[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736) › 12.28 # 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 12.28 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 12.28 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [12.28](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.12.28) 疏「成唯識下至法詞無礙境應無別」者，述曰：外人問言：若名等即聲，法詞二無礙解境有何別？答曰：即緣此故，二境有異。法無礙解，緣假名等。詞無礙解，緣實聲等，故說境差別。非二俱緣實，雖二自性互不相離，法對所詮故但取名，詞多對機故但說聲。耳聞聲已，意了義故，以所對不同，說二有異，非體有異也。又此二境及名等三與聲別者，蘊處界攝亦有異故。色蘊行蘊，聲處法處，聲界法界。如其次第，攝聲名句。問曰：聲上屈曲假，即言不相應。色上屈曲假，應非色處攝。答：聲上為有教名等不相應，色上為無教，故是色處攝。問曰：聲上有屈曲，即得以為教。色上有屈曲，即亦應得為教。故論復云「且依此土說名句文依聲假立，非謂一切。諸餘佛土亦依光明妙香味等假立三故。」述曰：四會相違，釋義可知，所引即《淨名經》。而言等者，等取觸思數等皆得假立名等三種，亦是不相應攝此三法故，以眾生機欲對待故假。又梵云便善那，此有四義：一者扇；二相好；三根形；四味，此即是鹽，能顯諸物中味故。味即是文。如言文義巧妙等，目之為便善那。此中四義，總是一顯義，故古德說名為味。《對法》云「此文名顯，能顯彼義，故為名句所依，能顯義故。惡剎那是字，無改轉義。」如《對法》說「鉢陀是迹，如尋象迹以覓象等，此名為句。理應名迹，義之迹故，尋此知義也。」順古所翻，稱之為句。今疏總略，以疏對論於義分明。疏「唯識論云此三離聲至亦不即聲」，述曰：三明不即聲不離聲，論主答難。謂先有問言：上來雖言名等即聲，若名等是不相應行者，色上屈曲非不相應，聲何故爾耶，故此答曰：此三離聲雖無別體，名等是假、聲是實有，假實異故，故名等三非即是聲，非聲所攝。但是差別之聲，義說名等，以詮義故，是不相應無別種子生，故言不即聲。疏「深密第四至而能宣說故」者，彼無「故」字，其「說」字下云「是故我依般若波羅蜜多，能取諸法無自性性。」意云：由文字般若能顯實相般若。既雙牒言說文字，明知通用四法。下引《淨名》，亦是第三〈香積品〉文。《十地論》中音聲即聲，音字即名句文，故下引風畫二喻。風喻音聲，畫喻名句文，義如下釋。疏「以余之意」下，第三料揀雙會。於中二：先雙會大小四法、後會大小不同。今初，分二：初直出正意，意在雙取；二「若就」下，會通前二。於中五：一正明去取。二「良以」下，出所以。三「書雖是色」下，遮妨難。恐有難云：疏不善相書之竹帛，非名句文。名句文身是不相應，翰墨簡牘但是色法，何得為體？故此救云：色與名等亦為所依，何異聲為名等所依？聲是色蘊所攝，書字之色豈非色攝耶？故前《唯識》之中例於餘方，亦依色等有名句文，亦同諸法顯義之體。顯無方理故，不取常規。四「前淨名」下，會通前文。「但言所用」者，用此四法，何必要四？問曰：若四中隨取，但取名等，豈不違於《唯識》之文離聲別有非正義耶？答：彼不離聲假實合說，今不離色假實亦存，未爽通理。疏「仁王云」下，五引證成立。既然但言名句味，不云音聲，明唯取名等。此即《仁王．觀空品》，而文少略。具云「大王！是經名句味，百佛千佛百千萬佛說名句味。於恒河沙三千大千國中，盛無量七寶，施三千大千國土中眾生，皆得涅槃四果，不如於此經起一念淨信，何況解一句者，句非句非非句故。」今但意在有名句味無聲之言，故不全引。 > Regarding the commentary's statement, "From the \*Cheng weishi lun\* below up to 'the cognitive objects of unhindered cognition regarding dharma and discourse would have no distinction'": The explanation states: The opponent asks: "If names and the like are identical with sound, what difference is there between the cognitive objects of the two unhindered cognitions regarding dharma and discourse?" The answer is: Precisely due to this \[difference between nominal designation and sound\], the two cognitive objects are distinct. The unhindered cognition regarding dharma takes provisional names and the like as its object. The unhindered cognition regarding discourse takes real sounds and the like as its object; therefore, a distinction between their objects is spoken of. It is not that both take the real as their object. Although their two intrinsic natures are not separated from one another, because dharma corresponds to that which is expressed, it takes only names; because discourse mostly corresponds to the capacities \[of listeners\], it speaks only of sound. After the ear hears sound, the mind understands the meaning; because that which they correspond to is not the same, the two are said to be different, not that their essences are different. Furthermore, regarding these two objects and the three \[factors of\] names and so forth being distinct from sound, their subsumption under aggregates, bases, and elements also differs: the aggregate of form and the aggregate of formations; the sound-base and the mental-object-base; the sound-element and the dharmadhātu. In this order, they subsume sound and name-phrase respectively. Question: "If inflection on sound is provisional, it is then said to be a non-concurrent \[formation\]. If inflection on visible form is provisional, it should not be subsumed under the form-base." Answer: "On sound, it is because there is teaching that name and so forth are non-concurrent; on visible form, it is because there is no teaching, hence it is subsumed under the form-base." Question: "If having inflection on sound immediately allows it to be teaching, then having inflection on visible form should likewise immediately allow it to be teaching." Therefore, the treatise also says: "For the time being, in accordance with this world, it is said that names, phrases, and syllables are provisionally established dependent on sound; this is not said of all \[worlds\]. For in other Buddha-lands, these three are also provisionally established dependent on light, wondrous fragrances, tastes, and so forth." The explanation states: The fourth is reconciling contradictions; the explanation of the meaning can be known, and what is cited is the \*Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra\*. When it says "and so forth," "and so forth" includes touch, volition, mental factors, and so on—all can provisionally establish the three \[factors of\] names and so on. These three dharmas are also subsumed under non-concurrent \[formations\] because they are provisional in correspondence with the capacities and desires of sentient beings. Furthermore, Sanskrit \*vyañjana\* has four meanings: first, a fan; second, major and minor marks; third, sense faculties and shapes; fourth, flavor—this is salt, because it can reveal the flavor in all things. Flavor is precisely syllable (letter). As in saying "the expressions (letters) and meanings are ingenious," they are designated \*vyañjana\*. Among these four meanings, all together have the single meaning of "revealing"; therefore, ancient masters called it "flavor." The \*Abhidharma-samuccaya\* says: "This syllable is called 'revealer' because it can reveal that meaning; therefore, it serves as the support for names and phrases, because it can reveal meaning. \*Akṣara\* is a character/letter, meaning unalterable." As the \*Abhidharma-samuccaya\* says: "\*Pada\* is a footprint; just as one tracks elephant footprints to find an elephant, this is called a phrase (pada). In principle, it should be called a footprint, because it is the footprint of meaning; tracking this, one understands the meaning." In accordance with ancient translations, it is termed a phrase. Now the commentary is comprehensive and concise; matching the commentary against the treatise makes the meaning clear. Regarding the commentary's statement, "The \*Cheng weishi lun\* says: 'These three, apart from sound, up to … are also not identical with sound'": The explanation states: The third is clarifying that they are neither identical with sound nor separate from sound, which is the treatise master answering an objection. This refers to a prior question: "Earlier, although it was said that names and so forth are identical with sound, if names and so forth are non-concurrent formations, why is it that inflection on visible form is not non-concurrent, whereas sound is?" Therefore, this answer is given: Although these three have no separate essence apart from sound, names and so forth are provisional while sound is real; because provisional and real differ, these three—names and so forth—are not identical with sound and are not subsumed under sound. It is merely that distinct sounds are nominally termed names and so forth because they express meaning. Being non-concurrent \[formations\], they are not produced from a separate seed; therefore, it is said that they are not identical with sound. Regarding the commentary's statement, "The fourth fascicle of the \*Saṃdhinirmocana\* up to … 'and thus can proclaim' with 'therefore'": in that \[original text\], there is no character "therefore" (故); beneath the character "proclaim" (說), it says: "Therefore, relying on the perfection of wisdom, I am able to grasp the naturelessness of all dharmas." The meaning is: by means of the prajñā of letters, one can reveal the prajñā of the true mark. Since both speech and letters are reiterated together, one clearly knows that the four dharmas are commonly used. The citation of \*Vimalakīrti\* below is also the text of the third, the "Fragrance Accumulation" chapter. In the \*Daśabhūmika-śāstra\*, "voice" is sound, and "phonetic characters" are names, phrases, and syllables; therefore, the two metaphors of wind and painting are cited below. Wind allegorizes voice and sound, and painting allegorizes names, phrases, and syllables, the meaning being explained below. Regarding the commentary's statement, "According to my understanding" below: The third is evaluation and twofold reconciliation. Within this, there are two parts: first, directly stating the correct view, the intention being to adopt both; second, from "If in terms of" below, reconciling the previous two. Within this, there are five points: 1. Directly clarifying what is rejected and what is accepted. 2. From "Because indeed" below, presenting the reason. 3. From "Although writing is visible form" below, warding off objections. Fearing there might be an objection saying: "The commentary does not properly discern: writing on bamboo and silk is not names, phrases, and syllables. The bodies of names, phrases, and syllables are non-concurrent \[formations\], whereas brush, ink, and bamboo tablets are merely material dharmas; how can they be taken as the essence?" Therefore, this defense is made: "Visible form also serves as a support for names and so forth; how is it different from sound serving as a support for names and so forth? Sound is subsumed under the aggregate of form; is the visible form of written characters not also subsumed under form?" Therefore, in the \*Cheng weishi lun\* earlier, by analogy to other lands, names, phrases, and syllables also depend on visible form and so on; they are likewise identical with the essences of all dharmas that reveal meaning. Because it reveals the principle of having no fixed direction, it does not adopt conventional rules. 4. From "The previous \*Vimalakīrti\*" below, reconciling the earlier text. "Only speaks of what is employed" means using these four dharmas; why must all four be required? Question: "If one takes whatever one pleases among the four, and takes only names and so forth, does that not contradict the text of the \*Cheng weishi lun\* that a separate existence apart from sound is not the correct doctrine?" Answer: "There, being inseparable from sound, provisional and real are spoken of together; here, being inseparable from visible form, provisional and real are also preserved, which does not violate the universal principle." 5. From the commentary's statement "The \*Benevolent King\* says" below, citing proof to establish it. Since it speaks only of names, phrases, and flavors, and does not mention voice and sound, it is clear that it adopts only names and so forth. This is the "Contemplating Emptiness" chapter of the \*Benevolent King\*, though the text is slightly abbreviated. Fully, it states: "Great King! The names, phrases, and flavors of this sūtra—hundreds of Buddhas, thousands of Buddhas, hundreds of thousands of myriads of Buddhas have spoken its names, phrases, and flavors. If one were to fill immeasurable seven jewels across three thousand great thousand worlds numerous as the sands of the Ganges, and bestow them upon the sentient beings in those three thousand great thousand worlds, causing them all to attain the four fruits of nirvāṇa, it would not equal generating a single thought of pure faith in this sūtra, let alone understanding a single phrase—because a phrase is not a phrase and is not a non-phrase." Now, the intention merely lies in the words having names, phrases, and flavors without sound, so it is not cited in full. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 12.27](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.12.27) - [Next: 12.29](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.12.29) - [Up: 12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.12) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736~en-mt.12.28) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.12.28](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.12.28) · Pramāṇa