[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736) › 56.25 # 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 56.25 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 56.25 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [56.25](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.56.25) 疏「今闕有字」下，第五會通經文。此句徵也。「此有二意」下，釋初意，以不盡字攝有字。前明不盡是無，故無可盡，則離謂空為有過；今明有體故不盡，則離斷滅過。「二者」下，第二意，即以無盡二字攝有字，以是有無不二，故離斷滅。於中，先出論文、次「意云」下釋論、後「今經亦無定字」下會釋今經。言「離前二空」者，一謂有無不二，故離於異攝。二即異故，義如前說。二者有無既其不二，豈滅有明無？故離斷滅。雖有二意，後意最親。疏「二有六句明不同相，即方便淨涅槃」者，疏文有三：第一總彰大意、第二隨文解釋、第三總結會通。初中有三：初出體、二釋名、三解妨。今初，即方便淨涅槃。對前性淨，方便有二：一對因彰果，從因方便而修得故。二對體起用，作用差別故名方便。方便即寂，故稱涅槃。疏「斷惑平等」下，第二釋此不同，對於前同。前同有三，今亦有三，而少開合。一對下不同眾生，言斷惑平等者，斷惑故異凡夫，平等故異小乘。小乘不斷法執，故非平等。又謂有惑可斷，不解無斷而斷：今皆反此，故云平等。二「而能斷故，不同外境但是所證」，即對前橫同諸法。然諸法中含其有無，故開為二。今對有境質礙之境不能斷惑，但是所證故。三「有異相故不同空」者，即前諸法中含此無法。又加此空者，前約性淨同空義多，今方便淨同空義少，故云不同於空。不云不同諸佛者，此多同佛故。疏「涅槃是果」下，三通妨難。而文有二妨：一以果違因妨。先問、後「約分證」下答。答有三義，文並可知。疏「今明地智」下，第二所證違智妨，亦先問、後「若分相」下答，大意可知。然約相融，凡是一法即攝一切。若以涅槃為門，涅槃門中攝一切法。若以菩提為門，菩提攝一切法。若法身為門，法身攝一切法。今約地智，地智門中攝一切法。智相即同菩提，智性即同涅槃。今取即相之性，故同與不同皆名涅槃。言「二而不二」者，性與相殊而復相即故。「難說甚深」者，欲言菩提即同涅槃，欲言涅槃即說為智。互融雙絕，難以一事當之，故理圓言偏、理與言絕，為難說耳。 > Regarding the commentary's "Now lacking the character 'being' (有)" and so forth: this is the fifth \[section\], reconciling the textual phrasing of the sūtra. This sentence is an inquiry. In "There are two meanings here" and so forth, it explains the first meaning: subsuming the character "being" through the characters "not exhausted" (不盡). Earlier, it was explained that "not exhausted" is "non-being," so there is nothing that can be exhausted, thereby avoiding the error of regarding emptiness as being; now it explains that because there is an essence, it is not exhausted, thereby avoiding the error of annihilationism. From "Second" onward is the second meaning: subsuming the character "being" through the two characters "inexhaustible" (無盡). Because being and non-being are non-dual, it avoids annihilationism. Within this, it first cites the text of the treatise; next, from "The meaning is" onward, it explains the treatise; and finally, from "The present sūtra also lacks the character 'definite'" onward, it harmonizes and explains the present sūtra. Regarding "free from the two aforementioned emptynesses": first, because being and non-being are non-dual, it is free from subsumption into difference; second, because it is identical with difference, the meaning is as explained before. Second, since being and non-being are non-dual, how could destroying being clarify non-being? Therefore, it avoids annihilationism. Although there are two meanings, the latter meaning is the closest. Regarding the commentary's "Second, there are six lines clarifying the differentiated characteristics, namely upāyapariśuddhi-nirvāṇa": the text of the commentary has three parts: first, it summarizes the general import; second, it explains following the text; third, it summarizes and harmonizes. In the first part, there are three: first, revealing the essence; second, explaining the name; third, resolving objections. Now the first is upāyapariśuddhi-nirvāṇa. In contrast to the preceding prakṛtipariśuddhi (natural purity), upāya has two meanings: first, manifesting the fruit in contrast to the cause, because it is cultivated and attained through causal upāya; second, initiating function in contrast to the essence, because differentiated operations are called upāya. Since upāya is identical with quiescence, it is called nirvāṇa. Regarding the commentary's "Equal in severing delusion" and so forth: this is the second part, explaining this differentiation in contrast to the preceding sameness. The preceding sameness had three aspects; here there are also three, with a minor difference in division and combination. First, in contrast to differentiated sentient beings below, stating "equal in severing delusion": because it severs delusion, it is distinct from ordinary persons; because it is equal, it is distinct from the Hīnayāna. The Hīnayāna does not sever grasping at dharmas, so it is not equal. Furthermore, they believe there is delusion that can be severed, failing to understand severing without severing; now all of this is the reverse of that, hence it is called "equal." Second, regarding "and being able to sever, it is distinct from external objects which are merely what is realized": this contrasts with the preceding horizontal sameness with all dharmas. However, all dharmas include both being and non-being, hence they are divided into two. Now, in contrast to objective spheres of being, which are obstructive realms, they cannot sever delusion and are merely what is realized. Third, regarding "having differentiated characteristics, it is distinct from emptiness": this refers to the preceding all dharmas containing this non-existent dharma. Moreover, adding this emptiness is because earlier, in terms of natural purity, the meaning of sameness with emptiness was dominant, whereas now, in upāya purity, the meaning of sameness with emptiness is minimal; hence it says "distinct from emptiness." Not saying "distinct from all buddhas" is because this is largely the same as the buddhas. Regarding the commentary's "Nirvāṇa is the fruit" and so forth: this is the third part, resolving objections. The text contains two objections: first, the objection that the fruit contradicts the cause. First it asks, and then from "in terms of partial realization" onward, it replies. The reply has three meanings, all evident from the text. Regarding the commentary's "Now clarifying the cognition of the bhūmi" and so forth: the second objection is that the realized contradicts the cognition. It also asks first, and then from "if differentiated by characteristics" onward, it replies; the general import can be known. However, in terms of characteristic integration, whenever there is one dharma, it subsumes everything. If one takes nirvāṇa as the gate, all dharmas are subsumed within the gate of nirvāṇa. If one takes bodhi as the gate, bodhi subsumes all dharmas. If dharmakāya is the gate, the dharmakāya subsumes all dharmas. Now, in terms of the cognition of the bhūmi, all dharmas are subsumed within the gate of the cognition of the bhūmi. The characteristics of cognition are identical with bodhi; the nature of cognition is identical with nirvāṇa. Now, taking the nature that is identical with characteristics, both sameness and differentiation are called nirvāṇa. Stating "two yet not two" means that nature and characteristics are distinct yet mutually identical. Regarding "profound and difficult to explain": if one wishes to speak of bodhi, it is identical with nirvāṇa; if one wishes to speak of nirvāṇa, it is spoken of as cognition. Mutually integrated and doubly transcendent, it is difficult to correspond to a single matter; therefore, while the principle is complete, words are partial; the principle and words are severed, which is why it is difficult to explain. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 56.24](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.56.24) - [Next: 56.26](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.56.26) - [Up: 56](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.56) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736~en-mt.56.25) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.56.25](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.56.25) · Pramāṇa