[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736) › 56.24 # 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 56.24 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 56.24 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [56.24](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.56.24) 疏「上四微中」下，第四料揀。於中二：先依論從勝以配；後「上依增勝」下，疏意明通。通相云何？如功德異小，無住功德凡外豈有？觀行異凡，小乘外道皆有無明，明彼亦無依止清淨，揀異外道凡小寧有？以並非聰慧雙證二空，定契性淨為恒寂然，故知論主從勝略配耳。疏「此徵體相也」者，疏釋論。體相有三：一者標相，如見煙知火、見鶴知池等；二者形相，如長短方圓等；三者體相，如火熱相等。今揀前二，故云體相。體相復二：一者事體，如向所引；二者理體，如空寂等。今是理體，約不同相。雖義兼於事，皆事理相即，為深義之體也。疏「智體空寂名為同相」等者，其猶世間色等空寂名為同相，色相差別為不同相。不同，猶於自性也。疏「總中此是誰相」下，釋總句，有二：先釋經、後釋論。經中兩重假徵，以經配答，可知。但體性有同有異，異者相據於外、性主於內。體者性相之通稱，則寬狹不同。今此所明即性為體，故經云「自性」，論經云「自體」。疏「何以言同」下，第二釋論同相之言，先出體、後釋名。「此即性淨涅槃」者，出體也。則下言不同，是方便淨涅槃。同相有二：一對因彰果，本隱今顯。二對用彰體，涅槃體淨故。不揀修生修顯，功德彰體，齊稱性淨。若依初義，無始法性名之為體。昔為妄覆，今障息德顯，故名為淨。若依後義，則涅槃法體名之為性，涅槃體淨名為性淨。下方便淨亦有二義，次下當辯。疏「上同諸佛」下，後釋名也。以體釋名，由體同故。略舉三同，顯橫竪皆同。上下即竪，「橫同諸法」，標也。「諸法如故」下，展轉釋成。文中自有五重徵釋。一云：云何知皆同諸法？釋云：諸法皆如，故智體即如，故云同也。二徵云：經云性空，何干於如？故釋云：如即空故。三又徵云：何以得知如即是空？故釋云：一切皆以空為自性，故自性即是空如。四又徵云：豈不言總意別？別在於智，何言諸法？故釋云：色性智性本無二故。即《起信》文，故以法取性，性隨法別，是則智空，非說餘空。若以法就性，性無不同。五徵云：縱言性同，何以得知是涅槃性？故引《涅槃經》證一切諸法中皆有安樂性。安樂性者，即涅槃性故。即《涅槃》第三四，十二問中一問也。疏「下句別者」下，釋此一句。疏文有六：初會論經。二「釋云」下，引論標釋。三「三種空者即地前」下，引他論證成。四「今云有者」下，引論別釋。五「今闕有」下，會通經文。六「三種空義」下，結廣有在。初二可知。三中即《寶性論》第四云「若散亂心失空眾生者，謂初發心菩薩離空如來藏義。以失變壞物修行者，名為空解脫門。此明何義？初發心菩薩起如是心：實有法可滅，後時得涅槃。如是菩薩失空如來藏修行。又有人以空為有物，我應得空，又生如是心：離色等法別更有空，我應修行。彼人不知空。」今疏，二當第三、三當第二，為順論中三種謗故。又取意引，對文可知。然《般若經》中四句，正遣此三空疑。一疑空滅色故，以色即是空遣之。二疑空異色故，以色不異空空不異色遣之。三疑空是物，今明空即是色，故非別有空也。疏今云有者，即初離謗攝者。四引論別釋也。然論先列三病，即返問辯非；後列三名治之，即順問彰是。今初。論云「自體空者，可如是取，如兔角耶？不也。可如是取，異此空智更有異空耶？不也。可如是取、有彼此自體、彼此轉滅耶？不也。」後順問彰是云「云何取此自體空有不二不盡？如是取此句，顯離三種空攝：一離謗攝、二離異攝、三離盡滅攝。」釋曰：上論先舉所揀，以經對治。今疏乃分其能治所治，兼經五字。一一對釋，於義易了。如云今云有者，牒經言；即初離謗攝者，即舉論立名。言不謂斷滅下，明離前過。如兔角者，即前可如是取如兔角耶？其不謂兩字，即前不也二字。斷滅兩字，即取三空亂意中第一亂意會同論文。下之二攝，例此可知。但觀上所引論文，自分主客，二即疑空異色、三即疑空是物謂空為有。三中言「此明非滅有體之智以成有體之空」者，此有兩釋，今是第一釋，由論云「彼此自體故，以空為此、智為彼，既離盡滅，故非滅有體之智」等。疏「亦非空有物可轉滅」者，即第二釋。前釋雙就智空上論盡滅，今就空上論盡滅，正順上第三，謂空為有謗，不要約智論有也。疏「離此三空」下，結成正義。然正義尚難，初二是有、後義非有，自互相違，何成正義？故說正義，智相是有、智性說空。今此智空，由有三德，離上三謗：一相作義故離初謗攝。謂若無智則無有空，若無真空智不成立，故若諸法不空即無道無果。《中論》云「以有空義故，一切法得成。」故論經云「有能離謗攝」。既空能成有，豈待滅智方成空耶？二不相礙義，是故不異。異即有礙於空，定性有故；空礙於有，定性無故。既不相礙，故非色外別更有空，故離異攝。三相違義。以體非有故無可盡，安謂空為有耶？故初則廢他成己故有空，後則廢己成他故非有空。由初有故不無，由後無故非有，非有非無是中道義，故此空有豈得異耶？由空義故與智非一，由前二義與智非異，非一非異是中道故，故此真空是智之體。體相無二為智之相，是同相也。同相即是空如來藏，空如來藏即性淨涅槃，其揆一耳。 > The Commentary states: "Among the above four subtleties..." and below is the fourth part, the critical analysis. Within this there are two: first, following the Śāstra, it matches them according to preeminence; second, from "The above is based on preeminence..." onward, the Commentary's intent is to clarify their general applicability. What is their general characteristic? Just as the meritorious quality is distinguished from the Hīnayāna, how could ordinary beings or non-Buddhists have non-abiding merit? The contemplative practice is distinguished from ordinary beings, yet both Hīnayāna and non-Buddhists have fundamental ignorance; this clarifies that they also lack the purity of reliance. To distinguish it from non-Buddhists, how could ordinary beings or the Hīnayāna possess it? For neither of them possesses the keen wisdom that dual-realises the two emptinesses, definitely tallying with the purity of nature as eternally quiescent. Therefore, one knows that the treatise master only briefly matched them according to preeminence. > > The Commentary states: "This inquires into the essence-characteristic." This is the Commentary explaining the Śāstra. There are three kinds of essence-characteristics: first, indicative characteristics, such as knowing fire by seeing smoke, or knowing a pond by seeing cranes; second, shape-characteristics, such as long, short, square, round, etc.; third, essence-characteristics, such as the heat characteristic of fire. Here, the former two are excluded; hence it is called the essence-characteristic. Essence-characteristics are further twofold: first, the essence of phenomena (vastu), as quoted earlier; second, the essence of principle (tattva), such as emptiness and quiescence. Here it is the essence of principle, considered in terms of distinct characteristics. Although the meaning also encompasses phenomena, phenomena and principle are mutually identical, serving as the essence of the profound meaning. > > The Commentary states: "The emptiness and quiescence of the essence of wisdom is called the common characteristic..." and so forth. This is just as in the worldly realm, where the emptiness and quiescence of form and the like is called the common characteristic, while the distinct characteristics of form are the uncommon characteristics. "Uncommon" is equivalent to svabhāva (own-nature). > > The Commentary states: "In the general statement, whose characteristic is this?..." and below explains the general sentence. There are two: first, explaining the sūtra; second, explaining the śāstra. In the sūtra there is a twofold provisional inquiry; matching it with the sūtra to reply may be known. However, essence and nature have identity and difference: difference means that characteristics pertain to the exterior, while nature governs the interior. "Essence" is a general term covering both nature and characteristics, so its breadth and narrowness differ. What is clarified here is taking nature as essence; hence the sūtra says "own-nature" (svabhāva), and the Śāstra's sūtra text says "own-essence." > > The Commentary states: "Why is it called 'common'?" and below is the second part, explaining the Śāstra's term "common characteristic." First it identifies the essence, and then explains the name. "This is the naturally pure nirvāṇa" identifies the essence. Then the subsequent mention of "uncommon" refers to the expediently purified nirvāṇa. The common characteristic has two \[aspects\]: first, contrasting cause to reveal the fruit, originally concealed and now manifest; second, contrasting function to reveal the essence, because the essence of nirvāṇa is pure. Without distinguishing between what is produced by cultivation and what is manifested by cultivation, the meritorious qualities reveal the essence, and both are equally called naturally pure. If based on the first meaning, the beginningless dharmatā is called the essence. Formerly veiled by delusion, now with hindrances ceased its virtues become manifest; hence it is called pure. If based on the latter meaning, the dharma-essence of nirvāṇa is called nature, and the purity of the essence of nirvāṇa is called natural purity. The expedient purity below also has two meanings, which will be discriminated next. > > The Commentary states: "Above, it is identical with all buddhas..." and below explains the name. It explains the name by way of essence, because the essence is identical. It briefly adduces three identities to show identity in both vertical and horizontal dimensions. Above and below are vertical; "horizontally identical with all dharmas" introduces the theme. From "Because all dharmas are tathatā..." onward, it unfolds the explanation to establish it. Within the text there are naturally five layers of inquiry and explanation. > First, it asks: How is it known that it is universally identical with all dharmas? The explanation says: All dharmas are tathatā; therefore, the essence of wisdom is itself tathatā, and thus it is called identical. > Second, it queries: The sūtra speaks of emptiness of nature; what has that to do with tathatā? Thus it explains: Tathatā is emptiness itself. > Third, it further queries: How is it known that tathatā is emptiness? Thus it explains: Everything takes emptiness as its own-nature; therefore, own-nature is emptiness-tathatā. > Fourth, it queries again: Does not the general statement have a specific intent? The specific rests on wisdom; why speak of all dharmas? Thus it explains: The nature of form and the nature of wisdom are fundamentally not two. This is the text of the Awakening of Faith. Therefore, if one apprehends nature by way of dharmas, nature differs according to dharmas; in that case, the emptiness of wisdom is not speaking of other emptinesses. But if one aligns dharmas with nature, nature is never different. > Fifth, it queries: Even granting that nature is identical, how is it known to be the nature of nirvāṇa? Therefore, it quotes the Nirvāṇa Sūtra to prove that among all dharmas there is the nature of bliss. The nature of bliss is itself the nature of nirvāṇa. This is one of the twelve questions in the thirty-fourth fascicle of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. > > The Commentary states: "The lower sentence specifies..." and below explains this single sentence. The text of the Commentary has six parts: first, harmonizing with the Śāstra's sūtra; second, from "The explanation says..." onward, citing the Śāstra to mark and explain it; third, from "The three kinds of emptiness refer to before the bhūmis..." onward, citing another treatise to verify and establish it; fourth, from "Now, speaking of existence..." onward, citing the Śāstra for a specific explanation; fifth, from "Now lacking existence..." onward, harmonizing with the sūtra text; sixth, from "The meanings of the three kinds of emptiness..." onward, concluding that an extensive treatment exists elsewhere. > The first two can be understood. In the third, the fourth fascicle of the Ratnagotravibhāga states: "If beings with distracted minds lose emptiness, this means bodhisattvas of initial aspiration depart from the meaning of the empty tathāgatagarbha. Cultivating practice by missing destructible objects is called the concentration of emptiness. What does this clarify? A bodhisattva of initial aspiration gives rise to this thought: 'There really are dharmas that can be extinguished, and later one attains nirvāṇa.' Such a bodhisattva cultivates practice by losing the empty tathāgatagarbha. Furthermore, there are people who take emptiness to be an existent thing: 'I should attain emptiness,' and further give rise to this thought: 'Apart from form and other dharmas there is separately another emptiness, which I should cultivate.' Such people do not know emptiness." Now in the Commentary, the second corresponds to the third, and the third corresponds to the second, in order to accord with the three kinds of slander in the Śāstra. Furthermore, it cites the general intent, which can be understood by comparing the texts. Now, the four phrases in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra directly dispel doubts regarding these three types of emptiness: first, doubting that emptiness annihilates form, which is dispelled by "form is itself emptiness"; second, doubting that emptiness is different from form, which is dispelled by "form is not different from emptiness, emptiness is not different from form"; third, doubting that emptiness is a thing—now it clarifies that "emptiness is itself form," so there is no separate emptiness. > > The Commentary's "Now, speaking of existence, it is subsumed under the first, departing from slander" is the fourth part, citing the Śāstra for a specific explanation. The Śāstra first lists the three errors, which uses counter-inquiries to discriminate the incorrect; later it lists three names to remedy them, which uses direct inquiry to reveal the correct. First is the beginning: The Śāstra states: "Regarding own-essence being empty, can it be grasped like this: like the horn of a hare? No. Can it be grasped like this: that different from this empty wisdom there is another, distinct emptiness? No. Can it be grasped like this: that there are own-essences of this and that, and this and that undergo annihilation? No." Then, the direct inquiry to reveal the correct says: "How is this own-essence grasped as emptiness and existence being non-dual and inexhaustible? To grasp it like this reveals that the sentence is subsumed under departing from the three kinds of emptiness: first, subsumed under departing from slander; second, subsumed under departing from difference; third, subsumed under departing from annihilation." Explanation: Above, the Śāstra first presents what is to be excluded, matching it with the sūtra as the antidote. Now the Commentary divides the antidotes and what is antidoted, incorporating the five characters of the sūtra. Explaining them one by one in correspondence makes the meaning easy to understand. For instance, "Now, speaking of existence" cites the words of the sūtra; "it is subsumed under the first, departing from slander" cites the Śāstra's established designation. Saying "It does not mean annihilation..." and below clarifies departing from the preceding fault. "Like the horn of a hare" corresponds to the earlier "can it be grasped like this: like the horn of a hare?" The two words "does not mean" correspond to the earlier two words "no." The two words "annihilation" take the first confused conception from the three confused conceptions of emptiness to harmonize with the treatise text. The two subsumptions below can be known by analogy with this. Simply by examining the treatise text cited above, the host and guest are naturally divided: the second is doubting that emptiness is different from form; the third is doubting that emptiness is a thing, considering emptiness to be existent. In the third, the statement "this clarifies that it is not extinguishing the wisdom of existent essence to accomplish the emptiness of existent essence" has two explanations; this is the first explanation. Because the Śāstra says "the own-essence of this and that," taking emptiness as "this" and wisdom as "that," since it departs from annihilation, it is "not extinguishing the wisdom of existent essence," etc. The Commentary's "nor is it that emptiness has an entity that can undergo annihilation" is the second explanation. The former explanation discussed annihilation regarding both wisdom and emptiness together; the present one discusses annihilation solely regarding emptiness, directly according with the third slander above, which considers emptiness to be existent, without needing to discuss existence in terms of wisdom. > > The Commentary states: "Departing from these three emptinesses..." and below concludes and establishes the correct doctrine. Yet the correct doctrine is still difficult: the first two are existent, while the latter meaning is non-existent; they mutually contradict each other, so how can they establish the correct doctrine? Therefore, in stating the correct doctrine, the characteristic of wisdom is existent, while the nature of wisdom is spoken of as empty. Now, because this empty wisdom possesses three virtues, it departs from the above three slanders: First, by virtue of mutual generation, it is subsumed under departing from the first slander. That is, if there is no wisdom, there is no emptiness; if there is no true emptiness, wisdom is not established. Therefore, if dharmas were not empty, there would be neither path nor fruit. The Madhyamakaśāstra states: "Because there is the meaning of emptiness, all dharmas are able to be established." Thus the Śāstra's sūtra says: "Existence is able to be subsumed under departing from slander." Since emptiness can establish existence, how could it wait for the extinction of wisdom to accomplish emptiness? Second, by virtue of non-obstruction, therefore it is not different. If it were different, it would obstruct emptiness, having a fixed-nature existence; and emptiness would obstruct existence, having a fixed-nature non-existence. Since they do not obstruct each other, there is no separate emptiness outside of form; hence it is subsumed under departing from difference. Third, by virtue of mutual contradiction. Since its essence is non-existent, there is nothing that can be exhausted; how could one claim that emptiness is existent? Thus, the former sets aside the other to accomplish itself, so there is emptiness; the latter sets aside itself to accomplish the other, so it is not an empty existence. Because of the former's existence it is not non-existent; because of the latter's non-existence it is not existent. Neither existent nor non-existent is the meaning of the Middle Way. How then could this emptiness and existence be different? By the meaning of emptiness, it is not one with wisdom; by the previous two meanings, it is not different from wisdom. Being neither one nor different is the Middle Way; therefore, this true emptiness is the essence of wisdom. Essence and characteristics being non-dual is the characteristic of wisdom; this is the common characteristic. The common characteristic is the empty tathāgatagarbha, and the empty tathāgatagarbha is the naturally pure nirvāṇa; their principle is one and the same. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 56.23](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.56.23) - [Next: 56.25](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.56.25) - [Up: 56](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.56) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736~en-mt.56.24) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [十地經論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.mahayanasutra.dasabhumika!vyakhyana*zh-bodhiruci.2.26) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.56.24](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.56.24) · Pramāṇa