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# 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 30.17

大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 30.17

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [30.17](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.30.17)

疏「無數下顯其離過」，即下三句。於中四：一總明。二「因明立量」下，釋世間義。三「如說佛聲」下，指事以明求過。不得定有則常，今非定有，不同外常。因緣造作即是無常，今從法性，故離造作，不同無常。何可求過？四「諸因量者」下，隨難牒釋。言諸因者，謂即生因、了因。言諸量者，謂現量、比量及聖言量。所言因者，所由所以順益待籍之義相也。為由有此所由，所以順益待籍宗果方明，故說此等名為因也。此即要是宗之所由，亦是宗之所以等。由此即顯與所立宗，一向一味能建立宗，故名因也。又因有三相：一遍是宗法性、二同品定有性、三異品遍無性。如立聲是無常，缾等為同品，虛空等為異品。於同品定有，異品遍無。是無常等因。同喻異喻皆名喻也。言「自他共等三種比量」者，因明。第二疏中廣說，今略示之。如薩婆多立無表色，自立量云：我無表色定是實色，許色性故，如許色聲等。此即自比量，謂自立義，令他解了。二他比量者，於他立中出宗因過。如大乘破薩婆多云：汝無表色非定實色，許無對故，如心心所。三共比量者，於他立中，出比量過。

> Regarding the Commentary's stating, "'Innumerable' below reveals their freedom from faults": this refers to the following three lines. There are four parts within it: 1. A general explanation. 2. Below "Hetuvidyā establishes an inference (pramāṇa)", it explains the worldly meaning. 3. Below "As when speaking of the Buddha's voice", it points to an instance to clarify seeking faults. Not being able to be definitely existent entails permanence; now it is not definitely existent, unlike non-Buddhist permanence. Being created from causes and conditions entails impermanence; now it proceeds from the dharmatā, and is therefore free from creation, unlike impermanence. How could a fault be sought? 4. Below "Regarding the various hetus and pramāṇas", it takes up difficult points in turn and explains them. "Various hetus (reasons)" refers to the productive cause (janaka-hetu) and the illuminating cause (jñāpaka-hetu). "Various pramāṇas (means of valid cognition)" refers to direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and authoritative testimony (śabdapramāṇa). What is called a reason (hetu) is the semantic mark of that from which, that by which, compliant assistance, and dependency. Because of having this origin, cause, compliant assistance, and dependency, the thesis (pakṣa) and fruit are made clear; therefore, these are said to be called "reasons." That is, it must be that from which the thesis arises and that by which the thesis is established, etc. By this, it is shown that it establishes the thesis with single-minded consistency with the thesis to be established; hence it is called a reason. Furthermore, a reason has three marks (trairūpya): 1. presence in the subject of the thesis (pakṣadharmatva); 2. definite presence in similar instances (sapakṣe sattvam); 3. absolute absence in dissimilar instances (vipakṣe 'sattvam). For example, in establishing that sound is impermanent, a pot and the like are similar instances, and space and the like are dissimilar instances. It is definitely present in similar instances and completely absent in dissimilar instances. This is the reason for impermanence and the like. Both similar and dissimilar examples are called examples (dṛṣṭānta). Regarding "the three kinds of inference: for oneself, for others, and shared": in Hetuvidyā, this is explained at length in the second commentary; now it is briefly indicated. For instance, when the Sarvāstivādins establish non-manifest form (avijñapti-rūpa), they establish their own inference thus: 'Our non-manifest form is definitely real matter, because we accept the nature of matter, just like accepted visible matter and sounds.' This is an inference for oneself, meaning one establishes one's own proposition to lead another to understand. Second, an inference for others is to point out faults in the thesis or reason within another's proposition. For instance, the Mahāyāna refutes the Sarvāstivādins: 'Your non-manifest form is not definitely real matter, because you accept that it has no resistance, just like the mind and mental factors.' Third, a shared inference is pointing out inferential faults in another's proposition.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736~en-mt.30.17) — English, machine translation

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.30.17](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.30.17) · Pramāṇa
