[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736) › 30.3 # 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 30.3 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 30.3 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [30.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.30.3) 疏「普見通於性相故離二邊」者，此上總釋一偈，此下別解上半。上半云「普見於諸法，二邊皆捨離。」今應問云：普見諸法，如何即能離得二邊？故今答云：通性相故。唯見相者即是有邊、唯見性者即墮無邊，性相無礙故離二邊。《中論》云「雖空而不斷，雖有而不常。」即由空有相即離二邊也。從「謂真故無有」下，引影公《中論．序》以釋之。真即是性，俗即是相，依二諦融，故離二邊。然二諦之義玄中已明，欲釋此疏略申四義：謂或說妄空真有，如《涅槃》云「空者所謂生死，不空者所謂大般涅槃。」二者妄有真空，即是今文。三俱空，相待無性故。四俱有，性相不壞故，於諦常自二故。今此正當第二俗有真空義，而有四對：初對定有無所在。我約真諦上說空，是無性空，不同無物空也；我就俗諦明其有，此是緣有，非定性之有也。二真故無有，則雖無而有。下一對彰有無體相是不壞有之無、不礙無之有，故成中道。三「雖有而無則不累於有」下，彰有無之德。若是定性之有，此有則唯是有，不得即無；若是定性之無，此無則唯是無，不得即有。今二互相即，故不偏滯。四「不滯於無」下一對，彰有無離過，滯空則斷、累有則常，既不滯不累，故無斷常。又釋：初對雙離有無，故云無有無無，此成空觀。第二對不壞有無，故云雖有而無、雖無而有，此成假觀。第三對明二諦相即故，不偏滯有無故，不為有邊所動、無邊所寂，成中道觀。肇公亦云：「涉有未始迷虛，故常處有而不染」，此不累有也；「不厭有而觀虛，故觀虛而不證」，此不滯於無也。第四離過，準前有釋。初對中初句云真故無有，無彼定性之有，是真空義；次句俗故無無，無彼斷滅之無，故是妙有義。第二對亦有亦無義。第三對非有非無義。第四對離過則成具德四句也。又初對雙離二過，一離有、二離無；第二對離非有非無；第三對離亦有亦無；第四對總明離過。故《起信》云「真如非有相、非無相、非非有相非非無相、非有無俱相」，即斯義也。是以結云「俱不俱等何由而有」，謂第四對正離斷常。第三對不偏滯故離於俱句。第二句不壞二故離於雙非，故俱寂也。又若有二可得名俱，今有即無故則有外無無可與有俱，今無即有故則無外無有可與無俱，故亦有亦無相違不立。言不俱不立者，若定有定無，遮彼有無有俱非句。今有即無，何有非無？今無即有，何有非有？故雙非亦寂。既無有無，亦無一異、斷常、來去，靡不皆如，故云都寂。是以經言「二邊皆捨離」，皆捨離者，一切二邊非局有無。又言離者，性自離故、不取著故、了真性故，非有諸邊可捨離也。 > Regarding the commentary's "Universally seeing penetrates both nature and characteristics, hence freeing one from both extremes": the above generally explains the single verse, and what follows separately interprets the first half. The first half says: "Universally seeing all dharmas, / one renounces both extremes." Now one should ask: "If one universally sees all dharmas, how is one able to be freed from both extremes?" Hence it is answered here: "Because it penetrates nature and characteristics." If one sees only characteristics, that is the extreme of existence; if one sees only nature, that falls into the extreme of nonexistence. Because nature and characteristics are unobstructed, one is free from both extremes. The Madhyamakaśāstra states: "Although empty, it is not annihilated; although existent, it is not permanent." It is precisely because emptiness and existence are mutually identical that one is free from both extremes. From "Because it is ultimate truth, it does not exist..." onwards, it cites Master \[Seng\]ying's "Preface to the Madhyamakaśāstra" to explain it. The ultimate truth is precisely nature; the conventional truth is precisely characteristics. Relying on the harmonization of the two truths, one is freed from both extremes. Now, the meaning of the two truths has already been clarified in the "Mysteries"; to explain this commentary, four meanings are briefly set forth: First, it is said that delusion is empty while truth is existent, as the Nirvāṇa \[Sūtra\] states: "The empty is so-called saṃsāra, and the non-empty is so-called mahāparinirvāṇa." Second, delusion is existent while true nature is empty, which is precisely the present text. Third, both are empty, because they lack nature in mutual dependence. Fourth, both are existent, because nature and characteristics are not destroyed, and with respect to the truths they are always intrinsically twofold. Here, it properly corresponds to the second meaning: conventional existence and true emptiness, which has four pairs: The first pair determines where existence and nonexistence reside. When I speak of emptiness with respect to ultimate truth, it is the emptiness of naturelessness, not the emptiness of non-being; when I explain existence with respect to conventional truth, this is conditioned existence, not the existence of a fixed nature. Second, "because of the ultimate it does not exist, yet although nonexistent it exists": the next pair reveals that the essence and characteristics of existence and nonexistence are nonexistence that does not destroy existence, and existence that does not obstruct nonexistence, thus establishing the Middle Way. Third, from "'although existent it is nonexistent, hence one is not burdened by existence'" onwards, it reveals the virtues of existence and nonexistence. If it were an existence of a fixed nature, this existence would be exclusively existent and could not be immediately nonexistent; if it were a nonexistence of a fixed nature, this nonexistence would be exclusively nonexistent and could not be immediately existent. Now, because the two are mutually identical, one is not biased or stalled. Fourth, the pair beginning with "'not stalled in nonexistence'" reveals that existence and nonexistence are free from faults: stalling in emptiness leads to annihilation, and being burdened by existence leads to permanence; since one is neither stalled nor burdened, there is neither annihilation nor permanence. Another explanation: The first pair leaves behind both existence and nonexistence, hence saying "there is neither existence nor nonexistence"—this accomplishes the contemplation of emptiness. The second pair does not destroy existence and nonexistence, hence saying "although existent it is nonexistent, although nonexistent it exists"—this accomplishes the contemplation of the provisional. The third pair explains that because the two truths are mutually identical, one is not biased or stalled in existence or nonexistence, and thus one is neither moved by the extreme of existence nor stilled by the extreme of nonexistence, which accomplishes the contemplation of the Middle Way. Master \[Seng\]zhao also said: "Entering existence, one is never deluded about emptiness; hence one always abides in existence without being tainted"—this is not being burdened by existence; "not abhorring existence while contemplating emptiness, one contemplates emptiness without realizing \[cessation\]"—this is not being stalled in nonexistence. The fourth, freedom from faults, follows the previous explanation. In the first pair, the first phrase says that because of the ultimate it does not exist—lacking that existence of a fixed nature is the meaning of true emptiness; the next phrase says that because of the conventional it is not nonexistent—lacking that nonexistence of annihilation is the meaning of wondrous existence. The second pair is the meaning of both existent and nonexistent. The third pair is the meaning of neither existent nor nonexistent. In the fourth pair, being free from faults completes the four propositions endowed with virtue. Furthermore, the first pair leaves behind both faults: first, freedom from existence; second, freedom from nonexistence. The second pair is free from neither-existent-nor-nonexistent. The third pair is free from both-existent-and-nonexistent. The fourth pair generally clarifies freedom from faults. Therefore, the Awakening of Faith states: "True suchness has neither the characteristic of existence, nor the characteristic of nonexistence, nor the characteristic of neither existence nor nonexistence, nor the characteristic of both existence and nonexistence"—this is precisely the meaning. Therefore, it concludes: "How could 'both' and 'not both' arise?" This means the fourth pair properly leaves behind annihilation and permanence. The third pair, because it is not biased or stalled, is free from the proposition of "both". The second phrase, because it does not destroy the two, is free from the dual negation, and thus both are quiescent. Furthermore, if there were two, one could speak of "both"; now, since existence is precisely nonexistence, outside of existence there is no nonexistence that could be combined with existence; and since nonexistence is precisely existence, outside of nonexistence there is no existence that could be combined with nonexistence; hence "both existent and nonexistent" are mutually contradictory and cannot stand. As for "not both cannot stand": if there were fixed existence and fixed nonexistence, negating them would give the proposition of neither. Now, existence is precisely nonexistence—how could there be a non-nonexistence? And nonexistence is precisely existence—how could there be a non-existence? Thus the dual negation is also quiescent. Since there is neither existence nor nonexistence, there is also neither identity nor difference, neither annihilation nor permanence, neither coming nor going; there is none that is not thus, and hence it is called completely quiescent. Therefore, the sūtra states: "one renounces both extremes." To renounce both means that all dual extremes are not confined to existence and nonexistence. Furthermore, saying "renounces" means that by nature they are inherently free, one does not grasp or cling, and one understands the true nature—it is not that there are actual extremes that can be renounced. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 30.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.30.2) - [Next: 30.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.30.4) - [Up: 30](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.30) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736~en-mt.30.3) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.30.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.30.3) · Pramāṇa