[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經義記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1764) › 2.15 # 大般涅槃經義記 2.15 大般涅槃經義記 2.15 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1764.2.15) 第二段中，先喻，次合，後顯勝相。喻中，「生跡」喻不淨等五度門觀，「象跡」喻於無常苦空無我等觀。象跡寬大，廣破故勝。合中，初言「是無常想亦如是」者，合前象跡。此文略少，若具，應言是無常苦無我等想亦復如是。文中就始且言無常。此實是慧，以想名說。何故如是？諸心心法更相受名，如四念處體實是慧而名為念，此亦同彼。又復此慧取相名想。「於諸想中最第一」者，合前一切跡中為上。下顯勝相，「若有勤修能除欲愛乃至憍慢」，明能斷除修道煩惱，得有餘果。欲界欲愛、色無色愛三界貪使，無明憍慢是三界中癡、慢二使，瞋在欲界得那含時已能斷除，故略不論。修無常想皆能滅之，亦斷見惑。文中舉終，始則可知。「及無常想」，明能滅智證無餘果，亦滅苦空無我等想，且說無常。自下第三難破如來安住之義，明佛定滅，成前第一無常法真。於三事中，且就波若難破住義，餘類可知。然今約前無常之想，進退作難，以無常想與彼波若同是慧故。難意如何？如來若離此無常想更有常法於中安住，安住則不滅，今則不應入於涅槃；今入涅槃，明佛離此無常想外更無常法可以安住。若佛不離此無常想，畢竟安住如是想中，此想便常，不可斷滅，云何昔言修無常想能滅煩惱及無常想？修無常想還能滅於無常之想，何處安住而言不離？離與不離皆無住義，明佛定滅；佛定滅故，無常理定，無常法真。 > In the second section, first is a simile, next is the application, and afterward the superior features are revealed. In the simile, the "footprints of living beings" is a simile for contemplations such as the five gates of deliverance—impurity and the rest; the "elephant's footprint" is a simile for contemplations such as impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and non-self. The elephant's footprint is broad and large; because it refutes extensively, it is superior. In the application, the initial statement that "this contemplation of impermanence is also like this" applies to the elephant's footprint mentioned before. This text is slightly abbreviated; if fully stated, it should say that the concepts of impermanence, suffering, non-self, and so forth are also like this. In the text, taking the beginning, it provisionally states "impermanence". This is actually wisdom, but is spoken of by the name "concept". Why is this? The various mental states and mental factors take names from one another; just as the essence of the four applications of mindfulness is actually wisdom yet they are named "mindfulness", this is also the same. Furthermore, this wisdom grasps marks and is therefore called "concept". "It is the most supreme among all concepts" corresponds to "the highest among all footprints" above. Next, the superior features are revealed: "If one diligently cultivates it, one can eliminate sensual desire, up to arrogance", which clarifies that it can sever the afflictions of the path of cultivation and attain the fruit of \[nirvāṇa\] with residue. Sensual desire in the desire realm, desire in the form and formless realms—these are the defilements of craving across the three realms; ignorance and arrogance are the two defilements of delusion and conceit across the three realms. Ill-will, belonging to the desire realm, can already be severed when attaining the state of an anāgāmin, so it is briefly omitted from discussion. Cultivating the concept of impermanence can eradicate all of them, and also severs the delusions of seeing. The text mentions the end, so the beginning can be known. "And the concept of impermanence" clarifies that it can extinguish the cognitive wisdom to realize the fruit \[of nirvāṇa\] without residue; it also extinguishes concepts such as suffering, emptiness, and non-self, though provisionally only "impermanence" is mentioned. From here onward, the third section raises an objection to refute the Tathāgata's meaning of "peaceful abiding", clarifying that the Buddha definitely passes into extinction, thus establishing the truth of the dharma of impermanence from the first \[section\] above. Among the three elements, it provisionally raises an objection against the meaning of abiding in terms of prajñā; the rest can be known by analogy. However, here, drawing upon the aforementioned concept of impermanence, the objection is framed through dilemmas, because the concept of impermanence and that prajñā are both alike in being wisdom. What is the intent of the objection? If the Tathāgata were free from this concept of impermanence and had another, permanent dharma in which to peacefully abide, then by peacefully abiding he would not be extinguished, and so now he ought not to enter nirvāṇa; yet now he enters nirvāṇa, which clarifies that beyond this concept of impermanence the Buddha has no other permanent dharma in which he can peacefully abide. If the Buddha is not free from this concept of impermanence and ultimately abides peacefully in such a concept, then this concept would be permanent and could not be severed or extinguished; how then could it have been said in the past that cultivating the concept of impermanence can eradicate afflictions and the concept of impermanence itself? Cultivating the concept of impermanence can in turn eradicate the concept of impermanence itself—where then could he peacefully abide, such that one could say he is "not free" from it? Both being free and not being free lack the meaning of abiding, which clarifies that the Buddha definitely passes into extinction; because the Buddha definitely passes into extinction, the principle of impermanence is definite, and the dharma of impermanence is real. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1764.2.14) - [Next: 2.16](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1764.2.16) - [Up: 2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1764.2) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1764~en-mt.2.15) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1764.2.15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1764.2.15) · Pramāṇa