[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [法華文句記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1719) › 3.186 # 法華文句記 3.186 法華文句記 3.186 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [3.186](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1719.3.186) 「今明」下正釋，為二：先通，次別。初文三：先列，次釋，三「若一切法」下，以四攝法辯法功用。釋中四句，皆先標、次引文釋。初句者既引文云諸法等者，以有言故且從有說，有言不出千如百界。第二句者，頻引五文皆證入實，且以入證對說為實。初文是被機之意，次文是諸法之本，次文是化儀之宗，次文是本行之源，次文是亡教之理。諸文皆以入證為實，故知有說無說無不皆以真實為本。第三句中引證意者，諸法權也，實相實也。實即次句，權即初句，合彼二句共為第三，以初二門無別法故。「例如」下引例，假想故虛、治欲故實，秖此一觀是實是虛，何妨一法亦權亦實。第四句者，引文即指中理，虛實理等二諦難思，雙非此諦以顯妙中，亦不異於前之三門，四門理同故皆云一切。三「若一切」下辨功用。又二：初正辨句攝法功用，次「直列」下明其句意。初文者，秖此四句尚互攝互破，權則俱權乃至俱是非權非實，況復餘法不攝破耶？況四句外無復有法，如此方成今經破立，豈與諸師破立同耶？當知諸師既不識於諸權諸實，縱說諸實，既未分判實義不成，況彼彼相望互推迷實，是故並為初句所破，故云「無不是權」。初句尚爾，況復三耶？故諸師權實並得權之少分耳。言「如來所說」者，舉果況凡。佛有所說尚皆是權，豈末世泛譚自言真實，不思聖化唯薦凡軀。第二句者實即究竟。佛說之權尚須入實，況餘權實而不入耶？故知一切唯有一實。言「巢窟」者，《說文》云：「鳥居木曰巢，獸居穴曰窟。」「保」者，住著也。消通大旨須稱佛心，直守一隅如保巢窟。三四二句準說可知，是故今文句句皆遍。若攝令可識，秖是三智照三諦境、被三種機，機遍法遍理遍事遍，皆云一切所以可知，以一空一切空故一切皆實，一假一切假故一切皆權，三四二句秖是中智雙照雙非，內由三德三身具足，故使外用橫竪顯密，為成今經破立之意，以對昔故須為四句。通論大綱法相雖爾，別論今品唯在第三，亦權一半名方便品，以對自證實智說之。是故須云第三半句，仍須攝彼餘三及半入此一半，方可得名今「方便品」。若專四句各攝一切尚非通方，何況諸師遍計權教，故云「不得一向」。 > From "Now explaining" onwards is the direct explanation, which has two parts: first general, then specific. The first passage has three: first listing, next explaining, and third, from "If all dharmas" onwards, discerning the function of the dharmas through the four inclusions of dharmas. In the explanation, all four propositions first state \[the thesis\] and next cite texts to explain it. In the first proposition, since it cites texts saying "all dharmas," etc., because there are words, it provisionally explains from the standpoint of existence; words do not go beyond the thousand suchnesses and the hundred realms. In the second proposition, it repeatedly cites five passages, all testifying to entering the real, provisionally taking realization through entry in contrast to preaching as the real. The first passage is the intent of responding to capacities; the next passage is the origin of all dharmas; the next passage is the essential theme of the teaching's protocol; the next passage is the source of the original practice; the next passage is the principle of transcending the teaching. The various passages all take realization through entry as the real, so we know that whether with preaching or without preaching, there is none that does not take the real as its basis. In the third proposition, regarding the intent of citing evidence: all dharmas are the provisional, and the true character is the real. The real is the second proposition, and the provisional is the first proposition; combining those two propositions together forms the third, because there is no other dharma separate from the first two gates. From "For example" onwards, it cites an analogy: because of mental imputation it is unreal, and because of curing desire it is real; this single contemplation itself is real and unreal, so what prevents a single dharma from being both provisional and real? In the fourth proposition, the cited text directly points to the principle of the middle; the principles of the unreal and the real are equal, and the two truths are inconceivable; the double negation of these truths reveals the wondrous middle, which is also not different from the previous three gates; because the principle of the four gates is identical, it always says "all." Third, from "If all" onwards, discerning the function. This also has two parts: first, directly discerning the function of the propositions in including dharmas; next, from "Directly listing" onwards, clarifying the intent of these propositions. In the first passage: these four propositions themselves mutually include and mutually refute one another—if provisional, all are provisional, up to all being neither provisional nor real; how much more so do they not include and refute other dharmas? Moreover, outside the four propositions there are no further dharmas; only in this way are the refutation and establishment of the present sūtra accomplished. How could this be the same as the refutations and establishments of the various masters? One should know that since the various masters do not recognize the various provisionals and reals, even if they speak of various reals, since they have not distinguished and judged them, the meaning of the real is not established; moreover, looking at one another, they mutually attribute delusion regarding the real to each other, and therefore they are all refuted by the first proposition; hence it says "none is not provisional." If this is so even for the first proposition, how much more so for the \[other\] three? Therefore, the provisional and real of the various masters only attain a tiny fraction of the provisional. As for "what the Tathāgata spoke": it cites the fruition to contrast with the ordinary. What the Buddha spoke is still entirely provisional; how could ordinary talks in the degenerate age claim themselves to be the real, failing to consider that the sacred teaching solely assists ordinary beings? In the second proposition, the real is the ultimate. The provisional spoken by the Buddha must still enter the real; how much more so do other provisionals and reals not enter? Therefore we know that all is solely the one real. As for "nest and cave": the \*Shuowen\* says: "Birds dwelling in trees is called a nest; beasts dwelling in holes is called a cave." "Guarding" means dwelling and clinging. Comprehensively penetrating the great gist must accord with the Buddha's mind; directly keeping to a single corner is like guarding a nest or cave. The third and fourth propositions can be understood by following this explanation; therefore, in the present text, every single proposition is pervasive. If subsumed to make them recognizable, they are simply the three wisdoms illuminating the realm of the three truths and responding to the three kinds of capacities; capacities are pervasive, dharmas are pervasive, principle is pervasive, and phenomena are pervasive; the reason why it always says "all" can be understood. Because one emptiness is all emptiness, all are real; because one conventionality is all conventionality, all are provisional; the third and fourth propositions are simply the wisdom of the middle simultaneously illuminating and simultaneously negating; internally, because the three virtues and three bodies are fully present, the external functions horizontally, vertically, explicitly, and secretly; to accomplish the meaning of refutation and establishment of the present sūtra, in contrast to the past, four propositions must be made. Although the dharma-characteristics are such when discussing the general outline comprehensively, when discussing this present chapter specifically, it lies solely in the third: the one half that is "also provisional" is called the "Skillful Means Chapter," spoken in contrast to the real wisdom of self-realization. Therefore one must speak of the half-proposition of the third; one must still subsume those remaining three and a half into this one half before it can properly receive the name of the present "Skillful Means Chapter." If one exclusively takes the four propositions as each including all, that is still not comprehensive; how much less so the various masters' pervasive conceptualization of the provisional teachings! Therefore it says "one must not be one-sided." > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 3.185](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1719.3.185) - [Next: 3.187](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1719.3.187) - [Up: 3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1719.3) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1719~en-mt.3.186) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1719.3.186](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1719.3.186) · Pramāṇa