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# 法華宗要 1.6

法華宗要 1.6

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [1.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1725.1.6)

第三明能詮用者，如〈法師品〉云：「一切菩薩阿耨菩提皆屬此經，開方便門示真實相。」此文正明是經勝用，用有二種，謂開及示。開者開於三乘方便之門，示者示於一乘真實之相。總說雖然，於中有三：先開、次示、第三合明開示之用。先明開義即有二種，謂所開之門及能開之用。所開之門即三乘教，此名方便。略有四義：一者佛方便智之所說教，依主立名名方便教；二者即三乘教巧順三機，持乘作名名方便教；三者為一乘教作前方便，因是後說一乘正教，對後正教名為方便；四者於一乘理權說方便非真實說，是方便義對真實說名為方便，依此四義故名方便。此名為門，有其二義：一者出義，諸子依此出三界故；二者入義，又依此教入一乘故。然門有二名，若言佛門人門，則門非佛人；若言板門竹門，則門是板竹。今三乘教名方便門者，同板竹門，門即方便，是故名為方便門也。開方便門，方便有其二義：若望出義，說三乘時開而不閉；望其入義，說三之時閉而不開，雖出三界未入一乘，故今說一乘教，言三是方便，方開方便門令入一乘故。如下文言：「當知諸佛方便力故，於一佛乘分別說三。」此言正開方便之門，諸餘言語例此可知。次明示用，於中亦二：先明所示、次明能示。所示之真實相，謂如前說，一乘人法、法相常住、道理究竟，天魔外道所不能破、三世諸佛所不能易，以是義故名真實相。而非三非一、無人無法，都無所得，如是正觀乃名真實究竟一乘。所以然者，諸有所得無道無果不動不出，故知如前非三是一。能乘所乘人法之相不出四句，是有所得。云何說此為真實相？解云：此言不然。所以者何？若言非三是一，不出四句故，是有所得非究竟者，是則有得為非、無得為是，亦入四句故，是有所得亦非正觀；若言寄言說無所得，而非如言取於無得，是故無得不入四句者，他亦寄言假說一乘，而非如言取於一乘，所以一乘亦出四句，是故當知遂言俱非，不如言取。二說無異。

> Third, explaining the function of the expressive \[text\]: as the Chapter on the Dharma Master says, 'The anuttarā samyaksambodhi of all bodhisattvas all belongs to this sūtra: opening the provisional gate and revealing the real dharmatā.' This text precisely clarifies the superior function of this sūtra. There are two kinds of function: namely, opening and revealing. 'Opening' means opening the provisional gate of the Triyāna; 'revealing' means revealing the real dharmatā of the Ekayāna. Although stated generally in this way, there are three \[aspects\] within it: first opening, next revealing, and thirdly explaining the functions of opening and revealing together.  
> First, explaining the meaning of opening, there are two kinds: namely, the gate that is opened and the function that can open it. The gate that is opened is the teaching of the Triyāna, which is named 'provisional.' Briefly, there are four meanings: First, the teaching preached by the Buddha's provisional wisdom is named 'provisional teaching' by naming it after its possessor. Second, the Triyāna teaching skillfully accords with the three capacities, and takes its name from sustaining the vehicles, being named 'provisional teaching.' Third, it acts as a prior expedient for the Ekayāna teaching, and because of this the correct teaching of the Ekayāna is later preached, so it is named 'provisional' in contrast to the later correct teaching. Fourth, with respect to the principle of the Ekayāna, it provisionally preaches as an expedient and is not an exposition of the real; this meaning of expedient is named 'provisional' in contrast to the real. Based on these four meanings, it is therefore named provisional. This is called a 'gate' with two meanings: First, the meaning of exit, because the children rely on this to exit the traidhātuka. Second, the meaning of entry, because relying on this teaching they also enter the Ekayāna. Now, 'gate' has two kinds of designation: if one says 'a Buddha-gate' or 'a human-gate', then the gate is not the Buddha or the person; but if one says 'a plank-gate' or 'a bamboo-gate', then the gate is itself the planks or bamboo. Here, when the Triyāna teaching is called a 'provisional gate', it is like the plank-gate or bamboo-gate: the gate is itself the provisional, and therefore it is named the 'provisional gate.' In 'opening the provisional gate,' 'provisional' has two meanings: from the perspective of exit, when preaching the Triyāna it is opened and not closed; from the perspective of entry, when preaching the three it is closed and not opened—although they have exited the traidhātuka, they have not yet entered the Ekayāna. Therefore now, preaching the Ekayāna teaching, it says that the three are provisional, and only then opens the provisional gate to cause them to enter the Ekayāna. As a subsequent passage says: 'You should know that by the power of the Buddhas' skillful means, within the one Buddha-vehicle they discriminately preach three.' These words precisely open the provisional gate; other statements are to be understood by analogy with this.  
> Next, explaining the function of revealing, there are also two \[aspects\]: first explaining what is revealed, and next explaining what can reveal it. What is revealed, the real dharmatā, means as explained previously: the persons and dharmas of the Ekayāna, the nature of dharmas being eternally abiding, the principle being ultimate, which neither heavenly demons nor non-Buddhists can destroy, and which the Buddhas of the three periods of time cannot alter. For this reason, it is named the 'real dharmatā.' Yet it is neither three nor one, without person and without dharma, with nothing whatsoever to be attained; such correct contemplation is precisely named the real, ultimate Ekayāna. Why is this so? Because for all who have something to be attained, there is no path, no fruit, no motion, and no exit. Therefore one knows that, as \[stated\] before, it is neither three nor one. The characteristics of persons and dharmas, both those who can ride and what is ridden, do not go beyond the four propositions, and this is having something to be attained. How can this be called the real dharmatā?  
> Explanation: This statement is incorrect. Why is that? If one says that 'neither three nor one' does not go beyond the four propositions, and therefore has something to be attained and is not ultimate, then taking attainment as wrong and non-attainment as right also enters the four propositions; therefore it has something to be attained and is also not correct contemplation. If one says that one borrows words to speak of non-attainment, but does not grasp at non-attainment according to words, and therefore non-attainment does not enter the four propositions, then the other party also borrows words to provisionally speak of the Ekayāna, but does not grasp at the Ekayāna according to words; therefore the Ekayāna also transcends the four propositions. Hence one should know that following the words both are wrong, but not grasping according to words, the two explanations do not differ.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1725~en-mt.1.6) — English, machine translation

## Linked texts (1)

- [妙法蓮華經](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.mahayanasutra.saddharmapundarika*zh-kumarajiva.2.32) — Classical Chinese

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1725.1.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1725.1.6) · Pramāṇa
