[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經集解](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763) › 1.23 # 大般涅槃經集解 1.23 大般涅槃經集解 1.23 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [1.23](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.1.23) 案道生曰：夫真理自然，悟亦冥符。真則無差，悟豈容易。不易之體為湛然常照，但從迷乖之，事未在我耳。苟能涉求，便反迷歸極。僧亮敘曰：無學地法，皆是其體。佛略說三，以標神道：一曰般若、二曰法身、三曰解脫也。法瑤敘曰：涅槃至號，其義贍博，豈唯般若等三以極其致，但略舉其要。然則此三，名殊而實同，非體異者也。如其體別，則同因成假名之法虛而不實，豈得稱常？僧宗敘曰：累患既息，體備眾德，略舉其三，可以貫眾。然此三德，體一而義異，就一體之上義目有三也。寶亮敘曰：障累既盡，萬行歸真，無德不滿、眾用皆足，轉因字果，名大涅槃。然其德淵曠，難可備舉，略陳其要，理可有三：一謂正法寶城、二標別德、三寄工用。何者？夫涅槃無體，為眾德所成，取況寶城以喻斯旨也。別德者，謂大常大我等，此是成涅槃之勝因也。工用者，謂歸依洲渚，能使物免苦而獲安也。智秀敘曰：體者，圓極妙有之本也。德者，般若法身解脫之流也。談德雖眾，論體唯一。何者？即圓極有可軌之義曰法身；有靜照之功曰般若；有無累之德曰解脫。是則即解脫之體可軌，亦可軌之體能照，更無別體而有德也。案：舊所詳習，有二種解釋：一謂圓極果體真實妙有，非如假名但以有用而無體也；一謂涅槃無體，假眾德以成，豈得不空耶？慧朗述法瑤曰：生死涅槃義分為二，謂十二因緣顛倒故有，即因緣無性是名涅槃。豈待離煩惱已，有妙有可得，而不空乎？故《般若經》云「設有法過於涅槃，亦說如幻如夢」矣。又述纖、愛、宗等舊釋云：萬行得圓極之果，果體是實，而隨德立義，非假眾義共成一體也。法安曰：涅槃雖假眾德為體，而異五陰成人也。何者？人及五陰，假實斯空；今涅槃雖空，而眾德是實也。 > Daosheng explains: True principle is spontaneous, and awakening also accords with it in dark convergence. When the true is without disparity, how could awakening be changeable? The unchanging substance is serene and ever-illuminating; it is merely that beings follow delusion and diverge from it, so that in fact it has not yet become theirs. If one can proceed to seek it, one reverses delusion and returns to the ultimate. Sengliang sets forth: The dharmas of the stage of aśaikṣa are all its substance. The Buddha briefly explained three to indicate the spiritual path: first, prajñā; second, dharmakāya; and third, vimokṣa. Fayao sets forth: Nirvāṇa is the supreme designation, and its meaning is abundant and broad. How could its import be exhausted solely by the three such as prajñā? He merely briefly cited what is essential. Thus, these three differ in name but are the same in reality; they are not different in substance. If their substances were distinct, they would be like dharmas of provisional designation formed by causes—empty and unreal—how could they be called permanent? Sengzong sets forth: When defilements and troubles are stilled, its substance is complete with manifold virtues; briefly citing three can encompass them all. However, as for these three virtues, their substance is one while their aspects differ; based upon the single substance, there are three designations of aspect. Baoliang sets forth: When hindrances and defilements are exhausted, the ten thousand practices return to the true; there is no virtue that is not replete, and manifold functions are all fully sufficient; the cause is transformed and designated as the result, which is named mahānirvāṇa. Yet its virtues are profound and vast, difficult to enumerate completely; briefly setting forth their essentials, in principle there can be three: first, the precious citadel of the true Dharma; second, marking distinct virtues; and third, conveying efficacious functions. Why is this? Nirvāṇa has no independent substance and is formed by the manifold virtues; taking the analogy of the precious citadel illustrates this purport. 'Distinct virtues' refers to great permanence, great self, and so on; these are the supreme causes that form nirvāṇa. 'Efficacious functions' refers to being a refuge and an island, able to make beings avoid suffering and obtain peace. Zhixiu sets forth: The substance is the root of consummate, wondrous being. The virtues are the currents of prajñā, dharmakāya, and vimokṣa. Although the virtues spoken of are manifold, in discussing the substance it is only one. Why is this? The fact that the consummate has an exemplary aspect is called dharmakāya; having the efficacy of serene illumination is called prajñā; having the virtue of being free of defilement is called vimokṣa. Thus, the substance of vimokṣa is exemplary, and the exemplary substance can illuminate; there is no other substance distinct from these possessing the virtues. \[The compiler\] notes: In what has traditionally been closely studied, there are two kinds of explanations: One holds that the consummate result-substance is real, wondrous being, not like a provisional designation that merely has function without substance; the other holds that nirvāṇa has no substance and is provisionally formed from manifold virtues—how could it not be empty? Huilang relates Fayao's words: Saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are divided in principle into two: \[saṃsāra\] exists because of the inversions of the twelve links of dependent origination; that these links of dependent origination are devoid of intrinsic nature is called nirvāṇa. How could it be that, upon separating from afflictions, there is a wondrous being to be attained that is not empty? Therefore the Prajñā Sūtra says: 'Even if there were a dharma surpassing nirvāṇa, I would still say it is like an illusion, like a dream.' He also relates the traditional explanations of Qian, Ai, Zong, and others, saying: The ten thousand practices attain the consummate result; the result-substance is real, and meanings are established according to its virtues; it is not that manifold meanings are provisionally combined to form a single substance. Fa'an says: Although nirvāṇa takes manifold virtues as its substance, this differs from the five aggregates forming a person. Why is this? A person and the five aggregates are both empty, whether provisional or real; now, although nirvāṇa is empty, its manifold virtues are real. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 1.22](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.1.22) - [Next: 1.24](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.1.24) - [Up: 1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.1) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763~en-mt.1.23) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.1.23](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.1.23) · Pramāṇa