[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736) › 20.48 # 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 20.48 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 20.48 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [20.48](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.20.48) 疏「五求不得」等者，即《中論．觀如來品》偈云「非陰不離陰，此彼不相在。如來不有陰，何處有如來？」即五求也。由諸外道妄計有我，我為如來，計有五故。五者，一謂即陰是如來、二謂離陰有如來、三謂如來中有陰、四謂陰中有如來、五謂陰能有如來。今並非之。若陰即如來，陰生滅故佛應生滅，故云非陰。二若謂離陰有如來者，以何相知？又如來墮常過，離陰生滅故。故云不離。三若謂如來中有陰，如器中有果，則亦是異，如來亦墮常故。四若陰中有如來，如床上有人，亦有別異過。故云此彼不相在。五若如來能有五陰、陰屬如來者，則如人有子，亦有別異過，異則如來墮常等故。然後四句皆成異過，初即是一，總合但是一異過耳。故〈觀法品〉破我，但云「若我是五陰，我即為生滅。若我異五陰，即非五陰相。」今細推尋，故有五求，皆不可得。上之五求但能破有，今四句並非，故言「謂佛有耶，常見為惑；謂佛無耶，邪見深厚。」此且雙破有無，而有過則微、無過則重，故云深厚。彼論偈云「邪見深厚者，則說無如來。如來寂滅相，分別有亦非。如是性空中，思惟亦不可」者，亦遣有無。「然則四句百非所不能加，故無所有」者，結歸經文。準《中論》中略說三種四句，皆不能加。初偈云「空則不可說，非空不可說，共不共叵說，但以假名說。」此一四句，共即俱句，不共則雙遮。若別說者，一空、二非空、三亦空亦非空、四非空非非空。此皆雙遮。辯中以第二四句云「寂滅相中無，常無常等四。」第三四句云「寂滅相中無，邊無邊等四。」今並拂之。非唯此四，泛爾隨相皆悉非之。然百非有二義：一約十惡說，如下當明；二約通相說，謂離一切分別之相耳。故論結云「如來過戲論，而人生戲論。戲論破慧眼，是皆不見佛。」謂起心動念並為戲論，非觀如來。應如《淨名．觀阿閦品》。故疏結云「真則無緣，佛尚應捨，何況餘境。」即借用《金剛》「法尚應捨，何況非法」。疏「相好者，經云盡人中福」等者，等取《善生經》云「一切世間福，不及如來一毛功德。一切毛功德，不及一好。一切好功德，不及一相。故名福相。」云「不及如來一相」等，等取《瑜伽》四十九亦如是說。 > Regarding the commentary's phrase, “The five searches do not find,” and so forth: This refers to the verse in the Madhyamakaśāstra, “Examination of the Tathāgata,” which states: “Neither the aggregates nor separate from the aggregates; this and that do not exist in one another. The Tathāgata does not possess the aggregates; where is there a Tathāgata?” These are the five searches. Because various heterodox teachers falsely conceptualize a self, and identify the self as the Tathāgata, they conceptualize five ways. As for the five: first, positing that the aggregates themselves are the Tathāgata; second, positing that the Tathāgata exists apart from the aggregates; third, positing that the aggregates exist within the Tathāgata; fourth, positing that the Tathāgata exists within the aggregates; fifth, positing that the aggregates belong to the Tathāgata. Now all of these are negated. If the aggregates were the Tathāgata, then because the aggregates arise and cease, the Buddha would arise and cease; hence it says “neither the aggregates.” Second, if it is posited that the Tathāgata exists apart from the aggregates, by what characteristic could he be known? Furthermore, the Tathāgata would fall into the error of permanence, being divorced from the arising and cessation of the aggregates. Hence it says “nor separate.” Third, if the aggregates were within the Tathāgata, like fruit within a bowl, this would also be difference, and the Tathāgata would also fall into permanence. Fourth, if the Tathāgata were within the aggregates, like a person on a bed, there would also be the error of distinction. Hence it says “this and that do not exist in one another.” Fifth, if the Tathāgata possessed the five aggregates, and the aggregates belonged to the Tathāgata, then it would be like a person having a child, which also has the error of distinction; being distinct, the Tathāgata would fall into permanence, and so forth. Thus the latter four phrases all constitute the error of difference; the first is identity; combined, they are simply the errors of identity and difference. Therefore, when the “Examination of Dharmas” refutes the self, it merely says: “If the self were the five aggregates, the self would be arising and ceasing. If the self were different from the five aggregates, it would not have the characteristics of the five aggregates.” Now, examining in detail, there are five searches, none of which can be found. The above five searches can only refute existence. Now the four phrases are all negated; hence it states: “To say the Buddha exists is the delusion of the view of permanence; to say the Buddha does not exist is deep and grave wrong view.” This temporarily refutes both existence and nonexistence; the error of existence is subtle, while the error of nonexistence is heavy; hence it is called “deep and grave.” The verse of that treatise states: “Those with deep and grave wrong views say that there is no Tathāgata. Regarding the quiescent characteristic of the Tathāgata, conceptualizing existence is also incorrect. In such emptiness of own-nature, thinking is also inadmissible”; this also dispels both existence and nonexistence. “However, the four propositions and hundred negations cannot be applied, and thus there is nothing existent”; this concludes by returning to the sūtra text. Following the Madhyamakaśāstra, three kinds of four propositions are briefly explained, none of which can be applied. The first verse states: “Empty cannot be stated; non-empty cannot be stated; both together and not together cannot be stated; they are spoken of only through conventional designation.” In this set of four propositions, ‘together’ is the conjunction proposition; ‘not together’ is the double negation. If stated separately: first, empty; second, non-empty; third, both empty and non-empty; fourth, neither empty nor non-empty. These are all double negations. In the discrimination, the second set of four propositions says: “Within the characteristic of quiescence, there are not the four of permanence, impermanence, and so forth.” The third set of four propositions says: “Within the characteristic of quiescence, there are not the four of finite, infinite, and so forth.” Now all of these are swept away. Not only these four; whatever follows characteristics in general is entirely negated. However, the hundred negations have two meanings: first, explained in terms of the ten evils, as will be clarified below; second, explained in terms of common characteristics, meaning being free from all conceptualized characteristics. Hence the treatise concludes: “The Tathāgata transcends prapañca, yet humans produce prapañca. Prapañca destroys the eye of wisdom, so that none of them see the Buddha.” This means that the stirring of the mind and arising of thoughts are entirely prapañca, not the contemplation of the Tathāgata. One should understand it as in the “Contemplation of Akṣobhya” chapter of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa. Thus the commentary concludes: “The real has no object of cognition; even the Buddha should be abandoned, how much more so other objects.” This borrows the Vajracchedikā’s “Even the Dharma should be abandoned, how much more so non-dharma.” Regarding the commentary's phrase, “As for the marks and signs, the sūtra says exhausting the fortune among humans,” and so forth: “And so forth” encompasses the Upāsaka-śīla-sūtra's statement: “All the fortune of the worldly realms does not equal the merit of a single pore of the Tathāgata. All the merit of the pores does not equal a single minor mark. All the merit of the minor marks does not equal a single mark. Therefore, they are called marks of fortune.” The statement “does not equal a single mark of the Tathāgata,” and so forth, encompasses the fact that fascicle forty-nine of the Yogācārabhūmi also speaks thus. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 20.47](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.20.47) - [Next: 20.49](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.20.49) - [Up: 20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.20) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736~en-mt.20.48) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.20.48](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.20.48) · Pramāṇa