[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [金剛般若疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699) › 4.3 # 金剛般若疏 4.3 金剛般若疏 4.3 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [4.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699.4.3) 「須菩提！善男子善女人」下，大章第二。前第一、明格量；今明格量所不能格量，會不格量所及。若其更格則人不信，故云不思議也。「爾時須菩提白佛」下，二周說法中，此是第二。依論師十二分，此是第十斷疑。今所不用，何故爾耶？論云「從如來非有為分下，皆是斷生疑」，何得言此中始是斷疑？復有人言：上來始答住問、降伏心問，今次答菩提心問。今明前具答四問竟，云何於此始答菩提心問耶？又前答後答無異，云何前非答菩提心，今始是答耶？其人見近不見遠也。次有人言：前明因空，今明果空。彼謂修行等是因，前辨修行空故是因，空菩提是果；今云實無菩提可得故是果空。此亦不然。上已具說因果深義竟，何得上言因空此亦是果空？今明此是第二周說。何以知耶？以前後四問皆同、佛答亦同，故知是二周說也。問：二周說何異？答：前廣說，今略說。前為前會眾說，後為後會眾說。故《大智論》解無生品云「問曰：前已說般若竟，今何得更說？答云：前為前來眾說，後為後來眾說也。如清涼池前來者飲竟而去，後來者更飲也。」問：《大經》云「為後來眾生以偈頌說」，今何故不作偈耶？答：說法多體，不可一勢。自有前會長行後來者偈，自有二俱偈、二俱長行，如《大智論》說，即是證也。問：今何故不作偈耶？答：諸般若多不作偈，以偈安字有限，於深義不能曲盡也。次明還是一會而有二周說。初周為利根人說，鈍根未悟，更為後周說也。問：前說後說無異，云何前說為利根人，後說為鈍根人耶？答：大意乃同，其中轉易形勢，故鈍根聞之仍得了悟。如一種義作此語說之不解，更作異門釋之則悟。猶如一米作一種食不能食，更作異食則能食也。雖是近事，斯乃聖人制作之大體也。「般若是一法，佛說種種名，隨諸眾生力，為之立異字。」即其證也。次意：前周盡緣，後周盡觀。前周盡緣者，正教菩薩無所得發心，破有所得發心，乃至無所得修行，破有所得修行，故是盡緣也。今此章明無有發菩提心人，亦無有修行人，故是盡觀也。論云「於內心修行，存我為菩薩，此即障於心，違於不住道。」斯經論之作，豈空稱哉？盡緣故無緣，盡觀故無觀，無緣無觀，不知何以目之，歎美強名正觀；正觀即是般若，即是金剛也。又前周正明觀行，後周除觀主。故《大智論》釋習應品云「問曰：前已明生法二空，今何故復辨生空？答：前為破生法二病，明生法二空，今為破觀空人也。」若無論經有十五章，有論經凡有十六章，有長信受一章經也。問：前周說既開三門：一、般若體門；二、信受門；三、功德門。今後周為後會，亦得如此以不？答：依論經亦得如此。初即般若體門，信受即第二門，三千世界須彌山七寶聚去是功德門也。今觀形勢小異於上，故不開三門，但依十五章鉤鎖相生，故釋疑解難以為次第也。初章為二：前問、次答。若約後會為論，則問意同前。昔來未依般若，不成發心修行，故今請問發心修行之義也。若約空觀為論，則前問成發心修行，後問請佛泯發心泯修行故也。問：前為成發心修行，後泯發心修行，將不相違耶？答：終為成一意耳。由泯發心，乃成發心耳；若見有發心，不成發心耳。故前來成發心即是泯發心，今泯發心即是發心也。佛答中為二：初、牒問，明發心即是緣盡義。從何以故實無發心者，明盡觀也。問：佛答與上何異？答：上但盡緣，今緣觀俱盡，即是異也。又上是廣答，具答四問；今是略答，但答發心。發心既爾，三問例然，為顯後周是略說故也。又意初發心尚緣觀俱息，況復修行等猶存有所得耶？「於意云何？如來於然燈佛所」下，第二章來者，論生起云「若無發心菩薩，今那得有受記菩薩耶？既有受記之人，必有發心之者，以受記是果、發心是因，何容有果而無因耶？」此終是歷破有所得我人見耳。前已破發心人見，今破受記人見也。就文有八菩提，開為二：初五菩提，引昔時了悟無受記菩薩以釋疑；次有三菩提，引現在佛果得菩提以釋疑。初中為三：一、佛問；二、須菩提答；三、佛述成。初、二如文。第三、佛述釋中有三菩提句，開為四意：一、直述理實無相，故無所得也；二、從「若有法」下，此是反釋，若有所得則不得記也。三、「以實無有法」下，順釋，以無所得故乃得記耳。「何以故」下，第四、釋無所得故得記之義也。言何以故無所得乃得記耶？釋云：如來者即諸法如義，以體如故名如來，亦體如故名得記，如中豈有法可得耶？若有得則不體如，不體如不名如來，亦不得受記也。「若有人言」下，第二、引現在得果時以釋疑也。疑云：無得受記之菩薩，今寧有得菩提之佛耶？以實有佛果得菩提，則實有菩薩得受記及發心也。此終是歷法破有所得我人見耳。故經云「菩提心見、受記見、佛見、菩提見、斷見、常見等，猶是一例義耳。」「實無佛得菩提」者，初發菩提心及受記時，尚了悟無所得，況至佛時猶有我人得菩提耶？如來所得三菩提無實無虛者，上破有見，今破無見也。明佛得三菩提，無所得為得，何故不得耶？肇師云「玄道在乎絕域，不得以得之」，即其義也。「無實無虛」者，前各彈有無見，此雙結非有非無也。無有有得之得故言無實，非無無得之得故言非虛，論意爾也。「是故如來說一切法皆是佛法」者，此成上非實非無義，虛非有耳。以體一切諸法如故名為如來，故一切法如即是如來，故云一切皆是佛法也。「即非一切法」者，一切顛倒之法，此非如來所證，故云則非一切法也。以一切如是如來故非無，一切顛倒非如來故非有，故成上非有無也。此猶是《大經》有所無無所有義耳。以無所有名大涅槃，故是如來也。有所無是顛倒生死，故非如來也。「是名一切法」者，還結一切諸法如也。問：上兩句已足，何用下更結耶？答：初句直明一切法是如來；次下兩句簡其有無，初句明無一切顛倒，次句明有一切法如也。問：上明然燈佛，與今何異？答：上為成不可取不可說義來也，今為成菩薩無義故來也。又上是略明義，此下八菩提是廣明義也。依論釋佛答中，論偈云「以後時受記，然燈行非上」，論師釋云「有四時然燈、四時受記，謂習種、性種、道種及初地。前然燈是習種時也，今此是性種、道種二時然燈。此中但是名字受記，未得真無生記，故云無有法得菩提。若此時已得真無生記者，後一然燈不更與受記也。」今謂此釋無所出，論直云「以後時受記，然燈行非上」，此言自難解，亦無四時受記、四時然燈也。又設有此義，於文義相皆不順，故於今無取也。 > From "Subhūti, if a good man or good woman" onward is the second major section. The first part above explained estimation; now it explains that which cannot be measured by estimation, reaching beyond what estimation can encompass. If one were to estimate it further, people would not believe it; hence it is called "inconceivable." > > From "At that time Subhūti addressed the Buddha" onward: within the two rounds of teaching the Dharma, this is the second. According to the treatise master's twelve divisions, this is the tenth: resolving doubts. But we do not adopt this here. Why so? The treatise states, "From the section on the Tathāgata being unconditioned onward, all serve to resolve doubts that arise"; how then can one say that resolving doubts only begins here? > > Others also say: The preceding text only answered the question on abiding and the question on subduing the mind; now it next answers the question on the bodhicitta. We now clarify: previously all four questions were fully answered; how could the answer to the question on the bodhicitta only begin here? Furthermore, since the earlier and later answers are no different, why would the earlier not be an answer regarding the bodhicitta, while only this one is? Such people see what is near but fail to see what is far. > > Next, others say: The earlier part explained the emptiness of the cause, while this part explains the emptiness of the fruit. They consider practice and the like to be the cause—since the previous part analysed practice as empty, it is the cause; while bodhi is the fruit, and now it states that truly there is no bodhi to be attained, so it is the emptiness of the fruit. This too is incorrect. Above, the profound meaning of cause and fruit has already been fully explained; how could one claim that the earlier is the emptiness of the cause and this is the emptiness of the fruit? > > We now explain that this is the second round of teaching. How is this known? Because the four questions before and after are entirely identical, and the Buddha's answers are also identical; therefore we know it is a second round of teaching. > > Question: How do the two rounds of teaching differ? > Answer: The earlier is an extensive explanation, while the later is a concise explanation. The earlier was spoken for the earlier assembly, and the later was spoken for the later assembly. Thus the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, explaining the chapter on non-arising, states: "Question: Prajñā has already been spoken before; why should it be spoken again now? Answer: The earlier was spoken for the assembly that came before; the later was spoken for the assembly that arrived later. Just as with a cool pond, those who arrived first drank and departed, while those who arrived later drink again." > > Question: The Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra says, "For sentient beings who arrive later, it is spoken in verses (gāthās)"; why then are verses not used here? > Answer: Preaching the Dharma has many modes; it cannot be restricted to a single pattern. Sometimes there is prose for the earlier assembly and verses for those who come later; sometimes both are verses, or both are prose, as stated in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, which serves as proof. > Question: Why then are verses not used here? > Answer: Prajñā texts mostly do not use verses, because verses have a limited number of words and cannot exhaustively express profound meanings in all their nuances. > > Next, it is explained that it is still a single assembly wherein two rounds are taught. The first round was spoken for people of sharp faculties; those of dull faculties who had not yet awakened are taught in the subsequent round. > Question: The earlier and later explanations are no different; how can the earlier be for people of sharp faculties and the later for people of dull faculties? > Answer: Although the general import is identical, the presentation and phrasing are varied, so that those of dull faculties, hearing it, still attain realization. Just as when a single principle is explained in one manner and not understood, if it is explained through a different approach, they awaken. Or just as when a single grain of rice is prepared as one type of food, one cannot eat it, but if it is made into a different food, one can eat it. Although this is an everyday analogy, it represents the grand design of the sages. "Prajñā is a single dharma; the Buddha speaks of it under various names, establishing different terms in accordance with the capacities of sentient beings"—this is precisely the proof. > > Another meaning: The earlier round exhausts the objects (ālambana), while the later round exhausts contemplation. "The earlier round exhausts the objects" means that it correctly instructs the bodhisattva to generate the mind without apprehension, refuting the generation of the mind with apprehension, up to practicing without apprehension, refuting practice with apprehension; hence it exhausts the objects. Now, this section explains that there is no person who generates the bodhicitta, nor is there any person who practices; hence it exhausts contemplation. The treatise says, "If in internal practice one maintains the notion of 'I am a bodhisattva', this obstructs the mind and contradicts the path of non-abiding." How could the compositions of these sūtras and treatises be made in vain? Because objects are exhausted, there are no objects; because contemplation is exhausted, there is no contemplation. Having neither objects nor contemplation, one knows not what to call it, but in praising it, it is forcibly termed "correct contemplation"; correct contemplation is prajñā, is vajra. > > Furthermore, the earlier round directly clarifies the practice of contemplation, while the later round removes the subject of contemplation. Thus the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, explaining the chapter on practicing in conformity, states: "Question: The two emptinesses of persons and dharmas have already been clarified above; why analyse the emptiness of persons again now? Answer: Previously, to refute the two illnesses of persons and dharmas, the two emptinesses of persons and dharmas were clarified; now it is to refute the person who contemplates emptiness." > > Without the commentary's division, the sūtra has fifteen sections; with the commentary's division, there are sixteen sections in all, having one additional section on faith and acceptance. > > Question: The earlier round of teaching opened into three gateways: first, the gateway of the essence of prajñā; second, the gateway of faith and acceptance; third, the gateway of merit. Can the later round for the later assembly also be like this or not? > Answer: According to the treatise's edition of the sūtra, it can also be like this. The beginning is the gateway of the essence of prajñā; faith and acceptance is the second gateway; and from the mass of the seven treasures like Mount Sumeru in the three-thousandfold world onward is the gateway of merit. Seeing now that the form is slightly different from the above, we do not open three gateways, but merely rely on the fifteen sections linked like an interlocking chain, taking the resolution of doubts and explanation of difficulties as the sequence. > > The first section has two parts: first the question, then the answer. If treated from the perspective of the later assembly, the intent of the question is the same as before: in the past, having not yet relied on prajñā, generating the mind and practicing were not achieved; therefore they now request instruction on the meaning of generating the mind and practicing. If treated from the perspective of the contemplation of emptiness, the earlier question was to establish generating the mind and practicing, while the later question asks the Buddha to obliterate generating the mind and obliterate practicing. > Question: If the earlier was to establish generating the mind and practicing, and the later is to obliterate generating the mind and practicing, does this not entail a contradiction? > Answer: In the end, they accomplish a single meaning. It is precisely through obliterating the generation of the mind that the generation of the mind is accomplished; if one sees that there is a generation of the mind, the generation of the mind is not accomplished. Therefore, the earlier establishment of the generation of the mind is itself the obliteration of the generation of the mind, and the present obliteration of the generation of the mind is itself the generation of the mind. > > In the Buddha's answer there are two parts: first, taking up the question to show that generating the mind is the exhaustion of objects; from "Why? Truly there is no one who generates the mind" onward, it explains the exhaustion of contemplation. > Question: How does the Buddha's answer differ from the above? > Answer: Above it only exhausted objects; here both objects and contemplation are exhausted—that is the difference. Furthermore, above was an extensive answer fully responding to all four questions; here is a concise answer, responding only to the generation of the mind. Since the generation of the mind is such, the other three questions follow by analogy, to demonstrate that the later round is a concise explanation. Another meaning is that if even the initial generation of the mind puts an end to both objects and contemplation, how much more so with practice and the rest—could they still retain apprehension? > > From "What do you think? Did the Tathāgata at the time of Dīpaṃkara Buddha..." onward, the second section appears. The treatise's contextualization states: "If there is no bodhisattva who generates the mind, how could there now be a bodhisattva who receives a prophecy? Since there is a person who receives a prophecy, there must be one who generates the mind, because receiving a prophecy is the fruit and generating the mind is the cause; how could there be a fruit without a cause?" In the end, this progressively refutes the views of self and person based on apprehension. Previously the view of a person generating the mind was refuted; now the view of a person receiving a prophecy is refuted. > > In the text there are eight occurrences of "bodhi", divided into two parts: first, five occurrences of bodhi, which cite the past awakening to the absence of a bodhisattva receiving a prophecy to resolve doubt; next, three occurrences of bodhi, which cite the present attainment of bodhi as the Buddha-fruit to resolve doubt. > > In the first part there are three divisions: first, the Buddha's question; second, Subhūti's answer; third, the Buddha's confirmation. The first and second are as in the text. In the third, the Buddha's confirmation and explanation, there are three clauses on bodhi, divided into four points: first, directly stating that the principle is truly without marks, and therefore without apprehension; second, from "If there were a dharma" onward, this is a negative explanation: if there were something apprehended, no prophecy would have been received; third, from "Because truly there is no dharma" onward, this is a positive explanation: precisely because there is nothing apprehended, the prophecy was received; fourth, from "Why?" onward, it explains why having nothing apprehended leads to receiving a prophecy. Why does having nothing apprehended lead to receiving a prophecy? The explanation says: "Tathāgata" means the reality (tathatā) of all dharmas; because he embodies reality, he is called "Tathāgata", and because he embodies reality, he is said to receive a prophecy—within reality, how could there be any dharma to be attained? If there were something attained, one would not embody reality; not embodying reality, one is not called a Tathāgata, nor would one receive a prophecy. > > From "If someone says" onward is the second part, citing the present time of attaining the fruit to resolve doubt. The doubt asks: If there is no bodhisattva who receives a prophecy, could there now be a Buddha who attains bodhi? Since there truly is a Buddha-fruit attaining bodhi, there truly must be a bodhisattva receiving a prophecy and generating the mind. In the end, this progressively refutes the views of self and person based on apprehension across all dharmas. Thus the sūtra says: "The view of bodhicitta, the view of prophecy, the view of Buddha, the view of bodhi, annihilationism, eternalism, and so forth are all of the same order." > > "Truly there is no Buddha who attains bodhi": at the time of initial bodhicitta and receiving a prophecy, one already realized non-apprehension; how much more so when reaching Buddhahood could there still be a self or person attaining bodhi? > > "That which the Tathāgata attains as sambodhi is neither real nor unreal": the above refuted the view of existence, now it refutes the view of non-existence. It clarifies that the Buddha attains sambodhi by taking non-attainment as attainment; why would it not be attained? Master Sengzhao said, "The profound path lies in the ultimate realm, where non-attainment constitutes attainment"—which is precisely this meaning. "Neither real nor unreal": the preceding separately criticized the views of existence and non-existence; this jointly concludes with neither existence nor non-existence. Because there is no attainment with apprehension, it is said to be "not real"; because there is no absence of attainment without apprehension, it is said to be "not unreal"—such is the treatise's meaning. > > "Therefore the Tathāgata says that all dharmas are the Buddha-dharma": this completes the above meaning of neither real nor unreal, false nor existent. Because he embodies the reality (tathatā) of all dharmas, he is called the Tathāgata; therefore the reality of all dharmas is precisely the Tathāgata, which is why it is said that all are the Buddha-dharma. > > "Are not all dharmas": all inverted dharmas are not what the Tathāgata realizes; hence it is said "they are not all dharmas." Because all reality is the Tathāgata, it is not non-existent; because all inversions are not the Tathāgata, it is not existent; thus it completes the above \[principle of\] neither existence nor non-existence. This is still the meaning of "having that which is absent and being devoid of that which exists" in the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra. Because non-existence is called great nirvāṇa, it is the Tathāgata; having that which is absent is inverted saṃsāra, hence it is not the Tathāgata. > > "Are called all dharmas": this returns to conclude with the reality of all dharmas. > Question: The above two lines were already sufficient; why conclude further below? > Answer: The first line directly clarifies that all dharmas are the Tathāgata; the next two lines distinguish their existence and non-existence: the first line clarifies the absence of all inversions, and the second line clarifies the presence of the reality of all dharmas. > > Question: What is the difference between the earlier mention of Dīpaṃkara Buddha and this one? > Answer: The earlier was introduced to establish the meaning of being ungraspable and ineffable; this one is introduced to establish the absence of a bodhisattva. Furthermore, the earlier briefly explained the meaning, while the eight occurrences of bodhi below explain the meaning extensively. > > Regarding the treatise's explanation of the Buddha's answer, the treatise's verse says: "Because the prophecy was received at a later time, Dīpaṃkara's practice was not supreme." A treatise master explained: "There are four periods of Dīpaṃkara and four periods of prophecy, namely the stage of practice disposition (adhimukticaryā-gotra), nature disposition (prakṛti-gotra), path disposition (gotra of the path), and the first bhūmi. The earlier Dīpaṃkara was at the time of the practice disposition; the present one is at the two times of nature disposition and path disposition. Here it is merely a nominal prophecy, not yet the true prophecy of non-arising, hence it says there is no dharma attaining bodhi. If at this time he had already received the true prophecy of non-arising, the subsequent Dīpaṃkara would not have conferred a prophecy again." We now hold that this explanation has no textual basis. The treatise simply states, "Because the prophecy was received at a later time, Dīpaṃkara's practice was not supreme"; these words are inherently difficult to explain, and there are no four periods of prophecy or four Dīpaṃkaras. Furthermore, even if such a doctrine existed, it does not accord with the literal or thematic context; therefore it is not accepted here. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 4.2.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699.4.2.5) - [Next: 4.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699.4.4) - [Up: 4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699.4) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699~en-mt.4.3) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [金剛般若波羅蜜經論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.prajnaparamita.vajracchedika!vajracchedikaprajnaparamitasutrasastra*zh-bodhiruci.2.54) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699.4.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1699.4.3) · Pramāṇa