[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736) › 32.50 # 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 32.50 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 32.50 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [32.50](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.32.50) 疏「是以物不即名」下，第三結成。於中又二：初正結、後引證。今初。此亦肇公《不真空論》意也，在文可知。然此言因破汰公《本無論》，後結成言也。彼論具云「本無者，情尚於無，多觸言而賓無。故非有，有即無也；非無，無即無也。尋夫立言之本旨，直以非有非真有，非無非真無。何必非有無此有，非無無彼無。此直好無之談，豈謂順通事實即物之情哉？夫以物物於物，則所物而可物。以物物非物，故雖物而非物。是以物不即名而就實，名不即物而履真。然則真諦獨靜於名教之外，豈文言之能辯者哉！」今但引其結文兩對耳。言物不即名以就實者，物體虛無，無當名之實也。名不即物而履真者，名但假立，無得物之功也。若名即物，召火即應燒口；若物即名，見物即應知名。今不爾者，明俱非實，故不相得也。 > Regarding the commentary's "Therefore things do not approach names" and what follows, the third part concludes the explanation. Within it there are also two parts: first, the direct conclusion; second, the citation of proof. Now for the first. This also reflects the intention of Master Zhao's Treatise on the Non-Absolute Emptiness, as can be known from the text. However, these words originally concluded an argument refuting Master Tai's Treatise on Original Nonexistence. That treatise states in full: "Those of original nonexistence esteem nonexistence in their sentiments, repeatedly contacting words to relegate things to nonexistence. Therefore, 'not existent' means that existence is itself nonexistent; 'not nonexistent' means that nonexistence is itself nonexistent. Examining the fundamental intention behind establishing these words, it was simply that 'not existent' means not truly existent, and 'not nonexistent' means not truly nonexistent. Why must 'not existent' obliterate this existence, and 'not nonexistent' obliterate that nonexistence? This is merely a discourse that relishes nonexistence; how could it be said to accord smoothly with actual facts and engage the true nature of things? If one designates a thing by means of things, then what is designated can be treated as a thing. But if one designates a non-thing by means of things, then though it is designated, it is not a thing. Therefore, things do not approach names to attain reality, and names do not approach things to step into truth. Thus the ultimate truth abides solitary and tranquil outside the realm of names and teachings; how could it be discerned by written words!" Here, only the two concluding antithetical pairs are cited. To say that things do not approach names to attain reality means that the substance of a thing is empty and insubstantial, lacking the reality that corresponds to the name. To say that names do not approach things to step into truth means that names are merely conventionally established, lacking the efficacy of grasping the thing. If names were identical to things, pronouncing 'fire' should burn one's mouth; if things were identical to names, seeing a thing should cause one to know its name. That this is not so makes clear that both are not real, and therefore do not coincide. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 32.49](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.32.49) - [Next: 32.51](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.32.51) - [Up: 32](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.32) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736~en-mt.32.50) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.32.50](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.32.50) · Pramāṇa