有人言：以無相境為宗。所以者何？明此經正遣蕩萬相，明無相理，故以無相之理為此經宗。有人言：此經以智慧為宗，自有二說：一說云慧有二種，一者、因中智慧；二者、果中智慧。今正以因中智慧為此經宗，凡有四文為證：一者、《大品》初云「欲得一切種智，當學般若。」此意言：欲得佛地智慧，當習因中智慧。二者、〈勸學品〉通勸三乘學般若。此經未說二乘作佛，而勸令學般若，證般若但在因中，非是果也。三者、《釋論》初云「為彌勒等說菩薩行，故說般若」，故知是般若因中之行，至果則轉名萬德。四者、《釋論》四十九卷云「因中名般若，菩薩成佛時轉名一切種智」，故般若不屬佛，但屬菩薩。又云「般若成佛時，轉名薩般若」，佛智窮堅極利，即是金剛薩波若。今既說波若，故知但明十地無漏，所以是因中般若為宗。有人言：從初地以上，終乎佛果皆平等，悉為經體。此則因之與果竝為經宗，即開善舊用。因慧中復有二說。有人言：但取無相實慧以為經宗。故《勝鬘經》云「金剛喻者，是第一義智」。有人言：實智、方便智悉為經宗。故《大品》二周之說，具明二慧。有人言：境之與智，合為經宗。故瑤法師云「語經宗極，則以實相為宗；明聖心，則以妙智為主。」是故境智合為經宗。問：如斯等說，何者是實？答：有人言：皆有道理，悉是佛語故。有人言：如此諸說竝悉失般若意。又有人言：唯我一解是，餘釋盡非。如莊嚴云：因名金剛，果非金剛，以因中斷惑、果地不斷。開善云：因果俱金剛，因果俱斷惑，故云佛智斷、佛菩提智斷。今明般若無一定相，如大火炎，四邊不可觸，豈得各定執？今當一一責之。若言境是波若，而今般若於汝正是智慧，云何辨於般若不以般若為宗，遂取非般若為宗。次責問：若以智慧為宗者，《大智論》云「般若深重，智慧輕薄」。今既說深重般若，何故不取深重般若為宗，而取輕薄智慧為宗？次問：若取因中智慧以為般若，是亦不然。所以者何？經中有種種說，或云因名般若、果稱薩般若，或因果悉稱般若，如《大經》三德之中有般若德，故知般若亦是果名，不應偏執。次問：若言始從初地，終至佛果，通取因果為宗者，是亦不然。《釋論》云「有人言：漏、無漏慧皆是般若。有人言：但無漏慧是般若。」龍樹無的取捨，何因緣故而汝偏執？又問：若言般若通因果者，何故《釋論》但云是因？斯則得通，復失其別。次責：若言境智合為宗者，亦應境智合為般若。於汝義中，智是正般若、境是相從般若，亦應智是正宗、境是相從宗，此與前說更復何異？次問：若言七家皆是者，此不識得失耳。如愚癡盲人，不知道路通與不通，皆言是道，故復為失也。次問：若言莊嚴為是、開善為非者，開善亦以開善為是、莊嚴為非，此亦一是非、彼亦一是非，竟誰是耶？如《大品》云「是見實，餘妄語耳。」問：山門解釋與他，為同為異？答：若求由來眾解若得，可問與今義同異；求竟不可得，將誰同異耶？能如此不同不異、不自不他，無依無得、一無所住，即是般若之玄宗也。作上解，有所依住，皆非般若宗也。今明般若無有定相，隨緣善巧，義無不通。而正般若未曾境與不境、智與不智，乃至因與不因、果與不果，方便隨緣，在因名因、在果名果，在境名境、在智名智，故果因境智必得名悉得。如肇師云「原夫能境智因果者，豈境智因果之所能？良以非境非智，能境能智；非因非果，能因能果等耳。」而今就文為論，一往方言般若非因非果，正以因果為宗。問：以何義知因果為宗？答：經及論文竝作此說。經云：發菩提心住般若，乃至無住相布施。如此大願大行，即是因義。次得如來無為法身，即是果義。論文至信者章中云「說因果深義，於彼惡世時，不空必有實」，故知明因辨果事已究竟，然後方明信受，故知因果為此經正宗耳。 > Fifth, discerning the central theme (zong) of the sūtra. Question: What does this sūtra take as its central theme? Answer: Commentators differ. Someone says: It takes the signless objective realm as its theme. Why? Because this sūtra precisely dispels the myriad marks and clarifies the signless principle; therefore, it takes the signless principle as the theme of this sūtra. Someone says: This sūtra takes wisdom as its theme. This in turn has two views. One view says wisdom is of two kinds: first, wisdom in the cause; second, wisdom in the fruit. Now it takes precisely wisdom in the cause as the theme of this sūtra. There are altogether four textual citations as proof: First, the beginning of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā says: "One who wishes to attain the knowledge of all aspects should train in prajñā." The meaning of this is: one who wishes to attain the wisdom of the Buddha-ground should practice wisdom in the cause. Second, the "Chapter on Encouraging Training" broadly encourages the three vehicles to train in prajñā. This sūtra does not yet speak of the two vehicles attaining Buddhahood, yet encourages them to train in prajñā, proving that prajñā is only in the cause and not the fruit. Third, the beginning of the Upadeśa says: "In order to speak of the bodhisattva practice for Maitreya and others, \[the Buddha\] speaks prajñā"; therefore, we know that prajñā is practice in the cause, and upon reaching the fruit it changes its name to the myriad virtues. Fourth, fascicle forty-nine of the Upadeśa says: "In the cause it is called prajñā; when the bodhisattva becomes a Buddha, it changes its name to knowledge of all aspects"; therefore, prajñā does not belong to the Buddha, but belongs only to bodhisattvas. Furthermore, it says: "When prajñā becomes a Buddha, it changes its name to sarvajñā"; the Buddha's wisdom is supremely hard and extremely sharp, which is precisely the vajra-sarvajñā. Now, since it speaks of prajñā, we know it only clarifies the undefiled state of the ten bhūmis; therefore, prajñā in the cause is the theme. Someone says: From the initial bhūmi upward to the ultimate Buddha-fruit, all are equal and entirely constitute the substance of the sūtra; thus both cause and fruit together constitute the theme of the sūtra, which is precisely what Kaishan formerly used. > > Within wisdom in the cause, there are again two views. Someone says: It takes only the signless real wisdom as the theme of the sūtra. Therefore the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra says: "That which is likened to a vajra is wisdom of the ultimate truth." Someone says: Both real wisdom and expedient wisdom constitute the theme of the sūtra. Therefore the twofold teachings of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā fully clarify both wisdoms. Someone says: The objective realm and wisdom combined constitute the theme of the sūtra. Therefore Dharma Master Yao says: "To speak of the ultimate theme of the sūtra, it takes the dharmatā as its theme; to clarify the sage's mind, it takes wondrous wisdom as primary." For this reason, realm and wisdom combined constitute the theme of the sūtra. > > Question: Among such explanations, which is the real one? Answer: Someone says: They all have reason, because they are all the Buddha's words. Someone says: All such explanations entirely miss the intention of prajñā. Yet another says: Only my single explanation is correct, and all other explanations are wrong. For instance, Zhuangyan says: The cause is called vajra, while the fruit is not vajra, because in the cause defilements are severed, while on the fruit-ground they are not severed. Kaishan says: Both cause and fruit are vajra; both cause and fruit sever defilements, and therefore it is said that the Buddha's wisdom severs, and the Buddha's bodhi-wisdom severs. > > We now clarify that prajñā has no fixed mark, like a great blaze of fire that cannot be touched on any of its four sides; how could each adhere to a fixed grasping? Now we shall question them one by one. If you say the objective realm is prajñā, yet now for you prajñā is precisely wisdom, why is it that when discerning prajñā you do not take prajñā as the theme, but instead take non-prajñā as the theme? Next we interrogate: If wisdom is taken as the theme, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "Prajñā is deep and weighty; wisdom is light and shallow." Now since \[the sūtra\] speaks of deep and weighty prajñā, why do you not take deep and weighty prajñā as the theme, but take light and shallow wisdom as the theme? Next we ask: If you take wisdom in the cause to be prajñā, this too is not so. Why? In the sūtras there are various explanations: sometimes it says the cause is named prajñā and the fruit is termed sarvajñā; sometimes both cause and fruit are termed prajñā, as among the three virtues in the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra there is the virtue of prajñā; thus we know prajñā is also a name for the fruit, and one should not cling one-sidedly. Next we ask: If you say that beginning from the first bhūmi and ending at the Buddha-fruit, one inclusively takes both cause and fruit as the theme, this too is not so. The Upadeśa says: "Someone says: Both defiled and undefiled wisdom are prajñā. Someone says: Only undefiled wisdom is prajñā." Nāgārjuna did not make a definitive choice; for what reason do you cling one-sidedly? Further we ask: If you say prajñā encompasses both cause and fruit, why does the Upadeśa say it is only the cause? In that case, while attaining what is comprehensive, you lose what is specific. Next we interrogate: If you say realm and wisdom combined are the theme, then realm and wisdom combined should also be prajñā. In your doctrine, wisdom is primary prajñā and the realm is secondary prajñā; then wisdom should also be the primary theme and the realm the secondary theme; how does this differ from the previous explanation? Next we ask: If you say all seven houses are correct, this fails to recognize gain and loss. Like an ignorant blind person who does not know whether a road is passable or impassable and claims that all are the road, this again is an error. Next we ask: If you say Zhuangyan is correct and Kaishan is wrong, Kaishan also takes Kaishan to be correct and Zhuangyan to be wrong; this side has its right and wrong, and that side has its right and wrong—in the end, who is right? As the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā says: "This view is real, and the rest is false speech." > > Question: Is the explanation of our mountain tradition the same as or different from others? Answer: If previous explanations could be apprehended upon seeking, one might ask whether they are the same as or different from our present view; but when sought to the end, they cannot be apprehended—with what could there be sameness or difference? To be able to be neither same nor different, neither self nor other, without dependence or apprehension, abiding nowhere whatsoever—this precisely is the profound theme of prajñā. Making the above interpretations, having that upon which one relies and abides, none of these is the theme of prajñā. We now clarify that prajñā has no fixed mark; skillful in accordance with conditions, its principle penetrates everywhere. Yet true prajñā has never been realm or non-realm, wisdom or non-wisdom, down to cause or non-cause, fruit or non-fruit. As an expedient according with conditions, in the cause it is named cause, in the fruit it is named fruit, in the realm it is named realm, and in wisdom it is named wisdom; therefore fruit, cause, realm, and wisdom must all obtain their names. As Master Zhao said: "Now, that which can make realm, wisdom, cause, and fruit—how could it be the function of realm, wisdom, cause, and fruit? It is simply because being neither realm nor wisdom it can be realm and wisdom; being neither cause nor fruit it can be cause and fruit." But now, discussing it in terms of the text, provisionally speaking, prajñā is neither cause nor fruit, yet precisely takes cause and fruit as its theme. > > Question: By what reason is it known that cause and fruit are the theme? Answer: Both the sūtra and the treatise text make this statement. The sūtra says: Generating bodhicitta and abiding in prajñā, down to dāna that does not abide in marks. Such great vows and great practices are precisely the meaning of the cause. Next, attaining the Tathāgata's unconditioned dharmakāya is precisely the meaning of the fruit. In the treatise text, in the chapter on the faithful, it says: "Explaining the profound meaning of cause and fruit, in that evil age, it will not be empty and must have reality." Therefore we know that once the matter of clarifying the cause and discerning the fruit is complete, only then does it clarify faith and acceptance. Hence we know that cause and fruit are the correct theme of this sūtra. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 1.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699.1.9) - [Next: 1.11](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699.1.11) - [Up: 1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699.1) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699~en-mt.1.10) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699.1.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699.1.10) · Pramāṇa