[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767) › 15.16 # 大般涅槃經疏 15.16 大般涅槃經疏 15.16 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [15.16](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.15.16) 「文殊師利下」，第三明一實諦慧聖行。若前文中舉四舉二共顯一實，何不從四至三而超至二？非無三諦，但此中文束四為二，其義則便；束四為三，義少不便，故不言三。解者不同。此間以常住佛果是一，依一實諦，引《勝鬘》云「一苦滅諦即是真實。」地人云：除妄顯黎耶即是實諦。中假師云：除斷常顯中道為一實諦。興皇悉不用，佛果所依能依焉是一實？妄惑與黎耶為一為異？若一既除妄惑亦除，黎耶若異，待妄說實，豈是一實？對邊說中，中還是邊，亦非一實。然一切法本無所有畢竟清淨，實無所有，何曾有實及以不實？諦與不諦，為緣方便假設言教。依文正以一道清淨為一實諦，是正真法，故《華嚴》云「法性遠離」。是故今明，若非彼是此，非一實諦。若隨緣異說，得意無咎。文顯一實，甚自分明。就文為二：一標宗、二論義。初標，有問、有答。答中有八善男子，初二共成初義，則有七不同：一約境、二約心、三約言說。私謂：亦可約言行。四據人、五約教、六約因體、七約果體。「文殊白佛」下，第二論義，還論七章。初約境論義，有問、有答。問中先領問。一往似問如來、虛空、佛性三種有何差別。尋下答意，正是問此三種與一實諦有何差別。佛答有三：一倡兩章門、二釋、三結。初倡章門又二：初倡昔四諦、次倡今一實。興皇名初為實滅章門、次為滅實章門，取教為實滅、取理為滅實。亦以四諦教中之實即是實諦，若虛空佛性皆是理實即為諦實，故名為諦。今此初倡昔四諦章者，各有三句：苦是苦境，諦是苦教亦是苦智，實是苦諦之理不二為實。又云：除苦一句，餘二亦得判實。又但取實，除兩句，只用實為諦。次「如來非苦」下，第二倡一實章門三種皆是實。非苦者非境，非諦者非教，是實者是理。後三諦亦爾。如來虛空佛性亦爾，顯時名如來，隱名佛性，虛空取隱顯不二。「所言苦者」下，第二釋兩章門。只約四諦即為四別，一一諦中皆先釋實諦，實諦即是昔四諦中之實。次釋諦實，皆如文。「復次言真實者即是如來」下，第三結章門，又二：先結三法與真實相即更無異體；次從「有苦有苦因」下，更結是非，又兩：初結三法異於四諦故是諦實，次結三法異於有為有漏是故是實。所言有苦即苦諦，苦因即集諦，苦盡即滅諦，苦對即道諦。問：非虛非實稱為實者，非虛非實亦應稱諦。答：如所問。問：二義若齊，何故二乘稱諦、如來稱實？答：與奪之殊，二乘審知是苦。又解：苦無苦與其諦名，未窮理實，故奪其實。「文殊白佛言如佛」下，釋第二據心章門，先問、次答。初問意云：諦攝倒不？如其攝者，云何得言不倒為實？若不攝者，復違前言攝法皆盡。進退兩望，悉皆有過。然下文具明是苦集攝，此中但明是苦諦者，偏據果報酬因之義。第三問答，釋約言說章門，其中二事可見。私謂：準佛答文既約斷惑，知是約行。「文殊言如佛所說」下，第四就人為問，云二乘所說為實不實？佛不定判實與不實。約斷惑邊是實，而非常住義當不實。「文殊魔說」下，五就教為難。魔所說者，聖諦攝不？佛答意云：四諦之中苦集諦攝。問：外道二十五六等諦為屬何諦？又外道所說四諦之中為壞幾諦？今明但壞苦集，不壞道滅。何者？彼云冥初生覺，後生五大五微等。生覺是因，壞佛集諦。大微是果，壞佛苦諦。二十五六，為佛苦集二諦所攝。「文殊師利言如佛」下，第六釋約因體章門。文殊牒佛一道清淨是實諦者，外道亦云一道清淨應是實諦。佛答意明外道但有苦集，無道滅。於非滅中而生滅想者，即橫計非想以為涅槃。非道道想者，計雞狗戒而以為道。非果果想者，計於萬物微塵世性之果。非因因想者，計微塵世性是萬物因。問：前云不壞滅道，今計非想雞狗等戒，豈非壞耶？答：此起橫計，橫壞道滅。前則不爾，彼明二十五諦直言冥初生覺等，六諦之中但言主諦依諦，何處云計非想之與狗戒？故知不壞道滅二諦。又問：外道有苦諦者，前何故云凡夫有苦無諦？答：直言有苦境以為苦諦，非謂苦智。「文殊言如佛所說」下，釋第七據果體章門，先問、次答。問為三：一唱外道有四德、二釋、三結。此初唱有，如文。「何以故」下釋。凡有二十四復次，計有常樂我淨即為四別。初、八復次計有常，二、五復次計有樂，三、三復次計有淨，四、八復次計有我。此初八復次計常，文在初者，通以因果故知有常；二列殺生因必得惡果故常；三據能專念故常；四舉憶想據所念；五舉修習；六舉算數；七據讀誦；八據形相，皆如文。次、計樂有五復次：一據因果、二據有求、三據樂因、四據樂緣、五據三品。三、三復次計有淨：一據淨因、二據淨緣、三據淨器。四、八復次計有我：一據造作、二據相貌、三據別味、四據作業、五據求乳、六據名字、七據有遮、八據伴類。「世尊諸外道等」下，第三總結外道應有實諦。「佛言」下，二如來答。文為三：初略、次廣、三結。初文二：初非、後釋。初如文。次「何以故」下，釋非。 > From "Mañjuśrī \[said to the Buddha\]" below, the third \[section\] clarifies the noble practice of the wisdom of the one real truth. If the preceding text set forth four \[truths\] and set forth two \[truths\] together to reveal the one real, why did it not go from four to three, but instead skipped ahead to two? It is not that there are no three truths, but rather that in this passage, bundling the four into two makes the sense convenient; bundling the four into three would make the sense somewhat inconvenient, so it does not speak of three. Interpreters differ \[on this\]. Those of this region take the eternally abiding Buddha-fruit to be the one, and relying on the one real truth, cite the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra: "The one truth of the cessation of suffering is the real." The Dilun masters say: Eliminating the false and revealing the ālayavijñāna is the real truth. The masters of the middle and provisional say: Eliminating extinction and permanence and revealing the middle way is the one real truth. Xīnghuáng rejects them all: How could the Buddha-fruit's support and what it supports be the one real? Are false delusion and the ālayavijñāna identical or different? If they are identical, when false delusion is eliminated, the ālayavijñāna would also be eliminated; if they are different, it posits the real in dependence on the false, so how could it be the one real? If one posits the middle against the extremes, the middle is still an extreme, and also not the one real. However, all dharmas are originally nonexistent and ultimately pure; since they are genuinely nonexistent, when was there ever the real or the unreal? Truth and non-truth are expedient designations and verbal teachings set up for the sake of conditions. According to the text, it takes the purity of the single path to be the one real truth, which is the correct and true Dharma; hence the Avataṃsaka Sūtra says: "The dharmatā is far removed \[from all characteristics\]." Therefore, it is now clarified that if one negates that and affirms this, it is not the one real truth. If one explains differently according to conditions, there is no error as long as one grasps the intended meaning. The text's revealing of the one real is exceedingly clear. Dividing the text, there are two parts: first, stating the main thesis; second, discussing the meaning. First, in stating \[the thesis\], there are questions and answers. In the answers there are eight occurrences of "good man"; the first two together establish the first meaning, thus yielding seven differences: first, in terms of the objective realm; second, in terms of the mind; third, in terms of speech (privately I think it could also be in terms of speech and practice); fourth, based on persons; fifth, in terms of teaching; sixth, in terms of the essence of the cause; seventh, in terms of the essence of the fruit. From "Mañjuśrī said to the Buddha" below, the second part discusses the meaning, likewise discussing seven topics. First, discussing the meaning in terms of the objective realm, there are questions and answers. In the question, he first summarizes the inquiry. At first glance, it seems to ask what difference there is among the three: the Tathāgata, space, and the buddhadhātu. Examining the meaning of the answer below, it is precisely asking what difference there is between these three and the one real truth. The Buddha's answer has three parts: first, proposing two thematic headings; second, explaining them; third, concluding. First, proposing the headings also has two parts: first, proposing the former four truths; next, proposing the present one real \[truth\]. Xīnghuáng called the first the heading of the "real cessation" and the next the heading of the "cessation real," taking teaching as the "real cessation" and principle as the "cessation real." He also held that the real within the teaching of the four truths is the "real truth," and that if space and the buddhadhātu are both the reality of principle, they are the "truth-real," and therefore called "truths." Now, in this initial proposing of the headings of the former four truths, each has three phrases: "suffering" is the realm of suffering; "truth" is the teaching of suffering and also the wisdom of suffering; "real" is the principle of the truth of suffering, being non-dual and thus real. It is also said: excluding the phrase "suffering," the other two can also be determined as real. Also, one may take only "real" and exclude two phrases, using only "real" as the truth. Next, from "the Tathāgata is not suffering" below, the second proposes the heading of the one real, that all three are real. "Not suffering" means not the realm; "not truth" means not the teaching; "is real" means it is the principle. The latter three truths are also like this. The Tathāgata, space, and the buddhadhātu are also like this: when revealed, it is called the Tathāgata; when concealed, it is called the buddhadhātu; space takes their non-duality whether concealed or revealed. From "That which is called suffering" below, the second explains the two headings. Simply in terms of the four truths, there are four distinctions; within each truth, it first explains the "real truth," the real truth being the real within the former four truths. Next, it explains the "truth-real," all as in the text. From "Furthermore, that which is called the real is the Tathāgata" below, the third concludes the headings, again having two parts: first, concluding that the three dharmas are identical with the real and have no different essence; next, from "there is suffering, there is the cause of suffering" below, it further concludes what is right and wrong, again having two parts: first, concluding that the three dharmas are different from the four truths and therefore are the truth-real; next, concluding that the three dharmas are different from the conditioned and contaminated, and therefore are real. What is called "there is suffering" is the truth of suffering; "the cause of suffering" is the truth of the origin; "the exhaustion of suffering" is the truth of cessation; "the counteractive to suffering" is the truth of the path. Question: If that which is neither unreal nor real is called real, then that which is neither unreal nor real should also be called truth. Answer: It is as you ask. Question: If the two meanings are equal, why do the two vehicles call it truth, while the Tathāgata calls it real? Answer: It is the difference between granting and stripping: the two vehicles know thoroughly that it is suffering. Another explanation: \[seeing that\] suffering lacks suffering is given the name of truth; since they have not plumbed the reality of principle, its \[status as\] real is stripped away. From "Mañjuśrī said to the Buddha: as the Buddha..." below, explaining the second heading based on the mind, there is first a question and next an answer. The initial question means: Does truth subsume inversions or not? If it subsumes them, how can it be said that being non-inverted is real? If it does not subsume them, this contradicts the previous statement that it subsumes all dharmas exhaustively. Looking at both advancing and retreating, both have faults. However, the text below fully clarifies that it is subsumed under suffering and origin; here it only clarifies that it is the truth of suffering, which is biased toward the meaning of the fruition repaying the cause. The third question and answer explains the heading in terms of speech, within which two matters can be seen. Privately I think: according to the Buddha's answer, since it is in terms of cutting off afflictions, one knows it is in terms of practice. From "Mañjuśrī said: As the Buddha has spoken" below, the fourth raises a question based on persons, asking: Is what the two vehicles speak real or not real? The Buddha does not definitively judge it as real or unreal. In terms of cutting off afflictions it is real, but since it is not eternally abiding, in sense it should be unreal. From "Mañjuśrī \[said\]: What Māra speaks..." below, the fifth raises a challenge based on teaching: Is what Māra speaks subsumed under the noble truths or not? The Buddha's intended answer is: Among the four truths, it is subsumed under the truths of suffering and origin. Question: To which truth do the heterodox twenty-five or \[twenty-\]six truths belong? Furthermore, among the four truths, how many truths does what the heterodox speak destroy? Now it is clarified that they only destroy suffering and origin, not destroying the path and cessation. Why? They say that from primal nature first arises intellect, and thereafter arise the five great elements, the five subtle elements, and so forth. The arising of intellect is the cause, destroying the Buddha's truth of the origin. The great and subtle elements are the fruit, destroying the Buddha's truth of suffering. The twenty-five or \[twenty-\]six truths are subsumed under the Buddha's two truths of suffering and origin. From "Mañjuśrī said: As the Buddha..." below, the sixth explains the heading in terms of the essence of the cause. Mañjuśrī cites the Buddha's \[statement\] that the purity of the single path is the real truth, \[noting that\] the heterodox also say that the purity of the single path should be the real truth. The Buddha's intended answer clarifies that the heterodox only have suffering and origin, and lack the path and cessation. As for giving rise to the thought of cessation in what is not cessation, this is falsely conceiving the naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana to be nirvāṇa. The thought of the path in what is not the path is conceiving the chicken and dog precepts to be the path. The thought of fruit in what is not fruit is conceiving the fruit of the worldly nature of subtle particles of all things. The thought of cause in what is not cause is conceiving that the worldly nature of subtle particles is the cause of all things. Question: Earlier you said they do not destroy cessation and the path; now that they conceive of naivasaṃjñā\[nāsaṃjñāyatana\] and the chicken and dog precepts, is this not destroying them? Answer: Here they give rise to false conceptions, falsely destroying the path and cessation. Previously it was not so: their explanation of the twenty-five truths merely said that from primal nature first arises intellect, etc.; and among the six categories they only spoke of the substance category and the dependent category, so where did they say they conceive of naivasaṃjñā\[nāsaṃjñāyatana\] and dog precepts? Therefore we know they do not destroy the two truths of the path and cessation. Another question: If the heterodox have the truth of suffering, why did you say earlier that ordinary beings have suffering but no truth? Answer: It simply says they have the realm of suffering which is taken as the truth of suffering, not that they have the wisdom of suffering. From "Mañjuśrī said: As the Buddha has spoken" below, explaining the seventh heading based on the essence of the fruit, there is first a question and next an answer. The question has three parts: first, stating that the heterodox have the four virtues; second, explaining; third, concluding. This first stating that they have them is as in the text. From "Why is that?" below, the explanation. There are altogether twenty-four occurrences of "furthermore"; conceiving permanence, bliss, self, and purity constitutes four distinctions. First, eight occurrences of "furthermore" conceive permanence; second, five occurrences of "furthermore" conceive bliss; third, three occurrences of "furthermore" conceive purity; fourth, eight occurrences of "furthermore" conceive self. In these first eight occurrences of "furthermore" conceiving permanence, the text at the beginning generally uses cause and fruit to know there is permanence; the second lists that the cause of killing necessarily obtains an evil fruit, hence permanence; the third is based on the ability to concentrate thoughts, hence permanence; the fourth raises recollection based on what is recollected; the fifth raises cultivation; the sixth raises calculation; the seventh is based on recitation; the eighth is based on physical form, all as in the text. Next, conceiving bliss has five occurrences of "furthermore": first, based on cause and fruit; second, based on having desires; third, based on the cause of bliss; fourth, based on the conditions of bliss; fifth, based on the three grades. Third, three occurrences of "furthermore" conceive purity: first, based on the cause of purity; second, based on the conditions of purity; third, based on the vessel of purity. Fourth, eight occurrences of "furthermore" conceive self: first, based on agency; second, based on bodily marks; third, based on distinct tastes; fourth, based on performing activities; fifth, based on seeking milk; sixth, based on names; seventh, based on having obstruction; eighth, based on companions. From "World-Honoured One, all the heterodox..." below, the third summarizes and concludes that the heterodox should have the real truth. From "The Buddha said" below, the second is the Tathāgata's answer. The text has three parts: first, brief; next, extensive; third, concluding. The first part has two: first, negating; later, explaining. The first is as in the text. Next, from "Why is that?" below, explaining the negation. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 15.15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.15.15) - [Next: 15.17](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.15.17) - [Up: 15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.15) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767~en-mt.15.16) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.15.16](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.15.16) · Pramāṇa