[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736) › 65.50 # 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 65.50 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 65.50 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [65.50](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.65.50) 疏「三攝相歸見」等者，然初及四五皆《唯識》所破，故彼論初云「又為開示謬執我法迷唯識者，令達二空，於唯識理如實知故。」此破凡外，今文所無。次論復云「有迷謬唯識理者。」釋曰：下皆護法廣破四師，此標也。次論云「或執外境如識非無。」釋曰：此即有宗，依十二處教，執心境俱有是第一義。論云「或執內識如境非有。」釋曰：此破清辯。依密意空教，撥識亦無。論云「或執諸識用別體同。」釋曰：即大乘一類菩薩，言八識體唯是一也，如一水鏡多波像生，即當此中第五義也。論云「或執離心無別心所。」釋曰：此即經部覺天所計。以有經言「士夫六界染淨由心，無心所相。雖於蘊中亦有心所，但於識上分位假立，無別實有。」然清辯計雖撥皆空，強違中道而立唯境。順世亦立唯四大種成有情故，若依此義，應有四句。清辯順世有境無心，中道大乘有心無境，一切有部有心有境，邪見撥無都無心境。然其有王無所，即此第四，而今指經論與彼不同。然第三義言如《解深密》者，即第一經〈心意識相品〉第三，廣慧菩薩問佛：菩薩於心意識祕密善巧。佛答云：「廣慧當知，於六趣生死彼有情及四生身分生起，於中最初一切種子，心識成熟，展轉和合增長廣大，依二執受：一者有色諸根及所依執受、二者相名分別言說戲論習氣執受。有色界中具二執受，無色界中不具二種。」釋曰：無色不具，即無色根，則唯有相名分別習氣，明是唯見。次下經又云「廣慧！阿陀那識為依止、為建立故，六識身轉，謂眼耳鼻舌身意識。此中有識，眼及色為緣生眼識。與眼識俱隨行，同時同境有分別意識轉等。」則知皆是唯立見分。此見亦即安慧所立一自證分，謂多立有相見二分，去相取見為自證耳。言「二十唯識」者，亦名唯識二十論，有二十偈故。世親菩薩造，唐三藏釋。最初即云「安立大乘三界唯心，以契經說三界唯心，心、意、識、了別，名之差別。此中說心，意兼心所，唯遮外境不遣相應，內識生時似外境現。如眼有翳，見髮蠅等，於中都無少分實義。」釋曰：此亦明唯心義。復有一卷《唯識論》，天親菩薩造，後魏瞿曇般若流支譯。細尋乃是《二十唯識》同本異譯，而文稍顯著。先列二十偈，初偈云「唯識無境界，以無塵望見，如人目有翳，見毛月等事。」偈竟「問云：初偈明何義？答曰；凡作論有三義。一者立義，即是初句。二者引證，即第二句。三者譬喻，即下二句。」下文廣釋，亦明外相無實，唯心現故，名攝相歸見。言「觀所緣緣論」者，但有兩紙，陳那菩薩造。論云「諸有欲令眼等五識以外色作所緣緣者，或執極微許有實體，能生識故。或執和合，以識生時帶彼相故。二俱非理。所以者何？極微於五識，設緣非所緣，彼相識無故，猶如眼根等。」釋曰：此破前極微生識。長行破意云：眼等能發識，識上無眼相，極微能發識，識豈有微相？故無所緣。又偈云「和合於五識，設緣非所緣，彼體實無故，猶如第二月。」釋曰：觀長行意，此破上和合以生識。謂彼執言：堅等多相和合一處，有是現量境，能發於識。破意云：和合法無實故，如眼錯亂，見第二月。釋曰：以無上二相，唯有於識故，名攝相歸見。然陳那立於三分。今言無相者，相實無故。下正義云：彼所緣緣非全不有，內識如外現，為識所緣緣。許彼相在識，及能生識故。釋曰：長行內識似外境現，為所緣緣。許眼等識帶彼相起，及彼生識，故結云「諸識唯內境，相為所緣緣，理極成也。」則非全無相，相全屬識，故云歸見。然上疏引，皆賢首意，欲成十義故復引之。法相立識，如前所引《唯識論》辯。 > Regarding the commentary's "Third, subsuming characteristics into the seeing \[division\]" and so forth: however, the first, fourth, and fifth are all refuted by the Cheng weishi lun. Thus, that treatise states at the beginning: "Furthermore, in order to elucidate for those who deludedly grasp at self and dharmas and are confused about consciousness-only, so that they may realize the two emptinesses and know the principle of consciousness-only as it truly is." This refutes ordinary people and non-Buddhists, which is not present in our present text. Next, the treatise further states: "There are those who are deluded about and misunderstand the principle of consciousness-only." Explanation: What follows is Dharmapāla extensively refuting the four masters, and this is the heading. Next, the treatise states: "Some cling that external objects, like consciousness, are not non-existent." Explanation: This refers to the Sarvāstivāda school; relying on the teaching of the twelve āyatanas, they cling that mind and objects both existing is the ultimate truth. The treatise states: "Some cling that internal consciousness, like objects, is non-existent." Explanation: This refutes Bhāviveka. Relying on the provisional teaching of emptiness, he repudiates consciousness as also being non-existent. The treatise states: "Some cling that the various consciousnesses differ in function but are identical in essence." Explanation: This refers to a class of Mahāyāna bodhisattvas who say that the essence of the eight consciousnesses is solely one, just as from a single pool of water or a single mirror many waves or reflections arise; this corresponds to the fifth meaning here. The treatise states: "Some cling that apart from mind there are no separate mental factors." Explanation: This is the view posited by Harivarman of the Sautrāntika. Because a sūtra states: "A person consists of six elements; defilement and purity arise from mind, and there are no characteristics of mental factors. Although there are also mental factors among the aggregates, they are merely provisionally posited according to states of consciousness, with no separate substantial existence." However, although Bhāviveka's view repudiates everything as empty, it forcibly contradicts the Middle Way to establish object-only. Because the Lokāyata also posited that only the four great elements constitute sentient beings, if we follow this meaning, there should be four positions. Bhāviveka and the Lokāyata hold that there are objects without mind; the Middle Way Mahāyāna holds that there is mind without objects; the Sarvāstivāda holds that there are both mind and objects; and wrong views repudiate everything, holding that there are neither mind nor objects. Yet having the mental king without mental factors is this fourth \[meaning\], but now the reference to sūtras and treatises is not the same as their \[view\]. Furthermore, the third meaning mentions "as in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra": this refers to the first fascicle, chapter 3, "Characteristics of Mind, Intellect, and Consciousness," where Bodhisattva Guāṅhuì asks the Buddha: "Bodhisattvas are skilled in the secret of mind, intellect, and consciousness." The Buddha answers: "Guāṅhuì, you should know that regarding the arising of those sentient beings in the saṃsāra of the six destinies and their physical embodiment through the four modes of birth, within that process, initially the mind-consciousness with all seeds matures, mutually coalescing, growing, and expanding, relying on two kinds of appropriation: first, the appropriation of the material sense faculties and what they depend on; second, the appropriation of the predispositions of verbal proliferation in signs, names, and discrimination. In the form realm, both appropriations are complete; in the formless realm, both are not complete." Explanation: Not having both in the formless realm means lacking the material faculties, and thus there are only the predispositions of signs, names, and discrimination, making it clear that there is only seeing. Next below, the sūtra further states: "Guāṅhuì! With the ādānavijñāna as support and foundation, the six consciousness bodies operate—namely, eye-, ear-, nose-, tongue-, body-, and mental consciousnesses. Herein, when there is consciousness, with eye and form as conditions, eye-consciousness arises. Accompanying the eye-consciousness, simultaneously and with the same object, the conceptual mental consciousness operates, and so on." Thus we know that all of this exclusively establishes the seeing division. This seeing is also the single self-verifying division established by Sthiramati; that is, whereas many establish the two divisions of characteristic and seeing, he discards characteristic and takes seeing as self-verification. As for the "Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratā": it is also called the Treatise on Consciousness-Only in Twenty Verses because it has twenty verses. Composed by Bodhisattva Vasubandhu and interpreted by the Tripiṭaka Master of the Tang. At the very beginning, it states: "To establish the Mahāyāna teaching that the three realms are mind-only, because a sūtra says: 'The three realms are mind-only.' 'Mind,' 'intellect,' 'consciousness,' and 'cognition' are differences in name. What is called 'mind' here includes mental factors; it only negates external objects and does not exclude associated factors. When internal consciousness arises, it appears resembling external objects. Like a person with cataracts seeing hairs, flies, and so forth, wherein there is not the slightest bit of real entity." Explanation: This also clarifies the meaning of mind-only. There is also a one-fascicle Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratā composed by Bodhisattva Vasubandhu and translated by Gautama Prajñāruci of the Later Wei. Upon careful examination, it is actually a different translation of the same original as the Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratā, but the text is slightly clearer. It first lists the twenty verses; the first verse says: "Consciousness-only has no sensory objects, / For viewing is observed without dust-particles; / Like a person whose eyes have cataracts, / Seeing things such as hairs or moons." After the verse, "A question asks: 'What meaning does the first verse clarify?' The answer says: 'In composing a treatise there are generally three meanings. The first is stating the thesis, which is the first line. The second is adducing proof, which is the second line. The third is a metaphor, which is the lower two lines.'" The text below explains extensively, also clarifying that external characteristics have no reality and are only manifestations of mind; hence it is called subsuming characteristics into the seeing. As for the Ālambanaparīkṣā: it has only two leaves, composed by Bodhisattva Dignāga. The treatise states: "All those who wish that the five consciousnesses such as the eye-consciousness take external form as their objective condition either grasp subtle atoms, claiming that they have real substance because they can generate consciousness, or grasp aggregate forms because when consciousness arises it bears their image. Both are unreasonable. Why is this? As for subtle atoms with respect to the five consciousnesses: / Even if a condition, they are not the objective support, / Because the consciousness lacks their characteristic, / Just like the eye faculty and so forth." Explanation: This refutes the former view that subtle atoms generate consciousness. The prose refutation means: the eye and other faculties can trigger consciousness, yet the consciousness does not bear the characteristic of the eye; subtle atoms can trigger consciousness, but how could consciousness possess the characteristic of subtle atoms? Therefore, there is no objective support. Furthermore, a verse states: "Aggregate forms with respect to the five consciousnesses: / Even if a condition, they are not the objective support, / Because their substance is truly non-existent, / Just like a second moon." Explanation: Examining the prose meaning, this refutes the above view that aggregate forms generate consciousness. That is, they grasp that the combination of multiple characteristics such as hardness in one place exists as an object of direct perception and can trigger consciousness. The refutation means: because composite dharmas are unreal, it is like an eye impairment seeing a second moon. Explanation: Because the above two characteristics do not exist and there is only consciousness, it is called subsuming characteristics into the seeing. However, Dignāga established three divisions. The statement here that there is no characteristic is because characteristics are truly non-existent. The correct doctrine below states: "That objective condition is not entirely non-existent; internal consciousness appearing like the external serves as the objective condition for consciousness. Because it is admitted that its characteristic exists in consciousness and can generate consciousness." Explanation: The prose states that internal consciousness appears like external objects and serves as the objective condition. It is admitted that the eye and other consciousnesses arise bearing that characteristic, and that they generate consciousness; hence it concludes: "The various consciousnesses are only internal objects; characteristics serve as the objective condition—this principle is thoroughly established." Thus, it is not completely without characteristics; characteristics entirely belong to consciousness, and therefore it is called returning to seeing. However, the citations in the above commentary are all Xianshou's intention; he cited them again because he wished to establish the ten meanings. The Dharma-characteristic \[school\] establishes consciousness as explained in the Cheng weishi lun cited previously. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 65.49](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.65.49) - [Next: 65.51](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.65.51) - [Up: 65](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.65) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736~en-mt.65.50) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.65.50](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.65.50) · Pramāṇa