[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736) › 56.13 # 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 56.13 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 56.13 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [56.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.56.13) 疏「問地地正證者」下，第五問答料揀。於中先問、後「古德」下答。於中二：先舉賢首釋；後「此亦順理」下，疏為會釋。以《刊定》取《唯識》意，約德異故，有十親證破智明昧，故為會釋二義俱取。於中二：初句總標、二別會。今初，言「此亦順理」者，非是不許彼之正義，正義即《唯識》意也，故云此亦順理。彼疏有二：先難古釋、後申正義。難古有三。一難云：謂境智互相如，約智證十如。何不境智互相如，約境證一如？二難云：加行後得非親證，可說彼智有明昧。正體緣如不變影，何得說此有明昧？三難云：能證有分限，所證無分限。以限證無限，境智豈相如？下出正義云：應知親證之言，但望當地加行後得故名為親，不望後地說為親證，故不相違也。於義可知。今當為古德先通此難。一者，我許有十如，則應如所難。我唯立一如，何因為此難？故應順語答第一云：境智互相如，說智十遍證。境智互相如，約境惟一證。二、答第二云：汝證十如不變影，一如而說為十如。我證真如不變影，何妨一智十親證？三、酬第三，有其二意：一隨難通。以能隨所證，不許有明昧。以所隨能證，真如應是智。二者反難云：真如無分限，不許有明昧。真如體不異，十德何由成？是則前難未為切要。 > On the Commentary's text from “Query: As for the direct realization in each stage…” onward: this is the fifth \[section\], questions, answers, and analytical distinctions. Herein, first is the question, followed by the answer from “The ancient masters…” onward. In this there are two \[parts\]: first, Xianshou's explanation is presented; next, from “This is also in accordance with reason…” onward, the Commentary harmonizes and explains them. Because the Kanding \[ji\], drawing upon the meaning of the Vijñaptimātra\[siddhi\], bases itself on the differences among virtues and thus maintains ten direct realizations while refuting \[the view of\] the cognition’s clarity and obscurity, the Commentary harmonizes them so as to accept both meanings. In this there are two \[parts\]: the initial clause generally designates \[the stance\], and second is the specific reconciliation. Now for the first: stating “This is also in accordance with reason” does not mean rejecting the correct doctrine of that \[tradition\]—the correct doctrine being the meaning in the Vijñaptimātra\[siddhi\]—hence it says “This is also in accordance with reason.” That commentary has two \[parts\]: first it challenges the ancient explanation, and then it states the correct doctrine. The challenge to the ancient \[view\] consists of three \[points\]. The first challenge says: It is said that object and cognition conform to each other, so based on the cognition there is the realization of ten tathatās. Why should object and cognition not conform to each other such that, based on the object, there is the realization of a single tathatā? The second challenge says: The preparatory and subsequent cognitions are not direct realizations, so one could say that those cognitions have clarity and obscurity. The fundamental cognition cognizes tathatā without transforming into an image—how can one claim that this \[cognition\] has clarity and obscurity? The third challenge says: The agent of realization has limits, whereas the object of realization has no limits. If one realizes the limitless with the limited, how could object and cognition conform to each other? Below, it presents the correct doctrine, saying: One should know that the term “direct realization” is only termed “direct” relative to the preparatory and subsequent \[cognitions\] of that respective ground; it is not called “direct realization” relative to the subsequent grounds. Therefore, there is no contradiction. Its meaning is clear. Now I shall first resolve these challenges on behalf of the ancient masters. First: if I accepted that there are ten tathatās, it should be as challenged. But I only establish one tathatā; on what basis does this challenge arise? Therefore, replying in kind to the first \[challenge\], one should say: Object and cognition conform to each other, so the cognition is said to realize ten times throughout. Object and cognition conform to each other, so in terms of the object there is only a single realization. Second, replying to the second: You realize ten tathatās without transforming into images, speaking of ten tathatās with respect to a single tathatā. I realize tathatā without transforming into images—what prevents a single cognition from directly realizing it ten times? Third, in answering the third, there are two points: First, resolving it in accordance with the challenge: since the agent conforms to the object of realization, you do not grant clarity or obscurity. If the object conformed to the agent of realization, tathatā would have to be cognition. Second, countering with a reverse challenge: tathatā has no limits, and you do not grant that it has clarity and obscurity. Since the essence of tathatā is not distinct, how could the ten virtues be established? Thus the previous challenges were not truly essential. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 56.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.56.12) - [Next: 56.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.56.14) - [Up: 56](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.56) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736~en-mt.56.13) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.56.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.56.13) · Pramāṇa