[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [法華文句記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1719) › 3.185 # 法華文句記 3.185 法華文句記 3.185 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [3.185](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1719.3.185) 「今詳」下但總略破之。又為五：先略非，次「經云」下引文正示，三「又初」下結非示過，四「如天親」下引例，五「當知」下結示。初文者，附旁用他五時之意，隱五時名潛為己釋。今以一一時中橫論權實體用多少，意明如來難思巧用，巧用不立但成漸次，是故云非。後約三轉又除果地，意欲擬為智諦離著，以因顯果，不意亦成漸次之非。次引文正示者，今用五時八教相入方成一實，一一時中橫竪間雜，唯至法華諦智純一，仍辨使成方便之相，故方便初即歎五佛智諦方便，是故品題須依圓頓。《經》云：「皆得覩見汝乃至果方常」。經令捨於方便，汝乃却更用之。《大經》自指《法華》為極，汝乃唯指金剛後心，應開諸教汝乃廢之。次示過中云「信解化果」者，即前四重始終漸入。次「何關」下正示其非。故嘉祥又云：「身之與乘各作四句，乘四句者，一、三為方便一為真實，令捨三取一，稟教之徒雖復捨三而封一實，麁惑雖去細惑尋生。」今問，至法華會若已捨三，復於何處而封一實？若未至法華，爾前復無捨三之教。聲聞之人於法華前，見修久破，至此何等細惑尋生？封實為是何等惑攝？豈有細惑由聞法生？次云：「為對破故，明三與一皆為方便。」今問，不審三一俱是方便，為在《法華經》前，為已至法華會耶？爾前尚迷三是方便，何曾云一亦是方便？故此品初但云「昔日方便示三」，的無三一俱名方便，對破之語為在何會？三云：「稟教之人乃識三一俱是方便，更封兩非而為理極。」今問，三周何周是稟兩非之文？爾前二乘尚無前二，況雙非耶？若菩薩人處處得入，何須《法華》？三又以三一為二，兩非為不二，二不二皆方便，非二非不二為真實，破亦準前徵人及處。四者「二與不二及以兩非仍屬四句，未免名言並稱方便，諸法寂滅不可言宣，乃是真實。」今問，三昧起告、三周顯本，為說不說？寂滅義遍，何但法華？教下之理本自無言，況大不可說先為五人，況今廣明五佛開權辨教權實，權實既顯誰復封言？言封三者，迷教迷情，今約部判教，消方便名須有指歸，豈徒遣語？以語逐語迷終未祛，雖千萬破終不可盡。身之四句準此可知。況此品初題為「方便」，應用方便以釋今品，乃作實釋殊違品目，故知嘉祥身霑妙化義已灌神，舊章先行理須委破，識此大旨師資可成。準此一途餘亦可了。亦如三種法輪殊乖承稟，大師稱為頓乳，其以根本為名，大師以三味為枝條，其亦以醍醐為歸本。今問，凡言根本，即曰能生，能生始成，後攝歸本，本却非始，二言相乖，枝本不立攝亦無當，況根本兩分攝歸方一，一為根本二則名枝，是則根本本來是枝，應須會初而從於後，故開華嚴枝別，以入法華本圓，況華嚴別圓俱成近迹，根義復壞法華本成。又言三味是枝末者，鹿苑可爾？二酥如何？若二酥圓別是枝，華嚴豈可成本？若爾，乃成會本歸本，或即會枝歸枝。若法華不關華嚴，則令二本永異，何得名為會末歸本？況法華部內無入華嚴之文，但有入佛知見，況涅槃終極五味明文，本師所師舊章須改，若依舊立師資不成，伏膺之說靡施，頂戴之言奚寄。四引二文為例者，即是今經體內方便之流類也。《大乘方便經》十種方便未撿。五「當知」下結示斥非。言「如空若海」也，總包諸經色流，咸歸今經空海。 > From "Now, examining in detail" onwards, \[the text\] merely refutes them comprehensively and briefly. This also has five parts: first, a brief rejection; next, from "The sūtra says" onwards, directly demonstrating by citing text; third, from "Moreover, the first" onwards, concluding the rejection and demonstrating the errors; fourth, from "As Vasubandhu" onwards, citing parallels; fifth, from "One should know" onwards, the concluding demonstration. In the first passage, by leaning on and using another's idea of the five periods, he concealed the name of the five periods to surreptitiously make it his own interpretation. Now, by cross-analyzing in each period the quantity of the essence and function of the provisional and real, the intention is to clarify the Tathāgata's inconceivable skillful function; if skillful function is not established, it becomes a mere gradual progression, and for this reason it is rejected. Later, concerning the three turnings, he further excluded the stage of fruition, intending to use it as wisdom and truth free from attachment, using the cause to reveal the fruit; without realizing it, this also incurred the error of gradual progression. Next, in directly demonstrating by citing text: now, only when the five periods and eight teachings interpenetrate does the one real come to be established; within each period, horizontal and vertical are intermingled, and only when one reaches the Lotus Sūtra are truth and wisdom pure and unmixed, yet it still analyzes them to establish the characteristics of skillful means. Therefore, at the beginning of "Skillful Means," it praises the wisdom, truth, and skillful means of the five buddhas; for this reason, the chapter title must rely on the perfect and sudden. The \*Sūtra\* says: "All were able to behold you, up to \[...\] only the fruit is eternal." The sūtra directs one to abandon skillful means, yet you conversely use them instead. The \*Great Sūtra\* (\*Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra\*) itself points to the \*Lotus Sūtra\* as the ultimate, yet you only point to the mind after the vajra\[-like samādhi\]; where the various teachings should be opened, you instead discard them. Next, in demonstrating the errors, "faith, understanding, transformation, and fruit" refers to the gradual entry from beginning to end through the four levels mentioned before. Next, from "What relation" onwards, it directly demonstrates his error. Thus Jiāxiáng also says: "The body and the vehicle are each made into four propositions. The four propositions of the vehicle are: 1. The three are skillful means and the one is the real, causing one to abandon the three and take up the one. Although the practitioners who receive the teaching abandon the three, they cling to the one real; though coarse afflictions are eliminated, subtle afflictions promptly arise." Now I ask: upon reaching the Lotus assembly, if they have already abandoned the three, where then do they cling to the one real? If they have not yet reached the Lotus, prior to this there was no teaching of abandoning the three. For the śrāvakas before the Lotus Sūtra, \[afflictions of\] views and cultivation had long been destroyed; upon reaching this point, what sort of subtle afflictions promptly arise? Under what kind of affliction is clinging to the real subsumed? How could subtle afflictions arise from hearing the Dharma? Next he says: "To counter and break this, it is explained that both the three and the one are skillful means." Now I ask: I wonder whether both the three and the one being skillful means occurs before the \*Lotus Sūtra\*, or after having already reached the Lotus assembly? Prior to this, they were still deluded about the three being skillful means; when did it ever say that the one was also a skillful means? Therefore, the beginning of this chapter only says "in the past, by skillful means, I demonstrated the three"; there is definitely no statement that both three and one are called skillful means. In what assembly did this countering refutation take place? Third, he says: "The person receiving the teaching then recognizes that both three and one are skillful means, and further clings to the double negation as the ultimate principle." Now I ask: among the three cycles \[of preaching\], which cycle contains the text receiving the double negation? Prior to this, the two vehicles did not even have the first two, let alone the double negation! If bodhisattvas can gain entry everywhere, why would they need the \*Lotus Sūtra\*? Third, he also takes the three and the one as the two, and the double negation as non-two, with both the two and the non-two being skillful means, and neither two nor non-two being the real; the refutation also follows the above in inquiring about the person and the place. Fourth: "The two, the non-two, and the double negation still belong to the four propositions, not escaping names and words, and are all called skillful means; that all dharmas are quiescent and ineffable is the real." Now I ask: when \[the Buddha\] arose from samādhi to proclaim, and in the three cycles revealed the origin, was he speaking or not speaking? The meaning of quiescence is pervasive; why would it be restricted to the Lotus? The principle under the teaching is originally wordless, not to mention that the great ineffable was first \[spoken\] for the five persons, let alone now broadly clarifying the five buddhas' opening of the provisional and discerning the provisional and real of the teachings; once the provisional and real are revealed, who would still cling to words? As for saying they cling to the three, this is delusion regarding the teaching and delusion of sentiment. Now, in classifying the teachings by division, resolving the name "skillful means" must have a point of reference; how could it merely be dispelling words? Pursuing words with words, delusion will never be eliminated; even with thousands of refutations, it can never be exhausted. The four propositions of the body can be known by following this. Moreover, the title of this chapter is "Skillful Means"; one should use skillful means to explain this chapter, yet making an interpretation in terms of the real thoroughly contradicts the chapter's title. Thus we know that Jiāxiáng's person was moistened by the wondrous transformation and his spirit was permeated by its meaning, but because the old treatises were circulated first, it is necessary to thoroughly refute them; only by recognizing this great gist can the master-disciple \[transmission\] be established. Following this one approach, the rest can also be understood. It is also like the three turnings of the wheel of the Dharma, which thoroughly depart from what was received and inherited: the Great Master called it the sudden and the milk, whereas he took "fundamental" as its name; the Great Master took the three flavors as branches and twigs, whereas he also took ghee as returning to the origin. Now I ask: whenever one speaks of "fundamental," it means "able to produce"; only when "able to produce" is established at the beginning can things later be gathered and returned to the origin. If the origin is instead not the beginning, the two statements contradict each other; if branches and origin are not established, the gathering in also has no basis. Moreover, if the fundamental is divided in two and only becomes one upon being gathered in, then the one is the fundamental and the two are named the branches; thus the fundamental was originally a branch. One ought to converge the beginning and follow the end, and therefore open the branch-distinctions of the \*Avataṃsaka\* to enter the fundamental perfection of the Lotus. Furthermore, the distinct and perfect \[teachings\] of the \*Avataṃsaka\* both become recent traces; the meaning of "root" is destroyed again, and the origin of the Lotus is established. Furthermore, if one says that the three flavors are branches and twigs, could that be so for Deer Park? How could it be so for the two curds? If the perfect and distinct of the two curds are branches, how could the \*Avataṃsaka\* be the origin? If so, then it becomes converging the origin to return to the origin, or converging the branches to return to the branches. If the Lotus has no relation to the \*Avataṃsaka\*, this causes the two origins to be eternally different; how could it be called converging the branches to return to the origin? Moreover, within the Lotus division there is no text on entering the \*Avataṃsaka\*, only on entering the knowledge and vision of the buddhas; not to mention the clear text of the five flavors as the ultimate in the \*Nirvāṇa \[Sūtra\]\*. The old treatises that the original master relied on must be revised; if one establishes \[his doctrine\] according to the old, the master-disciple relationship cannot be formed, the discourse of yielding from the heart cannot be applied, and the words of carrying upon the crown have nowhere to rest. Fourth, in citing the two texts as parallels: these belong to the category of skillful means within the essence in the present sūtra. The ten kinds of skillful means in the \*Mahāyāna Upāya Sūtra\* have not yet been examined. Fifth, from "One should know" onwards, the concluding demonstration repudiates the errors. Speaking of "like space or like the ocean": it comprehensively encompasses the streams of form of the various sūtras, all returning to the space and ocean of the present sūtra. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 3.184](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1719.3.184) - [Next: 3.186](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1719.3.186) - [Up: 3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1719.3) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1719~en-mt.3.185) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1719.3.185](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1719.3.185) · Pramāṇa