大方廣佛華嚴經疏 24.12

English (machine translation) 24.12

Language: English

24.12.1

Fifth is the treasury of hearing. The explanation of its characteristics has two parts: first, explaining the dharmas that are known; and second, from "a bodhisattva-mahāsattva..." onward, revealing the purpose of extensive hearing. In the first part, it designates the name "treasury of hearing." Explaining it as "knowing" is because hearing is the foundation; in reality, it is just knowing much. The text also divides into two: first, setting forth the headings; and second, taking them up and explaining them. In the first part, although there are ten clauses, their meaning is subsumed into seven. The first four clauses are merely conditioned arising, meaning: 1. conditioned arising; 2. the five contaminated aggregates; 3. the five uncontaminated aggregates; 4. the conditioned; 5. the unconditioned; 6. the karmically determinate; and 7. the indeterminate. Second, from "What are..." onward, it takes them up and explains them, which constitutes seven sections. First, within conditioned arising, based on the two gates of producing and projecting, it expands into four tiers of inquiry and explanation: among the twelve links, the first two are the projecting causes, the next five are the projected results, the next three are the producing causes, and the last two are the produced results; hence there are four. However, relying on the fourth fascicle of the Samuccaya-vyākhyā, it states: "The twelve links of existence all possess the meanings of 'this existing, that exists,' and so forth." Therefore, that treatise explains the characteristics of the links: "Characteristics mean conditioned arising without agency, conditioned arising that is impermanent, and conditioned arising through potency. 'This existing, that exists' reveals the meaning of conditioned arising without agency; solely because the conditions exist can the resultant dharmas exist, not that the conditions have any real functional agency capable of producing the resultant dharmas. 'From the arising of this, that arises' reveals the meaning of impermanent conditioned arising; it is not with unproduced dharmas as causes that any dharma arises and is established. 'Ignorance conditions formations' and so forth reveals the meaning of conditioned arising through potency; although all dharmas are without agency and impermanent, yet it is not the case that following any single dharma something is produced. All results arise due to the distinctions in the functions of dharmas." Now, in this sūtra, wishing to reveal the absence of intrinsic nature in conditioned arising, it adduces the first two gates and the one gate of potency. In the Sixth Stage this is elaborated extensively, spoken in terms of predominance within the two gates, the earlier and later alternately adduced. The first seven are accepted as sharing the causal station, hence they are called projecting and projected; the last five require viewing cause and effect against one another, so they are called producing and produced. Because of this, within the projecting and projected, it merely says "this existing, that exists." The later text then says "this arising, that arises"; arising is being produced. Therefore, the Abhidharmasamuccaya states: "In the causal state there are the projecting and projected; in the resultant state there are the producing and produced." However, the text has two contemplations, defiled and purified: first, within the projecting, it clarifies the defiled contemplation, hence saying, "Because ignorance exists, formations exist." Second, in terms of the projected, it also connects the active and passive correlatives to clarify the purified contemplation, hence saying, "Because consciousness does not exist, name-and-form does not exist." For consciousness connects to the projecting and has two kinds of karma: first, maintaining all karma-bonds of sentient beings, meaning that it arises and ceases together with the habit-energy projected by formations; second, acting as a condition for name-and-form, meaning that due to consciousness entering the mother's womb, name-and-form develops and grows. Now saying that consciousness does not exist means that it is not perfumed by karma and does not maintain karma-bonds, and therefore does not enter the womb to cause name-and-form to grow; hence it says, "Because consciousness does not exist, name-and-form does not exist." Third, producing and produced are correlated to clarify the defiled contemplation, hence saying, "Because craving arises, suffering arises." Suffering is the future result, and craving is the producing cause. There are three producing causes, but adducing the first subsumes the subsequent ones; below, clarifying the purified contemplation, adducing the subsequent subsumes the first, which is simply a skillful formulation of mutual implication. Fourth, producing and produced are also correlated to clarify the purified contemplation, meaning that when the cause is destroyed, the result perishes. The latter three gates all view the active and passive against each other; why are ignorance and formations viewed against each other solely in terms of the projecting? The answer is: wishing to reveal that all twelve links possess the two gates of non-agency and impermanence, they are clarified sequentially in the first station. Were it not so, one would suppose that only by viewing the four stations against one another could one obtain "this existing, that exists." The three gates below, wishing to show that the four stations are different, view the active and passive against each other. Furthermore, to reveal that within the projecting links there are either two or three, the first two are treated as a separate section. This is the wondrous skill of the speaker! Second, the five contaminated aggregates. "Aggregate" (skandha) has the meaning of accumulation. The first fascicle of the Samuccaya-vyākhyā says: "It has the meaning of concealing results and of a heavy burden, and it is designated by the name 'world' (loka): 'lo' (world) has the meaning of concealment, concealing the supreme truth. It also has the meaning of being destructible, being shifted by the three periods of time. 'Ka' means falling into falsity; dharmas that conceal precisely fall into falsity, so 'world' is falling into falsity." However, the aggregates of form and the rest also pertain to the meaning of uncontaminated and supramundane; wishing to disparage them, it merely adduces one portion. How is this known? One should know three things: 1. Know their characteristics, meaning that form has alteration and obstruction as its characteristic; sensation has reception as its meaning; perception grasps images; formations mean flux; and consciousness has discernment [as its characteristic]. 2. Know their arising and ceasing, meaning that arising comes from nowhere, and ceasing goes nowhere. 3. Know their non-arising and non-ceasing, meaning that dharmas are fundamentally unarisen, and now they do not cease. Therefore, Bodhisattva Balavan said: "Discerning these aggregates, their nature is fundamentally empty and quiescent; being empty, they cannot be destroyed—this is the meaning of non-arising." How much more so knowing that all dharmas converge in the aggregates, and the aggregates are the unobstructed dharmadhātu—only then is it called genuine extensive hearing! However, as for the nature of the aggregates, their natures are all in flux, and their names are established according to what is predominant. Formations, as a single category, although designating a general name, receive a specific name. Furthermore, it is because they subsume many dharmas. Third, the five uncontaminated aggregates, also called the five unappropriated aggregates. However, uncontaminated aggregates are also of two kinds: 1. Still retaining their original names, they are also called form and the rest, but because they are not associated with contamination, they are called uncontaminated. 2. Established by name from what has been transformed, namely the five-part dharmakāya, as in the present text. Wishing to reveal that virtues such as morality are desirable, it designates them as supramundane from the standpoint of the ultimate fruit. In principle, there are also worldly morality and the rest; morality, concentration, and wisdom have been explained repeatedly above. Liberation means freedom from bondage; it is named knowledge and vision of liberation because, through freedom from bonds, one contemplates, seeks, and comprehends objects with mastery. Fascicle 88 of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "The aggregate of morality gathers all precepts, harmonizing them into an aggregate." "Aggregate" (saṅgha) is precisely skandha. The others are to be understood accordingly. However, it is precisely transforming the previous five aggregates that forms these five parts: transforming the aggregate of form forms the body of morality, because both manifest and unmanifest morality belong to the aggregate of form; transforming the aggregate of sensation forms the body of concentration, for concentration is called correct reception (samāpatti), entering the four dhyānas and emerging from the four sensations; transforming perception forms wisdom, for "all that has marks is empty and false" and seeing marks as non-marks is seeing the dharmakāya; transforming formations forms liberation, for practices such as non-greed are called mental liberation, and permanently severing ignorance is wisdom-liberation. Furthermore, transforming consciousness forms the knowledge and vision of liberation: if associated with wrong reception and false perception, consciousness discerns various objects relying on the sense faculties; if associated with correct reception and wisdom, it is direct perception that knows as it truly is. The 'Contemplation of Emptiness' chapter of the Renwang jing says: "Contemplating form, consciousness, sensation, perception, and formations, one attains the forbearance of morality, the forbearance of knowledge and vision, the forbearance of concentration, the forbearance of wisdom, and the forbearance of liberation."

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"—this is what it means. What is the difference between [liberation-]knowledge-and-vision and wisdom? The fourth fascicle of the Buddhabhūmi-[sūtra-]śāstra contains three explanations in all. To state one briefly: untainted pure morality is called the aggregate of morality; untainted concentration and wisdom are called the aggregates of concentration and wisdom; the superior resolution (adhimukti) of the non-learner (aśaikṣa) is called the aggregate of liberation; and the right view of the non-learner is called the aggregate of the knowledge and vision of liberation. The first three are causes, and the last two are fruits. These five are individually said to have four dharmas as their intrinsic nature: concentration, wisdom, superior resolution, and unmanifest form (avijñapti-rūpa). Yet these five components of the dharmakāya do not veil the ultimate truth, are not altered by characteristics, and do not fall into delusion; hence they are called "supramundane." The Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā says: "Because they can counter the three realms, are devoid of inversion, devoid of proliferation (prapañca), and devoid of conceptual discrimination, this is the meaning of 'supramundane.'" Question: If the five ungrasped aggregates are conditioned and untainted, why say they are not altered by characteristics? Answer: Because of differences in the teachings. What came before was explained by the provisional and Hinayana teachings. If determined by the real teaching, they are said to be neither conditioned nor unconditioned, because they are identical with the true nature; they merely manifest in the semblance of the characteristics of aggregates, and so are designated by the name "aggregates." The "Cunda" chapter of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "Skillfully concealing the Tathāgata's conditioned characteristics, one should say that the Tathāgata is identical with the unconditioned, not to mention that each and every one perfectly interpenetrates. Knowing thus is called 'having heard much.'" Fourth, conditioned [dharmas]. Fascicle one hundred of the Yogācārabhūmi says: "Having arising and cessation and being bound to causes and conditions is called 'conditioned.'" The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "Because of having apprehension (upalabdhi), it is called 'conditioned.'" The two treatises differ in terms of mind and object. Here four things are briefly mentioned: the three realms are the bases [upon which beings rely], and sentient beings are those who rely [upon them]. However, the bases become differentiated according to the mind; hence the treatise says, "The realm to which desire belongs is called the desire realm," and so on. Fifth, unconditioned [dharmas]. "Conditioned" (wei) means "made" (zuo)—that is, the aforementioned arising and cessation; now, space and so forth are tranquil, vast, serene, and ever-abiding, devoid of that making; hence they are called "unconditioned." The Yogācārabhūmi says: "Devoid of arising and cessation and not bound to causes and conditions is called 'unconditioned.'" The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "Because of having nothing apprehended (anupalabdhi), it is called 'unconditioned.'" The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: "Because it does not fall into numbers." Thus, the general designations in the various treatises do not differ in their main import; yet, their enumerations vary in opening and combining. The Hinayana mostly speaks of three kinds, which are the first and the third and fourth here. Among the various Mahāyāna treatises, the Karatalaratna speaks of four, by adding tathatā. In the treatises of the Dharma-character school (Faxiang), six are sometimes spoken of, further adding the unshakeable (āniñjya) and the cessation of ideation and feeling (saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha); that is, because defilement-hindrances are eliminated within analytical cessation, it is called analytical cessation, and because meditative hindrances are eliminated, the latter two are further added. Or they are expanded into eight, by unfolding three natures within tathatā—namely, the tathatā of wholesome dharmas and so forth—intending gradually to extend this tathatā to pervade all dharmas. This sūtra speaks of six, unfolding nirvāṇa out of analytical cessation because the two paths are distinct; it further adds pratītyasamutpāda, to reveal that there is not a single phenomenon that is not identical with the real; and it omits the two meditative cessations, because they are not yet ultimate. "Space" is that which is revealed by freedom from all obstructions and the absence of material things. Second, "nirvāṇa." Ancient [masters] offered two explanations. One says: because its nature is quiescent and extinct, this is the naturally pure nirvāṇa; fascicle thirty-four of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra agrees with this, this [nirvāṇa] differing from analytical cessation only in being unmanifest versus manifest. Another says: it is the fruit of natural purity; this is after the path of liberation (vimukti-mārga), whereas analytical cessation is within the uninterrupted path (ānantarya-mārga). However, since non-analytical cessation in the Mahāyāna is defined in terms of natural purity, and the dharmatā is spoken of below, this latter interpretation is correct. Third, "cessation through analysis" (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha). "Analysis" (saṃkhyā) means the mental factor of wisdom; because wisdom serves as the condition to discern defilements, it can reveal the principle of cessation; hence the Tang Tripiṭaka Master [Xuanzang] translated it as "cessation through discernment" (ze mie), meaning that the cessation obtained by the power of discernment is called analytical cessation. However, this term "cessation" has two senses: first, the principle's nature is quiescent and extinct—this takes its name from what is revealed; second, because the principle is revealed through the destruction of defilements, the principle is called cessation—this takes its name from what reveals it. Fourth, "cessation not through analysis" (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha). It is not obtained through the destruction of defilements by the mental factor of wisdom, but is revealed simply through natural purity and the deficiency of conditions. Fifth, "pratītyasamutpāda." It has both specific and general [senses]. The specific refers to the twelve links of dependent origination; therefore, the Vibhajyavādins, the Mahāsāṃghika, the Ekavyāvahārika, the Gokulika, the Mahīśāsaka, and the Lokottaravāda all establish the twelve links of dependent origination as unconditioned. Their view is that because their sequential functioning as conditions is eternally unconfused, they are said to be permanent. Whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, this dharma is naturally so; hence it is called unconditioned. Thus fascicle thirty-two of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "The Śrāvaka teachings also speak of dharmatā and the reality limit (bhūtakoṭi)." Hence in the Saṃyuktāgama it is said that a monk asked the Buddha: "Were the twelve links of dependent origination made by the Buddha, or were they made by someone else?" The Buddha told the monk: "I did not make the twelve links of dependent origination, nor were they made by someone else. Whether there is a Buddha or no Buddha, all dharmas are just as they are; the marks of dharmas and the station of dharmas (dharmasthititā) eternally exist, namely, 'because this exists, that exists,' and so forth." The Nirvāṇa Sūtra also says they are unconditioned. Master [Hui]yuan said: "Discussing the dharma in terms of persons, transmigration through the three times is conditioned. Setting aside persons and discussing the dharma, the characteristics of dharmas are eternally fixed; therefore it is called unconditioned." Looking at the intention of the present sūtra, pratītyasamutpāda is devoid of intrinsic nature; therefore it is called unconditioned. The Larger Prajñāpāramitā says: "The bodhisattva contemplates the twelve links of dependent origination as being inexhaustible like space." The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "The twelve links of dependent origination are Buddha-nature." Although only the twelve links of dependent origination are cited, all dharmas of the aggregates and realms are already subsumed. Sixth, "the abiding of dharmatā." This is tathatā. Because it is not deluded or inverted, it is called tathatā. Moreover, "real" and "thus-as-always" selects out the false and selects out phenomena; in all stations, it is eternally like its nature. Saying that it "abides" is due to its freedom from alteration and change. Being the nature of all dharmas is the sense of according with conditions. Saying again that it "abides" is the sense of being unchanging—phenomena, in being immediately false and immediately true, are all thus. If based on the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, dharmatā and the abiding of dharma each constitute one meaning (and so forth), which would make seven dharmas. Now, the Hinayana speaks of three: space is taken as external space, and moreover they posit all three as truly existent. If explained according to the Mahāyāna, not only does the number increase, but the meaning is also different. In the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra, they are established on the basis of two meanings: first, because they are transformed by the mind alone; second, they are nominally posited based on dharmatā. That is, all these meanings are merely the one tathatā, hypothetically established according to different senses: first, the meaning of marklessness; second, the meaning of being what is realized; third, the meaning of the exhaustion of defilements; fourth, the meaning of natural purity; fifth, the meaning of according with conditions; sixth, the meaning that according with conditions is immediately unchanging. Here, dharmatā is simply tathatā.

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However, the dharmatā-tathatā is also a provisional designation: to ward off nihilistic denial it is said to exist; to ward off grasping at existence it is said to be empty; to prevent it from being thought illusory it is said to be real; because the noumenon is not deluded or inverted it is named tathatā; being the nature of all dharmas it is named dharmatā—there is no real entity apart from form and mind. Now, one who is of great learning does not merely know its name; one should know it in this way. Sixth, regarding designated dharmas (vyākaraṇa-dharma), some explain: because they are able to incur desirable or undesirable retributions, they are called designated (vyākaraṇa). This is a general explanation. Where vyākaraṇa is distinguished elsewhere, it refers to the wholesome and the unwholesome. Here, only the wholesome is raised; it should be said that wholesome dharmas that conform to principle may be recorded [or designated]. Below, the essences of the designated dharmas are presented: there are eleven phrases, which in meaning are subsumed under just five: The Four Noble Truths, as already distinguished above in this chapter. The four fruits of the ascetic (śramaṇa), as in the "Chapter on Pure Conduct". The four analytical knowledges (pratisaṃvid), as in the Ninth Stage. The thirty-seven factors [of enlightenment], as in the Fourth Stage. The four fearlessnesses (vaiśāradya) will now be explained briefly: because one has no cowardice in the face of external challenges, they are called fearlessnesses. The Yogācārabhūmi says: "Regarding these slanders and challenges, the Tathāgata sees no truly existent causal marks whatsoever; by this reason and condition he is able to understand inherently, remaining serene and fearless." The fearlessnesses are four: first, fearlessness of all-knowledge (sarvajñāna); second, fearlessness regarding the destruction of contaminations (āsravakṣaya); third, [fearlessness regarding] the obstructive dharmas; fourth, [fearlessness regarding] the path leading out of suffering. Each of these four sections has a challenge and an answer: First, the external challenge states: If the Buddha is omniscient, when monks come from other lands, why is it necessary to ask them, 'Are you dwelling in comfort?' Saying he is omniscient means there is nothing he does not know; now asking others, how contradictory! The Buddha proclaimed of himself: 'I am an omniscient person; it is only to gather in those who come, following the conventional manners of teacher and pupil among worldly beings.' Second, some challenge: If the Buddha says of himself that his contaminations are forever destroyed, why did he address Rāhula with loving words and scold Devadatta? Regarding this challenge, the Buddha saw correctly that it had no basis, remaining secure and without cowardice, proclaiming his virtuous title: 'My contaminations are truly destroyed; it is only to subdue them according to their capacities.' Third, some challenge: If the Buddha said that desire can obstruct the path, why do stream-enterers (srotāpanna) and once-returners (sakṛdāgāmin) still have love for wives and children? Regarding this challenge, the Buddha's mind was without fear or dread; he proclaimed his virtuous title: 'I say that desire can obstruct the path, but it obstructs non-returners (anāgāmin) and arhats, not the first two fruits.' Fourth, some challenge: If the Buddha said that the noble paths can end suffering, why do arhats suffer the pain of ulcers bursting and snakebites? Regarding this challenge, the Buddha's mind was without fear or dread, proclaiming his virtuous title: 'I say that the noble path truly can end the limit of suffering, but I speak of the future, not the present.' Among the four, the first one is free from the cognitive obscurations (jñeyāvaraṇa); the second is free from the affliction obscurations (kleśāvaraṇa); the third concerns the obstacles to the path of departure; the fourth is the path of departure itself. The first two are for one's own benefit; the latter two are for the benefit of others. As to why he praises these four himself: the first is for bodhisattvas; the second is for śrāvakas; the latter two are for both in common. The Dazhidulun, scroll 28, the Yogācārabhūmi, scroll 50, and the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, scroll 14, distinguish their marks at length. Seventh, the undesignated [or undeclared] (avyākṛta) dharmas are divided into two: first, inquiring into the name; second, from "namely, the world" below, distinguishing the marks. Now, the first: Undesignated has two meanings: first, being neither wholesome nor unwholesome, unable to incur desirable or undesirable retribution, it is called undesignated. This may explain other texts. Here, it precisely refers to false conjectures and unreasonable questions that cannot be recorded [or answered]; hence they are called undesignated, not in contrast to wholesome and unwholesome. Therefore, the Kośa, scroll 19, says: "Various sūtras speak of the fourteen undeclared matters," which is precisely this meaning. They are also called 'set-aside declarations' (sthāpanīya-vyākaraṇa); 'declaration' means answering, and because they should not be answered. Why are they not answered? It is because these are meaningless words: knowing them does not free one from birth and death; not knowing them does not obstruct nirvāṇa. The designated matters mentioned earlier are the opposite of this. The Dazhidulun, scroll 3, says: "Why are the fourteen challenges not answered? Because these matters have no reality. That dharmas are permanent—there is no such principle; to speak of annihilation is also like this. As if someone were to ask: 'Milking a cow's horn, how many pints of milk do you get?' Can this be called a question? Furthermore, the world is endless like a cartwheel. Furthermore, there is no benefit and there is harm, falling into evil views, obscuring the true reality of the Four Truths and all dharmas. Furthermore, humans are incapable of knowing. Furthermore, [the Buddha] speaks in accord with the Dharma." Scroll 17 says: "There was a monk who contemplated the fourteen challenges and could not understand them; he took leave of the Buddha to no longer be a disciple. The Buddha said: 'I teach the Dharma to save those subject to old age, sickness, and death. These are matters of dispute, like a poisoned arrow; they should not be pursued.'" The Laṅkāvatāra also says: "These are all worldly debates, not what I teach." As for the fourteen, these are the four tetralemmas (catuṣkoṭi) mentioned earlier here, where the fourth tetralemma is simply combined into two, namely, whether the body and the soul are one, or the body and the soul are different. Now, various sūtras and treatises mostly speak of the fourteen challenges, though their characteristics may be the same or different; they will not be harmonized in detail. When this sūtra discusses them fully, they do not go beyond the two attachments to self and dharmas. The text is divided into five sections: First, there are four tetralemmas, clarifying the undeclared with respect to the self. Second, from "past" below, horizontally discussing the quantity of ordinary beings and noble ones with respect to the three periods of time. Third, from "what kind" below, vertically discussing the beginning and end with respect to ordinary beings and noble ones. Fourth, from "from whence does the world" below, inquiring into where the three worlds come from. Fifth, from "which" below, distinguishing the undeclared with respect to the limits of birth and death. Now, regarding the first, although there are sixteen phrases, their faults do not go beyond the two views of annihilation and permanence. As for "the world," according to the Large Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, it extends across the three worlds, namely, the world of sentient beings, the world of the five aggregates, and the receptacle world. The meaning of this text here primarily reveals the world of sentient beings, and secondarily clarifies the world of the five aggregates, because sentient beings are the general, primary provisional entities, which non-Buddhists impute to be the self. Regarding the views such as having an end: the first four phrases on having an end pertain to future times; the four phrases on permanence and so forth pertain to past times. The existence or non-existence of the Tathāgata arises based on nirvāṇa. Therefore, the Madhyamakaśāstra, "Chapter on Erroneous Views," says: "Did I exist in past times, or did I not exist? Views such as the permanence of the world all depend on past times. Will I act in future times, or will I not act? Views such as having an end all depend on future times." The "Chapter on Nirvāṇa" says: "The existence, non-existence, etc., of the Tathāgata after extinction arises based on nirvāṇa. The four phrases on the existence and non-existence of the self and sentient beings are spoken in relation to the present." Having known the basis for the arising of views, next they are individually explained according to the text, which forms four sections. In the first four phrases, saying "having an end" refers to non-Buddhists holding the view of annihilation, who impute that the self will no longer act in future lifetimes, ending along with this body. "Without an end" means that the self will act further in future lifetimes.

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As for the third, the both-proposition: because the body ends, it has an end; because the self is not different [from the body], it is endless. As for the fourth, the neither-proposition: this proposition is also established because, [grasping that] the self persists while the body ends, one sees errors in the propositions above. That is to say, because the body ends it is not endless, and because the self persists it is not finite; since these are both wrong views, [the Buddha] does not answer them. If one wishes to refute them: the first two propositions fall into the fault of [denying] future lifetimes; that is, if it has an end, it ends together with the aggregates, and if it is endless, it is just this present body; thus in both cases there is no future lifetime. If there is no future lifetime, what benefit is there in cultivating the path and practicing austerities? Regarding the third proposition, 'both finite and endless': if the body ends and the self persists, are the body and the self one or different? If they are one, then it should not be that one ends while the other does not; if they are different, apart from the aggregates by what mark can the existence of a self be known? If it is claimed that when relinquishing human form to be born in heaven, the human portion still remains while the heavenly portion increases, this would mean being half god and half human; therefore neither is tenable. Regarding the fourth proposition: 'not finite' does not escape non-existence, and 'not endless' does not escape existence; how can one arbitrarily make conceptual distinctions concerning this? Second, the four propositions concerning permanence and so on: regarding the past, if the self of past lifetimes is identical to the present self, it is termed 'permanent'. If it is permanent, there are great faults, for this destroys cause and effect, nirvāṇa, and the like. If it is claimed that my self has only now been born, it is termed 'impermanent'. If so, the self is a produced entity and also falls into being causeless; if it is causeless, there is likewise no nirvāṇa and so forth. The third proposition, seeing the two faults above, then asserts that the self is permanent while the body is impermanent. Apart from the body, where is there a self? This again incurs the above two faults. The fourth asserts that because the self is not different, it is not impermanent, and because the body has differences, it is not permanent. The refutation is the same as that for the third proposition. Furthermore, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: 'Because all dharmas are empty, how could there be views of finitude, endlessness, permanence, and the like?' The remaining points are as extensively treated in that treatise. Third, regarding the four propositions on 'the Tathāgata after extinction' and so forth, the explanation has two meanings: first, explaining that 'Tathāgata' here does not refer to the Buddha. Ru (tathā) means 'similarity', and lai (āgata) means 'coming from the past limit'. That is, one person grasps: just as one comes from a past lifetime to be born here, departing to a future lifetime is also like this; hence it is said that 'the Tathāgata exists after extinction', meaning that it exists just as when it came from the past limit. This is due to positing a self that is different from the aggregates. The second view states: just as one comes here from a past lifetime, after death there is annihilation; hence it is said that 'the Tathāgata does not exist after extinction', meaning that it does not go as it came. This is due to positing that the aggregates and the self are one. The third view: because of positing coarse and subtle selves, one says that because the coarse self ends together with the body, it does not depart as it came, and because the subtle self is different from the aggregates and does not perish together with them, it also departs as it came; hence it is said that 'the Tathāgata both exists and does not exist after extinction'. The fourth view states: the self is like space, its essence having neither coming nor going. The Jin dynasty sūtra says: 'the Tathāgata after extinction departs as it came, does not depart as it came', and so forth; this is explained by taking all three times into perspective. If one relies on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, the four propositions are framed based on nirvāṇa, where 'Tathāgata' refers to the Buddha. In accordance with the text of this sūtra, it is also that non-Buddhists set up their own teachers as 'tathāgata'. Some assert that after extinction the Tathāgata definitely exists and is unchanging; some assert that entering the [nirvāṇa] without remainder is identical to empty space; some assert that the Dharma-[body] exists while the response-[body] does not; some assert that in terms of the response[-body] it does not exist, while in terms of the Dharma[-body] it is not non-existent. Because all four propositions constitute conceptual proliferation and do not perceive the quiescent mark of the Tathāgata, they are also wrong views. In this, those of the provisional and Hinayana teachings have not yet been able to avoid it. Fascicle eighty-seven of the Yogācārabhūmi states: 'Observing in accordance with reality on the basis of two rationales, it is in both cases unexplainable whether the Tathāgata exists or does not exist after extinction. Why is this? First, based on the ultimate truth, that [Tathāgata] is ungraspable, much less whether it exists or does not exist after extinction. If based on the conventional: is the Tathāgata designated conventionally upon conditioned formations, or upon nirvāṇa? If upon conditioned formations, after the Tathāgata's extinction not a single conditioned formation can be found in transmigration; at that time, upon what could the Tathāgata be conventionally designated? Since there is no Tathāgata, how could there be existence, non-existence, and so on? If upon nirvāṇa, nirvāṇa is revealed solely by the absence of conditioned formations, cut off from all conceptual proliferation. Because that which is internally realized cuts off conceptual proliferation, designating it as existent is not in accord with reason. Nor should it be designated as non-existent, lest one disparage the quiescent nirvāṇa that is designated as wondrous existence.' Furthermore, because this nirvāṇa is exceedingly difficult to know and most subtle, it is called 'profound'. Because it is revealed by the cessation of diverse and non-singular conditioned formations and defilements, it is called 'vast'. Because it cannot be measured by direct perception, inference, or valid scripture, it is called 'immeasurable'. Fourth, the four propositions on the existence or non-existence of the self and sentient beings: these both jointly establish that 'sentient beings' are just the five aggregates, not referring to an overarching master; 'existing' means definitively existing, and definitive existence clings to permanence; 'not existing' means definitively not existing, and definitive non-existence clings to annihilation. The third, seeking to avoid the above two faults, posits both existence and non-existence, thus falling into contradiction. The fourth, evading this contradiction, posits the neither-proposition, which again becomes conceptual proliferation. However, among these four propositions, there are also singular graspings that 'the self exists and what belongs to it does not', or 'what belongs to it exists and the self does not', which also do not depart from the first two propositions. Moreover, combining the above forms the third, and mutual negation forms the fourth, which also do not go beyond the first two propositions. The second section, explaining the quantity of the ordinary and noble beings of the three vehicles: because it is horizontally boundless, it cannot be recorded. The third section: because it is vertically without limit, it cannot be recorded. Someone in answering a question said that there was an original Buddha who awakened spontaneously, citing an otter offering sacrifices to heaven as also responding to capacities; why should one further leave it unrecorded? If there were an original Buddha, the Tathāgata should know it and could state the name. What is meant by 'what dharmas'? All dharmas, defiled, pure, and so forth. The fourth section, inquiring into the origins of the world, has six propositions: the first two propositions ask about sentient beings and the world of aggregates; the next four propositions concern the receptacle world, because non-Buddhists posit that sentient beings have a primal birth. Or they assert that they come from the primordial darkness (prakṛti) and return to darkness. Or they assert that the worlds are all composed of atoms, meaning that the most wondrous form is permanent and unchanging, aggregating to form bodies and receptacles, and dispersing to become atoms. These are all sources of wrong views, and therefore should not be answered. The reason why the world of sentient beings does not speak of formation and disintegration is that the Yogācārabhūmi states: 'Sentient beings, when compared to the receptacle [world], have five differences: first, the receptacle realm's saṃsāra is produced by shared causes, whereas the saṃsāra of sentient beings is produced solely by unshared causes; this is the difference in causes. Second, the receptacle [world] has interruption and cessation, whereas the transmigration of sentient beings is uninterrupted; this is the difference in time. Third, regarding destruction and non-destruction by the three disasters; this is called the difference in nature. Fourth, the causes of the receptacle realm are never permanently severed, whereas sentient beings are not like this; this is called the difference in severance. Fifth, the receptacle [world] is severed and then resumes, whereas once sentient beings are severed there is no resumption; this is called the difference in resumption.' For these reasons, formation and disintegration are omitted. The fifth, concerning the initial and final limits of saṃsāra, has only two propositions. Question: That the initial limit has no beginning is made clear by the holy teachings. That saṃsāra has an end—how could that not be correct principle? Answer: Briefly, there are three points.

24.12.5

First, with respect to one single person, one may speak of an end; but looking across all [beings], there is no final limit. Second, because their dogmatic grasping fosters wrong views, [the Buddha] also does not answer. That is to say, if one concedes that there is an end, there must be a beginning, for permanent dharmas have neither beginning nor end. Third, in terms of the dharmatā, both are ineffable. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: 'What the Great Sage spoke of / is that the primal limit cannot be found. / Saṃsāra has no beginning, / nor does it have an end. / If there is neither beginning nor end, / how could there be a middle? / Therefore herein, / prior, posterior, and simultaneous also do not exist.' Since it is said that the primal limit cannot be found, one should also not definitively say there is neither beginning nor end, much less hold the view that there is a beginning and an end! Furthermore, a verse states: 'Because the true Dharma, its preacher, / and its listener are difficult to find, / therefore saṃsāra / is neither finite nor endless.' The above wrong views mostly belong to non-Buddhists, and also include the Hinayana. When bodhisattvas understand them well, their questions and answers are unhindered; they immediately raise refutations in order to cause themselves and others to dwell in the middle. Second, from 'the bodhisattva' onward, it clarifies the meaning of having heard much. That is, taking pity on beings who have heard nothing and long sink in saṃsāra, they vow to uphold the treasury of what has been heard, realizing it for themselves and benefiting others.

Linked texts (1)

大方廣佛華嚴經疏 — Classical Chinese