[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767) › 12.27 # 大般涅槃經疏 12.27 大般涅槃經疏 12.27 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [12.27](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.12.27) 從「爾時文殊」下，是品中第八，答上三乘若無性問。文為兩：初釋偈疑兼遣上問、二迦葉論義正答上問。初文為五：一文殊騰純陀疑、二如來許說、三文殊出疑、四如來為釋、五文殊領解。然此是答問那忽騰疑？疑何不決復使他騰？河西解云：文殊是游方大士，影響釋迦，即眾中上座，恒為啟發之主，所以為其騰疑。二云：聖無彼我，唯益是存。況復二人為友，為騰何妨。純陀於何處生疑？前設五難，佛答中未見性是無常、見性是常。如來受飯食已入金剛三昧，是食消已則見佛性得三菩提。如此之常即本無今有、已有還無，便是無常，當知如來不得是常。何故復言兼答迦葉？三乘若無性，云何得有三乘差別之問？今舉此偈明差別無差別，所以得為兼答問也。迦葉所問，懸與理同。若三乘人同一乘性，何得三異？若三乘人全未有於一乘之性，云何說有？若舉偈答差無差疑，一切皆遣，即兼答意也。然純陀與佛論未見性是無常、見性是常，時凡三根解悟，上根於〈哀歎品〉中已悟；中根於迦葉問中悟；下根既未解悟，今文殊更為騰疑。此一偈凡四出：一出此中、二出梵行、三出二十五、四出二十六，大意是同而為緣則異。此中釋差無差別義，梵行中釋得無所得義，二十五釋有不定有、無不定無、非有非無中道之義，二十六為釋破定性明無性義。此之四出，亦為下品三根。成論師云：金剛心未是常、後心是常，無常則本有而今無，常則本無而今有。此釋正是純陀所疑，非關偈意。又解：本有者，本有煩惱，此昔日之本；今無者，今無般若，即昔日之今。皆是金剛心前本有今無耳。三世有法無有是處者，據金剛心已後常住。佛果非三世攝，故言無有是處。復云：上半不異前，而言三乘人同入無餘涅槃，故言三世有法無有是處。復一解：本有煩惱、今無煩惱，非三世攝；本無涅槃、今有涅槃，亦非世攝。諸師雖作眾解，都不遣純陀疑。只為汝本既無常今亦無常，本未得常今始得常，本無今有三世所攝。疑難宛然，何關偈意？地人云：常法非是始得，本來體用具足，但為妄惑所覆，後時方顯。若爾，先隱後顯，亦應顯已還隱。既顯已不隱，亦應隱而不顯（云云）。三藏師云：生死無始而有終，涅槃有始而無終；今時始得故言有始，一得永已故言無終。作此釋者還同地人，小乘亦得作如此說。惑滅道存、本無今有，悉是無常。作此說者，準舊不免純陀之難。興皇云：迦葉難意，三乘各得涅槃，云何同一佛性？同一佛性亦應同一佛乘。佛答三乘只一佛性，昔於一為三，今只三為一，豈可三乘。前來無性而今方有，但隨緣異辨，前來未悟則本有而今無，今時始悟則本無而今有。例如過去燈王、多寶，此是本有今無；未來彌勒，即是本無今有，亦是現在過去、現在未來，斯乃上半意也。至論佛性，何關有無及以今本，即下半意。又彈他解云：有三可三便成差別，有一可一便成無差，若差則失無差、若無差則失差，開一為三則失一、合三為一則失三。今明不爾。昔三猶是今一、今一猶是昔三，開三不失一、合一不失三，即是差即無差、無差即差。若得此意，本有今無三世有法，無有是處。亦應例言，本無今有三世有法，斯有是處。無常常境、智非境智、因果非因果，例皆如是。又云：本有只是有，今無只是無。又本不有今不無，只是非有非無。又云：上半是有，下半是無，無有是處是非有非無，例本無今有亦復如是（云云）。然興皇以同一佛性為本有，始悟為今無釋上半，佛性非今非本釋下半，指此為差別無差別義。斯乃分文兩派，義不相關。今則不爾，只約一句，差即無差、無差即差，一諦即三諦故言本有，三諦即一諦故言今無，即三一而非三一，故言三世有法無有是處。如是展轉不得相離，乃是差即無差、無差即差、非差非無差，是則遣迦葉之難豁無遺餘。亦是無常即常、常即無常，即非常非無常，釋純陀之疑雲消氷冶。智悟亦然，悟一即三名本有，悟三即一名今無，悟三一非三一名無有是處。此則何難不遣、何疑不除？如是則本有者，一有一切有，即是世界。今無者，一無一切無，即是對治。合此有無，一切亦有亦無，即為人。三世有法無有是處，即第一義。今此一悉即具四悉，乃遣難釋疑。私謂：若二人疑難皆遣皆釋，是則物機咸融悉會。本有即有句有門，今無即無句無門。聲聞緣覺亦有差別亦無差別，即亦有亦無句亦有亦無門。三世有法無有是處，即非有非無句非有非無門。一四相即，乃遣難釋疑。觀師三釋：一云上三句出所非，除性有性無；後一句結無有是處。二云：本有即不有，此有可令無。本無即不無，此無可令有。此有不有故非有，此無不無故非無。非有非無，故言三世不攝。三云：上半無差別而差別，下半差別而無差別。釋此為二：一者當體、二者為緣。當體即法身本地，故無差別；約緣故有三乘之異、差別不同。又釋本有今無即是無今之本，此本非今，即是非今之本。本無今有即是無本之今，此今非本，即是非本之今。故非世攝。此解大意可見，不復具之。 > From "At that time Mañjuśrī" onward is the eighth \[section\] within the chapter, answering the earlier question of whether the three vehicles lack the \[Buddha-\]nature. The text has two parts: first, resolving doubt regarding the verse while concurrently answering the earlier question; second, Kāśyapa's debate properly answering the earlier question. The first part has five \[sections\]: first, Mañjuśrī relays Cunda's doubt; second, the Tathāgata consents to explain; third, Mañjuśrī sets forth the doubt; fourth, the Tathāgata explains it for him; fifth, Mañjuśrī receives and understands it. Yet this is answering a question—why then does it relay a doubt? Why did he not resolve his own doubt, but instead had another relay it? Hexi explains: Mañjuśrī is a great master who travels the directions to assist Śākyamuni; as the senior seat in the assembly, he is always the host who initiates and reveals, which is why he relayed the doubt for him. Second, it is said: holy beings have no self and other, considering only what benefits \[others\]. Furthermore, the two are friends, so what harm is there in relaying it for him? Where did Cunda's doubt arise? Previously he posed five challenges, and in the Buddha's answer, not having seen the nature is impermanent, while having seen the nature is permanent. After receiving the meal, the Tathāgata entered the vajrasamādhi; when this food was digested, he saw the buddhadhātu and attained sambodhi. If permanence is like this—originally non-existent and now existing, having existed and then returning to non-existence—it is simply impermanent; one should know that the Tathāgata does not attain this permanence. Why also say it concurrently answers Kāśyapa? If the three vehicles lack the nature, how could there be the question of the differences among the three vehicles? Now, by raising this verse, it clarifies that difference is non-difference, which is why it can serve as a concurrent answer to the question. Kāśyapa's question fundamentally harmonizes with the principle. If persons of the three vehicles share the nature of the one vehicle, how can there be three distinctions? If persons of the three vehicles completely lack the nature of the one vehicle, how can it be said to exist? If the verse is cited to answer the doubt about difference and non-difference, all \[difficulties\] are dispelled; this is precisely the intent of the concurrent answer. When Cunda debated with the Buddha that not having seen the nature is impermanent and having seen the nature is permanent, among the three faculties of beings who understood and awakened at the time: those of superior faculties had already awakened in the "Chapter on Grieving"; those of middling faculties awakened during Kāśyapa's question; since those of inferior faculties had not yet understood and awakened, now Mañjuśrī relays the doubt for them once more. This single verse appears a total of four times: first here; second in \[the chapter on\] Pure Conduct; third in fascicle twenty-five; and fourth in fascicle twenty-six. The general intent is the same, but the conditions \[for its utterance\] differ. Here it explains the meaning that difference is non-difference; in Pure Conduct it explains the meaning that attainment is non-attainment; in twenty-five it explains the middle way meaning that existence is not determinately existent, non-existence is not determinately non-existent, and it is neither existent nor non-existent; in twenty-six it refutes determinate nature to clarify the meaning of no nature. These four occurrences are also for the three faculties of the inferior grade. Masters of the \*Satyasiddhi\* say: the vajra-mind is not yet permanent; the subsequent mind is permanent. Impermanence means originally existing but now non-existent; permanence means originally non-existent but now existing. This explanation is precisely what Cunda doubted and does not pertain to the verse's meaning. Another explanation says: "originally existing" means originally having afflictions, this being the "original" of the past; "now non-existent" means now lacking prajñā, which is the "now" of the past. Both are merely originally existing and now non-existent prior to the vajra-mind. As for "among things of the three times, there is no such place \[where it exists\]," it is based on the permanence after the vajra-mind. The fruit of buddhahood is not subsumed under the three times; hence it says "there is no such place." It is also said: the first half does not differ from the former, yet says that persons of the three vehicles together enter nirvāṇa without remainder; hence it says that among things of the three times, there is no such place. Yet another explanation: originally having afflictions and now being without afflictions is not subsumed under the three times; originally lacking nirvāṇa and now having nirvāṇa is likewise not subsumed under the times. Although the various masters offer many explanations, none dispel Cunda's doubt. Merely because your original state was impermanent, the present is also impermanent; originally having not attained permanence, one only now attains permanence; originally non-existent and now existing, it is subsumed under the three times. The doubt and challenge remain intact—how does this pertain to the verse's meaning? The Dilun masters say: the permanent dharma is not newly attained; originally its essence and function are fully complete, merely covered over by false delusion, and later revealed. If so, being first hidden and later revealed, having been revealed it should also return to being hidden. Since once revealed it is not hidden, while hidden it also should not be revealed (and so forth). The Tripiṭaka master says: saṃsāra is beginningless but has an end; nirvāṇa has a beginning but has no end. Being newly attained at the present time, it is said to have a beginning; once attained it lasts forever, hence it is said to have no end. One who makes this explanation is still the same as the Dilun masters; Hīnayāna may also make such an explanation. When delusion is extinguished and the path abides, originally non-existent and now existing, all are impermanent. One who makes this explanation, judged by the old \[reasoning\], cannot escape Cunda's challenge. Xinghuang says: the intent of Kāśyapa's challenge is, if the three vehicles each attain nirvāṇa, how can they share the same buddhadhātu? If they share the same buddhadhātu, they should also share the same Buddha-vehicle. The Buddha answered that the three vehicles have only one buddhadhātu; formerly out of the one three were made, and now the three are merely made into one—how could there be three vehicles? It is not that formerly there was no nature and only now it exists; it is merely distinguished differently according to conditions. Prior to awakening, it was originally existing and now non-existent; now when first awakening, it is originally non-existent and now existing. For example, past King of Lamps and Prabhūtaratna are originally existing and now non-existent; future Maitreya is originally non-existent and now existing; this is also present-past and present-future—such is the meaning of the first half. Coming to the discussion of buddhadhātu, what does it have to do with existence or non-existence, or with now and originally? This is the meaning of the second half. He also criticizes other explanations, saying: if having three can be three, it becomes difference; if having one can be one, it becomes non-difference. If there is difference, one loses non-difference; if there is non-difference, one loses difference. Opening the one into three loses the one; combining the three into one loses the three. Now it is explained that this is not so. The former three are still the present one; the present one is still the former three. Opening the three does not lose the one; combining the one does not lose the three. This is precisely difference being non-difference, and non-difference being difference. If one grasps this meaning, "originally existing and now non-existent, among things of the three times there is no such place"—one should likewise say by analogy that "originally non-existent and now existing, among things of the three times there is such a place." Impermanent and permanent objects, wisdom and non-wisdom objects, cause and effect and non-cause and effect—all examples are like this. It is also said: "originally existing" is simply existence; "now non-existent" is simply non-existence. Furthermore, originally not existing and now not non-existent is simply neither existence nor non-existence. It is also said: the first half is existence, the second half is non-existence; "there is no such place" is neither existence nor non-existence; the analogy of "originally non-existent and now existing" is also like this (and so forth). However, Xinghuang interprets the first half by taking the identical buddhadhātu as original existence and initial awakening as present non-existence, and interprets the second half by taking the buddhadhātu as neither present nor original, identifying this as the meaning that difference is non-difference. This merely splits the text into two streams whose meanings do not interrelate. Now we do not do this. Basing it simply on a single phrase: difference is non-difference, and non-difference is difference. The one truth is the three truths, hence called "originally existing"; the three truths are the one truth, hence called "now non-existent"; being three and one yet neither three nor one, it says "among things of the three times, there is no such place." In this way, turning mutually without being separated from one another, it is difference being non-difference, non-difference being difference, and neither difference nor non-difference; thus it dispels Kāśyapa's challenge completely without remainder. It is also impermanence being permanence, permanence being impermanence, and being neither permanent nor impermanent, dissolving Cunda's doubt like melting ice and scattering clouds. Wisdom-awakening is also like this: awakening to the one as the three is called "originally existing"; awakening to the three as the one is called "now non-existent"; awakening to the three and one as neither three nor one is called "there is no such place." In this case, what challenge is not dispelled, what doubt is not removed? Thus "originally existing" means when one exists, all exist, which is the mundane \[siddhānta\]. "Now non-existent" means when one is non-existent, all are non-existent, which is the therapeutic \[siddhānta\]. Combining this existence and non-existence, all are both existent and non-existent, which is for individual persons \[siddhānta\]. "Among things of the three times, there is no such place" is the ultimate \[siddhānta\]. Now this single \[phrase\] fully possesses the four siddhāntas, thus dispelling challenges and resolving doubts. I personally consider: if the doubts and challenges of both men are all dispelled and resolved, the capacities of beings will be completely harmonized and fully unified. "Originally existing" is the existence phrase and the door of existence. "Now non-existent" is the non-existence phrase and the door of non-existence. The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas having both difference and non-difference is the both-existence-and-non-existence phrase and the door of both existence and non-existence. "Among things of the three times, there is no such place" is the neither-existence-nor-non-existence phrase and the door of neither existence nor non-existence. The mutual identity of the one and four thus dispels challenges and resolves doubts. Master Guan's three explanations: first, he says the first three lines present what is negated, eliminating inherent existence and inherent non-existence; the final line concludes that "there is no such place." Second, he says: "originally existing" is non-existing; this existence can be made non-existent. "Originally non-existent" is not non-existing; this non-existence can be made to exist. Because this existence does not exist, it is non-existent; because this non-existence is not non-existent, it is not non-existent. Being neither existent nor non-existent, it is said not to be subsumed under the three times. Third, he says: the first half is non-difference yet difference; the second half is difference yet non-difference. Explaining this has two aspects: first, in terms of essence; second, in terms of conditions. In terms of essence, it is the original ground of the dharmakāya, hence without difference; in terms of conditions, there are the distinctions of the three vehicles, which are differing and distinct. He also explains: "originally existing and now non-existent" is the origin without the now; this origin is not the now, which is the origin that is not the now. "Originally non-existent and now existing" is the now without the origin; this now is not the origin, which is the now that is not the origin. Therefore, it is not subsumed under the times. The general drift of this explanation can be seen, so I will not elaborate further. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 12.26](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.12.26) - [Next: 12.28](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.12.28) - [Up: 12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.12) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767~en-mt.12.27) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [大般涅槃經](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.mahayanasutra.mahaparinirvana-mahayana*zh-dharmaksema.28.34) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.12.27](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.12.27) · Pramāṇa