[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736) › 9.23 # 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 9.23 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 9.23 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [9.23](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.9.23) 疏「第一義空」下，第六明二諦空有，即離別中相即義也。雖有不即不離，對前成即。故《仁王．二諦品》云「波斯匿王言：『第一義諦中有世諦不？若言無者，智不應二；若言有者，智不應一。一二之義其事云何？』佛言：『汝今無聽、我今無說，無聽無說是即名為一義二義。』即說偈云：『無相第一義，無自無他作。因緣本自有，無自無他作。法性本無性，第一義空如。諸有本有法，三假集假有。有無本自二，譬如牛二角。照解見無二，二諦常不即。於解常自一，於諦常自二，通達此無二，真入第一義。』」《涅槃》十三云「文殊師利白佛言：『世尊所說世諦、第一義諦，其義云何？世尊！第一義諦中有世諦不？世諦之中有第一義不？如其有者，即應一諦；如其無者，將非如來虛妄說耶？』佛言：『善男子！世諦者即第一義諦。』『世尊！若爾則無二諦。』佛言：『有善方便，隨順眾生，說有二諦。善男子！若隨言說則有二種：一者世法、二者出世法。善男子！如出世人之所知者，名第一義諦。世人知者，名為世諦。善男子！五陰和合稱言某甲，凡夫眾生隨其所稱，是名世諦。解陰無有某甲名字，離陰亦無某甲名字，出世之人如其性相而能知之，名第一義諦。』」以上二經對前二論，二宗有殊，前教則八諦區分，初一唯世俗、後一唯勝義，中間六諦上下相望各通二義，而皆約事，令第八諦獨居事外。今此二經，《仁王》則雖有二諦，智照無二。《涅槃》則本唯一諦，解惑分二。斯則二而不二、不二而二，一二自在為真二諦。故昔人云：二諦並非雙，恒乖未曾各。即其義也。生公云：「是非相待故，有真俗名生，一諦為真、二言成權矣。」即《涅槃經》意也。梁論亦云「智障甚盲瞑，謂真俗別執。」然法相務欲分析、法性務在融通，各據一門，勿生偏滯。然疏云「第一義空該通真妄」者，真妄俱空，非獨真空。妄有妄空，真有也。而言第一義空者，非無物為空，乃即妙有之空也。「真非俗外」者，明不異也，影取俗非真外。「即俗而真」者，明相即也，影取即真而俗。而不云俗非真外即真而俗者，一則影取，如上所明。二則以妄必是其真，亦有真非妄故。如波即濕，有濕非波，即靜水故。即佛已證故，但言隨順觀察世諦即入第一義諦，無有隨順觀察第一義即入世俗故。故上《涅槃》中文殊雙徵，如來但云世諦即第一義。疏「雖空不斷」等者，由上二諦既融，令不斷不常。中道妙旨不唯約事，此即《中論》及《智論》文。且約空為真諦、有為俗諦者，空是即有之空故，雖空不斷，斯乃即俗之真也。不同始教，如龜毛兔角，方說名空。「雖有不常」者，有是即空之有故，此有非常，斯乃即真之俗也。若執有定是有，便墮常見。故《中論》云「定有則著常，定無則著斷。是故有智者，不應著有無。」非斷非常即是中道，若滅故不常、續故不斷，但俗中一義耳。上則不壞有無而離有無，有之與無非一非異，故成中道。若其一者，有無之義俱壞；若其異者，便墮斷常。何者？若法定有有相，則終無無相。如說三世有者，未來中有，遷至現在、轉入過去，不捨本相，是則為常。又定有者應不從緣，不從緣者墮無因常。若法定無，先有今無是則為斷。若不融三諦明空有者，決不能祛斷常之見。 > The Commentary states: "Emptiness of the ultimate truth..." and so forth; this is the sixth \[section\], which explains the emptiness and existence of the two truths, concerning the meaning of mutual identity within identity versus difference. Although there are non-identity and non-difference, set against the preceding \[teaching\] this constitutes mutual identity. Therefore the \*Benevolent Kings Sūtra\*, "Chapter on the Two Truths," states: "King Prasenajit said: 'Is the conventional truth present within the ultimate truth? If one says it is not, cognition should not be twofold; if one says it is present, cognition should not be single. How is it regarding the meaning of single and twofold?' The Buddha said: 'You now have no hearing, and I now have no speaking; no hearing and no speaking is precisely termed the single meaning and the two meanings.' Then he spoke a verse, saying: 'The signless is the ultimate truth; it is not made by oneself nor made by another. Causes and conditions are fundamentally existent in themselves, neither made by oneself nor made by another. The dharmatā is fundamentally without nature, and the ultimate truth is empty like this. All existing things are fundamentally existent phenomena, existing through the collection of the three designations. Existence and non-existence are fundamentally two in themselves, just like the two horns of an ox. When illuminated by understanding, they are seen as non-dual; the two truths are constantly non-identical. To understanding, they are constantly single in themselves; to the truths, they are constantly two in themselves. Thoroughly penetrating this non-duality, one truly enters the ultimate truth.'" Fascicle thirteen of the \*Nirvāṇa Sūtra\* states: "Mañjuśrī said to the Buddha: 'What is the meaning of the conventional truth and ultimate truth taught by the World-Honoured One? World-Honoured One, is the conventional truth present within the ultimate truth? Is the ultimate truth present within the conventional truth? If it is present, there should be only a single truth; if it is not present, would that not mean the Tathāgata speaks falsely?' The Buddha said: 'Good son, the conventional truth is precisely the ultimate truth.' 'World-Honoured One, if so, there are no two truths.' The Buddha said: 'There are skilful upāyas that, in accordance with sentient beings, teach that there are two truths. Good son, if conforming to verbal expression, there are two kinds: first, worldly phenomena; second, supramundane phenomena. Good son, that which is known by supramundane people is termed the ultimate truth. That which is known by worldly people is termed the conventional truth. Good son, when the five aggregates harmonize and are given the name of a certain person, and ordinary sentient beings conform to what is named—this is termed the conventional truth. Understanding that the aggregates have no name of a certain person, and that apart from the aggregates there is also no name of a certain person, supramundane people can know them according to their nature and characteristics—this is termed the ultimate truth.'" Comparing the above two sūtras with the previous two treatises, the two traditions differ. In the former teaching, eight truths are distinguished: the first is exclusively conventional, the last is exclusively ultimate, and the middle six truths, looking back and forth from above and below, each partake of both meanings, yet all are treated in terms of phenomena, leaving the eighth truth to abide uniquely outside of phenomena. Now in these two sūtras: in the \*Benevolent Kings Sūtra\*, although there are two truths, cognitive illumination is non-dual; in the \*Nirvāṇa Sūtra\*, fundamentally there is only a single truth, but understanding and confusion divide it into two. This is precisely twofold yet non-dual, non-dual yet twofold; single and twofold being unimpeded constitutes the true two truths. Hence an ancient said: 'The two truths are together yet not a pair; constantly divergent yet never separate.' This is precisely its meaning. Master Sengzhao said: 'Because right and wrong are mutually relative, the names "true" and "conventional" arise; a single truth is the real, while speaking of two is provisional.' This is precisely the import of the \*Nirvāṇa Sūtra\*. The \*Liang Treatise\* \[on Mahāyānasaṃgraha\] also states: 'Cognitive obscuration is extremely blinding; it is referred to as grasping separately at the true and the conventional.' However, the Faxiang school focuses on analysis, while the Faxing school focuses on interpenetration; each relies on one approach, so do not give rise to one-sided obstinacy. However, when the Commentary says, "Emptiness of the ultimate truth encompasses both the true and the false," both the true and the false are empty, not merely the true being empty. The false has false existence and false emptiness; the true has \[true existence\]. As for saying "emptiness of the ultimate truth," it is not that there being no thing is emptiness; rather, it is the emptiness that is identical with subtle existence. "The true is not outside the conventional" clarifies their non-difference, implicitly implying that the conventional is not outside the true. "Being identical to the conventional is the true" clarifies their mutual identity, implicitly implying that being identical to the true is the conventional. As for why it does not say that the conventional is not outside the true and being identical to the true is the conventional: first, it is implicitly indicated, as clarified above; second, because the false must be the true, yet there is also the true that is not the false. Just as waves are precisely moisture, yet there is moisture that is not waves, namely calm water. Since the Buddha has already realized it, one only speaks of conforming to and contemplating the conventional truth as entering the ultimate truth; there is no conforming to and contemplating the ultimate truth as entering the conventional. Therefore, in the \*Nirvāṇa Sūtra\* above, when Mañjuśrī raises both queries, the Tathāgata only states that the conventional truth is precisely the ultimate. The Commentary's words "Although empty, it is not severed," and so forth: because the two truths above are already harmonized, they cause \[reality\] to be neither severed nor permanent. The subtle purport of the Middle Way is not merely treated in terms of phenomena; this is precisely the text of the \*Madhyamakaśāstra\* and the \*Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa\*. Setting emptiness as the ultimate truth and existence as the conventional truth: because emptiness is the emptiness identical with existence, although empty, it is not severed; this is precisely the true that is identical with the conventional. It is not like the initial teaching, where one only speaks of emptiness like the hair of a tortoise or the horns of a hare. "Although existent, it is not permanent": because existence is the existence identical with emptiness, this existence is impermanent; this is precisely the conventional that is identical with the true. If one grasps existence as definitively existent, one falls into the view of permanence. Therefore the \*Madhyamakaśāstra\* states: 'Definite existence leads to attachment to permanence; definite non-existence leads to attachment to annihilation. Therefore the wise should not be attached to existence or non-existence.' Being neither severed nor permanent is precisely the Middle Way; if it is impermanent because of cessation and unsevered because of continuation, that is only a single meaning within the conventional. The above, then, without destroying existence and non-existence, is free from existence and non-existence; existence and non-existence are neither one nor different, and thus constitute the Middle Way. If they were one, the meanings of existence and non-existence would both be destroyed; if they were different, one would fall into annihilation or permanence. Why is this? If phenomena definitively had the characteristic of existence, they would ultimately lack the characteristic of non-existence. Just as those who assert existence across the three times say that what exists in the future shifts to the present and turns into the past without abandoning its fundamental characteristic—this would be permanence. Furthermore, that which is definitively existent should not arise from conditions; not arising from conditions, it falls into causeless permanence. If phenomena were definitively non-existent, being previously existent and now non-existent would be annihilation. If one does not harmonize the three truths to clarify emptiness and existence, one will definitely be unable to eliminate the views of annihilation and permanence. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 9.22](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.9.22) - [Next: 9.24](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.9.24) - [Up: 9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.9) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736~en-mt.9.23) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (2) - [仁王般若經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1707.2.113) — Classical Chinese - [佛說仁王般若波羅蜜經](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.245.1.44) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.9.23](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1736.9.23) · Pramāṇa