[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經集解](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763) › 4.55 # 大般涅槃經集解 4.55 大般涅槃經集解 4.55 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [4.55](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.4.55) 案道生曰：一往云等，未曉其然，須以事設難然後辨也。僧亮曰：若佛智具足地淨用勝令施者得常，則前不如後也。若後不用而前用，則後不如前也。此五難中，前四明地不淨，後一明佛無用也。法瑤曰：向直云等，未知所以然。今寄不等之難，欲明二迹同是權而不實。若使菩薩果實而非權，則佛亦同分。所以然者，既共一身，佛云何獨常而菩薩不耶？今據佛是常，乃所以顯菩薩是權也。敬遺記僧宗曰：難意假執昔教，每使前劣而後勝。若不等之義既成，則常之義壞也。雖許後勝，乃所以不勝。何者？若先是無常，豈容少時便得為常？初就功德智慧滿不滿為難，第二以眾生非眾生相對，第三以報非報相對，第四行非行相對，第五用不用相對也。法蓮記僧宗曰：五難難行令不等，果亦有差。現見施菩薩行，不如施佛，則行勝也。寶亮曰：純陀意亦難見，而解釋者多方。今且先撿佛教。若佛本是法身常身，今日亦是，復何所難耶？設若今昔並是無常，二世復等也，正應約王宮生，推理作難耳。何者？案昔教中以道樹所成佛為實，及至《首楞嚴經》云「七百阿僧祇壽者為真，丈六者為應。」而二理並妙，非我所知，且見王宮所生煩惱之身始成佛耳，如《法華》中彌勒所難也。若推理而言，業與煩惱能得無常苦報；今煩惱業盡，報亦應無，云何猶有此五陰耶？然亦可是化，非我所知。但今日十地行滿、無漏圓足，所得果報理應是常。若爾者，先受施時節即未成佛，應是無常，今日是常；二施之報，云何言等耶？曇愛曰：此下第二段有兩章，第一難、第二答。 > Daosheng comments: At first glance it was said to be equal, but not yet understanding why, it was necessary to pose objections based on facts before discerning it. Sengliang says: If the Buddha's wisdom is complete, his stage pure, and his function superior, causing the giver to obtain permanence, then the former is inferior to the latter. If the latter does not make use of it while the former does, then the latter is inferior to the former. Among these five objections, the first four clarify that the stage is not pure, while the last one clarifies that the Buddha does not make use of it. Fayao says: Just before, it was merely stated that they are equal, without knowing why. Now, using the objection that they are unequal, he wishes to clarify that the two traces are equally provisional and not real. If the bodhisattva were truly real and not provisional, then the Buddha would also share in that nature. Why is this? Since they share one body, how could the Buddha alone be permanent while the bodhisattva is not? Now, basing this on the Buddha being permanent actually serves to reveal that the bodhisattva is provisional. Sengzong, as recorded by Jingyi, says: The intent of the objection provisionally clings to the past teaching, consistently making the former inferior and the latter superior. If the meaning of inequality is established, then the meaning of permanence is undone. Although he grants that the latter is superior, it actually implies it is not superior. Why? If he was formerly impermanent, how could he become permanent in just a short time? The first raises an objection based on whether merit and wisdom are complete or incomplete; the second contrasts sentient beings with non-sentient beings; the third contrasts retribution with non-retribution; the fourth contrasts practice with non-practice; the fifth contrasts using with not using. Sengzong, as recorded by Falian, says: The five objections challenge the practice so as to make them unequal, and the fruits also differ. It is observed that the practice of giving to a bodhisattva is inferior to giving to a Buddha, so the practice is superior. Baoliang says: Cunda's intention is also difficult to perceive, and commentators explain it in many ways. Now let us first examine the Buddha's teaching. If the Buddha was originally a permanent body of the dharmakāya and is so today as well, what objection could there be? If both past and present were impermanent, the two times would again be equal; he should properly infer from the birth in the royal palace to frame his objection. Why? In past teachings, the Buddha attained under the Bodhi tree was taken as real; until the Śūraṅgama Sūtra says, 'A lifespan of seven hundred asaṃkhyeyas is the true, while the sixteen-foot body is the manifestation.' Yet both principles are wondrous and beyond my knowledge; one merely sees the body of afflictions born in the royal palace first becoming a Buddha, just as Maitreya questioned in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra. If speaking from the deduction of principle: karma and afflictions can produce an impermanent, suffering retribution; now that afflictions and karma are exhausted, the retribution should also be gone, so how can these five aggregates still exist? However, it may also be a transformation, which is beyond my knowledge. But today the practice of the ten stages is fulfilled and the uncontaminated is perfected; the karmic retribution obtained should in principle be permanent. If so, at the time of previously receiving the offering he had not yet attained buddhahood, so it should be impermanent, whereas today it is permanent; how could the retributions of the two offerings be said to be equal? Tan'ai says: Below, this second section has two parts: first, the objection; second, the reply. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 4.54](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.4.54) - [Next: 4.56](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.4.56) - [Up: 4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.4) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763~en-mt.4.55) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.4.55](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.4.55) · Pramāṇa