[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經集解](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763) › 68.60 # 大般涅槃經集解 68.60 大般涅槃經集解 68.60 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [68.60](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.68.60) 案僧亮曰：世間住空，無有非空之處對空，故無對。無非四大對於四大者，色性非空，住在空中。無非空對空者，心依大起，亦無非大對大，何得名四大為有耶？佛不答者，以其非決，以置答為答。何者？六識所依各異，五識依大、意識不依，無色不住空，故非決也。「涅槃是有」訖「安隱彼岸」者，此皆本不得今得；空無此義也。「離於如是」訖「三世攝」等，如來佛性三法等離。三法是有為，虛空若同者，同在三法之外也。「世人說」訖「不得不三世攝」者，佛說二法聚色無色，至可見不可見。色是四大，非色是心數也。僧宗曰：無非四大對，此問麁，故置答也。如此人說空非色是心數者，此下廣明耶解，並不得受相也。寶亮曰：第二問之始，正釋異意。舉於虛空，以決涅槃，今兩同為有。佛今答言：雖同是常，要佛果有對治而不無。明如來、佛性、涅槃三法，同有所治，故是有也。故下去二，釋此三義為非涅槃者，是生死法正對治。此生死虛偽果盡，故名涅槃。為非如來者，闡提二乘之流執相心重，不能稱如理而解。如來能斷此不如之解，得於如解故，所以名如來也。為非佛性者，眾生所以不見佛性，良由有煩惱業報，假依果而資身。佛既斷業報盡，無復所須，則窮鑒佛性之理，明闇障之義。傾今對治此業報盡，故名佛性也。一切世間無非虛空對於虛空，世間無有一物而非虛空，復為虛空所治者，那得難云虛空是有耶？解意雖然，於物情未去，故迦葉復因此後更設一竝。若虛空無所對治，不得為有。今四大起時，亦無所對治，何故獨名四大為有、虛空為無？決辭既爾，佛今將解，故無非言。虛空亦同涅槃是有者，其義不然。何以故？明涅槃是有，可見可證，能作種種應色，備有八我萬用，皎然可得，是有現見處。虛空無斯之用，云何為有耶？既非其如此，然後答難。從「若離於如是法外更有法者」下，已對向決。若使離如是法外別有一法而是有者，必三世所攝。虛空若同是有，應三世攝，是無常法。答理既申，佛還引事更到難迦葉言：如世人說虛空，名為無色無對。若虛空非色而是有者，應即心數法。若是心數，不得不是三世所攝，同四陰也。 > Sengliang comments: The world abides in space, and there is no place that is not space to serve as a counter-correlative to space; hence, it has no counter-correlative. When it is said, 'There is nothing that is not the four great elements to counter the four great elements'—the nature of form is not space, yet it abides within space. If there is nothing that is not space to counter space, the mind also arises in reliance upon the great elements, and there is likewise nothing that is not the great elements to counter the great elements; how then could the four great elements be called existent? The Buddha does not reply because it is not a decisive argument, answering by setting the question aside. Why? The bases of the six consciousnesses are each different: the five consciousnesses rely on the great elements, whereas the mental consciousness does not rely on them; the formless does not abide in space, and therefore it is not decisive. From 'Nirvāṇa is existent' down to 'the secure yonder shore'—these are all cases where what was originally not attained is now attained; space has no such meaning. From 'apart from such phenomena' down to 'subsumed under the three times' and so forth—the three phenomena of the Tathāgata, buddhadhātu, and so on are set apart. These three phenomena are saṃskṛta; if space were the same, it would likewise be outside these three phenomena. From 'worldly people say' down to 'must be subsumed under the three times'—the Buddha speaks of the two groups of phenomena, form and formlessness, up to visible and invisible. Form is the four great elements; non-form is mental concomitants. Sengzong says: 'There is nothing that is not the four great elements to counter'—this question is crude, and therefore it is answered by being set aside. When such a person says that space is non-form and is a mental concomitant, what follows below extensively explains wrong understanding, and none can be accepted. Baoliang says: The beginning of the second question directly explains a differing view. It brings up empty space to settle \[the status of\] nirvāṇa, making both alike existent. The Buddha now replies by stating: Although both are alike permanent, it is essential that the fruit of buddhahood possesses an antidote and is not nonexistent. He clarifies that the three phenomena of the Tathāgata, buddhadhātu, and nirvāṇa all alike have that which they remedy; hence they are existent. Therefore, the two \[passages\] below explain these three meanings: that which is non-nirvāṇa is the direct antidote to the phenomena of saṃsāra. When the fruit of this deceptive saṃsāra is exhausted, it is named nirvāṇa. That which is non-Tathāgata means that icchantikas and the followers of the two vehicles have a heavy mind of clinging to marks and cannot understand in accordance with the true principle. The Tathāgata is able to sever such discordant understanding and attain harmonious understanding; hence he is named the Tathāgata. That which is non-buddhadhātu means that the reason sentient beings do not see the buddhadhātu is precisely because they have the karmic retribution of afflictions and provisionally rely on fruitions to support their bodies. Once the Buddha has severed all karmic retributions completely, having no further need, he thoroughly discerns the principle of the buddhadhātu and clarifies the meaning of dark obscurations. Overturning and now remedying these karmic retributions until they are exhausted is why it is named the buddhadhātu. 'In all the world there is nothing that is not empty space to counter empty space'—in the world there is not a single thing that is not empty space, nor is it remedied by empty space; how could one object that empty space is existent? Although the understanding of the meaning is such, in the minds of living beings \[the doubt\] has not yet been dispelled; therefore Kāśyapa further raises a parallel objection based on this. If empty space has nothing to remedy, it cannot be considered existent. Now, when the four great elements arise, they likewise have nothing to remedy; why then are the four great elements alone called existent, while empty space is called nonexistent? Since the settling words are such, the Buddha now, wishing to explain, does not make non-assertion. To claim that empty space is also existent like nirvāṇa—that principle is not so. Why? It is explained that nirvāṇa is existent, visible, and realizable, able to produce various responsive forms, fully possessing the eight aspects of the self and myriad functions, distinctly attainable; it is an existent domain directly seen. Empty space has no such function; how could it be existent? Since it is not like this, he then answers the objection. From 'If, apart from such phenomena, there were further phenomena' onward, it already counters the preceding settlement. If, apart from such phenomena, there were a distinct phenomenon that is existent, it must be subsumed under the three times. If empty space were likewise existent, it should be subsumed under the three times and be an impermanent phenomenon. Once the principle of the answer has been set forth, the Buddha turns back to cite worldly matters to pose an inverted objection to Kāśyapa, saying: As worldly people speak of empty space, they call it formless and without resistance. If empty space is non-form and yet is existent, it should be a mental concomitant phenomenon. If it is a mental concomitant, it cannot fail to be subsumed under the three times, identical to the four aggregates. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 68.59](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.68.59) - [Next: 68.61](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.68.61) - [Up: 68](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.68) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763~en-mt.68.60) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.68.60](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.68.60) · Pramāṇa