[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [仁王經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1708) › 1.10 # 仁王經疏 1.10 仁王經疏 1.10 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [1.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1708.1.10) 問：若爾，如何第二無相名為不了？解云：據實具說三種無自性性，理無淺深，以隱密相，言一切法無自性等，而不分別配三無性。《深密經》等廣顯三種無自性性，是故第三法輪門中加「無自性性」四字，意顯別有三無性理，由是名為了不了義，非理淺深名了不了。若廣分別，如《廣百論》第十卷中有三師釋：一瑜伽學徒立依他有，二清辨菩薩說依他空，三護法菩薩雙破兩執。故彼論中云「第一瑜伽學徒，以理標宗云：分別所執法體是無，因緣所生法體是有，由斯感果，輪迴三有；或修加行，證三菩提，乃至廣說。為證此義，引經頌云『遍計所執無，依他起性有，妄分別失壞，隨增減二邊。』第二清辨釋此經云：名是遍計所執，義是依他起性。名於其義非有故無，義隨世間非無故有，不可引此證有依他。次瑜伽學徒破彼釋經，文有三節：初總據非理、次別顯四失、後結破違經。初總破云：此釋不然，義相違故。次四失者，一若名於義非有故無，義亦於名是無何有？二又於其義所立名言，既因緣生，如義應有。三若妄所執能詮性無，妄執所詮其性豈有？四名隨世俗有詮表能，汝不許為依他起性，義亦隨俗假說有能，何不許為遍計所執？後結假云：世俗假立能詮所詮，無應並無、有應齊有。如今經說一有一無，故汝所言不符經義。次清辨為證己義，復引經言『由立此此名，詮於彼彼法。彼皆性非有，由法性皆然。』次瑜伽學徒破此經云：經意不說名於義無，但說所詮法性非有，辨諸法性皆不可詮，名言所詮皆是共相，諸法自相皆絕名言，自相非無、共相非有。此中略說所詮性無，非謂能詮其性實有，故頌但說彼非有言，不爾應言此性非有。次清辨為證依他性無，復引經中所說略頌『無有少法生，亦無少法滅。淨見觀諸法，非有亦非無。』次瑜伽學徒又破此說：此頌意顯遍計所執自性差別，能詮所詮其體皆空，無生無滅離執淨見，觀諸世間因緣所生非無非有。故此非證依他是無。次清辨菩薩引經證成依他性空，故契經言『諸法從緣起，緣法兩皆無，能如是正知，名通達緣起。若法從緣生，此法都無性，若法都無性，此法非緣生。』次瑜伽學徒會彼經云：如是二經說緣生法雖無自性，而不相違。以從緣生法有二種：一者遍計所執、二者依他起性。此中意明遍計所執自性非有，不說依他。若說依他都無自性，便撥染淨二法皆無，名惡取空，自他俱損。次清辨云：此妄分別，誰復能遮？得正見時，自當除遣。第三護法菩薩雙破空有兩執，建立中道依他起性非空非有。故彼復云：如是等類，隨見不同，分隔聖言，合成多分，互興諍論、各執一邊。既不能除惡見塵垢，詎能契當諸佛世尊所說大乘清淨妙旨？未會真理，隨己執情，自是非他，深可怖畏。應捨執著空有兩邊，領悟大乘不二中道。」廣說如彼。 > Question: If so, why is the second wheel of signlessness called implicit? Answer: In fact, it fully teaches the three kinds of lack of intrinsic nature, and in principle there is no shallowness or depth; yet through a concealed manner, it says that all phenomena lack intrinsic nature and so on, without distinguishing and matching them to the three lacks of intrinsic nature. The Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra and others extensively illuminate the three kinds of lack of intrinsic nature. Therefore, in the approach of the third Dharma-wheel, the four characters 'lack of intrinsic nature' (niḥsvabhāvatā) are added, the intention being to clarify that there is distinctly the principle of the three lacks of intrinsic nature. It is on this basis that they are called explicit or implicit in meaning; it is not on account of shallowness or depth in principle that they are called explicit or implicit. If we explain this in detail, as in the tenth fascicle of the Guang bai lun (Śataśāstra-vaipulya-ṭīkā), there are the explanations of three masters: First, the followers of the Yogācāra establish the existence of the other-dependent nature; second, the Bodhisattva Bhāviveka asserts the emptiness of the other-dependent nature; third, the Bodhisattva Dharmapāla refutes both attachments. Hence, that treatise states: "First, the followers of the Yogācāra established their tenet by means of reasoning, saying: 'The entity of the phenomena grasped by conceptual construction is non-existent, but the entity of the phenomena produced by causes and conditions is existent. Dependent on this, one experiences karmic fruition and transmigrates in the three realms of existence; or one cultivates preparatory application and realizes the three bodhis,' and so forth at length. To corroborate this meaning, they cited a sūtra verse: 'The imagined is non-existent, / the other-dependent nature exists; / false conceptualization is destroyed / in accordance with the two extremes of superimposition and deprecation.' Second, Bhāviveka interpreted this sūtra, saying: 'Names are the imagined nature, and meanings/objects are the other-dependent nature. Since names are not existent with respect to their meanings/objects, they are non-existent; since meanings/objects are not non-existent according to worldly convention, they exist. One cannot cite this to prove that the other-dependent exists.' Next, the followers of the Yogācāra refuted his interpretation of the sūtra. The text has three sections: first, a general statement that it is unreasoned; next, a specific display of four fallacies; and finally, a concluding refutation showing that it contradicts the sūtra. First, in the general refutation they say: 'This interpretation is not so, because its meaning is contradictory.' Next, as for the four fallacies: (1) If names are non-existent because they are not existent with respect to their meanings/objects, then since meanings/objects are also non-existent with respect to names, how could they exist? (2) Furthermore, the names established for those meanings/objects are already born of causes and conditions; thus, like the meanings/objects, they should exist. (3) If the nature of the signifier falsely grasped is non-existent, how could the nature of the signified falsely grasped be existent? (4) If names have the capacity to designate in accordance with convention, and yet you do not accept them to be of the other-dependent nature, then since meanings/objects are also only conventionally designated as having capacity, why do you not accept them to be of the imagined nature? Finally, concluding with conventional designation, they say: 'The conventional designation of signifier and signified must either both be non-existent together, or both be equally existent. Now, as the sūtra states that one is existent and one is non-existent, what you say does not accord with the meaning of the sūtra.' Next, Bhāviveka, to prove his own meaning, further cited a sūtra, saying: 'By establishing these various names, / they express those various phenomena. / None of them exist in their own nature, / because the true nature of phenomena is entirely like this.' Next, the followers of the Yogācāra refuted this sūtra \[citation\], saying: 'The intention of the sūtra is not to say that names are non-existent with respect to meanings/objects; it only says that the true nature of the signified phenomena is non-existent, demonstrating that the true nature of all phenomena cannot be expressed. What is expressed by nominal designations is in all cases a universal characteristic; the specific characteristics of all phenomena completely transcend nominal designation. Specific characteristics are not non-existent, whereas universal characteristics are not existent. Here, it briefly states that the nature of the signified is non-existent, but it does not mean that the nature of the signifier is genuinely existent. Therefore, the verse only utters the words "those do not exist"; otherwise, it should have said "these do not exist in their nature".' Next, Bhāviveka, to prove that the other-dependent nature is non-existent, further cited a brief verse spoken in a sūtra: 'Not the least phenomenon is produced, / nor is the least phenomenon destroyed. / Pure vision contemplates all phenomena / as neither existent nor non-existent.' Next, the followers of the Yogācāra again refuted this statement: 'The intention of this verse is to clarify that the intrinsic nature and differences of the imagined nature—both signifier and signified—are fundamentally empty in their entity. Pure vision, which is free of grasping and without production or destruction, contemplates all worldly phenomena produced by causes and conditions as neither non-existent nor existent. Therefore, this does not prove that the other-dependent is non-existent.' Next, the Bodhisattva Bhāviveka cited a sūtra to substantiate that the other-dependent nature is empty, where a sūtra states: 'Phenomena arise from conditions; / conditions and phenomena are both non-existent. / One who is able to know correctly in this way / is said to comprehend conditioned arising. / If a phenomenon is produced from conditions, / this phenomenon has no intrinsic nature at all; / if a phenomenon has no intrinsic nature at all, / this phenomenon is not produced from conditions.' Next, the followers of the Yogācāra reconciled those sūtras, saying: 'Although these two sūtras say that phenomena produced from conditions lack intrinsic nature, they are not contradictory. For phenomena produced from conditions are of two kinds: first, the imagined nature; second, the other-dependent nature. Here, the intention is to clarify that the intrinsic nature of the imagined nature does not exist; it does not speak of the other-dependent. If one were to say that the other-dependent completely lacks intrinsic nature, one would then repudiate both defiled and pure phenomena as non-existent, which is called the wrongly grasped emptiness, harming both oneself and others.' Next, Bhāviveka said: 'Who could ever put a stop to this false conceptualization? When one attains right view, it will naturally be eliminated.' Third, the Bodhisattva Dharmapāla refuted both attachments to emptiness and existence, establishing the Middle Way wherein the other-dependent nature is neither empty nor existent. Thus he further states: 'Classes such as these, following their different views, divide the sacred words and form many factions, mutually raising disputes and each clinging to one extreme. Since they cannot eliminate the dust and defilement of evil views, how could they ever accord with the pure, sublime purport of the Mahāyāna spoken by the Buddhas, the World-Honoured Ones? Failing to comprehend the true principle and following their own clinging sentiments, approving of themselves and deprecating others, they are truly to be feared! One should abandon attachment to the two extremes of emptiness and existence, and awaken to the non-dual Middle Way of the Mahāyāna.'" It is extensively explained like that. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 1.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1708.1.9) - [Next: 1.11](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1708.1.11) - [Up: 1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1708.1) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1708~en-mt.1.10) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [仁王護國般若波羅蜜多經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1709.1.15) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1708.1.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1708.1.10) · Pramāṇa