[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736) › 50.19 # 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 50.19 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 50.19 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [50.19](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.50.19) 疏「此之事事所以無違」下，出事事無違因。略出三因：一法性融通門、二緣起相由門，上二即事事無礙義；三直語同一緣起，通事通理非無礙義。如覩一葉落，知天下秋矣。言「亦由後二段令此無違」者，後二即事理無違及理理無違，由此故令事事無違。謂既同一味，事復即理，由事即理，理融於事，故得事事無礙，故無違也。疏「然上三段無違」下，重總料揀。於中二：一同異類料揀；二「開此則有」下句數料揀，但就剎眾生以成諸句。初根本四句、二剎上理事成四句、三約眾生上理事成四句，上二三兩四句但是事理無礙；四以剎事對生理為四、五以眾生事望剎理成四，此後二四方成事事無礙。疏「上二四句各初及第三等」者，以事理相望，唯就同類即得成故。言各二及四，雖非無礙，亦不相違。「義如上說」者，以二四皆是不即，故非無礙。言「亦不相違」者，由上同一緣起故。由不壞之事、不變之性，皆同一緣起故。疏「此中初二句是理理無違」者，一剎無性即眾生無性，二理同故。言「以無可即亦無可違」者，釋第二句是理理無違義。疏「第四句雖非無礙亦不相違」者，第四不礙兩存，故非無礙。而亦同是一緣起故，及第五四中亦不相違，皆同前二三四句中亦不相違。疏「第五四句」等者，言此中初及第三句是。「第二段理事無違中異類事理相望」者，以將剎望眾生無性，眾生與剎是異類也。 > Regarding the commentary's "As for the reason why phenomenon and phenomenon are without contradiction here" and so forth: this presents the causes for phenomenon and phenomenon being without contradiction. It briefly presents three causes: 1. the gateway of the interpenetration of dharmatā; 2. the gateway of the mutual dependence of conditioned origination—the above two being the meaning of the non-obstruction of phenomenon and phenomenon; 3. speaking directly of sharing the same conditioned origination, which extends to both phenomenon and principle, not being the meaning of non-obstruction. It is like seeing a single leaf fall and knowing that autumn has arrived under heaven. As for "also by virtue of the subsequent two sections this is rendered free of contradiction": the subsequent two are the absence of contradiction between phenomenon and principle, and the absence of contradiction between principle and principle; through these, phenomenon and phenomenon are rendered free of contradiction. That is to say, since they share the same single flavor, and phenomena are moreover identical to principle, because phenomena are identical to principle, principle permeates phenomena; therefore, the non-obstruction of phenomenon and phenomenon is attained, and hence there is no contradiction. Regarding the commentary's "However, regarding the absence of contradiction in the above three sections" and so forth: it synthesizes and discriminates again in general. Within this are two parts: 1. discrimination of identical and different categories; 2. discrimination of the number of propositions under "unfolding this there are..."; it merely establishes the various propositions with respect to lands and sentient beings. First, the fundamental four propositions; second, establishing four propositions on principle and phenomenon in lands; third, establishing four propositions on principle and phenomenon in sentient beings—the above second and third sets of four propositions are merely the non-obstruction of phenomenon and principle; fourth, contrasting the phenomena of lands with the principle of sentient beings to form four; fifth, viewing the phenomena of sentient beings against the principle of lands to form four; only these latter two sets of four form the non-obstruction of phenomenon and phenomenon. Regarding the commentary's "In the above two sets of four propositions, each initial and third, and so forth": because when phenomenon and principle are viewed against each other, they can be accomplished only with respect to the same category. As for each second and fourth, although not non-obstructed, they are also not mutually contradictory. "The meaning is as stated above": because both the second and fourth are non-identity, they are not non-obstructed. As for "also not mutually contradictory": this is due to sharing the same conditioned origination above. Because unchanging nature and non-destroyed phenomena all share the same conditioned origination. Regarding the commentary's "Here the initial two propositions are the absence of contradiction between principle and principle": 1. the naturelessness of lands is identical to the naturelessness of sentient beings; 2. because the principle is identical. As for "since there is nothing to identify with, there is also nothing to contradict": this explains that the second proposition is the meaning of the absence of contradiction between principle and principle. Regarding the commentary's "Although the fourth proposition is not non-obstructed, it is also not mutually contradictory": the fourth does not obstruct the dual preservation of both, hence it is not non-obstructed. Yet since they are also together a single conditioned origination, and also in the fifth set of four they are not mutually contradictory, all are identical to the absence of mutual contradiction in the previous second, third, and fourth propositions. Regarding the commentary's "The fifth set of four propositions" and so forth: this means that the first and third propositions here are "viewing different categories of phenomenon and principle against each other in the second section of the absence of contradiction between principle and phenomenon"; because taking lands and viewing them against the naturelessness of sentient beings, sentient beings and lands are different categories. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 50.18](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.50.18) - [Next: 50.20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.50.20) - [Up: 50](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.50) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736~en-mt.50.19) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.50.19](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.50.19) · Pramāṇa