[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大方廣佛華嚴經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735) › 40.9 # 大方廣佛華嚴經疏 40.9 大方廣佛華嚴經疏 40.9 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [40.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.40.9) 第八因緣生滅，亦名從緣無性。初約一切智觀。此下三門皆明深觀，謂四句求緣皆無有生，無生而生，故曰深觀。此門明不自生、不他生，第九門明不共生，第十門明不無因生。釋此四句，略有二意：一破邪、二顯理。理外妄計曰邪。邪亡則理顯，理顯則惑亡，反覆相順。然自他等四是計是依，不之一字是藥是理。窮生之理不出自等，自等若無生將安寄？故以不不之，則惑亡理顯。然其所計，略有三類：一者外道，謂冥性為自、梵天為他、微塵和合為共、自然為無因。又此四計亦是僧佉、衛世、若提子、勒沙婆也。二小乘，同類因為自、異熟因為他、俱有因為共、計無明支託虛而起亦曰無因，上計亦通大乘執相之者。三約大乘，果法為自、眾緣為他、合此為共、離此為無因。又賴耶自種為自、眾緣為他、合此為共、離此為無因。又法從真起為自、從妄起為他、合此為共、離此為無因。所計雖眾，但顯正理，諸計自妄。顯理復二：一約無生以顯深觀、二約生無生無礙以顯深觀。先中，略為二解：一約展轉釋，法從緣故不自生。既無有自，對誰說他？又一切法總為自故，又他望於他亦是自故，既無有他，故不他生。自他不立，合誰為共？有因尚不生，無因何得生？二約因緣形奪釋，故《對法》云「自種有故不從他，待眾緣故非自作，無作用故不共生，有功能故非無因。」論解同此。若爾，自種有故則是自生，豈曰無生？此乃假自破他，非立於自。次句假他遣自，故《中論》云「如諸法自性，不在於緣中」也。下二句例然，惟審詳之。二約無礙者，但因緣生果各有二義，謂全有力、全無力。緣望於果，若全有力，則因全無力，故云因不生緣生，故云不自生。二因望果全有力亦然，故云緣不生，自因生故，故不他生。三二力不俱，故不共生。四二無力不俱，故不無因。此復二義：一約用，則力用交徹有相入義，謂有力攝無力故。故〈十忍品〉云「菩薩善知緣起法，於一法中解眾多，眾多法中解了一」等。二據體有空不空，有相即義，謂非但因力歸緣，亦乃因體由緣而顯，全攝同緣，因如虛空。故上文云「一即是多多即一」等。力無力必俱故常相即入，是為無盡大緣起甚深之觀。文中亦有順逆。初順觀中，經云無明緣行者，牒也。無明因緣能生諸行者，釋也。論云「有分非他作，自因生故。」此以不他生釋經因字，謂如行支唯從無明，故云自因，即上自因觀也。二者非自作，緣生故。此以不自生釋經緣字，謂行支但假無明為緣，非有行自體在無明中從自而生，即他因觀。但取揀餘不親生故名因，顯前非後，疎故名緣，非謂四緣之因緣也。餘並可知。二約大悲觀，即異求中計非想等以為涅槃，又計妙行為解脫者，非是常德但是生滅，故可悲之。三約一切相智觀，此及後門名無始觀。此有二意：一若約俗說，因緣為生滅之本，生死無際故因緣無始。二約真說，見法緣集無有本性可依，故名無始，即《淨名》云「從無住本立一切法」故。染淨真性皆無始終，顯染可除，但云無始，餘如別說。論云「中際因緣生故後際生」，即舉此第八門。隨順縛故即第九門，謂但一念從緣生即是不生，故無始也。不言初際生者，意顯無初故。今不起妄，即不生故。 > Eighth: arising and cessation through causes and conditions, also called "lacking self-nature through conditions." First, in terms of the contemplation of all-knowledge (sarvajñatā): the three gates from here down all clarify profound contemplation, meaning that when one seeks conditions through the four propositions, in all cases there is no arising; yet there is arising without arising, hence it is called profound contemplation. This gate clarifies neither arising from self nor arising from other; the ninth gate clarifies not arising from both; the tenth gate clarifies not arising without a cause. In explaining these four propositions, there are briefly two senses: first, refuting the heterodox; second, revealing the principle. Delusional reckonings outside the principle are called heterodox. When the heterodox is eliminated, the principle is revealed; when the principle is revealed, delusion is eliminated; they correspond mutually and reciprocally. However, the four \[terms\]—self, other, and so forth—are the reckonings and their supports, while the single word "not" is the medicine and the principle. Fathoming the principle of arising does not go beyond self and the rest; if self and the rest do not exist, where can arising lodge? Therefore, by negating them with "not," delusion is eliminated and the principle is revealed. Now, the reckonings are briefly of three kinds: First, the non-Buddhists: they reckon the unmanifest primordial nature (prakṛti) as self, Brahmā as other, the aggregation of minute particles (paramāṇu) as both, and spontaneity (svabhāva) as causeless. Furthermore, these four reckonings are also those of the Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Jñātiputra (Nirgrantha-jñātiputra), and Rākṣasa (or Lākṣa/Lokāyata). Second, the Hīnayāna: they take homogeneous cause (sabhāga-hetu) as self, vipāka-cause (vipāka-hetu) as other, co-existent cause (sahabhū-hetu) as both, and reckoning the link of ignorance as arising dependent on vacuity as causeless; the reckonings above also apply to those in the Mahāyāna who grasp at marks. Third, in terms of the Mahāyāna: taking the result dharma as self, the various conditions as other, combining these as both, and departing from these as causeless. Furthermore, the ālaya\[-vijñāna\]'s own seeds are taken as self, the various conditions as other, combining these as both, and departing from these as causeless. Furthermore, phenomena arising from the real is taken as self, arising from delusion as other, combining these as both, and departing from these as causeless. Although the reckonings are numerous, merely revealing the correct principle causes all reckonings to become delusive on their own. Revealing the principle also has two aspects: first, revealing profound contemplation in terms of non-arising; second, revealing profound contemplation in terms of the non-obstruction between arising and non-arising. In the former, there are briefly two explanations: First, explaining through mutual dependence: since phenomena arise from conditions, they do not arise from self. Since there is no self, relative to what could one speak of "other"? Furthermore, because all phenomena collectively constitute the self, and also because the other looked at from the perspective of another is also a self, since there is no other, they do not arise from other. Since self and other are not established, combining what would constitute "both"? When even \[an effect\] with a cause does not arise, how could it arise without a cause? Second, explaining through causes and conditions mutually defining and negating each other: hence the Abhidharmasamuccaya states: "Because its own seeds exist, it does not come from other; because it depends on various conditions, it is not made by self; because there is no agency, it does not arise from both; because it has efficacy, it is not causeless." The explanation in the treatise is identical to this. If so, then since its own seeds exist, it would be arising from self; how could it be called non-arising? This is merely adopting "self" provisionally to refute "other," not establishing "self." The next phrase provisionally uses "other" to dispel "self"; hence the Madhyamakaśāstra states: "Just as the self-nature of phenomena does not exist in conditions." The lower two phrases follow this model; merely examine them carefully. Second, regarding non-obstruction: causes and conditions each possess two senses in producing an effect, namely, being completely potent and being completely impotent. If the conditions relative to the effect are completely potent, then the cause is completely impotent; hence it is said that the cause does not produce and conditions produce, meaning it does not arise from self. Second, the cause relative to the effect being completely potent is also like this; hence it is said that conditions do not produce and it arises from its own cause, meaning it does not arise from other. Third, the two potencies do not co-exist, hence it does not arise from both. Fourth, the two impotencies do not co-exist, hence it is not without cause. This again has two senses: first, in terms of function, potency and function mutually penetrate, possessing the meaning of mutual entry, meaning that the potent subsumes the impotent. Hence the "Ten Forbearances Chapter" states: "Bodhisattvas skillfully know the phenomena of dependent origination; within one phenomenon they understand many, and within many phenomena they understand one," and so forth. Second, based on essence having emptiness and non-emptiness, there is the meaning of mutual identity: not only does the potency of the cause return to the conditions, but the essence of the cause is also revealed through conditions; fully subsumed and assimilated to conditions, the cause is like empty space. Hence the text above states: "One is precisely many, many is precisely one," and so forth. Potency and impotency must co-exist, hence they are perpetually mutually identical and mutually entering; this is the profound contemplation of the inexhaustible great dependent origination. In the text, there are also forward and reverse \[orders\]. First, in the forward contemplation, the sūtra stating that ignorance conditions karmic formations is the restatement \[of the link\]. Ignorance as a cause and condition being able to produce all karmic formations is the explanation. The treatise states: "The constituent of existence (bhavāṅga) is not made by another, because it arises from its own cause." This uses "not arising from other" to explain the word "cause" (hetu) in the sūtra, meaning that just as the link of karmic formations comes solely from ignorance, it is called its "own cause," which is the above contemplation of its own cause. Second, it is not made by self, because it is conditioned arising. This uses "not arising from self" to explain the word "condition" (pratyaya) in the sūtra, meaning that the link of karmic formations merely relies on ignorance as a condition, and it is not that the self-substance of karmic formations exists within ignorance and arises from itself; this is the contemplation of other causes. It merely designates "cause" by selecting what does not indirectly produce, revealing the former rather than the latter; and designates "condition" because of being distant, not referring to the cause-condition (hetu-pratyaya) among the four conditions. The rest can all be understood accordingly. Second, in terms of the contemplation of great compassion, this belongs to \[the theme of\] seeking what is different: reckoning the \[sphere of\] neither-perception-nor-non-perception, etc., as nirvāṇa, and reckoning wondrous practices as liberation; these are not the permanent virtue \[of nirvāṇa\] but are merely arising and cessation, hence they are pitiable. Third, in terms of the contemplation of the cognition of all aspects, this and the subsequent gate are called the contemplation of beginninglessness. This has two senses: first, if spoken in terms of the conventional, causes and conditions are the root of arising and cessation, and because cyclic existence has no limit, causes and conditions have no beginning. Second, if spoken in terms of the real, seeing that phenomena gather through conditions without any fundamental nature to rely upon, it is therefore called beginningless; this is what Vimalakīrti refers to in saying: "From the root of non-abiding all phenomena are established." The real nature of defilement and purity has neither beginning nor end; to show that defilement can be eliminated, it merely speaks of beginninglessness, the rest being as explained elsewhere. The treatise states: "Because causes and conditions of the intermediate limit arise, the subsequent limit arises"; this precisely adduces this eighth gate. Conforming to bondage is precisely the ninth gate, meaning that merely a single thought arising from conditions is precisely non-arising, hence it is beginningless. It does not mention arising from the initial limit because the intention is to reveal that there is no beginning. If one does not give rise to delusion now, then there is non-arising. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 40.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.40.8) - [Next: 40.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.40.10) - [Up: 40](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.40) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735~en-mt.40.9) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.40.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1735.40.9) · Pramāṇa