[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [妙法蓮華經玄義](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1716) › 3.120 # 妙法蓮華經玄義 3.120 妙法蓮華經玄義 3.120 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [3.120](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1716.3.120) 若作生滅解權實者，墮在初番；若作不生不滅解者，墮第二番；乃至第七番，亦可知。又縱廣引經論莊嚴己義者，亦不得出初番隨情二諦化他權實，況出初番第二、第三權實！尚不出初番三種權實，況第七番三種權實！若但以初番二智，破一切世間情執略盡，假令得入化城，秖是自行實智，尚不得化他之權，何況能得後番諸智！若尋二十一種二智，凡破幾外見，凡破幾權經論，復顯幾是，立幾權經論，然後方稱妙權妙實。世人全不識一兩種權實之意，而情中即計為智。若是智者，破何惑？見何理？未見理、未破惑，生死浩然，非情何謂？今若待前諸麁智而明妙智者，法華破待之意也。若其會者，一切權經論所明諦理皆成妙理，無非智地。會一切權經論所明二智無非妙智，悉是大車。如此破會深廣，莫以《中論》相比，可熟思之（云云）。 > If one interprets the provisional and real in terms of arising and ceasing, one falls into the first turn; if one interprets them in terms of non-arising and non-ceasing, one falls into the second turn; and so on, up to the seventh turn, which may also be known. Furthermore, even if one cites sūtras and treatises far and wide to embellish one's own view, one still cannot step beyond the provisional and real for transforming others \[found in\] the first turn's two truths conforming to subjective sentiment, not to mention stepping beyond the second and third \[levels of\] the provisional and real of the first turn! When one cannot even step beyond the three kinds of provisional and real of the first turn, how much less can one step beyond the three kinds of provisional and real of the seventh turn! If one merely uses the two wisdoms of the first turn to largely destroy all worldly attachments of subjective sentiment, even granting that one manages to enter the conjured city, it is merely the real wisdom of one's own practice; one has not yet obtained even the provisional \[wisdom\] for transforming others, let alone being able to attain the various wisdoms of the subsequent turns! If one examines the twenty-one kinds of two wisdoms: how many non-Buddhist views in all are refuted, how many provisional sūtras and treatises in all are refuted, how many correct \[teachings\] are further revealed, and how many provisional sūtras and treatises are established, only then can they be termed the wondrous provisional and the wondrous real! People of the world have no recognition whatsoever of the meaning of one or two kinds of the provisional and real, yet within their subjective sentiments they presume this to be wisdom. If it is wisdom, what delusion does it destroy? What principle does it perceive? Having not perceived the principle and not destroyed delusion, with saṃsāra vast and boundless, what can it be called if not subjective sentiment? Now, if one clarifies wondrous wisdom by contrast with the preceding coarse wisdoms, this is the Lotus Sūtra's purport of refuting through contrast. If they are integrated, the principles of truth explained in all provisional sūtras and treatises all become wondrous principles, with none not being the ground of wisdom. Integrating the two wisdoms explained in all provisional sūtras and treatises, none is not wondrous wisdom, and all are the great cart. Such refutation and integration is profound and vast; do not compare it to the Madhyamaka-śāstra. One should reflect on this thoroughly (and so forth). > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 3.119](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1716.3.119) - [Next: 3.121](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1716.3.121) - [Up: 3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1716.3) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1716~en-mt.3.120) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1716.3.120](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1716.3.120) · Pramāṇa