[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736) › 12.27 # 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 12.27 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 12.27 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [12.27](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.12.27) 疏「大乘有三」下，疏文分三：初標、次釋、後「以餘」下料揀。疏「一云攝假從實以聲為體」下，第二釋也。大乘通意以聲為實，名句文但聲上假立。經部師義，參預大乘故，亦謂名等依聲假立。疏「一契經等」者，此引稍略，具引應云「佛告曼殊室利菩薩曰：善男子！如來言音略有三種：一者契經、二者調伏、三者本母。」下廣釋其相。今疏所引，但意在言音兩字耳。疏「雜集論云成所引聲謂諸聖所說」者，亦證唯聲為教體也。既言聖說是聲，明非名等為教體也。即彼論第一釋外六界聲塵界云「聲者四大種所造，耳根所取義，若可意、若不可意、若俱相違。若因執受大種、若因不執受大種、若因俱大種，若世所共成、若成所引、若遍計所執，若聖言所攝、若非聖言所攝，如是十一種聲，由五種因之所建立，謂相故、損益故、因差別故、說差別故、言差別故。相者，謂耳根所取義。說差別者，謂世所共成等三。餘如其所應。因執受大種者，謂語等聲。因不執受大種者，謂樹等聲。因俱者，謂手鼓等餘聲。世所共成者，謂世俗語。所攝成所引者，謂諸聖所說。遍計所執者，謂外道所說。聖言非聖言所攝者，謂依見等八種言說。」今疏但引成所引聲，以證聲為教體。然上五因攝十一者，初一是總、餘四是別。損益攝初三，可意是益、不可意是損、俱相違通二。因差別攝次三，說差別攝次三，言差別攝後二，思之可知。言八種言說者，即八種聖語：一見言見、二不見言不見、三聞言聞、四不聞言不聞、五覺言覺、六不覺言不覺、七知言知、八不知言不知，斯即為聖言所攝。若見言不見等，則非聖言。疏「二云以體從用名等為體」者，義引論文。然《唯識》第二破於小乘名等實有。故彼論云「復如何知異色心等，有實詮表名句文身（論主問也）？契經說故。如契經說：佛得希有名句文身（外人答也）。此經不說異色心等有實名等，為證不成（論主總非）。」下廣破竟，便結云「語不異能詮，人天共了。執能詮異語，天受非餘。」下申正義云「然依語聲分位差別，而假建立名句文身。名詮自性，句詮差別，文即是字，為二所依。此三離聲雖無別體，而假實異，亦不即聲。由此法詞二無礙解境有差別、聲與名等蘊界處攝亦各有異。」上即論文。準彼論疏，薩婆多雖有名由聲顯生二義，論主取生破顯，正理師救云「聲上屈曲，是名句文。體異於聲，而定實有。」故上論文廣破異聲實有名等。故彼疏破竟，結云「故知但由無始慣習，前前諸聲分位力故，後生解時，謂聞名等。其實耳等但能取得聲之自性，剎那便謝，意識於中詮解究竟名為名等，非別實有。是故汝等寧知異語別有能詮。」次假外問云：既聲體即是能詮，何有名等三種差別？故論下申正義云「然依語聲分位差別等，於中有四：一從初至假建立名句文身，顯假差別。」此論主解依聲建立名句文身，如梵音斫芻，此翻為眼。若但言斫、或唯言芻，未有所目，說為字分位。若二連合，能詮法體，詮於眼體，說為名分位。然未有句位，更添言阿薩剎縛，名為眼有漏，說為句分位。故依分位，以立名等。依一切位，非自在故。外人難言：分位差別，何者是也？論從「名詮自性至為二所依」，述曰：二顯二用殊，名詮諸法自性，句詮諸法差別。文即是字，為名句之所依，不能詮自性及差別故。文者彰義，與二為依，彰表二故。又名為顯，與二為依，能顯義故，而體非顯。字者，無改轉義，是其字體。文是功能，功能即體，故言文即是字等。或字為初首，即多剎那聲集成一字，集多字為所依。次能成名，詮諸法體。多名已後，方成句身，詮法差別。即《雜集》云「自性差別，及此二言，如是三法，總攝一切。」此二言者，即是字也。字即語故，說之為言。名句二種，所依止之言也。《瑜伽論》云「名於自性施設，句於差別施設。名句所依止性說之為字。」又《顯揚》言「句必有名，名不必有句。名必有字，字不必有名。如《樞要》說。」此下廣論自共相義，略不錄之。疏「無性論」下，可知。 > The Commentary states: "In the Mahāyāna there are three": the commentary's text is divided into three parts: first, setting forth the positions; next, explaining them; and finally, from "according to the rest" downward, distinguishing them. The Commentary states: "The first says that gathering the nominal to the real, voice is taken as the essence": this is the second, the explanation. The general intention of the Mahāyāna takes sound as real, and names, phrases, and phonemes as merely nominally established upon sound. The Sautrāntika tenets share in the Mahāyāna, and therefore they also hold that names and the like are nominally established relying on sound. The Commentary states: "First, the sūtras and so forth": this quotation is somewhat abridged; cited in full, it should read: "The Buddha addressed the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, saying: 'Good son, the spoken voices of the Tathāgata are, in brief, of three kinds: first, sūtras; second, vinaya; third, mātṛkā.'" Below, it extensively explains their characteristics. The quotation in our Commentary now merely intends to focus on the two words "spoken voice." The Commentary states, "The Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā says that sound induced by accomplishment refers to that spoken by the noble ones": this also proves that sound alone is the essence of the teaching. Since it says that what the noble ones speak is sound, it is clear that names and the like are not the essence of the teaching. Roll 1 of that treatise, in explaining the sound sense-datum element among the six external elements, states: "Sound is that which is created by the four great elements, the object grasped by the auditory faculty, whether agreeable, disagreeable, or contrary to both; whether caused by apprehended great elements, by non-apprehended great elements, or by both great elements; whether universally accepted by the world, induced by accomplishment, or imagined by conceptual construction; whether subsumed under noble speech or not subsumed under noble speech. These eleven kinds of sound are established by five kinds of causes: namely, by characteristic, by benefit and harm, by distinction of cause, by distinction of utterance, and by distinction of speech. 'Characteristic' refers to the object grasped by the auditory faculty. 'Distinction of utterance' refers to the three such as 'universally accepted by the world.' The rest are as appropriate. 'Caused by apprehended great elements' refers to sounds such as speech. 'Caused by non-apprehended great elements' refers to sounds such as trees. 'Caused by both' refers to other sounds such as hand-drums. 'Universally accepted by the world' refers to conventional words. 'Induced by accomplishment' refers to what is spoken by the noble ones. 'Imagined by conceptual construction' refers to what is spoken by non-Buddhists. 'Subsumed under noble speech or non-noble speech' refers to the eight kinds of speech based on seeing and so forth." Now, our Commentary only cites "sound induced by accomplishment" to prove that sound is the essence of teaching. However, of the above five causes subsuming the eleven, the first is general and the remaining four are specific. Benefit and harm subsume the first three: agreeable is benefit, disagreeable is harm, and contrary to both applies to both. Distinction of cause subsumes the next three; distinction of utterance subsumes the next three; and distinction of speech subsumes the last two, as one can reflect and understand. The "eight kinds of speech" are the eight kinds of noble speech: 1. speaking of seeing when seeing; 2. speaking of not seeing when not seeing; 3. speaking of hearing when hearing; 4. speaking of not hearing when not hearing; 5. speaking of perceiving when perceiving; 6. speaking of not perceiving when not perceiving; 7. speaking of knowing when knowing; 8. speaking of not knowing when not knowing. These are subsumed under noble speech. If one speaks of not seeing when seeing, and so forth, it is non-noble speech. The Commentary states: "The second says that pursuing the function from the essence, names and the like are taken as the essence": this cites the treatise's meaning. However, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, roll 2, refutes the Hīnayāna view that names and the like are real entities. Thus that treatise says: "Furthermore, how is it known that, distinct from form, mind, and the like, there exist real expressers, namely collections of names, phrases, and phonemes? (The master of the treatise asks.) Because the sūtras say so; as a sūtra says: 'The Buddha attained rare collections of names, phrases, and phonemes.' (The opponent answers.) This sūtra does not say that distinct from form, mind, and the like there exist real names and the like; as proof, this is invalid. (The master of the treatise generally refutes this.)" Having refuted it extensively below, it then concludes: "Speech is not different from the expresser; this is understood in common by humans and devas. Clinging to the expresser as different from speech is a divine favor, nothing else." Below, it sets forth the correct position: "Yet relying on the differential states of vocal sound, collections of names, phrases, and phonemes are nominally established. A name expresses own-nature; a phrase expresses distinctive features; a phoneme is simply a letter, serving as the basis for the two. Although these three have no separate essence apart from sound, the nominal and the real differ, nor are they identical with sound. Due to this, the objects of the two unobstructed knowledges of Dharma and speech differ, and the subsumption of sound versus names and the like under the aggregates, elements, and sense-spheres is also distinct in each case." The above is the text of the treatise. According to the commentary on that treatise, although the Sarvāstivādins hold two views—that names are manifested by sound, or produced by sound—the master of the treatise took the 'production' view to refute the 'manifestation' view. The master of the Nyāyānusāra countered, saying: "The inflections upon sound are names, phrases, and phonemes. Their essence differs from sound, and they are definitely real entities." Therefore, the treatise above extensively refutes the existence of real names and the like distinct from sound. Thus, having completed the refutation, that commentary concludes: "Therefore, we know that merely due to beginningless habituation and the power of the differential states of successive sounds, when later understanding arises, one claims to hear names and the like. In reality, the ear and so on are only able to grasp the own-nature of sound, which perishes in an instant; the mental consciousness fully expresses and interprets within it, which is called names and the like, but they are not separately real entities. Therefore, how can you know that distinct from speech there are separate expressers?" Next, provisionally posing an outside question: If the essence of sound is itself the expresser, why are there the three distinctions of names and the like? Therefore, the treatise below sets forth the correct doctrine: "Yet relying on the differential states of vocal sound..." Within this, there are four points: first, from the beginning up to "nominally establishing the collection of names, phrases, and phonemes," it clarifies nominal distinctions. This is the master of the treatise explaining the establishment of collections of names, phrases, and phonemes relying on sound: as in the Sanskrit cakṣus, translated here as "eye" (yan). If one says only cak, or only ṣus, nothing has yet been designated; this is called the state of a letter (phoneme). If the two are united, they can express the essence of the phenomenon, expressing the entity of the eye; this is called the state of a name. However, the state of a phrase is not yet present; adding the word āsrava, meaning "the eye is with outflows," is called the state of a phrase. Therefore, relying on states, names and the like are established. Relying on all states, they are not independent. An opponent objects: "What are the differential states?" The treatise proceeds from "a name expresses own-nature" to "serving as the basis for the two." Exposition: Second, it reveals the difference between the two functions: a name expresses the own-nature of phenomena; a phrase expresses the distinctive features of phenomena. A phoneme is simply a letter, serving as the basis for names and phrases, because it cannot express own-nature or distinctive features. A "phoneme" (wen) has the meaning of manifesting (zhang), providing a basis for the two and making the two manifest. It is also called revealing (xian), providing a basis for the two, capable of revealing meaning, though its essence is not revealing. A "letter" (zi, akṣara) has the meaning of being unalterable; this is the essence of the letter. The phoneme is function, and function is essence; thus it says "a phoneme is simply a letter," and so forth. Alternatively, a letter is the beginning, where sound of many moments aggregates into one letter, and the aggregation of many letters serves as the basis. Next, it can form a name, expressing the entity of phenomena. After many names, a collection of phrases is finally completed, expressing the distinctive features of phenomena. This is what the Abhidharmasamuccaya means by: "Own-nature, distinction, and the words for these two: such three dharmas generally subsume all." "The words for these two" are precisely the letters. Letters are speech, hence they are called "words." They are the words upon which names and phrases depend. The Yogācārabhūmi says: "Name is designated with respect to own-nature; phrase is designated with respect to distinction. The nature upon which name and phrase depend is called letter." Furthermore, the Prakaraṇāryavācā says: "A phrase must have a name, but a name does not necessarily have a phrase. A name must have a letter, but a letter does not necessarily have a name. As stated in the Shunyao." Below, it extensively discusses the meaning of self- and common-characteristics, which is omitted here. In the Commentary, from "the treatise by Asabhāva" downward, it can be understood. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 12.26](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.12.26) - [Next: 12.28](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.12.28) - [Up: 12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.12) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736~en-mt.12.27) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [金剛經纂要刊定記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1702.2.81) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.12.27](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.12.27) · Pramāṇa