[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [勝鬘寶窟](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1744) › 1.37.2 # 勝鬘寶窟 1.37.2 勝鬘寶窟 1.37.2 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [1.37.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1744.1.37.2) 無物可比，故言無比。 出情識之外，故言不思。 超言說之境，稱為不議。 此皆自近之遠有五歎也。 言自近之遠者，妙微語過世間，亦有無等語能過出世間。 雖過世間，於出世中有二乘菩薩可得比類，是故今明於出世中亦無比類，猶言可思可議，是故今明心不能思、口不能議。 有此妙身，是故今敬禮。 又上三句辨歎，下一句明敬。 自有敬而不歎、歎而不敬，今則具足。 又三句辨口業，下句明身業，心通二處。 「如來色無盡」者，上雖五歎，恐物有盡極，未必能一切處一切時常應，是故今明能應物無盡。 所以無盡者，由本無盡，故應常不盡； 由群生無盡，故垂形不窮，故有無盡歎也。 「智慧亦復然」者，上歎色形，今美智慧。 歎色有六：一微妙、二無等、三無比、四不思、五不議、六不盡。 今歎智慧，義亦應然，但略示智同於色。 色既無盡，則智亦無盡。 無盡者，無量無邊之智慧也。 所以偏歎色智者，形則無倫、智則無盡，蓋是物之欣要，故偏說之。 問：上覩金容，可歎妙色； 未明智慧，云何歎智？ 答：將一色類智，既有絕妙之身，必有超群之智。 又前赴感中具明色智，知感即應，故是智無不周； 普放淨光，故形色無比。 上既雙覩，故今俱歎。 「一切法常住」者，上雖歎色智，恐未必具於餘德，是故今明具一切德。 故下文說「成就一切佛法，名如來法身。 」問：若爾，法身攝一切德，何故復有波若？ 答：若作法身名說，無非法身，餘二亦爾。 故下文說「智慧身自在」，則波若中有法身。 今法身中亦有波若，故云智慧亦復然。 解脫亦有法身，故云是故禮法王。 若就別義者，《攝論》云「法身是眾德所依，如身根為眾根所依，是故法身具一切德。 」雖具眾德，未必是常，故云常住。 所以常者，如來藏中過恒沙佛法顯成今德，是故為常。 若是無常，不足歸依； 以是常住，故可歸依。 今佛異昔佛，故明常住佛； 今歸異昔歸，故歸依常住。 古舊之釋判其真應者，一行半歎應身，「常住」已下歎法身。 今用此意。 第三同異門。 初偈及第二偈下半，人無異釋。 有人言：「如來色無盡」者，此歎報身，報身其有常色，常故無盡。 「智慧亦復然」者，此歎智慧，報身之中不出功德智慧，以智慧同色常住，故言亦復然。 第四詳論得失門。 且前問後家，若言無盡是常住義者，下句復云「一切法常住」，文則為煩。 又下歸依章中明無盡歸、常住歸，若無盡即是常住者，文則不應兩出，又即言不巧。 世間云：絕倫之貌、無盡之才。 若以常釋無盡，則於歎不巧，是故應用初師之說。 次論法身有色無色，古今論諍。 有人言：法身有色，《泥洹經》云「妙色湛然常安穩，不隨時節劫數遷」，《涅槃》云「捨無常色，獲得常色」，《地論》云「如來相好莊嚴為實報身」。 又菩薩廣劫修作相好之因，而何無果？ 以文義推之，當知法身有色。 破無色者云：若言色是礙義，故佛果無色者，亦應心是緣義，應說佛果無心。 佛遂有無緣之心，應有無礙之色。 問：無礙云何名色？ 答：若爾，佛無緣，云何有知？ 次江南雲、旻、藏等悉云：佛果無色，故《涅槃》云「願得如來無色主身」，《文殊十禮經》云「無色無形相，無根無住處，不生不滅故，敬禮無所觀」也。 破有色者云：若言佛果有色者，應架芎隆之屋帶楚之裳。 難意云：法身既有無礙之色，應處無礙之宅、應著無礙之衣也。 肇公注《淨名》「至人空洞無像，豈國土之有恒」，竺道生著《法身無淨土論》明法身無淨土，此皆用無色義也。 通初家難云：色與心此二非類，麁心可研習為妙心、麁色不可研習為妙色，是故佛果則無色有心。 問：若爾，經云何言捨無常色？ 答：蓋是妙有炳然，故言色耳。 二家各執，互成諍論。 今依龍樹一言決之。 《中論．法品》云「諸佛或說我，或說於無我。 > Because there is no thing to compare to \[him\], he is said to be "incomparable." Because he transcends the reach of affective consciousness, he is said to be "inconceivable." Because he surpasses the realm of speech, he is called "inexpressible." These are five praises proceeding from the near to the far. That they proceed "from the near to the far" means that while "subtle" and "fine" express his surpassing the mundane, there is also the phrase "unequalled" which can express his surpassing the supramundane. Although he surpasses the mundane, within the supramundane there are the two vehicles and bodhisattvas with whom he might still be compared; therefore it is now clarified that even within the supramundane he has no comparison. It might still be said that he can be conceived or expressed; therefore it is now clarified that the mind cannot conceive him and the mouth cannot express him. Having this wondrous body, we therefore now pay homage. Furthermore, the upper three lines explain the praise, and the lower single line explains the veneration. There can be veneration without praise, or praise without veneration; here both are fully present. Moreover, three lines explain the karma of speech, and the lower line clarifies the karma of body, with the mind running through both places. As for "the Tathāgata’s form is inexhaustible": although there were five praises above, one might fear that material forms have an exhaustion and a limit, and might not necessarily respond constantly in all places and at all times; therefore it is now clarified that his capacity to respond to things is inexhaustible. Why is it inexhaustible? Because the fundamental is inexhaustible, the response is constantly inexhaustible; because sentient beings are inexhaustible, the manifestation of his form is endless. Hence there is the praise of "inexhaustible." As for "wisdom is also likewise": having praised his physical form above, \[the text\] now extols his wisdom. Praising his form has six aspects: first, subtly fine; second, unequalled; third, incomparable; fourth, inconceivable; fifth, inexpressible; sixth, inexhaustible. Now in praising his wisdom, the meaning should also be likewise; it merely indicates in brief that wisdom is the same as form. Since form is inexhaustible, wisdom is also inexhaustible. "Inexhaustible" means wisdom that is immeasurable and boundless. Why are form and wisdom praised in particular? Because his form has no peer and his wisdom is inexhaustible; being what beings delight in and seek as essential, they are spoken of in particular. Question: Above, having beheld the golden countenance, it was permissible to praise his wondrous form; but since wisdom was not yet apparent, why is wisdom praised? Answer: Taking form as an analogy for wisdom, since he possesses an incomparable body, he must possess pre-eminent wisdom. Furthermore, in the earlier section on responding to capacities, both form and wisdom were fully explained: knowing capacities and immediately responding is wisdom pervading everything; universally emitting pure light is physical form being incomparable. Since both were seen above, both are now praised together. As for "all dharmas are permanently abiding": although form and wisdom were praised above, one might fear that he does not necessarily possess the remaining virtues; therefore it is now clarified that he possesses all virtues. Hence a later passage states: "Accomplishing all buddha-dharmas is called the Tathāgata’s dharmakāya." Question: If so, and the dharmakāya subsumes all virtues, why is there also prajñā? Answer: If spoken of under the name of the dharmakāya, there is nothing that is not the dharmakāya; the other two are also likewise. Hence a later passage states, "The wisdom-body is sovereign"; thus within prajñā there is the dharmakāya. Now within the dharmakāya there is also prajñā, and so it says: "Wisdom is also likewise." Liberation also has the dharmakāya, and so it says: "Therefore I pay homage to the Dharmarāja." If we take up their differentiated meanings, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: "The dharmakāya is the locus of all virtues, just as the body sense-faculty is the locus of the various faculties; therefore the dharmakāya possesses all virtues." Although possessing all virtues, they might not necessarily be permanent; hence it says "permanently abiding." Why are they permanent? Because the buddha-dharmas surpassing the sands of the Ganges within the tathāgatagarbha are revealed to constitute his present virtues; therefore they are permanent. If they were impermanent, they would not be worthy of taking refuge in; because they are permanently abiding, they can be taken refuge in. The present Buddha differs from the former Buddha; hence it clarifies the permanently abiding Buddha. Taking refuge now differs from taking refuge formerly; hence one takes refuge in the permanently abiding. As for the interpretations of older authorities in distinguishing between the true and the responsive \[bodies\]: a verse and a half praises the responsive body; from "permanently abiding" onward praises the dharmakāya. We now adopt this view. Third, the section on similarities and differences. Regarding the first gāthā and the lower half of the second gāthā, people have no differing interpretations. Some say: "The Tathāgata’s form is inexhaustible" praises the reward body; the reward body has permanent form, and being permanent, it is inexhaustible. "Wisdom is also likewise" praises wisdom; within the reward body, it does not go beyond merit and wisdom, and because wisdom is the same as form in permanently abiding, it says "is also likewise." Fourth, the section evaluating strengths and weaknesses. First, to question the latter position: if one says that "inexhaustible" means "permanently abiding," then the lower line again saying "all dharmas are permanently abiding" would render the text redundant. Furthermore, below in the chapter on taking refuge, it clarifies the inexhaustible refuge and the permanently abiding refuge; if "inexhaustible" were identical with "permanently abiding," the text should not present both, and furthermore the wording would not be skillful. In worldly parlance they say: "peerless countenance, inexhaustible talent." If one explains "inexhaustible" by means of "permanent," then it is unskillful as praise; therefore one should adopt the explanation of the first master. Next, concerning whether the dharmakāya has form or is formless, there has been debate from past to present. Some say: the dharmakāya has form. The Niḥsarana Sūtra says: "Wondrous form is tranquil and constantly peaceful, not shifting with seasons, periods, and kalpas." The Nirvāṇa says: "Relinquishing impermanent form, one attains permanent form." The Daśabhūmivyākhyāna says: "The marks and signs adorning the Tathāgata are the real reward body." Furthermore, a bodhisattva cultivates the causes for the marks and signs over vast kalpas, so how could there be no fruit? Deducing from the textual meanings, one should know that the dharmakāya has form. Those who refute formlessness say: if one says that form means obstruction and therefore the buddha-fruit has no form, then mind means having an object, and one should say that the buddha-fruit has no mind. But the Buddha after all has an objectless mind; so he should have unobstructed form. Question: Being unobstructed, how can it be called form? Answer: If so, when the Buddha is without objects, how can he have knowing? Next, south of the Yangtze River, \[masters\] Yun, Min, Zang, and others all said: the buddha-fruit has no form. Therefore the Nirvāṇa says: "May I attain the Tathāgata’s formless, sovereign body." The Sūtra of Mañjuśrī's Ten Homages says: "Without form and without shape or marks, without faculties and without a dwelling place, because it is neither produced nor destroyed, I pay homage to that which cannot be observed." Those who refute the possession of form say: if one says that the buddha-fruit has form, he should erect a vaulted house and wear the garments of Chu. The intent of the objection is: since the dharmakāya has unobstructed form, it should dwell in an unobstructed residence and wear unobstructed clothing. Master Sengzhao’s commentary on the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: "The Perfect Person is empty and vast, without images; how could his land be constant?" Zhu Daosheng composed the Treatise on the Dharmakāya Having No Pure Land, clarifying that the dharmakāya has no pure land; these all employ the meaning of formlessness. Resolving the objection of the first position, they say: form and mind—these two are not of the same category; a coarse mind can be trained and practiced into a wondrous mind, but coarse form cannot be trained and practiced into wondrous form; therefore the buddha-fruit has no form but has mind. Question: If so, why does the sūtra speak of relinquishing impermanent form? Answer: It is merely that wondrous existence is brilliantly clear, and hence it is called form. The two schools each cling to their own view, engaging in mutual debate. Now, relying on Nāgārjuna, we resolve it with a single statement. The "Chapter on Dharmas" in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: "The Buddhas have sometimes spoken of a self, and sometimes spoken of no-self." > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 1.37.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1744.1.37.1) - [Next: 1.37.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1744.1.37.3) - [Up: 1.37](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1744.1.37) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1744~en-mt.1.37.2) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1744.1.37.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1744.1.37.2) · Pramāṇa