[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [金剛般若疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699) › 4.14 # 金剛般若疏 4.14 金剛般若疏 4.14 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [4.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699.4.14) 「須菩提！以三千世界碎為微塵」下，第十四章經。前已明微塵，今復明，何異？釋：有同有異。有同者，同取為譬喻，異者來意各別。前舉有微塵譬有所得布施，成格量優劣義故來。明有得布施，此是塵染因，還得塵染果，故不及持經四句。今舉微塵喻，破十方佛法身一異之疑，如世界碎末為塵，不可言一處住，以其各散故；亦非異處，既無聚云何散耶？十方佛法身不可一處住、不可異處住，以不可一處住，非是混成一法身；不可異處住，故不可各各有法身。故論偈云「於是法界處，非一亦不異。」此破由來兩解，或言十方佛混成一法身，或言各各有法身義也。問：何故舉微塵喻破法身一異疑耶？答：如微塵散滅故不可說一異處，如是十方佛煩惱盡故不可說法身一異處住，故論偈云「微塵碎為末，示現煩惱盡」也。問：何因緣故，破法身一異疑耶？答：上明化身有來去、法身無有來去。法身無來去，故時會生疑：十方佛法身同為無來去，為成一法身同處住？為各各有法身異處住耶？又上來廣破二身一異之見，令識正果；今破微塵世界聚散之見，令識依果，故令了悟不依不正畢竟空義，故有此文來也。此中前牒彼疑，而頓舉三千世界微塵者，欲明十方一切佛法身同異義也。答云甚多者，十方諸佛多也。「說微塵」者，舉微塵為喻也。假名微塵無所有，故云「非微塵」也。「是名微塵」者，還結正假名義也。「世界一合相」者，若微塵、世界相對，微塵喻十方法身不一，世界喻十方法身不異。但論意用微塵通喻不一異，世界偏喻不一也。問：前微塵通喻不一異，何故舉世界別喻不一耶？答：人聞十方法身皆無來去大小，應是一也。以多有一疑，故偏破一也。一合相者，合眾塵成世界也。一合相不可說者，聖人了合無所合，如〈破合品〉「是法不自合，異法亦不合。合法及合時，合者亦皆無。」故無有合。但凡夫見有世界，故起貪著心，言有世界耳。「若人言佛說我見」者，此文近接前生，明凡夫貪著其事生也。凡夫貪著由於我見，我見既無，貪著何由有耶？又遠釋一經，上來處處歎無我無人，但凡夫顛倒起我見人見耳。時會便疑：佛說凡夫起我見，故知有我見可起；若無我見，佛不應說凡夫起我見。此是一疑也。又二乘人云：先有我見故斷我見，故得無我智，是名得道。此是二疑。破初疑云：若人言說我見，便有我見可說者，則不解佛所說義。佛欲明我見是無故說我見耳，非說我見便有我見可說也。故《中論》最後偈云「一切諸法空，世間常等見，何處於何時？誰起是諸見？」故非但正見不可得，邪見亦不可得，故知道門未曾邪正。此經將竟。上破昔有所得正見不可得，今破其邪見亦無得，顯正般若未曾邪正也。即是答二乘人，亦不得言先有我見，斷我見故得無我智。今乃明我本來畢竟不可得，何所斷故言無我耶？「應如是知」者，上明我見本來不可得，今明法見亦本來不可得，故舉我列法，故云應如是知、見、信解，不生法相也。「所言法相者，則非法相」者，亦如我義。佛說我既非我，說法相亦非法相也。問：如是知、見、信解，何異耶？答：論偈云「二智及三昧，知是世諦智」，見是第一義諦智。信解者，是二智所依三昧，依三昧故發生二智也。問：何故明二智？答：菩薩了人法空，具足二智也。又始行菩薩未得無生，了悟淺名世諦智。深行菩薩得無生忍，了悟二空，名第一義諦智。三昧通是二人智所依也。 > From “Subhūti, if \[a good man or good woman were to\] pulverise the trichiliocosm into minute particles of dust” onward is the fourteenth chapter of the sūtra. Minute particles of dust have already been explained above; now that they are explained again, what is the difference? Explanation: There are both similarities and differences. As for the similarity, they are both taken as an analogy; as for the differences, the underlying reasons for their introduction are distinct. Previously, adducing the minute particles of dust served to illustrate giving with apprehension, introduced to establish the superior and inferior measures \[of merit\]. It explained that giving with apprehension is a cause tainted by defilement and brings about a result tainted by defilement in return; hence it is inferior to upholding a four-line verse of the sūtra. Now, adducing the analogy of the minute particles of dust serves to refute doubts regarding the oneness and difference of the dharmakāyas of the Buddhas of the ten directions. Just as when a world is pulverised into dust, it cannot be said to abide in a single place, because the particles are individually scattered; nor are they in different places, for since there is no aggregation, how could there be scattering? The dharmakāyas of the Buddhas of the ten directions cannot abide in a single place, nor can they abide in different places. Because they cannot abide in a single place, they are not blended into a single dharmakāya; because they cannot abide in different places, there cannot be individually distinct dharmakāyas for each. Therefore, the verse in the commentary says: “In this realm of the dharmadhātu, they are neither one nor different.” This refutes two conventional interpretations: either that the Buddhas of the ten directions are blended into a single dharmakāya, or that there are individually distinct dharmakāyas for each. Question: Why is the analogy of the minute particles of dust adduced to refute doubts regarding the oneness and difference of the dharmakāya? Answer: Just as the minute particles of dust are scattered and destroyed, so that they cannot be said to be in one place or different places, in the same way, because the afflictions of the Buddhas of the ten directions have been exhausted, their dharmakāya cannot be said to abide in one place or different places. Therefore, the verse in the commentary says: “The minute particles of dust are pulverised into powder / to demonstrate the exhaustion of afflictions.” Question: For what reason are doubts regarding the oneness and difference of the dharmakāya refuted? Answer: Above, it was explained that the nirmāṇakāya comes and goes, whereas the dharmakāya has no coming and going. Because the dharmakāya has no coming and going, doubts arose in the assembly at that time: Since the dharmakāyas of the Buddhas of the ten directions are alike in having no coming and going, do they form a single dharmakāya abiding in the same place? Or does each have its own dharmakāya abiding in different places? Furthermore, previously the view of the oneness and difference of the two bodies was extensively refuted in order to lead them to recognise the primary fruition; now the view of the aggregation and scattering of the minute particles of dust and the worlds is refuted in order to lead them to recognise the dependent fruition, thereby causing them to awaken to the meaning of ultimate emptiness that is neither dependent nor primary. Hence this passage has been introduced. In this passage, by first citing that doubt and immediately adducing the minute particles of dust of the trichiliocosm, \[the Buddha\] wishes to explain the meaning of the identity and difference of the dharmakāyas of all Buddhas of the ten directions. The reply saying “Very many” refers to the multitude of the Buddhas of the ten directions. “Speaking of minute particles of dust” adduces the minute particles of dust as an analogy. As conventional designations, minute particles of dust are non-existent; hence it says “are not minute particles of dust.” “Are called minute particles of dust” concludes again with the meaning of correct conventional designation. As for “the unitary composite characteristics of the world,” if minute particles of dust and the world are contrasted, the minute particles of dust illustrate that the dharmakāyas of the ten directions are not one, and the world illustrates that the dharmakāyas of the ten directions are not different. However, the commentary's intention employs the minute particles of dust to generally illustrate neither oneness nor difference, and the world specifically illustrates not one. Question: If the minute particles of dust previously illustrated neither oneness nor difference in general, why is the world adduced to specifically illustrate not one? Answer: When people hear that the dharmakāyas of the ten directions are all without coming and going, or greatness and smallness, they think they must be one. Because many have the doubt of oneness, oneness is specifically refuted. As for the unitary composite characteristics, this means combining the many particles of dust to form a world. That the unitary composite characteristics are ineffable means that the sage understands that combination has nothing to combine, as in the “Examination of Combination”: “This dharma does not combine with itself, / nor does it combine with a different dharma. / The dharma of combination, the time of combination, / and that which combines are all non-existent.” Therefore, there is no combination. It is merely that ordinary persons see the existence of a world and thus give rise to a mind of craving and attachment, saying that a world exists. As for “If someone says that the Buddha taught the view of a self,” this text closely connects to what precedes it, explaining that it arises because ordinary persons are cravenly attached to these things. The craving and attachment of ordinary persons stems from the view of a self; once the view of a self is absent, whence could craving and attachment arise? Furthermore, looking broadly back over the whole sūtra, throughout it has praised selflessness and the absence of a person, and it is merely that ordinary persons, being deluded, give rise to the view of a self and the view of a person. The assembly at that time then doubted: If the Buddha said that ordinary persons give rise to the view of a self, one should know that there is a view of a self that can arise; if there were no view of a self, the Buddha should not say that ordinary persons give rise to the view of a self. This is the first doubt. Furthermore, people of the two vehicles say: Because there is previously a view of a self, one eliminates the view of a self, and thereby obtains the cognition of selflessness, which is called attaining the path. This is the second doubt. Refuting the first doubt, it says: If someone says that in speaking of the view of a self there is then a view of a self that can be spoken of, they do not understand the meaning of what the Buddha taught. The Buddha merely wishes to explain that the view of a self is non-existent, and therefore speaks of the view of a self; he does not mean that speaking of the view of a self implies there is a view of a self that can be spoken of. Therefore, the final verse of the \*Madhyamakaśāstra\* says: “All dharmas being empty, / where and at what time, / and by whom could such views / of eternity in the world and so forth arise?” Therefore, not only is correct view unobtainable, but wrong view is also unobtainable; thus one knows that the gate of the Path has never been wrong or right. This sūtra is drawing to a close. Above, it refuted the previously held correct view with apprehension as unobtainable; now, it refutes its wrong view as also unobtainable, revealing that correct prajñā has never been wrong or right. This is precisely the reply to the people of the two vehicles: one also cannot say that there was previously a view of a self, and that by eliminating the view of a self one obtains the cognition of selflessness. Now it is explained that a self has fundamentally and ultimately been unobtainable from the beginning; what is there to be eliminated that one would speak of selflessness? As for “should thus know,” above it was explained that the view of a self has fundamentally been unobtainable, and now it is explained that the view of dharmas has also fundamentally been unobtainable; hence adducing the self lays out dharmas, and so it says that one should thus know, see, and resolve with faith, not giving rise to the characteristic of dharmas. As for “what is called the characteristic of dharmas is not the characteristic of dharmas,” this is also like the meaning of self. Just as the self taught by the Buddha is not a self, so too the characteristic of dharmas taught is not the characteristic of dharmas. Question: How do thus knowing, seeing, and resolving with faith differ? Answer: The verse in the commentary says: “Two cognitions and samādhi: / knowing is the cognition of worldly truth,” and seeing is the cognition of ultimate truth. Resolving with faith is the samādhi upon which the two cognitions depend; relying upon samādhi, the two cognitions are brought forth. Question: Why are two cognitions explained? Answer: Bodhisattvas comprehend the emptiness of persons and dharmas, fully possessing the two cognitions. Furthermore, for bodhisattvas of initial practice who have not yet attained the non-arising \[of dharmas\], their shallow awakening is called the cognition of worldly truth. For bodhisattvas of profound practice who have attained the acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas, their awakening to the twofold emptiness is called the cognition of ultimate truth. Samādhi is universally that upon which the cognitions of both persons depend. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 4.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699.4.13) - [Next: 4.15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699.4.15) - [Up: 4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699.4) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699~en-mt.4.14) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (3) - [金剛般若經旨贊](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2735.2.220) — Classical Chinese - [御注金剛般若波羅蜜經宣演](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2733.2.194) — Classical Chinese - [金剛般若波羅蜜經論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.prajnaparamita.vajracchedika!vajracchedikaprajnaparamitasutrasastra*zh-bodhiruci.3.62) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699.4.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699.4.14) · Pramāṇa