[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大方廣佛華嚴經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735) › 24.12 # 大方廣佛華嚴經疏 24.12 大方廣佛華嚴經疏 24.12 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [24.12.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.24.12.1) 第五聞藏。 釋相中二：初明所知之法、後「菩薩摩訶薩」下顯多聞之意。 今初，標稱聞藏。 釋云知者，聞為本故，實則多知耳。 文亦分二：先標章、後牒釋。 今初，句雖有十，義束為七。 初之四句但是緣生故，謂一緣生； 二有漏五蘊； 三無漏五蘊； 四有為； 五無為； 六有記； 七無記。 二「何等」下牒釋，即為七段。 初緣起中依生引二門，開為四重徵釋，謂十二支，初二能引、次五所引、次三能生、後二所生，故為四也。 然依《雜集》第四云「十二有支，皆具此有彼有等義。 」故彼論文釋支相云「相者，謂無作緣生故、無常緣生故、勢用緣生故。 此有彼有者，顯無作緣生義，唯有緣故果法得有，非緣有實作用能生果法。 此生故彼生者，顯無常緣生義，非無生法為因故，少有法生而得成立。 無明緣行等者，顯勢用緣生義，雖復諸法無作無常，然不隨一法為生故。 一切果生，以諸法功能差別故。 」然今經中欲顯緣起無性，舉前二門勢用一門。 六地廣辨，就二門中從增勝說，前後互舉。 前七許同因位，故名能引所引； 後五要因果相望，云能生所生。 由此能所引中，但云此有彼有。 後文則云此起彼起，起即生也。 故《集論》云「謂於因時有能引所引，於果時有能生所生。 」然文有染淨二觀，初於能引中明染觀，故云無明有故行有。 第二約所引，亦通能所相對以明淨觀，故云識無故名色無。 以識通能引有二種業，一持諸有情所有業縛，謂與行所引習氣俱生滅故。 二與名色作緣，謂由識入母胎，名色得增長。 今言識無者，即不為業熏、不持業縛，故不入胎增長名色，故云識無故名色無。 第三能生所生相對以明染觀，故云愛起故苦起。 苦即當果，愛即能生。 能生有三，舉初攝末； 下明淨觀，舉末攝初，蓋巧辨影略耳。 第四亦能所生相對以明淨觀，謂因亡果喪耳。 後之三門皆能所相望，何以無明與行唯約能引而相望耶？ 答：欲顯十二支皆有無作無常二門故，於初一位相次以明。 不爾，則謂要四位相望方得此有彼有故。 下之三門，欲顯四位不同故能所相望。 又為顯能引支中或二或三，故於前二別為一段。 蓋說者之妙也。 第二有漏五蘊。 蘊者，積聚義。 《雜集》第一云「藏果重擔義而標名世間者，世即隱覆義，隱覆勝義故。 又可破壞義，三世所遷故。 間者，墮虛偽中故，隱覆之法即墮虛偽故，世即是間。 」然色等蘊通於無漏出世之義，欲訶毀故，略舉一分。 云何知之？ 應知三種：一知其相，謂色以變礙為相、受以領納為義、想者取像、行謂遷流、識以了別。 二知其生滅，謂生無所從來、滅無所至。 三知其不生不滅，謂法本不生，今則無滅。 故力林菩薩云「分別此諸蘊，其性本空寂，空故不可滅，此是無生義。 」況知一切法趣蘊，蘊即法界無礙，方名真實多聞。 然諸蘊性，性皆遷流，隨勝立名。 行之一種，雖標總稱，即受別名。 又攝法多故。 第三無漏五蘊，亦名無取五蘊。 然無漏蘊亦有二類：一仍本名，亦名色等，不與漏相應，故名為無漏。 二從已轉立名，即五分法身，如今文是。 欲顯戒等德是可欣故，從極果標以出世。 理實亦有世間戒等，戒定慧三，上來頻釋。 解脫即是離繫，為名解脫知見。 由離繫縛，於境自在觀求覺了。 《智論》八十八云「戒眾者，攝一切戒，和合成眾。 」眾即蘊也。 餘皆準之。 然即轉前五蘊成此五分，謂轉色蘊成於戒身，表無表戒皆色蘊故。 轉受蘊而成定身，定名正受，入四靜慮出四受故。 轉想成慧，凡所有相皆是虛妄，見相非相見法身故，轉行為解脫，無貪等行名心解脫，永斷無知慧解脫故。 又轉識成解脫知見，若與邪受妄想相應，謂識依根了別諸境； 若與正受智慧相應，即是現量如實知故。 《仁王．觀空品》云「觀色識受想行，得戒忍、知見忍、定忍、慧忍、解脫忍。 > Fifth is the treasury of hearing. The explanation of its characteristics has two parts: first, explaining the dharmas that are known; and second, from "a bodhisattva-mahāsattva..." onward, revealing the purpose of extensive hearing. In the first part, it designates the name "treasury of hearing." Explaining it as "knowing" is because hearing is the foundation; in reality, it is just knowing much. The text also divides into two: first, setting forth the headings; and second, taking them up and explaining them. In the first part, although there are ten clauses, their meaning is subsumed into seven. The first four clauses are merely conditioned arising, meaning: 1. conditioned arising; 2. the five contaminated aggregates; 3. the five uncontaminated aggregates; 4. the conditioned; 5. the unconditioned; 6. the karmically determinate; and 7. the indeterminate. Second, from "What are..." onward, it takes them up and explains them, which constitutes seven sections. First, within conditioned arising, based on the two gates of producing and projecting, it expands into four tiers of inquiry and explanation: among the twelve links, the first two are the projecting causes, the next five are the projected results, the next three are the producing causes, and the last two are the produced results; hence there are four. However, relying on the fourth fascicle of the Samuccaya-vyākhyā, it states: "The twelve links of existence all possess the meanings of 'this existing, that exists,' and so forth." Therefore, that treatise explains the characteristics of the links: "Characteristics mean conditioned arising without agency, conditioned arising that is impermanent, and conditioned arising through potency. 'This existing, that exists' reveals the meaning of conditioned arising without agency; solely because the conditions exist can the resultant dharmas exist, not that the conditions have any real functional agency capable of producing the resultant dharmas. 'From the arising of this, that arises' reveals the meaning of impermanent conditioned arising; it is not with unproduced dharmas as causes that any dharma arises and is established. 'Ignorance conditions formations' and so forth reveals the meaning of conditioned arising through potency; although all dharmas are without agency and impermanent, yet it is not the case that following any single dharma something is produced. All results arise due to the distinctions in the functions of dharmas." Now, in this sūtra, wishing to reveal the absence of intrinsic nature in conditioned arising, it adduces the first two gates and the one gate of potency. In the Sixth Stage this is elaborated extensively, spoken in terms of predominance within the two gates, the earlier and later alternately adduced. The first seven are accepted as sharing the causal station, hence they are called projecting and projected; the last five require viewing cause and effect against one another, so they are called producing and produced. Because of this, within the projecting and projected, it merely says "this existing, that exists." The later text then says "this arising, that arises"; arising is being produced. Therefore, the Abhidharmasamuccaya states: "In the causal state there are the projecting and projected; in the resultant state there are the producing and produced." However, the text has two contemplations, defiled and purified: first, within the projecting, it clarifies the defiled contemplation, hence saying, "Because ignorance exists, formations exist." Second, in terms of the projected, it also connects the active and passive correlatives to clarify the purified contemplation, hence saying, "Because consciousness does not exist, name-and-form does not exist." For consciousness connects to the projecting and has two kinds of karma: first, maintaining all karma-bonds of sentient beings, meaning that it arises and ceases together with the habit-energy projected by formations; second, acting as a condition for name-and-form, meaning that due to consciousness entering the mother's womb, name-and-form develops and grows. Now saying that consciousness does not exist means that it is not perfumed by karma and does not maintain karma-bonds, and therefore does not enter the womb to cause name-and-form to grow; hence it says, "Because consciousness does not exist, name-and-form does not exist." Third, producing and produced are correlated to clarify the defiled contemplation, hence saying, "Because craving arises, suffering arises." Suffering is the future result, and craving is the producing cause. There are three producing causes, but adducing the first subsumes the subsequent ones; below, clarifying the purified contemplation, adducing the subsequent subsumes the first, which is simply a skillful formulation of mutual implication. Fourth, producing and produced are also correlated to clarify the purified contemplation, meaning that when the cause is destroyed, the result perishes. The latter three gates all view the active and passive against each other; why are ignorance and formations viewed against each other solely in terms of the projecting? The answer is: wishing to reveal that all twelve links possess the two gates of non-agency and impermanence, they are clarified sequentially in the first station. Were it not so, one would suppose that only by viewing the four stations against one another could one obtain "this existing, that exists." The three gates below, wishing to show that the four stations are different, view the active and passive against each other. Furthermore, to reveal that within the projecting links there are either two or three, the first two are treated as a separate section. This is the wondrous skill of the speaker! Second, the five contaminated aggregates. "Aggregate" (skandha) has the meaning of accumulation. The first fascicle of the Samuccaya-vyākhyā says: "It has the meaning of concealing results and of a heavy burden, and it is designated by the name 'world' (loka): 'lo' (world) has the meaning of concealment, concealing the supreme truth. It also has the meaning of being destructible, being shifted by the three periods of time. 'Ka' means falling into falsity; dharmas that conceal precisely fall into falsity, so 'world' is falling into falsity." However, the aggregates of form and the rest also pertain to the meaning of uncontaminated and supramundane; wishing to disparage them, it merely adduces one portion. How is this known? One should know three things: 1. Know their characteristics, meaning that form has alteration and obstruction as its characteristic; sensation has reception as its meaning; perception grasps images; formations mean flux; and consciousness has discernment \[as its characteristic\]. 2. Know their arising and ceasing, meaning that arising comes from nowhere, and ceasing goes nowhere. 3. Know their non-arising and non-ceasing, meaning that dharmas are fundamentally unarisen, and now they do not cease. Therefore, Bodhisattva Balavan said: "Discerning these aggregates, their nature is fundamentally empty and quiescent; being empty, they cannot be destroyed—this is the meaning of non-arising." How much more so knowing that all dharmas converge in the aggregates, and the aggregates are the unobstructed dharmadhātu—only then is it called genuine extensive hearing! However, as for the nature of the aggregates, their natures are all in flux, and their names are established according to what is predominant. Formations, as a single category, although designating a general name, receive a specific name. Furthermore, it is because they subsume many dharmas. Third, the five uncontaminated aggregates, also called the five unappropriated aggregates. However, uncontaminated aggregates are also of two kinds: 1. Still retaining their original names, they are also called form and the rest, but because they are not associated with contamination, they are called uncontaminated. 2. Established by name from what has been transformed, namely the five-part dharmakāya, as in the present text. Wishing to reveal that virtues such as morality are desirable, it designates them as supramundane from the standpoint of the ultimate fruit. In principle, there are also worldly morality and the rest; morality, concentration, and wisdom have been explained repeatedly above. Liberation means freedom from bondage; it is named knowledge and vision of liberation because, through freedom from bonds, one contemplates, seeks, and comprehends objects with mastery. Fascicle 88 of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "The aggregate of morality gathers all precepts, harmonizing them into an aggregate." "Aggregate" (saṅgha) is precisely skandha. The others are to be understood accordingly. However, it is precisely transforming the previous five aggregates that forms these five parts: transforming the aggregate of form forms the body of morality, because both manifest and unmanifest morality belong to the aggregate of form; transforming the aggregate of sensation forms the body of concentration, for concentration is called correct reception (samāpatti), entering the four dhyānas and emerging from the four sensations; transforming perception forms wisdom, for "all that has marks is empty and false" and seeing marks as non-marks is seeing the dharmakāya; transforming formations forms liberation, for practices such as non-greed are called mental liberation, and permanently severing ignorance is wisdom-liberation. Furthermore, transforming consciousness forms the knowledge and vision of liberation: if associated with wrong reception and false perception, consciousness discerns various objects relying on the sense faculties; if associated with correct reception and wisdom, it is direct perception that knows as it truly is. The 'Contemplation of Emptiness' chapter of the Renwang jing says: "Contemplating form, consciousness, sensation, perception, and formations, one attains the forbearance of morality, the forbearance of knowledge and vision, the forbearance of concentration, the forbearance of wisdom, and the forbearance of liberation." > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) ### [24.12.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.24.12.2) 」即斯義也。 知見與慧，此二何別？ 《佛地論》第四總有三說。 略舉其一，謂無漏淨戒名為戒蘊，無漏定慧名定慧蘊，無學勝解名解脫蘊，無學正見名解脫知見蘊。 前三是因，後二是果。 此五別說四法為性，謂定、慧、勝解及無表色。 然此五分法身，不覆勝義、不為相遷、不墮虛偽，故名出世。 《雜集》云「謂能對治三界，無顛倒、無戲論、無分別故，是出世間義。 」問：無取五蘊即有為無漏，何以言不為相遷？ 答：約教異故。 前是權小所明。 若實教定，說非為無為，同真性故。 但似蘊相現，立以蘊名故。 《涅槃．純陀》云「善覆如來有為之相，應言如來同於無為，況一一融攝。 若如是知，名為多聞。 」第四有為者，《瑜伽》一百云「有生滅繫屬因緣，是名有為。 」《智論》云「有所得故，是名有為。 」二論心境為異。 今略舉四事：三界即所依處，眾生即能依之者。 然所依處隨心成異，故論云「欲所屬界名欲界」等。 第五無為。 為者作也，即前生滅，今虛空等。 寂寞冲虛湛然常住，無彼造作，故名無為。 《瑜伽》云「無生滅，不繫屬因緣，是名無為。 」《智論》云「無所得故名為無為。 」《淨名》云「不墮數故。 」然諸論總名，大旨無別，然其名數，開合不同。 小乘多說三種，即此中初及三四。 諸大乘中，《掌珍》說四，謂加真如。 法相論中，或說有六，復加不動及想受滅，謂於擇滅中滅惑障故名為擇滅，滅定障故復加後二。 或開為八，於真如中開出三性，謂善法真如等，漸欲展此真如遍諸法故。 此經說六，於擇滅中開出涅槃，二道別故； 復加緣起，顯無一事不即真故； 略無二定，未究竟故。 言虛空者，離諸障礙無物所顯故。 二涅槃者，古有二釋。 一云：性寂滅故，此即性淨涅槃，《涅槃》三十四亦同此說，此與擇滅顯未顯殊。 一云：即性淨之果，此即解脫道後，擇滅乃在無間道中。 然大乘非擇滅既約性淨，又下說法性，則後解為正。 三數緣滅者，數謂慧數，由慧為緣揀擇諸惑，能顯滅理，故唐三藏譯為擇滅，謂擇力所得滅，名為擇滅。 然此滅言，有其二義：一理性寂滅，此從所顯得名； 二因滅惑顯，名理為滅，則從能顯得名。 四非數緣滅者，非由慧數滅惑所得，但以性淨及於緣缺之所顯故。 五緣起者，有別有通。 別謂十二因緣，故分別論者、大眾一說雞胤、化地、說出世部，皆立十二緣起以為無為。 彼意以其次第作緣恒無雜亂，故說為常。 有佛無佛此法自爾，名曰無為。 故《智論》三十二云「聲聞法中亦說法性、實際。 」故《雜阿含》中說，有一比丘問佛：「十二因緣為是佛作？ 為是餘人作？ 」佛告比丘：「我不作十二因緣，亦非餘人作。 有佛無佛諸法皆如，法相法位一切常有，所謂是事有故是事有」等。 《涅槃》亦說即是無為。 遠公云：「就人論法，三世流轉是其有為。 廢人談法，法相常定故曰無為。 」望今經意，緣起無性，故曰無為。 《大品》云「菩薩觀十二因緣如虛空不可盡。 」《涅槃》云「十二因緣即是佛性。 」雖舉十二因緣，即已攝陰界諸法。 六法性住者，即真如也。 謂非妄倒，故名真如。 又真實如常揀妄揀事，於一切位恒如其性。 而云住者，離遷變故。 與法為性，是隨緣義。 復云住者，是不變義，即妄即真事皆如矣。 若準《智論》，法性、法住各是一義（云云），即為七法。 然小乘說三，虛空則就外空，復計三皆實有。 若大乘說，非唯數增，義亦有異。 《唯識論》中二義建立：一唯心變故、二依法性假施設有。 謂此諸義但一真如，隨義假設。 一無相義、二所證義、三惑盡義、四性淨義、五隨緣義、六隨緣即不變義。 此中法性即是真如。 > "—this is what it means. What is the difference between \[liberation-\]knowledge-and-vision and wisdom? The fourth fascicle of the Buddhabhūmi-\[sūtra-\]śāstra contains three explanations in all. To state one briefly: untainted pure morality is called the aggregate of morality; untainted concentration and wisdom are called the aggregates of concentration and wisdom; the superior resolution (adhimukti) of the non-learner (aśaikṣa) is called the aggregate of liberation; and the right view of the non-learner is called the aggregate of the knowledge and vision of liberation. The first three are causes, and the last two are fruits. These five are individually said to have four dharmas as their intrinsic nature: concentration, wisdom, superior resolution, and unmanifest form (avijñapti-rūpa). Yet these five components of the dharmakāya do not veil the ultimate truth, are not altered by characteristics, and do not fall into delusion; hence they are called "supramundane." The Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā says: "Because they can counter the three realms, are devoid of inversion, devoid of proliferation (prapañca), and devoid of conceptual discrimination, this is the meaning of 'supramundane.'" Question: If the five ungrasped aggregates are conditioned and untainted, why say they are not altered by characteristics? Answer: Because of differences in the teachings. What came before was explained by the provisional and Hinayana teachings. If determined by the real teaching, they are said to be neither conditioned nor unconditioned, because they are identical with the true nature; they merely manifest in the semblance of the characteristics of aggregates, and so are designated by the name "aggregates." The "Cunda" chapter of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "Skillfully concealing the Tathāgata's conditioned characteristics, one should say that the Tathāgata is identical with the unconditioned, not to mention that each and every one perfectly interpenetrates. Knowing thus is called 'having heard much.'" Fourth, conditioned \[dharmas\]. Fascicle one hundred of the Yogācārabhūmi says: "Having arising and cessation and being bound to causes and conditions is called 'conditioned.'" The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "Because of having apprehension (upalabdhi), it is called 'conditioned.'" The two treatises differ in terms of mind and object. Here four things are briefly mentioned: the three realms are the bases \[upon which beings rely\], and sentient beings are those who rely \[upon them\]. However, the bases become differentiated according to the mind; hence the treatise says, "The realm to which desire belongs is called the desire realm," and so on. Fifth, unconditioned \[dharmas\]. "Conditioned" (wei) means "made" (zuo)—that is, the aforementioned arising and cessation; now, space and so forth are tranquil, vast, serene, and ever-abiding, devoid of that making; hence they are called "unconditioned." The Yogācārabhūmi says: "Devoid of arising and cessation and not bound to causes and conditions is called 'unconditioned.'" The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "Because of having nothing apprehended (anupalabdhi), it is called 'unconditioned.'" The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: "Because it does not fall into numbers." Thus, the general designations in the various treatises do not differ in their main import; yet, their enumerations vary in opening and combining. The Hinayana mostly speaks of three kinds, which are the first and the third and fourth here. Among the various Mahāyāna treatises, the Karatalaratna speaks of four, by adding tathatā. In the treatises of the Dharma-character school (Faxiang), six are sometimes spoken of, further adding the unshakeable (āniñjya) and the cessation of ideation and feeling (saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha); that is, because defilement-hindrances are eliminated within analytical cessation, it is called analytical cessation, and because meditative hindrances are eliminated, the latter two are further added. Or they are expanded into eight, by unfolding three natures within tathatā—namely, the tathatā of wholesome dharmas and so forth—intending gradually to extend this tathatā to pervade all dharmas. This sūtra speaks of six, unfolding nirvāṇa out of analytical cessation because the two paths are distinct; it further adds pratītyasamutpāda, to reveal that there is not a single phenomenon that is not identical with the real; and it omits the two meditative cessations, because they are not yet ultimate. "Space" is that which is revealed by freedom from all obstructions and the absence of material things. Second, "nirvāṇa." Ancient \[masters\] offered two explanations. One says: because its nature is quiescent and extinct, this is the naturally pure nirvāṇa; fascicle thirty-four of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra agrees with this, this \[nirvāṇa\] differing from analytical cessation only in being unmanifest versus manifest. Another says: it is the fruit of natural purity; this is after the path of liberation (vimukti-mārga), whereas analytical cessation is within the uninterrupted path (ānantarya-mārga). However, since non-analytical cessation in the Mahāyāna is defined in terms of natural purity, and the dharmatā is spoken of below, this latter interpretation is correct. Third, "cessation through analysis" (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha). "Analysis" (saṃkhyā) means the mental factor of wisdom; because wisdom serves as the condition to discern defilements, it can reveal the principle of cessation; hence the Tang Tripiṭaka Master \[Xuanzang\] translated it as "cessation through discernment" (ze mie), meaning that the cessation obtained by the power of discernment is called analytical cessation. However, this term "cessation" has two senses: first, the principle's nature is quiescent and extinct—this takes its name from what is revealed; second, because the principle is revealed through the destruction of defilements, the principle is called cessation—this takes its name from what reveals it. Fourth, "cessation not through analysis" (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha). It is not obtained through the destruction of defilements by the mental factor of wisdom, but is revealed simply through natural purity and the deficiency of conditions. Fifth, "pratītyasamutpāda." It has both specific and general \[senses\]. The specific refers to the twelve links of dependent origination; therefore, the Vibhajyavādins, the Mahāsāṃghika, the Ekavyāvahārika, the Gokulika, the Mahīśāsaka, and the Lokottaravāda all establish the twelve links of dependent origination as unconditioned. Their view is that because their sequential functioning as conditions is eternally unconfused, they are said to be permanent. Whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, this dharma is naturally so; hence it is called unconditioned. Thus fascicle thirty-two of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "The Śrāvaka teachings also speak of dharmatā and the reality limit (bhūtakoṭi)." Hence in the Saṃyuktāgama it is said that a monk asked the Buddha: "Were the twelve links of dependent origination made by the Buddha, or were they made by someone else?" The Buddha told the monk: "I did not make the twelve links of dependent origination, nor were they made by someone else. Whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, all dharmas are just as they are; the marks of dharmas and the station of dharmas (dharmasthititā) eternally exist, namely, 'because this exists, that exists,' and so forth." The Nirvāṇa Sūtra also says they are unconditioned. Master \[Hui\]yuan said: "Discussing the dharma in terms of persons, transmigration through the three times is conditioned. Setting aside persons and discussing the dharma, the characteristics of dharmas are eternally fixed; therefore it is called unconditioned." Looking at the intention of the present sūtra, pratītyasamutpāda is devoid of intrinsic nature; therefore it is called unconditioned. The Larger Prajñāpāramitā says: "The bodhisattva contemplates the twelve links of dependent origination as being inexhaustible like space." The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "The twelve links of dependent origination are Buddha-nature." Although only the twelve links of dependent origination are cited, all dharmas of the aggregates and realms are already subsumed. Sixth, "the abiding of dharmatā." This is tathatā. Because it is not deluded or inverted, it is called tathatā. Moreover, "real" and "thus-as-always" selects out the false and selects out phenomena; in all stations, it is eternally like its nature. Saying that it "abides" is due to its freedom from alteration and change. Being the nature of all dharmas is the sense of according with conditions. Saying again that it "abides" is the sense of being unchanging—phenomena, in being immediately false and immediately true, are all thus. If based on the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, dharmatā and the abiding of dharma each constitute one meaning (and so forth), which would make seven dharmas. Now, the Hinayana speaks of three: space is taken as external space, and moreover they posit all three as truly existent. If explained according to the Mahāyāna, not only does the number increase, but the meaning is also different. In the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra, they are established on the basis of two meanings: first, because they are transformed by the mind alone; second, they are nominally posited based on dharmatā. That is, all these meanings are merely the one tathatā, hypothetically established according to different senses: first, the meaning of marklessness; second, the meaning of being what is realized; third, the meaning of the exhaustion of defilements; fourth, the meaning of natural purity; fifth, the meaning of according with conditions; sixth, the meaning that according with conditions is immediately unchanging. Here, dharmatā is simply tathatā. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) ### [24.12.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.24.12.3) 然法性真如亦假施設，遮撥為無故說為有，遮執為有故說為空，勿謂虛幻故說為實，理非妄倒故名真如，為法之性名為法性，非離色心別有實體。 今多聞之人不唯知名而已，應如是知。 第六有記法者，有釋云：謂能招愛非愛果，故名有記。 此乃通說。 餘處辨記，即是善惡。 今唯舉善，應云順理善法可記錄故。 下出所記法體，句有十一，義攝唯五。 四聖諦，如前本品已辨。 四沙門果，如〈梵行品〉。 四辨，如第九地。 三十七品，如第四地。 四無所畏，今當略明，謂外難無怯，故名無畏。 《瑜伽》云「如來於此謗難都不見有如實因相，由是因緣能自了知坦然無畏。 」無畏有四：一一切智無畏、二漏盡無畏、三者障道、四出苦道。 此之四段各有難答。 初外難云：若佛是一切智者，有諸比丘從他方來，何須問言安樂住不？ 言一切智無所不知，今問於他，一何相反。 佛自唱言：我是一切智人，但為攝受來者，隨順世間師弟人事故。 二有難云：若佛自言漏永盡者，何以愛語羅睺、訶罵調達？ 佛於此難正見無由、安隱無怯，自唱德號，我實漏盡，但為隨根而調伏故。 三有難云：若佛說欲能障道者，何故預流、一來尚有妻子之愛？ 佛於此難心無怯懼，謂自唱德號，我說欲能障道，但障不還、羅漢，非初、二果。 四有難云：若佛說諸聖道能盡苦者，何故羅漢受瘡潰蛇螫之苦？ 佛於此難心無怯懼，自唱德號，我說聖道實能盡苦邊際，但說未來，非現在故。 四中初一離所知障，次離煩惱障，三是出離道障，四即出離之道。 初二自利，後二利他。 所以自歎此四者，初一為菩薩、第二為聲聞、後二通為。 《智論》二十八、《瑜伽》五十、《對法》十四廣辨其相。 第七無記中分二：先徵名、後「謂世間」下辨相。 今初。 無記二義：一非善非惡，不能招感愛非愛果，名為無記。 可釋餘文。 今此正謂虛妄推度非理問難不可記錄，故名無記，非對善惡。 故《俱舍》第十九云「諸契經說十四無記」，即其義也。 亦名置記，記即答也，不應答故。 所以不答者何？ 謂此乃無義語也，知之不免生死，不知不障涅槃； 前說有記則反於此。 《智論》第三云「所以不答十四難者，此事無實故。 諸法有常，無此理故，言斷亦爾。 如有人問：𤛓於牛角，得幾升乳？ 豈曰問耶？ 復次世界無窮猶如車輪。 復次無利有失，墮惡邪中，覆於四諦諸法實相。 復次人不能知。 復次稱法說故。 」第十七云「有一比丘思惟十四難不能解，辭佛不為弟子。 佛言：『我為老病死人說法濟度。 此是鬪諍法，如中毒箭，不應推尋。 』」《楞伽》亦云「皆是世論，非我所說。 」言十四者，即此中前四四句，其第四四句但合為二，謂身與神一、身與神異。 然諸經論多說十四難，而相或同異，不繁會釋。 今經委論，不出我法二執。 文分五段：第一有四四句，就我明無記。 第二「過去」下，就三世橫論凡聖數之多少。 三「何等」下，約凡聖竪論初後。 四「世間從何」下，徵三世間所從。 五「何者」下，約生死際畔以辨無記。 今初句雖十六，其過不出斷常二見。 言世間者，準《大品》中通三世間，謂眾生世間、五蘊世間及器世間。 今此文意，正顯眾生世間，兼明五蘊世間，以眾生是總主假者，外道計以為我故。 有邊等諸見，初有邊四句約未來世，常等四句約過去世。 如來有無，依涅槃起。 故《中論．邪見品》云「我於過去世，為有為是無？ 世間常等見，皆依過去世。 我於未來世，為作為無作？ 有邊等諸見，皆依未來世。 」〈涅槃品〉云「如來滅後有無等，依涅槃起。 我及眾生有無四句，約現在說。 」既知起見之本，次隨文別釋，即為四段。 第一四句言有邊者，即斷見外道，計我於後世更不復作，則與此身俱盡。 無邊者，謂我於後世更有所作。 > However, the dharmatā-tathatā is also a provisional designation: to ward off nihilistic denial it is said to exist; to ward off grasping at existence it is said to be empty; to prevent it from being thought illusory it is said to be real; because the noumenon is not deluded or inverted it is named tathatā; being the nature of all dharmas it is named dharmatā—there is no real entity apart from form and mind. Now, one who is of great learning does not merely know its name; one should know it in this way. Sixth, regarding designated dharmas (vyākaraṇa-dharma), some explain: because they are able to incur desirable or undesirable retributions, they are called designated (vyākaraṇa). This is a general explanation. Where vyākaraṇa is distinguished elsewhere, it refers to the wholesome and the unwholesome. Here, only the wholesome is raised; it should be said that wholesome dharmas that conform to principle may be recorded \[or designated\]. Below, the essences of the designated dharmas are presented: there are eleven phrases, which in meaning are subsumed under just five: The Four Noble Truths, as already distinguished above in this chapter. The four fruits of the ascetic (śramaṇa), as in the "Chapter on Pure Conduct". The four analytical knowledges (pratisaṃvid), as in the Ninth Stage. The thirty-seven factors \[of enlightenment\], as in the Fourth Stage. The four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya) will now be explained briefly: because one has no cowardice in the face of external challenges, they are called fearlessnesses. The Yogācārabhūmi says: "Regarding these slanders and challenges, the Tathāgata sees no truly existent causal marks whatsoever; by this reason and condition he is able to understand inherently, remaining serene and fearless." The fearlessnesses are four: first, fearlessness of all-knowledge (sarvajñāna); second, fearlessness regarding the destruction of contaminations (āsravakṣaya); third, \[fearlessness regarding\] the obstructive dharmas; fourth, \[fearlessness regarding\] the path leading out of suffering. Each of these four sections has a challenge and an answer: First, the external challenge states: If the Buddha is omniscient, when monks come from other lands, why is it necessary to ask them, 'Are you dwelling in comfort?' Saying he is omniscient means there is nothing he does not know; now asking others, how contradictory! The Buddha proclaimed of himself: 'I am an omniscient person; it is only to gather in those who come, following the conventional manners of teacher and pupil among worldly beings.' Second, some challenge: If the Buddha says of himself that his contaminations are forever destroyed, why did he address Rāhula with loving words and scold Devadatta? Regarding this challenge, the Buddha saw correctly that it had no basis, remaining secure and without cowardice, proclaiming his virtuous title: 'My contaminations are truly destroyed; it is only to subdue them according to their capacities.' Third, some challenge: If the Buddha said that desire can obstruct the path, why do stream-enterers (srotāpanna) and once-returners (sakṛdāgāmin) still have love for wives and children? Regarding this challenge, the Buddha's mind was without fear or dread; he proclaimed his virtuous title: 'I say that desire can obstruct the path, but it obstructs non-returners (anāgāmin) and arhats, not the first two fruits.' Fourth, some challenge: If the Buddha said that the noble paths can end suffering, why do arhats suffer the pain of ulcers bursting and snakebites? Regarding this challenge, the Buddha's mind was without fear or dread, proclaiming his virtuous title: 'I say that the noble path truly can end the limit of suffering, but I speak of the future, not the present.' Among the four, the first one is free from the cognitive obscurations (jñeyāvaraṇa); the second is free from the affliction obscurations (kleśāvaraṇa); the third concerns the obstacles to the path of departure; the fourth is the path of departure itself. The first two are for one's own benefit; the latter two are for the benefit of others. As to why he praises these four himself: the first is for bodhisattvas; the second is for śrāvakas; the latter two are for both in common. The Dazhidulun, scroll 28, the Yogācārabhūmi, scroll 50, and the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, scroll 14, distinguish their marks at length. Seventh, the undesignated \[or undeclared\] (avyākṛta) dharmas are divided into two: first, inquiring into the name; second, from "namely, the world" below, distinguishing the marks. Now, the first: Undesignated has two meanings: first, being neither wholesome nor unwholesome, unable to incur desirable or undesirable retribution, it is called undesignated. This may explain other texts. Here, it precisely refers to false conjectures and unreasonable questions that cannot be recorded \[or answered\]; hence they are called undesignated, not in contrast to wholesome and unwholesome. Therefore, the Kośa, scroll 19, says: "Various sūtras speak of the fourteen undeclared matters," which is precisely this meaning. They are also called 'set-aside declarations' (sthāpanīya-vyākaraṇa); 'declaration' means answering, and because they should not be answered. Why are they not answered? It is because these are meaningless words: knowing them does not free one from birth and death; not knowing them does not obstruct nirvāṇa. The designated matters mentioned earlier are the opposite of this. The Dazhidulun, scroll 3, says: "Why are the fourteen challenges not answered? Because these matters have no reality. That dharmas are permanent—there is no such principle; to speak of annihilation is also like this. As if someone were to ask: 'Milking a cow's horn, how many pints of milk do you get?' Can this be called a question? Furthermore, the world is endless like a cartwheel. Furthermore, there is no benefit and there is harm, falling into evil views, obscuring the true reality of the Four Truths and all dharmas. Furthermore, humans are incapable of knowing. Furthermore, \[the Buddha\] speaks in accord with the Dharma." Scroll 17 says: "There was a monk who contemplated the fourteen challenges and could not understand them; he took leave of the Buddha to no longer be a disciple. The Buddha said: 'I teach the Dharma to save those subject to old age, sickness, and death. These are matters of dispute, like a poisoned arrow; they should not be pursued.'" The Laṅkāvatāra also says: "These are all worldly debates, not what I teach." As for the fourteen, these are the four tetralemmas (catuṣkoṭi) mentioned earlier here, where the fourth tetralemma is simply combined into two, namely, whether the body and the soul are one, or the body and the soul are different. Now, various sūtras and treatises mostly speak of the fourteen challenges, though their characteristics may be the same or different; they will not be harmonized in detail. When this sūtra discusses them fully, they do not go beyond the two attachments to self and dharmas. The text is divided into five sections: First, there are four tetralemmas, clarifying the undeclared with respect to the self. Second, from "past" below, horizontally discussing the quantity of ordinary beings and noble ones with respect to the three periods of time. Third, from "what kind" below, vertically discussing the beginning and end with respect to ordinary beings and noble ones. Fourth, from "from whence does the world" below, inquiring into where the three worlds come from. Fifth, from "which" below, distinguishing the undeclared with respect to the limits of birth and death. Now, regarding the first, although there are sixteen phrases, their faults do not go beyond the two views of annihilation and permanence. As for "the world," according to the Large Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, it extends across the three worlds, namely, the world of sentient beings, the world of the five aggregates, and the receptacle world. The meaning of this text here primarily reveals the world of sentient beings, and secondarily clarifies the world of the five aggregates, because sentient beings are the general, primary provisional entities, which non-Buddhists impute to be the self. Regarding the views such as having an end: the first four phrases on having an end pertain to future times; the four phrases on permanence and so forth pertain to past times. The existence or non-existence of the Tathāgata arises based on nirvāṇa. Therefore, the Madhyamakaśāstra, "Chapter on Erroneous Views," says: "Did I exist in past times, or did I not exist? Views such as the permanence of the world all depend on past times. Will I act in future times, or will I not act? Views such as having an end all depend on future times." The "Chapter on Nirvāṇa" says: "The existence, non-existence, etc., of the Tathāgata after extinction arises based on nirvāṇa. The four phrases on the existence and non-existence of the self and sentient beings are spoken in relation to the present." Having known the basis for the arising of views, next they are individually explained according to the text, which forms four sections. In the first four phrases, saying "having an end" refers to non-Buddhists holding the view of annihilation, who impute that the self will no longer act in future lifetimes, ending along with this body. "Without an end" means that the self will act further in future lifetimes. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) ### [24.12.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.24.12.4) 三俱句者，身盡故有邊，我不異故無邊。 四俱非句者，亦以我存身盡，見上有過，故立此句。 謂身盡故非無邊，我存故非有邊，既皆邪見，故不答之。 若欲破者，初之二句墮無後世過，謂有邊則與陰同盡、無邊則是今身，故皆無後世。 無後世者，修道苦行為何益耶？ 第三句亦有邊無邊者，若身盡我存，身我為一為異？ 一則不應有盡不盡，異則離蘊何相知有我耶？ 若謂捨人生天，人分猶在天分更增，則半天半人，故皆不可。 第四句非有邊未免於無、非無邊未免於有，云何於此強分別耶？ 二常等四句。 約過去者，過去世我即是今我，名之為常。 若常，即有大過，破壞因果涅槃等故。 若謂我今始生，名為無常。 若爾，我是作法，亦墮無因，無因則亦無涅槃等。 第三見上二過，便謂我常身無常。 離身何處有我？ 又成上二過。 第四謂我不異故非無常，身有異故非常。 破同第三句。 又《中論》云「一切法空故，何有邊無邊及常等見。 」餘義廣如彼論。 三如來滅後等四句，釋有二義：一明如來者非是佛也。 如即相似，來謂從前際來。 謂一有執云：如從前世來生此間，去向後世亦復如是，故云如來滅後有，謂如前際來時有故。 此由計我異陰故。 二云：如從前世來此間，死後斷滅，故云如來滅後無，謂不如來時去故。 此計陰我一故。 三由計我有麁細故，謂麁我與身俱盡故云不如去，細我異陰不同滅故、亦如來時而去故，云如來滅後亦有亦無。 四云我如虛空，體無來去故。 晉經云如來滅後如去不如去等，此則通望三世以辨。 若依《中論》，附涅槃起四句，如來即佛也。 順此經文，亦是外道自立己師而為如來。 有謂如來滅後定有不變，或謂入無餘依同於太虛，或謂法有應無，或謂約應非有、約法非無。 以其四句皆成戲論，不見如來寂滅相，故亦為邪見。 此則權小之徒未能免也。 《瑜伽》八十七云「依二道理如實隨觀，俱不可記如來滅後若有若無。 所以者何？ 且依勝義，彼不可得，況其滅後或有或無。 若依世俗，為於諸行假立如來？ 為於涅槃？ 若於諸行，如來滅後無有一行流轉可得，爾時何處假立如來？ 既無如來，何有無等？ 若於涅槃，涅槃唯是無行所顯，絕諸戲論。 自內所證絕戲論故，施設為有，不應道理。 亦復不應施設非有，勿當損毀施設妙有寂靜涅槃。 」又此涅槃極難知故、最微細故，說名甚深。 種種非一，諸行煩惱斷所顯故，說名廣大。 現量比量及正教量所不量故，說名無量。 四我及眾生有無等四句，此並雙立眾生即是五蘊，非約總主，有即定有，定有著常； 無即定無，定無著斷。 三遠上二過，雙立有無，即墮相違。 四避此相違，立俱非句，又成戲論。 然此四句，亦有單計我有所無、所有我無，亦不離初之二句。 又合上成第三，互奪成第四，亦不出初之二句。 第二門明三乘凡聖數之多少者，以橫無邊，故不可記也。 第三門竪無際故不可記也。 有人答問，云有初佛言自然悟，引獺祭天亦為應機，寧加置記？ 若有初佛，如來應知，則可說名。 言何法者？ 染淨等一切法也。 第四門徵世間所從，有六句：初二句問眾生及蘊世間、次四句約器世間，以外道計眾生有最初生故。 或謂從冥諦中來，還至冥故。 或謂世界皆微塵成，謂至妙之色常恒不變，聚則為身器、散則成微塵故。 此皆邪見之源，故不應答。 有情世間不言成壞者，《瑜伽》云「有情望器有五不同：一謂器界生死共因所生，有情生死但由不共故，是因不同。 二謂器有除斷，有情流轉不斷故，是時不同。 三謂三災壞不壞故，名法不同。 四謂器界因無永斷，有情不爾，名斷不同。 五謂器則斷而復續，有情斷已無續，名續不同。 」以斯義故，略無成壞也。 第五約生死初後際，唯有二句。 問：初際無始，聖教所明。 生死有終，豈非正理？ 答：略有三義。 > As for the third, the both-proposition: because the body ends, it has an end; because the self is not different \[from the body\], it is endless. As for the fourth, the neither-proposition: this proposition is also established because, \[grasping that\] the self persists while the body ends, one sees errors in the propositions above. That is to say, because the body ends it is not endless, and because the self persists it is not finite; since these are both wrong views, \[the Buddha\] does not answer them. If one wishes to refute them: the first two propositions fall into the fault of \[denying\] future lifetimes; that is, if it has an end, it ends together with the aggregates, and if it is endless, it is just this present body; thus in both cases there is no future lifetime. If there is no future lifetime, what benefit is there in cultivating the path and practicing austerities? Regarding the third proposition, 'both finite and endless': if the body ends and the self persists, are the body and the self one or different? If they are one, then it should not be that one ends while the other does not; if they are different, apart from the aggregates by what mark can the existence of a self be known? If it is claimed that when relinquishing human form to be born in heaven, the human portion still remains while the heavenly portion increases, this would mean being half god and half human; therefore neither is tenable. Regarding the fourth proposition: 'not finite' does not escape non-existence, and 'not endless' does not escape existence; how can one arbitrarily make conceptual distinctions concerning this? Second, the four propositions concerning permanence and so on: regarding the past, if the self of past lifetimes is identical to the present self, it is termed 'permanent'. If it is permanent, there are great faults, for this destroys cause and effect, nirvāṇa, and the like. If it is claimed that my self has only now been born, it is termed 'impermanent'. If so, the self is a produced entity and also falls into being causeless; if it is causeless, there is likewise no nirvāṇa and so forth. The third proposition, seeing the two faults above, then asserts that the self is permanent while the body is impermanent. Apart from the body, where is there a self? This again incurs the above two faults. The fourth asserts that because the self is not different, it is not impermanent, and because the body has differences, it is not permanent. The refutation is the same as that for the third proposition. Furthermore, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: 'Because all dharmas are empty, how could there be views of finitude, endlessness, permanence, and the like?' The remaining points are as extensively treated in that treatise. Third, regarding the four propositions on 'the Tathāgata after extinction' and so forth, the explanation has two meanings: first, explaining that 'Tathāgata' here does not refer to the Buddha. Ru (tathā) means 'similarity', and lai (āgata) means 'coming from the past limit'. That is, one person grasps: just as one comes from a past lifetime to be born here, departing to a future lifetime is also like this; hence it is said that 'the Tathāgata exists after extinction', meaning that it exists just as when it came from the past limit. This is due to positing a self that is different from the aggregates. The second view states: just as one comes here from a past lifetime, after death there is annihilation; hence it is said that 'the Tathāgata does not exist after extinction', meaning that it does not go as it came. This is due to positing that the aggregates and the self are one. The third view: because of positing coarse and subtle selves, one says that because the coarse self ends together with the body, it does not depart as it came, and because the subtle self is different from the aggregates and does not perish together with them, it also departs as it came; hence it is said that 'the Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after extinction'. The fourth view states: the self is like space, its essence having neither coming nor going. The Jin dynasty sūtra says: 'the Tathāgata after extinction departs as it came, does not depart as it came', and so forth; this is explained by taking all three times into perspective. If one relies on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, the four propositions are framed based on nirvāṇa, where 'Tathāgata' refers to the Buddha. In accordance with the text of this sūtra, it is also that non-Buddhists set up their own teachers as 'tathāgata'. Some assert that after extinction the Tathāgata definitely exists and is unchanging; some assert that entering the \[nirvāṇa\] without remainder is identical to empty space; some assert that the Dharma-\[body\] exists while the response-\[body\] does not; some assert that in terms of the response\[-body\] it does not exist, while in terms of the Dharma\[-body\] it is not non-existent. Because all four propositions constitute conceptual proliferation and do not perceive the quiescent mark of the Tathāgata, they are also wrong views. In this, those of the provisional and Hinayana teachings have not yet been able to avoid it. Fascicle eighty-seven of the Yogācārabhūmi states: 'Observing in accordance with reality on the basis of two rationales, it is in both cases unexplainable whether the Tathāgata exists or does not exist after extinction. Why is this? First, based on the ultimate truth, that \[Tathāgata\] is ungraspable, much less whether it exists or does not exist after extinction. If based on the conventional: is the Tathāgata designated conventionally upon conditioned formations, or upon nirvāṇa? If upon conditioned formations, after the Tathāgata's extinction not a single conditioned formation can be found in transmigration; at that time, upon what could the Tathāgata be conventionally designated? Since there is no Tathāgata, how could there be existence, non-existence, and so on? If upon nirvāṇa, nirvāṇa is revealed solely by the absence of conditioned formations, cut off from all conceptual proliferation. Because that which is internally realized cuts off conceptual proliferation, designating it as existent is not in accord with reason. Nor should it be designated as non-existent, lest one disparage the quiescent nirvāṇa that is designated as wondrous existence.' Furthermore, because this nirvāṇa is exceedingly difficult to know and most subtle, it is called 'profound'. Because it is revealed by the cessation of diverse and non-singular conditioned formations and defilements, it is called 'vast'. Because it cannot be measured by direct perception, inference, or valid scripture, it is called 'immeasurable'. Fourth, the four propositions on the existence or non-existence of the self and sentient beings: these both jointly establish that 'sentient beings' are just the five aggregates, not referring to an overarching master; 'existing' means definitively existing, and definitive existence clings to permanence; 'not existing' means definitively not existing, and definitive non-existence clings to annihilation. The third, seeking to avoid the above two faults, posits both existence and non-existence, thus falling into contradiction. The fourth, evading this contradiction, posits the neither-proposition, which again becomes conceptual proliferation. However, among these four propositions, there are also singular graspings that 'the self exists and what belongs to it does not', or 'what belongs to it exists and the self does not', which also do not depart from the first two propositions. Moreover, combining the above forms the third, and mutual negation forms the fourth, which also do not go beyond the first two propositions. The second section, explaining the quantity of the ordinary and noble beings of the three vehicles: because it is horizontally boundless, it cannot be recorded. The third section: because it is vertically without limit, it cannot be recorded. Someone in answering a question said that there was an original Buddha who awakened spontaneously, citing an otter offering sacrifices to heaven as also responding to capacities; why should one further leave it unrecorded? If there were an original Buddha, the Tathāgata should know it and could state the name. What is meant by 'what dharmas'? All dharmas, defiled, pure, and so forth. The fourth section, inquiring into the origins of the world, has six propositions: the first two propositions ask about sentient beings and the world of aggregates; the next four propositions concern the receptacle world, because non-Buddhists posit that sentient beings have a primal birth. Or they assert that they come from the primordial darkness (prakṛti) and return to darkness. Or they assert that the worlds are all composed of atoms, meaning that the most wondrous form is permanent and unchanging, aggregating to form bodies and receptacles, and dispersing to become atoms. These are all sources of wrong views, and therefore should not be answered. The reason why the world of sentient beings does not speak of formation and disintegration is that the Yogācārabhūmi states: 'Sentient beings, when compared to the receptacle \[world\], have five differences: first, the receptacle realm's saṃsāra is produced by shared causes, whereas the saṃsāra of sentient beings is produced solely by unshared causes; this is the difference in causes. Second, the receptacle \[world\] has interruption and cessation, whereas the transmigration of sentient beings is uninterrupted; this is the difference in time. Third, regarding destruction and non-destruction by the three disasters; this is called the difference in nature. Fourth, the causes of the receptacle realm are never permanently severed, whereas sentient beings are not like this; this is called the difference in severance. Fifth, the receptacle \[world\] is severed and then resumes, whereas once sentient beings are severed there is no resumption; this is called the difference in resumption.' For these reasons, formation and disintegration are omitted. The fifth, concerning the initial and final limits of saṃsāra, has only two propositions. Question: That the initial limit has no beginning is made clear by the holy teachings. That saṃsāra has an end—how could that not be correct principle? Answer: Briefly, there are three points. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) ### [24.12.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.24.12.5) 一約一人則可云終，通望一切則無終極。 二以彼定執長邪見，故亦不應答。 謂若許有終必有始故，常法無始亦無終故。 三約法性皆不可說故。 《中論》云「大聖之所說，本際不可得。 生死無有始，亦復無有終。 若無有始終，中當云何有。 是故於此中，先後共亦無。 」既言本際不可得，亦不應定謂無始無終，況有始終之見耶？ 又有偈云「真法及說者，聽者難得故，是故則生死，非有邊無邊。 」上諸邪見多是外道，亦參小乘。 菩薩善知，則問答無滯便舉破者，令自他造中故也。 第二「菩薩」下顯多聞之意。 謂悲物無聞長淪生死，故誓持聞藏，自證利他。 > First, with respect to one single person, one may speak of an end; but looking across all \[beings\], there is no final limit. Second, because their dogmatic grasping fosters wrong views, \[the Buddha\] also does not answer. That is to say, if one concedes that there is an end, there must be a beginning, for permanent dharmas have neither beginning nor end. Third, in terms of the dharmatā, both are ineffable. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: 'What the Great Sage spoke of / is that the primal limit cannot be found. / Saṃsāra has no beginning, / nor does it have an end. / If there is neither beginning nor end, / how could there be a middle? / Therefore herein, / prior, posterior, and simultaneous also do not exist.' Since it is said that the primal limit cannot be found, one should also not definitively say there is neither beginning nor end, much less hold the view that there is a beginning and an end! Furthermore, a verse states: 'Because the true Dharma, its preacher, / and its listener are difficult to find, / therefore saṃsāra / is neither finite nor endless.' The above wrong views mostly belong to non-Buddhists, and also include the Hinayana. When bodhisattvas understand them well, their questions and answers are unhindered; they immediately raise refutations in order to cause themselves and others to dwell in the middle. Second, from 'the bodhisattva' onward, it clarifies the meaning of having heard much. That is, taking pity on beings who have heard nothing and long sink in saṃsāra, they vow to uphold the treasury of what has been heard, realizing it for themselves and benefiting others. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735~en-mt.24.12.1) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (4) - [大智度論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.prajnaparamita.pancavimsatisahasrika!mahaprajnaparamitopadesa*zh-kumarajiva.32.72) — Classical Chinese - [妙法蓮華經玄贊](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1723.7.498) — Classical Chinese - [大乘阿毘達磨雜集論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.yogacara.abhidharmasamuccaya!bhasya*zh-xuanzang.4.17) — Classical Chinese - [佛地經論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.mahayanasutra.dharma.buddhabhumisutra!buddhabhumisutrasastra*zh-xuanzang.4.20) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.24.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.24.12) · Pramāṇa