[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736) › 45.21.2 # 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 45.21.2 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 45.21.2 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [45.21.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.45.21.2) 疏中即出過破。 非有遮有故，未免於無； 非無遮無，安得離有？ 故還成亦有亦無，無第四但非之義，以皆執取非中道故。 「云何於此」下，結斥邪見。 疏「二常等四句」等者，方上破邊等，先出四句，後方別破。 今則常句，便立便破。 初常句中，先立。 然前問偈云「我於過去世，為有為是無。 」即問今之現我，過去先已有耶？ 今初句云有，故過去世我即是今我也。 論初破常句云「過去世有我，是事不可得。 過去世中我，不作今世我。 」疏「若言常即有大過」等者，出過破也。 即彼長行云「先世中我不作今我，有常過故。 若常，有無量過。 何以故？ 如人修福因緣故作天，然後作人。 若先世我即是今我者，天即是人。 以罪業因緣故作旃陀羅，後作婆羅門。 若先世我即是今我，旃陀羅即是婆羅門」等。 疏「若謂我今」下，即第二句，亦先立、後「若爾」下，破。 有二種破：先因緣破，緣作是無常，汝立我常故。 二墮無因故，故論云「過去我不作是事則不然，過去世中我異今亦不然。 若謂有異者，離彼應有今我住過去世，而今我自生，如是則斷滅，失於業果報，彼作而此受，有如是等過。 先無而今有，此中亦有過，我則是作法，亦為是無因。 」釋曰：此中初二句牒計總非，次二句標有異過； 次二偈二世相對以辯異過； 末後一偈獨就未來以彰其過，上二句標，下二句顯，第三句由今始有故成作法即墮無常，次句指同前非云亦是也。 前失業果即是無因，今我自生豈非無因？ 疏「第三見上」下，謂見前二過便即雙立。 從「離身」下，破。 即前所引偈中即離門也。 二「又成上二過」者，亦常同初句，亦無常同第二故。 第四句但翻用前句而立破，則還同第三。 論偈但云「如過去世中，有我無我見，若共若不共，是義皆不然。 」疏「又中論云」下，即品末之偈，總結上過，示以性空。 末後又偈云「瞿曇大聖主，憐愍眾生故，悉斷一切見，我今稽首禮。 」即總結一品也。 疏「三如來滅後」下，前明見所依，從其後義，云依涅槃起。 而其前義，通依三世我陰而起，順於晉經。 疏「若依中論」下，第二意中，於中二：先定見所依及如來不同，以外道自謂勒沙婆等是世尊、是如來故。 故《百論》中序德相形，言優樓佉等亦是世尊故。 疏「有謂如來滅後定有不變」者，別示四句。 先示可知； 後「以其四句皆成戲論」下，明破無記之意。 上依《中論．涅槃品》偈云「如來滅度後，不言有與無，亦不言有無，非有及非無。 」又云「涅槃與世間，無有少分別，世間與涅槃，亦無少分別。 涅槃之實際，及與世間際，如是二際者，無毫釐差別。 」釋曰：初之一偈依二諦說，後之二偈唯依第一義，與《瑜伽》同。 疏「瑜伽八十七」下，證成上義。 則顯《中論》初偈俱通二諦。 約世諦中唯釋二句，等字等於三四。 約涅槃中但釋初二句。 從「又此涅槃極難知故」下，三義通顯離四句、絕百非。 《中論》末後偈云「一切法皆空，何有邊無邊，亦邊亦無邊，非邊非無邊？ 何者為一異？ 何有常無常，亦常亦無常，非常非無常？ 諸法不可得，滅一切戲論，無人亦無我，佛亦無所說。 」釋曰：此偈可結無記一段，以文相續故此引耳。 疏「四我及眾生有無等四句」中，言「雙立」者，雙立我法，眾生即蘊、蘊即法故，故疏直就緣生法理以辯有無。 然此四句，《大品》、《智論》、《俱舍》等於此句立二句。 《大品》等云身與神一及異成二句，《俱舍》即命與身即及離成二句。 初句云俱有者，謂有執云：但有身處則有神我，有神我處其必有身，身之與神不相離故。 釋曰：此即身神一句，故《智論》云「神即是身者，有人言：身即是神。 何以故？ 分析此身，求神不可得故。 受之麁妙皆是身故，故言身即是神。 > In the commentary, \[he\] immediately points out the fault and refutes \[it\]. Because "neither existence" negates existence, it does not escape non-existence; because "nor non-existence" negates non-existence, how could it be free from existence? Therefore it reverts to becoming both existence and non-existence, and there is no meaning of the fourth \[position\] merely negating \[them\], because all \[these views\] grasp at what is not the Middle Way. From "How in this..." onwards, \[he\] concludes by censuring erroneous views. Regarding the commentary's "Second, the four propositions of permanence and so forth": compared to the refutation of the finite and so forth above, where \[he\] first stated the four propositions and only afterwards refuted them individually, here with the proposition of permanence, it is established and immediately refuted. In the first proposition, permanence, it is first established. Now, the previous questioning verse stated: "Did I in past eras / exist, or was I non-existent?" That is, it asks: did the present self of now already exist previously in the past? Now the first proposition says it did exist; therefore, the self of past eras is this present self. The treatise, first refuting the proposition of permanence, states: "That there was a self in past eras / is untenable. / The self in past eras / does not become the self of the present era." Regarding the commentary's "If one says it is permanent, there is a great fault..." and so forth: this points out the fault and refutes \[it\]. That is, the prose text of that \[treatise\] states: "The self in the previous era does not become the present self, because of the fault of permanence. If it were permanent, there would be limitless faults. Why? Just as a person, by causal conditions of cultivating merit, becomes a deva, and afterwards becomes a human: if the self of the previous era were identical with the present self, then a deva would be a human. By causal conditions of sinful karma one becomes a caṇḍāla, and afterwards becomes a brāhmaṇa: if the self of the previous era were identical with the present self, a caṇḍāla would be a brāhmaṇa," and so forth. Regarding the commentary's "If one claims that I now...": this is the second proposition; it is likewise first established, and then refuted from "If so..." onwards. There are two kinds of refutations: first, refutation by causes and conditions, \[since\] what is made by conditions is impermanent, while you posit a permanent self; second, because it falls into \[the fault of having\] no cause. Therefore the treatise states: "If the past self did not do \[this\], that is incorrect; / that the self in past eras is different from the present is also incorrect. / If one claims there is a difference, / apart from that \[past self\] there should be a present \[self\]. / My abiding in the past era / while the present self arises of itself— / if so, there would be annihilation, / and loss of karmic retribution; / that one would act and this one receive \[it\]— / there are faults such as these. / That it was previously non-existent and now exists / also contains a fault here: / the self would then be a fabricated dharma, / and it would also be uncaused." Explanation: Here, the first two lines reiterate the claim and refute it generally; the next two lines state the fault of being different; the next two verses contrast the two eras to explain the fault of difference; the final verse takes up the future alone to reveal its fault: the upper two lines indicate it, the lower two lines make it clear; the third line \[shows that\] because it begins to exist only now, it becomes a fabricated dharma and thus falls into impermanence; the next line points to its agreement with the preceding refutation, saying "it would also be \[uncaused\]". The previous loss of karmic result was precisely \[falling into\] being uncaused; if the present self arises of itself, how could that not be uncaused? Regarding the commentary's "Third, seeing the above...": this means that seeing the faults of the previous two, one immediately posits both. It is refuted from "apart from the body" onwards: this is the approach of identity and difference in the previously cited verse. Second, regarding "It also incurs the above two faults": also permanent is the same as the first proposition, and also impermanent is the same as the second. The fourth proposition merely inverts and applies the previous propositions to establish and refute, and thus reverts to being the same as the third. The verse of the treatise merely states: "As in past eras, / views of having a self and not having a self, / whether combined or not combined— / none of these meanings is correct." Regarding the commentary's "Furthermore, the Madhyamakaśāstra states...": this is the verse at the end of the chapter, which sums up the above faults and reveals them to be empty by nature. The final verse further states: "Gautama, the Great Holy Lord, / out of pity for sentient beings, / completely severed all views; / I now bow my head in reverence to him." This concludes the entire chapter. Regarding the commentary's "Third, after the Tathāgata's parinirvāṇa...": earlier, in explaining what the views rely upon, following its latter meaning, it was said to arise relying upon nirvāṇa; whereas its former meaning generally arises relying upon the aggregates of the self in the three times, conforming to the Jin translation of the sūtra. Regarding the commentary's "If according to the Madhyamakaśāstra...": in the second meaning, there are two \[parts\]: first, determining the basis of the views and the distinction regarding the Tathāgata, because non-Buddhists themselves claim that Ṛṣabha and others are World-Honoured Ones and Tathāgatas. Therefore in the Śataśāstra, in the preface \[extolling\] virtues in comparison, it is stated that Ulūka and others are also World-Honoured Ones. Regarding the commentary's "Some claim that after the Tathāgata's parinirvāṇa, he definitely exists unchangingly": this distinguishes and shows the four propositions. The initial demonstration can be understood; later, from "Because all four propositions become prapañca...", it explains the meaning of refuting the undeclared (avyākṛta). Above, relying upon the verses of the "Nirvāṇa Chapter" of the Madhyamakaśāstra, it states: "After the Tathāgata has passed into extinction, / one does not say he exists or does not exist, / nor does one say he both exists and does not exist, / nor neither exists nor does not exist." And it further states: "Between nirvāṇa and the mundane world / there is not the slightest difference; / between the mundane world and nirvāṇa / there is also not the slightest difference. / The bhūtakoṭi of nirvāṇa / and the limit of the mundane world: / between these two limits / there is not a hair's breadth of difference." Explanation: The first single verse is spoken relying upon the two truths; the latter two verses rely solely upon the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), identical to the Yogācārabhūmi. Regarding the commentary's "Yogācārabhūmi fascicle eighty-seven...": this corroborates and establishes the above meaning, revealing that the first verse of the Madhyamakaśāstra applies equally to both truths. In terms of the conventional truth, it only explains two propositions, the word "and so forth" being equivalent to the third and fourth. In terms of nirvāṇa, it only explains the first two propositions. From "Furthermore, because this nirvāṇa is extremely difficult to know...", the three meanings generally reveal freedom from the four propositions and severance of the hundred negations. The final verse of the Madhyamakaśāstra states: "All dharmas are empty: / how could there be the finite or the infinite, / both finite and infinite, / neither finite nor infinite? / What is identical or different? / How could there be permanent or impermanent, / both permanent and impermanent, / neither permanent nor impermanent? / All dharmas are unobtainable; / all prapañca is extinguished; / there is no person and no self; / the Buddha also taught nothing." Explanation: This verse may conclude the section on the undeclared (avyākṛta); it is cited here because the text is continuous. In the commentary's "Fourth, the four propositions of the existence, non-existence, and so forth of the self and sentient beings", regarding the phrase "positing both": this posits both self and dharmas, since sentient beings are the aggregates, and the aggregates are dharmas; hence the commentary directly explains existence and non-existence in terms of the principle of dharmas arising through conditions. However, regarding these four propositions, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, the Abhidharmakośa, and so forth posit two propositions for this position. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā and others say that the body and the soul (jīva) being one and being different constitute two propositions; the Abhidharmakośa says that the life-principle and the body being identical and distinct constitute two propositions. The first proposition, saying both exist, means that there is an attachment claiming: wherever there is a body, there is a soul-self; wherever there is a soul-self, there must be a body, because the body and the soul are not separated from each other. Explanation: This is the single proposition of the body and the soul; hence the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa states: "Regarding 'the soul is identical with the body,' some say: the body is identical with the soul. Why? Analyzing this body, in seeking the soul it cannot be found; because what is received, whether coarse or subtle, is all body, therefore it is said that the body is identical with the soul." > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 45.21.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.45.21.1) - [Next: 45.21.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.45.21.3) - [Up: 45.21](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.45.21) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736~en-mt.45.21.2) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (2) - [般若燈論釋](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.madhyamaka.mmk!prajnapradipa*zh-prabhakaramitra.15.34) — Classical Chinese - [中論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.madhyamaka.mmk!pingala*zh-kumarajiva.4.236) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.45.21.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.45.21.2) · Pramāṇa