[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [涅槃玄義發源機要](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1766) › 3.2.4 # 涅槃玄義發源機要 3.2.4 涅槃玄義發源機要 3.2.4 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [3.2.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1766.3.2.4) 」「井中」下，經云「如闇室中井及種種寶，人亦知有，闇故不見。 有善方便然大明燈，照之得見。 是人終不生念：『是水及寶，本無今有。 』涅槃亦爾，本自有之，非適今也。 大智如來以善方便然智慧燈，令諸菩薩得見涅槃正因佛性。 」附此眾生者，由心神不斷故。 「但約」下，謂其理元一，約時有異，故云兩時異。 或作「若」字者，誤。 「本有」下，神時雖無當果之事，而有當果之理。 「時」或作「助」者，誤。 金心即等覺，種覺即妙覺。 「明乳」下，乳喻眾生，酪喻佛性，醪煖喻修行。 醪應作撈，謂取酪必撈攪也。 應法師云：「應作酵，古孝切，起酒麵也。 經文多作醪，音勞。 《三蒼》、《說文》皆云有滓酒也。 醪非字體。 」胡麻喻眾生，油喻佛性，擣壓喻修行。 雙取二文者，取〈如來性〉文證本有，取〈師子吼〉及〈迦葉〉文證當有。 「又引」下，即〈迦葉品〉云「為非佛性，說為佛性。 」非佛性者，謂牆壁瓦石。 此師但得簡去木石之文，豈識依正互融之理？ 當知木石剎塵悉由心變，當體即心。 我心成佛，即剎塵俱成，安有木石別居心外？ 則非本有之用者，謂眾生則有本有之用，木石則無也。 寧曉因中有依正互融之理？ 果上有依正互融之事耶？ 因中有果過者，斥彼所解，過同外道。 若相續常者，由因相續得至果故。 亦應至無常者，此亦他人不了二鳥雙遊之旨，故有斯難。 若達雙遊，則常與無常二皆理具。 了因了本有等者，了因是智，照本有性，如燈照物。 生因是福，從因至果，如泥成瓶。 「鷸蚌」下，今師雙斥二家也。 專執者，不許專破； 專破者，不許專執。 更互是非，其猶鷸蚌，而併為今師漁父所擒也。 《春秋後語》第十云「趙將伐燕，蘇代為燕說趙王曰：『臣從外來，過小水，見蚌方出暴。 而鷸啄其肉，蚌夾其喙。 鷸曰：「今日不雨，明日不雨，必見蚌脯。 」蚌亦謂鷸曰：「今日不出，明日不出，必見死鷸。 」兩者不相捨，漁父得而併擒之。 今趙且伐燕，燕趙相支以弊其眾，臣恐強秦之為漁父也。 故願大王熟計之。 』趙王乃止。 」「今當」下，雙斥二家。 初約理非三世以斥專執，次約適緣四說以斥專破。 初文中非三藏通教之宗也，佛性之名不在二教故。 工匠揆則任用者，揆，度也。 《左傳》曰「山有木，工則度之。 」有本「任」下闕「用」字。 矟用者，山卓切。 《埤蒼》云「矟長丈八尺。 或作槊，俗字也。 」佛即破之者，此段皆〈師子吼〉中破定性文也。 屒直為曲者，屒音臣，字誤也，屒應作「熨」。 下陳如品疏云「向時曲者，任机熨。 机直為床。 」向時直者為床，今熨床曲為机。 「若專」下，約適緣四說，以斥專破也。 是諸佛法界者，法界遍攝，四門互融。 舊義下云云者，今四句互融不同，舊師各執。 又約理非四句，不同專執； 而隨機說四，不同專難故。 此二家悉為今破。 須除惑都盡等者，惑許漸除，理須頓見。 不可一期等者，由智漸滿故理漸見。 「三云」下，此師明佛果在二諦外，故真可漸知，果須頓得。 「既不」下，除惑由見理故。 「理既」下，以理體圓通如太虛空，不可分知故。 「若初」下，反覆詰難也。 初既稱後即是頓見，則不須後見。 初不稱後者，謂初淺後深也，既有淺深故非頓見。 然第二師但執漸見，恐彼被難轉計於頓，故此遮之。 如法觀佛等者，佛即佛果，涅槃即真諦，此計涅槃在真不同。 前師謂涅槃是俗也。 佛與涅槃既是一相，不應真漸見、佛頓得。 引華嚴者，彼謂即俗而真，故可分知； 果在惑外不即生死，故不可漸得。 既不即生死，豈非虛妄分別生死涅槃異耶？ 以佛果無所證，但證涅槃故。 「真與」下，佛果所證涅槃即是真諦故也。 依此知是執佛果，不出二諦家難也。 若以今家會通，並是通義，約當教則不出二諦； > Regarding the passage below \[the words\] "In the well": The sūtra states, "Just as with a well and various treasures in a dark room, people know they exist, yet due to the darkness, they cannot see them. A person with skillful means lights a great, bright lamp, and illuminating them, makes them seen. That person never thinks: 'This water and these treasures did not exist originally and only exist now.' Nirvāṇa is also like this: it exists originally of itself and is not something that has just now come to be. The Tathāgata of Great Wisdom, with skillful means, lights the lamp of wisdom, enabling all bodhisattvas to see the primary cause Buddha-nature of nirvāṇa." "Attaching to these sentient beings" is because their mental consciousness is uninterrupted. Regarding the passage below "Merely in terms of": This means that the principle is fundamentally one, but there are differences in terms of time; hence it says "the two times differ." Where some texts have the character \*ruo\* (若, "if"), it is an error. Regarding the passage below "Originally existent": At the time of the mental consciousness, although there is not yet the actual fact of the future fruit, the principle of the future fruit is present. Where some texts have \*zhu\* (助, "assist") for \*shi\* (時, "time"), it is an error. The "vajra mind" is virtual enlightenment, and "seed enlightenment" is sublime enlightenment. Regarding the passage below "Explaining milk": Milk is an analogy for sentient beings, curd is an analogy for Buddha-nature, and yeast and warmth are analogies for cultivation. \*Lao\* (醪, "lees") should be \*lao\* (撈, "scoop"), meaning that to obtain curd one must scoop and stir. Master Ying says: "It should be \*jiao\* (酵, 'yeast'), phonetic spellings \*gu\* and \*xiao\*, which raises wine and dough. Sūtra texts mostly write \*lao\* (醪), pronounced \*lao\*. Both the \*Sancang\* and the \*Shuowen\* state that it is wine with dregs. \*Lao\* (醪) is not the correct base character." Sesame is an analogy for sentient beings, oil is an analogy for Buddha-nature, and pounding and pressing are analogies for cultivation. "Taking both passages" means taking the text of the chapter on the "Tathāgata Nature" to prove original existence, and taking the texts of the chapters on "Lion's Roar" and "Kāśyapa" to prove future existence. Regarding the passage below "Further citing": This is the "Kāśyapa Chapter" saying, "For what is not Buddha-nature, it is spoken of as Buddha-nature." "What is not Buddha-nature" refers to walls, tiles, and stones. This teacher has only grasped the text that sets aside wood and stone; how could he know the principle of the mutual integration of the insentient and sentient realms? One must know that wood, stone, and every dust-mote of the lands are all transformations of the mind, and their very substance is mind. When my mind achieves Buddhahood, the lands and dust-motes all achieve it simultaneously; how could wood and stone exist separately outside the mind? "Then it is not the function of original existence" means that sentient beings have the function of original existence, whereas wood and stone do not. How could he understand that in the cause there is the principle of the mutual integration of the insentient and sentient, and in the fruit there is the reality of the mutual integration of the insentient and sentient? The "error of fruit in the cause" refutes that teacher's interpretation, whose error is identical to that of non-Buddhists. "If it is a continuous permanence": because the continuity of the cause reaches the fruit. "It should also reach impermanence": this too is because others do not understand the purport of the two birds flying together, which is why they raise this objection. If one penetrates the flying together, then permanence and impermanence are both intrinsically present in principle. "The revealing cause reveals the originally existent, etc.": The revealing cause is wisdom, which illuminates the originally existent nature, just as a lamp illuminates objects. The generating cause is merit, which proceeds from cause to fruit, just as clay becomes a jar. Regarding the passage below "The snipe and the clam": Our master refutes both traditions here. Those who rigidly cling do not allow for rigid refutation; those who rigidly refute do not allow for rigid clinging. Alternately asserting right and wrong, they are like the snipe and the clam, both seized by our master, the fisherman. Fascicle 10 of the \*Chunqiu houyu\* states: "When Zhao was about to attack Yan, Su Dai spoke to the King of Zhao on Yan's behalf, saying: 'I came from outside and crossed the Yi River, where I saw a clam just emerging to sun itself. A snipe pecked at its flesh, and the clam clamped shut upon its beak. The snipe said: "If it does not rain today and does not rain tomorrow, there will surely be a dead, dried clam." The clam also said to the snipe: "If you do not get out today and do not get out tomorrow, there will surely be a dead snipe." Neither would let go of the other, and a fisherman caught and seized them both. Now Zhao is about to attack Yan; if Yan and Zhao hold out against each other and exhaust their people, I fear that powerful Qin will play the fisherman. Therefore, I hope Your Majesty will deliberate deeply upon this.' The King of Zhao then ceased." Regarding the passage below "Now we shall": He refutes both traditions. First, he relies on the principle being beyond the three time periods to refute the rigid clingers; next, he relies on the four explanations adapted to conditions to refute the rigid refuters. In the first passage, it is not the tenet of the Tripiṭaka or Shared Teachings, because the term "Buddha-nature" does not exist in these two teachings. "Craftsmen measure and employ according to need": \*kui\* (揆) means to measure. The \*Zuo Zhuan\* states: "The mountains have timber; the craftsman measures it." Some editions lack the character \*yong\* (用, "employ") below \*ren\* (任). For "spear use": \*shao\* (矟) has the phonetic spelling \*shan\* and \*zhuo\*. The \*Picang\* states: "A \*shao\* is eighteen feet long. It is also written as 槊, which is a vulgar character." "The Buddha then refuted it": this entire section consists of the texts in "Lion's Roar" that refute fixed natures. "Ironing the straight into the curved": \*chen\* (屒) is pronounced \*chen\*; the character is erroneous and should be \*yun\* (熨, "iron"). The commentary on the chapter on Ājñāta-Kauṇḍinya below states: "What was previously curved is ironed for use as a stool. The straight wood is made into a bed." What was previously straight was made into a bed; now one irons the bed's wood, curving it into a stool. Regarding the passage below "If one rigidly": He relies on the four explanations adapted to conditions to refute the rigid refuters. "It is the realm of phenomena of all Buddhas": the realm of phenomena encompasses all completely, and the four gates mutually integrate. Regarding the passage below "The old interpretations, etc.": Now the four phrases are mutually integrated, unlike the old masters who each clung to one. Moreover, in terms of principle it is beyond the four phrases, unlike those who rigidly cling; and explaining four in accordance with capacities is unlike those who rigidly object. Thus both traditions are refuted by our master now. "One must eradicate delusions entirely, etc.": He concedes that delusions are gradually eliminated, but the principle must be seen suddenly. "It cannot be that in a single period, etc.": Because wisdom gradually reaches fullness, the principle is gradually seen. Regarding the passage below "The third says": This teacher explains that the Buddha-fruit lies outside the two truths; therefore, the ultimate truth can be gradually known, but the fruit must be suddenly attained. Regarding the passage below "Since it is not": Eliminating delusion arises from seeing the principle. Regarding the passage below "Since the principle is": Because the substance of the principle is perfectly pervasive like empty space, it cannot be known in parts. Regarding the passage below "If the initial": This is a back-and-forth cross-examination. If the initial corresponds to the subsequent, it is sudden seeing, and there would be no need for subsequent seeing. If the initial does not correspond to the subsequent, it means the initial is shallow and the subsequent is deep; since there are degrees of depth, it is not sudden seeing. However, the second teacher only clung to gradual seeing; fearing that when confronted with this objection he would shift his position to sudden seeing, this is prevented here. "Contemplating the Buddha according to the Dharma, etc.": The Buddha is the Buddha-fruit, and nirvāṇa is the ultimate truth; this position maintains that nirvāṇa is within the ultimate, which is different. The previous teacher held that nirvāṇa is conventional. Since the Buddha and nirvāṇa are of a single characteristic, it should not be that the ultimate is gradually seen while the Buddha is suddenly attained. Citing the \*Avataṃsaka\*: He maintains that one realizes the ultimate right within the conventional, so it can be known in parts; the fruit lies outside delusion and is not identical with saṃsāra, so it cannot be gradually attained. If it is not identical with saṃsāra, is this not a false discrimination between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa? Because the Buddha-fruit has nothing to realize, but merely realizes nirvāṇa. Regarding the passage below "The ultimate and": The nirvāṇa realized by the Buddha-fruit is precisely the ultimate truth. Based on this, we know this is an objection raised by the tradition that clings to the Buddha-fruit not going beyond the two truths. If integrated according to our tradition, they are all shared meanings; in terms of that teaching, they do not go beyond the two truths; > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 3.2.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1766.3.2.3) - [Next: 3.2.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1766.3.2.5) - [Up: 3.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1766.3.2) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1766~en-mt.3.2.4) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1766.3.2.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1766.3.2.4) · Pramāṇa