[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767) › 11.23 # 大般涅槃經疏 11.23 大般涅槃經疏 11.23 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [11.23](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.11.23) 「爾時佛讚」下，第四述成從。「我今當更為汝」下，是第三明中道圓觀。文為三：初許說、次正說、三歎教。初中云入如來藏者，入藏由觀，非觀不入。次「若我住」下，是正說。文為二：初略、後廣。略又為三：一標中道、二明乖中之惑、三辨破惑之觀。初標中道即明非有非無。若我住者，明非有。我住在身中，即是常法不離於苦，常即是我，身即是苦，此即是有，此有非道。若無我者，明非無。若定是無，則無修因趣果，亦無父母世間善法，此無非道。既作有無兩責，不得有無，即非有無，名中道說。次「若言諸法」下，是明乖中之惑，又二：初明惑、次結惑。初明惑中有六句，三雙相對：三句計常、三句計斷。於生死中自作此計，障理不明，故名為惑。若開善云：生死一向是苦無樂。光宅云：生死之中有定實樂。莊嚴云：生死之中有虛妄樂。妄樂乃為行苦所偪，故非實樂。然三師所說，皆為此訶。開善云生死是苦，即是此中斷見。光宅云一向是樂，即是此中常見。莊嚴云妄樂又為行苦所逼，即是此中亦常亦斷。亦應有第四句計，不知是誰。次從「修一切法常」下，結惑，又三，謂法、譬、合。初法中言「修一切法常」下，結墮斷見者。解有二意。一云：本自執常，他將斷難。常義不立，便執於斷；本自執斷，他將常難。斷義不立，更執於常。二云：兩見相因，見修斷過即自修常，見修常過即自修斷。「如步屈蟲」下，譬。六卷云折腰蟲。《周易》云「尺蠖之屈以求伸也。」時俗云桑枝變作。未必全爾，桑根為蟬，腐草為螢，其例亦然。此蟲腰折。修常斷者，合譬。明斷因常生、常因斷生，故有此譬。「以是義故」下，第三明破惑之觀，又二：初正明、次結解。初亦有三雙六句。對前無我只應言我，而經中言常者，有二解：一云誤；二云常是通名，我等是別。佛果萬德，通得名常。言餘法者，中道之外皆名餘法。常樂我淨即指如來祕藏佛法僧、正解脫等。當知中道只是真法，二邊為餘。「當知如是」下，是結解。又二：先法、後譬。初法中云愚人無疑者，有二解。疑為解津，愚既無解，所以不疑。二云：中道分明顯然易解，愚尚不疑，何況智者。依文似如後解為勝。「如羸病人」下，譬說，還餘前二解。若依惑意，即愚人分別而生諸見，如服酥輕便。若依後解，酥是好藥，健人服者本來自好，羸人服者亦得輕便。譬中道法，愚人亦解。六卷云「服已迷悶」，即是不解迷惑意也。「有無之法」下，第二廣明中道，又二：初約諸法有無顯中道、二約諸法不二顯中道。初文者，夫有無者不可定取，說有為無、說無為有，有是無有，無是有無。於無上說有，有不定有；於有上說無，無不定無。不有不無，即是中道。次不二者，無二異不二、無不二異二，二不二不可得，乃是非二非不二，是名中道。初文有無中，有法、有譬。初法說極略，唯此一句，直標有無其性不定。若他明三無為定無，不可為有；三聚定有，不可為無，此非不定不名中道。「譬如四大」下，次舉譬，先譬、次合。初譬中欲明有無不定，如佛赴緣，若執有者，破有說無；若執無者，破無說有。四大亦爾，如善醫師別知諸病，若水病者以火藥治，若火病者以水藥治，地風亦爾。不善醫師，不別病相，妄授於藥。次「善男子」下，合譬，初總合、次別合。初可見。次「若言」下，別合，又二：先舉有無為合、後舉常無常例合。初又二：先別破有無、後總結為誡。初文三句。初句云智不應染者，有二解。一云：智聞佛說佛性是有，不應染著。愚便責其現用處所，或六根中或遍身中。二若聞佛性是有，應知佛意不定專在於有，有即表無。無即妄語者，是第二句，破無。亦二意。一云：道理不無，定無乖理，故是妄語。二云：佛性雖有，未有現用，故言是無，汝有智人不應云妄。若言有者，是第三句。為執有情多，故更重破。不應默然者，若有佛性，應能現瑞。何以默然？二云：若定有有者，就汝推撿，何以默然？次「亦復不應」下，結不許爭論。言有言無乃至四句，並是戲論。「若說於苦」下，第二舉苦無常等例合。復有五：一約苦、二約無常、三約我無我、四約空寂、五約幻化，皆解惑，對辨可見。文云「雖有去來而常住無變」者，此是即去來不去來、即動而寂。 > From "At that time the Buddha praised" onward is the fourth \[section\], affirming \[it\]. From "I shall now further for you" onward is the third \[part\], explaining the perfect contemplation of the middle way. The text has three \[sections\]: first, consenting to explain; second, the main explanation; third, praising the teaching. In the first \[section\], "entering the tathāgatagarbha" means entering the treasury by means of contemplation; without contemplation, one does not enter. Next, from "If a self abides" onward is the main explanation. The text has two \[parts\]: first, brief; later, detailed. The brief also has three: first, indicating the middle way; second, explaining the delusion that contravenes the middle; third, distinguishing the contemplation that refutes delusion. First, indicating the middle way explains neither existence nor non-existence. "If a self abides" explains non-existence. If a self abided in the body, it would be a permanent phenomenon not separate from suffering; permanence is the self, and the body is suffering; this is existence, and this existence is not the way. "If there is no self" explains not non-existent. If it were definitely non-existent, there would be no cultivating causes to head toward the fruition, nor would there be parents and worldly good dharmas; this non-existence is not the way. Since both existence and non-existence are thus called to account, and neither existence nor non-existence can be maintained, it is neither existence nor non-existence, which is called the exposition of the middle way. Next, from "If one says that all dharmas" onward explains the delusion that contravenes the middle, which also has two: first, explaining delusion; second, concluding the delusion. In the first, explaining delusion, there are six phrases, in three pairs of opposites: three phrases grasp at permanence, and three phrases grasp at annihilation. Fabricating these views within saṃsāra obstructs the principle so that it is not understood, hence it is called delusion. As Kāishàn said, saṃsāra is completely suffering without bliss. Guāngzhái said that within saṃsāra there is definitely real bliss. Zhuāngyán said that within saṃsāra there is deceptive bliss; deceptive bliss is pressed by the suffering of conditioned existence (saṃskāra-duḥkhatā), so it is not real bliss. However, what these three masters said is all reproved here: Kāishàn saying saṃsāra is suffering is the view of annihilation here; Guāngzhái saying it is entirely bliss is the view of permanence here; Zhuāngyán saying deceptive bliss is pressed by the suffering of conditioned existence is both permanence and annihilation here. There should also be a fourth phrase of grasping, but it is not known whose it is. Next, from "cultivating all dharmas as permanent" onward concludes the delusion, which also has three, namely dharma, simile, and application. In the first, the dharma, the words from "cultivating all dharmas as permanent" conclude falling into the view of annihilation. There are two interpretations. One says: originally one clings to permanence oneself, but another challenges it with annihilation; when the meaning of permanence cannot be established, one then clings to annihilation. Originally one clings to annihilation oneself, but another challenges it with permanence; when the meaning of annihilation cannot be established, one further clings to permanence. The second says: the two views condition each other; seeing the fault in cultivating annihilation, one cultivates permanence oneself; seeing the fault in cultivating permanence, one cultivates annihilation oneself. From "Like an inchworm" onward is the simile. The six-fascicle \[version\] says a "broken-waist worm." The \*Book of Changes\* says, "The bending of the inchworm is to seek extension." Popular convention says it transforms from a mulberry branch; this may not be entirely so, just as mulberry roots become cicadas and rotting grass becomes fireflies—their cases are similar. This worm's waist is bent. Those who cultivate permanence and annihilation are the application of the simile, explaining that annihilation arises dependent on permanence and permanence arises dependent on annihilation, hence this simile. From "For this reason" onward is the third \[section\], explaining the contemplation that refutes delusion, which also has two: first, directly explaining; second, concluding the understanding. The first also has three pairs and six phrases. In contrast to the preceding non-self, it should only say "self," but in the sūtra it says "permanence." There are two explanations: one says it is an error; the second says permanence is a general designation, while self and so forth are specific. The myriad virtues of the Buddha-fruition can all generally be called permanent. Saying "the remaining dharmas" means that everything outside the middle way is called a remaining dharma. Permanence, bliss, self, and purity refer to the Tathāgata's secret treasury, the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha, right liberation, and so forth. One should know that the middle way is simply the true dharma, while the two extremes are the rest. From "One should know that thus" onward concludes the understanding. It also has two: first, the dharma; later, the simile. In the first, the dharma, "the foolish have no doubts" has two interpretations. Doubt is a ford to understanding; since the foolish have no understanding, they therefore have no doubt. The second says: the middle way is distinct, obvious, and easily understood; even the foolish do not doubt it, how much less the wise. Following the text, the latter interpretation seems superior. From "Like a debilitated sick person" onward is the simile, which still accommodates the two previous interpretations. If according to the sense of delusion, the foolish person discriminates and produces views, just as consuming ghee causes diarrhea. If according to the latter interpretation, ghee is a good medicine; when taken by a healthy person, it is originally good, and when taken by a debilitated person, it also brings ease. It illustrates that regarding the dharma of the middle way, even a foolish person understands. The six-fascicle \[version\] says "having taken it, becomes faint and confused," which is the sense of not understanding and being deluded. From "The dharmas of existence and non-existence" onward is the second \[part\], explaining the middle way in detail, which also has two: first, revealing the middle way in terms of the existence and non-existence of dharmas; second, revealing the middle way in terms of the non-duality of dharmas. In the first text: as for existence and non-existence, they cannot be definitively grasped; existence is explained as non-existence, and non-existence is explained as existence; existence is the non-existence of existence, and non-existence is the existence of non-existence. When existence is spoken of on the basis of non-existence, existence is not definitively existence; when non-existence is spoken of on the basis of existence, non-existence is not definitively non-existence. Neither existence nor non-existence is the middle way. Next, non-duality means there is no duality distinct from non-duality, nor is there non-duality distinct from duality; since neither duality nor non-duality can be apprehended, it is neither duality nor non-duality, which is called the middle way. In the first text on existence and non-existence, there are the dharma and the simile. The first, the presentation of the dharma, is extremely brief—only this single phrase, directly indicating that the nature of existence and non-existence is indeterminate. If others explain the three unconditioned \[dharmas\] as definitely non-existent and incapable of being existent, and the three aggregates as definitely existent and incapable of being non-existent, this is not indeterminate and is not called the middle way. From "Like the four great elements" onward next adduces the simile, first the simile and next the application. In the first, the simile, it intends to explain that existence and non-existence are indeterminate. Just as the Buddha responds to conditions: if someone clings to existence, he refutes existence and explains non-existence; if someone clings to non-existence, he refutes non-existence and explains existence. The four great elements are also like this: just as a skilled physician discerns the various illnesses—if it is a water illness, he treats it with fire medicine; if it is a fire illness, he treats it with water medicine; earth and wind are also like this. An unskilled physician does not discern the symptoms of the illness and wrongly prescribes medicine. Next, from "Good son" onward applies the simile: first a general application, next a specific application. The first can be seen. Next, from "If one says" onward is the specific application, which also has two: first, adducing existence and non-existence as the application; later, adducing permanence and impermanence as an analogous application. The first also has two: first, specifically refuting existence and non-existence; later, concluding with an admonition. The first text has three phrases. The first phrase says that the wise should not be tainted, which has two interpretations. One says: when the wise hear the Buddha say that the buddhadhātu exists, they should not be tainted and attached to it; the foolish then demand its current location of functioning, whether in the six sense faculties or throughout the whole body. Second, if they hear that the buddhadhātu exists, they should know that the Buddha's intent is not definitively focused on existence alone; existence expresses non-existence. "Non-existence is false speech" is the second phrase, refuting non-existence, which also has two meanings. One says: in principle it is not non-existent; definite non-existence contravenes principle, hence it is false speech. The second says: although the buddhadhātu exists, it does not yet have manifest functioning, hence it is said to be non-existent; you who are wise should not say it is false. "If one says it exists" is the third phrase. Because those who cling to existence are numerous, it refutes it once again. "Should not remain silent": if there is a buddhadhātu, it should be able to manifest signs; why remain silent? Second, it says: if there is definitely existence, upon investigation by you, why remain silent? Next, from "Nor should one further" onward concludes by not permitting debate. Asserting existence, asserting non-existence, up to the four propositions, are all proliferations of thought (prapañca). From "If one speaks of suffering" onward is the second \[section\], adducing suffering, impermanence, and so forth as an analogous application. There are again five: first, in terms of suffering; second, in terms of impermanence; third, in terms of self and non-self; fourth, in terms of emptiness and quiescence; fifth, in terms of magical illusion; all contrast understanding and delusion, which can be seen. When the text says "although having coming and going, it is permanently abiding without change," this is coming and going being identical to non-coming and non-going, activity being identical to quiescence. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 11.22](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.11.22) - [Next: 11.24](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.11.24) - [Up: 11](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.11) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767~en-mt.11.23) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.11.23](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.11.23) · Pramāṇa