[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大方廣佛華嚴經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735) › 14.26 # 大方廣佛華嚴經疏 14.26 大方廣佛華嚴經疏 14.26 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [14.26](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.14.26) 第三業果甚深。問中亦二，初標能所問人。以事中顯理是可貴，故問寶首也。二「一切」下正顯問端中三：初舉法按定，謂諸眾生身但四大假名，四大無主，身亦無我，安有我所？彼此同許，以為按定。二「云何」下正設疑難。能造能受是謂為我，所造所受即是我所。以無我故無能造受，誰令苦樂？無我所故無所造受，何以現見而有苦等十事五對？一苦樂者約麁相說，三塗為苦、人天為樂；二就苦中各有妍媸；三於其樂中有內身外境；四通於苦樂受中，若時若事皆有多少。此上皆約生報，前生作故。五現作現受名現報，隔一生去受名為後報。三「然法界」下結難，謂二無我理即真法界，真法界中定無善惡，未知苦樂從何而生？此問所以也。為無我故無我所耶？為有所受亦有我耶？此致疑也。以聖言量及正理量違於現量，如何可通？結成難也。 > Third, the profundity of karma and result. Within the question there are also two parts: first, identifying the person who asks and the one asked. Because revealing the noumenon within phenomena is precious, he asks Bao Shou. Second, from 'all' downward, properly presenting the opening of the question, in three parts: First, citing the principle to establish the premise: the bodies of sentient beings are merely the provisional names of the four great elements; the four elements have no master, and the body is likewise without a self—how could there be what belongs to a self? Both parties mutually accept this, so it is taken as the established premise. Second, from 'how' downward, directly presenting the doubt and difficulty. The maker and the experiencer are called the self; what is made and what is experienced is what belongs to the self. Because there is no self, there is no maker or experiencer: who causes suffering and pleasure? Because there is nothing belonging to a self, there is nothing made or experienced: why is it manifestly observed that there are suffering and so forth, ten items in five pairs? 1. Suffering and pleasure are spoken of in terms of coarse marks: the three evil destinies are suffering, while humans and devas are pleasure. 2. Within suffering, each has beauty and ugliness. 3. Within that pleasure, there are the internal body and external objects. 4. Pervading the experiences of suffering and pleasure, both time and events have much and little. All the above concern retribution in the next life (upapanna-vedanīya), being produced by past lives. 5. What is done in the present and experienced in the present is called retribution in the present life (dṛṣṭa-dharma-vedanīya); what is experienced after an interval of a lifetime is called retribution in subsequent lives (apara-paryāya-vedanīya). Third, from 'yet the dharmadhātu' downward, concluding the difficulty: the principle of the two selflessnesses is itself the true dharmadhātu; within the true dharmadhātu, there is definitely neither wholesome nor unwholesome—from where do suffering and pleasure arise? This asks for the reason. Is there nothing belonging to a self because there is no self? Or, because there is something experienced, is there also a self? This poses the doubt. Because the authority of sacred words and the authority of correct reasoning contradict direct perception, how can this be resolved? This concludes and forms the difficulty. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 14.25](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.14.25) - [Next: 14.27](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.14.27) - [Up: 14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.14) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735~en-mt.14.26) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.14.26](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.14.26) · Pramāṇa