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# 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 51.10

大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 51.10

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [51.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.51.10)

疏「百門之內」下，第三釋文。於中二：先總、後「最初」下別。既依十如，則十十科之。疏「大般若云：三世諸佛皆以性空而為佛眼」者，見性為佛眼故。疏「理無惑計有無常實」者，即生公十四科實相義中，具云「夫惑情所封則兩端斯失，失理背宗所計皆虛。理無惑計則有無並實，實則說空可以袪滯有者之惑，明有可以釋守空者之迷。斯則空有二教旨俱得實。」釋曰：此中有三，初約情非、二約理是、三約教真。今當其中，但用理是。疏「無有少」下，文中三：初牒經、二「如遍非情」下設難、三「故應釋言」下會通。然此段疏，為遮妄執一切無情有佛性義。就計此義，自有淺深。一謂精神化為土木金石、梟獍負塊以成於子，情變非情、非情變情。斯為邪見，不異外道眾生計生草木有命，故不可也。若說無情同一性故，則稍近宗，亦須得意。彼本立意約於真如自體遍，故真實之性無有二。故《涅槃經》說第一義空為佛性故，一切法中有安樂性，攝境從心無非心故，色性智性體無二故。如是等文，諸經具有。今謂此釋太即太過，失情無情壞於性相。若以《涅槃》第一義空該通心境，《涅槃》何以揀於瓦礫言無性耶？廣如別破。今直顯正義，謂性與相非一非異，情與非情亦非一非異，故應釋言「以性從緣」等。一如《涅槃》者，揀去牆壁瓦礫等故。二無覺不覺者，真性之中無心境故。三「無非覺悟」，以無情性融覺性故。故引《起信》文略一句。然其此義前已引竟，今此復要彼論通問。「問云：若諸佛法身離於色相者，云何能現種種色相？答曰：即此法身是色體故，能現於色。所謂從本已來色心不二，以色性即智性故。色體無形說名智身，以智性即色性故說名法身遍一切處。」今取二性相即互融之義說耳。論云等者，引證，非正證前，故云亦可證此。可為證者，智及智處同般若故。「既二性相即」下，結釋經文。「況心為總相」下，舉況以釋。前結一性義，今結唯心義。總相則無所不攝。又融攝重重即本經意，隨舉一塵即含法界，何令色境非一性耶？

> Regarding the Commentary's 'Within the hundred gates' below, this is the third part, explaining the text. Within this are two parts: first, general; second, from 'the very first' below, specific. Since it relies on the ten suchnesses, it classifies them into ten times ten. Regarding the Commentary's 'The Great Prajñā says: All buddhas of the three periods take nature-emptiness as the buddha-eye,' this is because seeing the nature is the buddha-eye. Regarding the Commentary's 'The principle is devoid of deluded projections, and existence and non-existence are both real,' this comes from Master Daosheng's fourteen sections on the meaning of the true mark, where it states in full: 'When deluded sentiments are attached, both extremes are lost; losing the principle and turning away from the source, whatever is projected is entirely false. When the principle is devoid of deluded projections, existence and non-existence are both real. Being real, speaking of emptiness can dispel the delusion of those stagnated in existence, and clarifying existence can resolve the confusion of those clinging to emptiness. Thus, the teachings of both emptiness and existence attain reality in their purports.' The explanation says: Herein are three points: first, the falsity regarding sentiment; second, the correctness regarding principle; third, the truth regarding doctrine. Now, we are in the middle of these, applying only the correctness regarding principle. Regarding the Commentary's 'There is not a single' below, within the text are three parts: first, taking up the sūtra; second, from 'If suchness pervades insentient things' below, raising an objection; third, from 'Therefore one should explain' below, harmonizing them. However, this section of the commentary is intended to block the false attachment to the view that all insentient things possess buddha-nature. Regarding the attachment to this view, there are shallow and deep levels. The first claims that spirit transforms into earth, wood, metal, and stone, or that owls and beastly creatures carry lumps \[of dirt\] to produce offspring, sentient beings turning into insentient things and insentient things turning into sentient beings. This is a heterodox view, no different from non-Buddhists who believe that living grass and trees have life; hence it is unacceptable. If one says that insentient things share the same one nature, this is somewhat closer to the principle, yet one must still grasp the meaning. Their original intention relies on the omnipresence of tathatā's own essence; thus the real nature is not two. For this reason, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says that ultimate emptiness is buddha-nature, and within all dharmas there is the nature of peace and bliss; gathering the objective realm into the mind, there is nothing that is not mind, because the nature of form and the nature of wisdom are non-dual in essence. Passages such as these are found in all sūtras. Now, I consider this interpretation too reductive and extreme, conflating the sentient and the insentient, and destroying nature and characteristics. If one uses the ultimate emptiness of the Nirvāṇa \[Sūtra\] to encompass both mind and objects universally, why does the Nirvāṇa \[Sūtra\] exclude tiles and gravel, saying they have no nature? This is broadly refuted elsewhere. Now, directly revealing the correct principle: nature and characteristics are neither one nor different, and sentient and insentient are also neither one nor different; therefore one should explain: 'taking the nature to follow conditions' and so on. First, 'as in the Nirvāṇa,' because it excludes walls, tiles, gravel, and the like. Second, 'without awakening or non-awakening,' because within the true nature there is neither mind nor object. Third, 'nothing is not awakened,' because the insentient nature interfuses with the nature of awakening. Therefore it cites the Awakening of Faith, omitting one phrase. However, this meaning has already been cited previously, yet here it is needed again for that treatise's answer to the question: 'Question: If the dharmakāya of all buddhas is free from form-characteristics, how can it manifest various form-characteristics? Answer: Because this dharmakāya is the essence of form, it can manifest form. That is to say, from the beginning form and mind have been non-dual, because the nature of form is the nature of wisdom. The essence of form is formless, called the wisdom-body; because the nature of wisdom is the nature of form, it is called the dharmakāya pervading all places.' Here, it merely takes the meaning of the two natures being mutually identical and interfused to explain it. When the treatise says and so on, it cites it as proof, not as direct proof for what precedes; hence it says it can also prove this. What can serve as proof is that wisdom and the locus of wisdom are identical in prajñā. From 'Since the two natures are mutually identical' below, it concludes the explanation of the sūtra text. From 'How much more so when the mind is the universal mark' below, it adduces a comparison to explain. The former concluded the meaning of one nature; this now concludes the meaning of consciousness-only. As the universal mark, there is nothing it does not encompass. Furthermore, manifold interfusion is the intention of this sūtra: whenever a single dust mote is raised, it contains the dharmadhātu; how could the objective realm of form not be of one nature?  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736~en-mt.51.10) — English, machine translation

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.51.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.51.10) · Pramāṇa
