[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經集解](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763) › 52.48 # 大般涅槃經集解 52.48 大般涅槃經集解 52.48 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [52.48](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.52.48) 案僧亮曰：已說有無者之偏，欲明四執皆不會中道，答第三不定難也。僧宗曰：答第四難也。有無不可定說，但有則眾緣故生。一境起三乃至無量，亦復何嫌？但使識解惑之緣耳。寶亮曰：下去解正義。將明中道，故先出耶說。若當定作此四句，計因中有果、因中無果、半有半無、非有非無，皆不免生死，必繫屬於魔說。若從容稱當中途，不乖正理、心無所執，此名中道。諸佛菩薩雖說說法非有非無，亦不決定有也。若是有者，可得定說有即不有，亦無無可無，云何決定？如五緣生眼識，若少一緣，識則不生。然此識亦不定屬一緣，復非中間緣具便發而非有非無。以從因緣起，故名為有；體無自性，便說為無。若作如此之說，體萬法虛，離有離無，是名正義。 > Sengliang states: Having explained the bias of those positing existence or non-existence, he intends to clarify that none of the four attachments accords with the middle path, answering the third objection regarding indeterminacy. Sengzong says: This answers the fourth objection. Existence and non-existence cannot be definitively stated; but when there is existence, it arises through manifold conditions. From a single object arise three and up to immeasurable \[mental states\]; what objection could there be to this? One need only recognize the conditions of understanding and delusion. Baoliang says: From here below he explains the correct principle. Intending to clarify the middle path, he first brings forward the false doctrines. If one definitively constructs these four propositions—conceiving that there is a fruit in the cause, that there is no fruit in the cause, that it is half-existent and half-non-existent, or that it is neither existent nor non-existent—in none of these cases does one escape birth and death; one will inevitably be bound to demonic doctrines. If one remains at ease, accords with the middle path, does not deviate from the correct principle, and harbors no attachments in mind, this is called the middle path. Although the Buddhas and bodhisattvas speak of the Dharma as neither existent nor non-existent, they also do not definitively assert existence. If it were existent, one could definitively state it, but existence is not existence, nor is non-existence something that can be non-existent; how could it be definitive? Just as visual consciousness is produced by five conditions: if one condition is missing, the consciousness does not arise. Yet this consciousness does not definitively belong to any single condition, nor is it produced in the interval between them; when conditions are complete it manifests, being neither existent nor non-existent. Because it arises from causes and conditions, it is called existent; because its substance lacks self-nature, it is described as non-existent. If one explains it in this way, comprehending that the ten thousand phenomena are empty and free from both existence and non-existence, this is called the correct principle. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 52.47](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.52.47) - [Next: 52.49](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.52.49) - [Up: 52](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.52) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763~en-mt.52.48) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.52.48](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.52.48) · Pramāṇa