[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767) › 17.23 # 大般涅槃經疏 17.23 大般涅槃經疏 17.23 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [17.23](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.17.23) 「迦葉白佛」下，第二領解。又二：先領、次述成。四味者，即四諦味，出是出苦味、離是離集味，滅道如文。「迦葉白佛」下，第二明捨心果。文為二：初明空平等、二辨知見。所以然者，即寂而照、即空而有、即實而權，上三心果，即事而理。而後結云諸佛境界，即事而理，與今互顯。初又三：一明平等果、二辨空義、三明利益。初文先問、後答。答中二：初略明空門果、後廣明空門果。歎須菩提者，於聲聞中解空第一，舉小況大以明地體。舊有二解：一云七地，引經云「七地能入寂滅」。二云八地，空有並觀故是平等。今云初地與一子地，理同能異，故立別名，何得淺深？例聖行中戒定之果同在初地。「善男子」下，第二廣明空門果。又三：法、譬、合。初法說，具明人法二空。不見父母等即是生空，不見陰界即是法空。而復言眾生壽命者，更牒前生空。次「譬如虛空」下，舉事空為譬。「一切諸法」下，合。「迦葉白佛」下，第二廣辨空門義。又二：先問、後答。答又三：一列十一空章、二一一解釋、三結。初文者，若《大品》明十八空，或論七空。今處中說，故但十一。然《大品》廣空而略性，此經廣性而略空，總其二經互顯其美。「菩薩云何」下，解釋十一空。舊有二說。冶城云：前六空是互無空性空，下五空是任理空。任理是真諦空，互無是世諦空。莊嚴用之。開善皆是理空，而廣斥冶城，仍分為四：初六是假名空、次二是實法空、次一是平等空、次二是佛果空，以修行有漸故。觀師云：此十一空皆是破病，引《釋論》云「如藥有十一，破十一病。空十一有，名十一空，亦得皆明理，亦得言前八是破病、後三是顯真。今明羅列十一，界分不同，即世界。緣宜十一，說之生善，是為人。治十一病，是對治。聞一一空即能見理，是第一義。通方融治，豈應定執。私謂：經論不同，不逾四悉，該括漸頓、融通顯密，豈逾於斯。此十一空即為十一段。」初文明內空云無外法、外空無內法，冶城呼為互無空。開善明外空時例解內法亦空，內空時亦例解外法亦空。知有為是空時例知無為亦空，知無為時有為亦空。有人評此二解，謂冶城於文為得、於理為失，開善於理為得、於文不便。有師言：待內明外，既無內即無外。此還扶開善解。文解內空無有常樂三寶等，後文又云「如來法僧不在二空。」解言：前云無者，無理外橫計。後言不無者，即理內正法。若釋內外空作互無釋，極不相應；若作相待，意則易見。既待內外，得離內外以為二空；既無內外，即無內外合為一空。有為空者，如內外空。無為空者，而言佛等四法非有為非無為，即中道正法。無始空者，一云破外道冥初，故言無始；二云遠討其根，無初來處，非今始空始破，明無無、無有始。性空，一云破性說性空；二云本性皆空，如貧窮人一切皆空。舊云：從眼生滅去，就法空明第一義。從何等去，就人空明第一義。開善云：何得用於淺近生法兩空釋大涅槃？又諸經無不前明生空，何故此中前明法空？觀師云：眼生時無所從來，即不生義；滅時無所去，即不滅義。還是《中論》兩不之義。若眼是有，不應本無今有、已有還無。推其實性，無眼無主，推一切法亦應如是。 > From "Kāśyapa said to the Buddha" below is the second \[section\], expressing understanding. This also has two \[parts\]: first he expresses his understanding, and next \[the Buddha\] confirms and approves it. The "four tastes" are the tastes of the four truths: "emerging" is emerging from the taste of suffering; "departing" is departing from the taste of origination; cessation and path are as in the text. From "Kāśyapa said to the Buddha" below, the second \[part\] clarifies the fruit of the mind of equanimity (upekṣā). The text has two \[parts\]: first it clarifies emptiness and equality, and second it analyzes knowledge and vision. Why is this so? Because quiescent yet illuminating, empty yet existing, real yet provisional, the fruits of the preceding three minds were \[reaching\] the principle through phenomena; and \[the text\] concludes later by stating that the realm of all buddhas is \[reaching\] the principle through phenomena, mutually illuminating the present \[teaching\]. The first \[part\] also has three \[sections\]: first, clarifying the fruit of equality; second, analyzing the meaning of emptiness; third, clarifying the benefits. The first text first asks and then answers. Within the answer there are two \[parts\]: first it briefly clarifies the fruit of the gate of emptiness, and next it extensively clarifies the fruit of the gate of emptiness. Praising Subhūti is because among the śrāvakas he was foremost in understanding emptiness; an inferior \[vehicle\] is raised to illustrate the superior so as to clarify the substance of the ground. Traditionally there have been two explanations: one says it is the seventh ground, citing the sūtra as saying "the seventh ground is able to enter cessation"; the second says it is the eighth ground, because emptiness and existence are contemplated together, hence it is equality. Now we say: the first ground and the single-child ground are identical in principle and different in capacity, so distinct names are established—how could there be shallow and deep? This is by analogy with the fruits of morality and concentration in the noble practices, which together reside in the first ground. From "Good man" below is the second \[part\], extensively clarifying the fruit of the gate of emptiness. This also has three \[parts\]: teaching, metaphor, and application. First, the teaching fully clarifies the two emptinesses of persons and dharmas. Not seeing father, mother, and so forth is the emptiness of living beings; not seeing the aggregates and realms is the emptiness of dharmas. And further speaking of "living beings and lifespan" takes up again the preceding emptiness of living beings. Next, from "Just as space" below, phenomenal emptiness is cited as a metaphor. From "all dharmas" below is the application. From "Kāśyapa said to the Buddha" below, the second \[section\] extensively analyzes the meaning of the gate of emptiness. This also has two \[parts\]: first a question, then an answer. The answer also has three \[parts\]: first, listing the eleven chapters on emptiness; second, explaining each one individually; third, the conclusion. As for the first text: the Pañcaviṃśati clarifies eighteen emptinesses, or treatises discuss seven emptinesses; here \[the sūtra\] speaks in the middle, hence there are only eleven. However, the Pañcaviṃśati is extensive on emptiness and brief on the \[buddha-\]nature, while this sūtra is extensive on the nature and brief on emptiness; taken together, the two sūtras mutually illuminate their excellence. From "How does a bodhisattva..." below, the eleven emptinesses are explained. Traditionally there have been two theories. Yěchéng said: the first six emptinesses are the emptiness of mutual absence and the emptiness of inherent nature, while the lower five emptinesses are the emptiness of conformity to principle. Conformity to principle is the emptiness of ultimate truth, while mutual absence is the emptiness of conventional truth. Zhuāngyán adopted this. Kāishàn held that all are the emptiness of principle and extensively refuted Yěchéng, still dividing them into four: the first six are the emptiness of provisional designations, the next two are the emptiness of actual dharmas, the next one is the emptiness of equality, and the next two are the emptiness of the buddha fruit, because cultivation has a gradual sequence. Master \[Jí\]zàng said: these eleven emptinesses all destroy maladies; he cited the Treatise \[on the Great Prajñāpāramitā\] as saying, "Just as there are eleven medicines to destroy eleven maladies, emptying eleven existences is called the eleven emptinesses. They may also all clarify principle, or it may be said that the first eight destroy maladies and the latter three reveal the real. Now, we explain that laying out eleven \[emptinesses\] according to different boundaries is the mundane \[siddhānta\]; being suited to conditions in eleven ways so that preaching them generates goodness is the individual \[siddhānta\]; curing eleven maladies is the counteractive \[siddhānta\]; hearing each individual emptiness and thereby being able to see the principle is the paramārtha \[siddhānta\]. Comprehensively fusing and curing, how could one rigidly adhere to a fixed view?" I personally state: the differences among sūtras and treatises do not exceed the four siddhāntas; encompassing gradual and sudden, fusing exoteric and esoteric—how could it exceed this? These eleven emptinesses constitute eleven passages. The first text, clarifying internal emptiness, says there are no external dharmas, and external emptiness says there are no internal dharmas; Yěchéng called this the emptiness of mutual absence. Kāishàn, when clarifying external emptiness, by analogy explained that internal dharmas are also empty, and when clarifying internal emptiness, also by analogy explained that external dharmas are also empty. When one knows that the conditioned is empty, by analogy one knows that the unconditioned is also empty; when one knows the unconditioned, the conditioned is also empty. Someone assessed these two explanations, saying that Yěchéng was successful with the text but failed with the principle, while Kāishàn was successful with the principle but awkward with the text. One master said: by dependence on the internal, the external is clarified; since there is no internal, there is no external. This in turn supports Kāishàn's explanation. The text explains that internal emptiness has no permanence, bliss, Three Jewels, and so forth, yet a later text also says, "The Tathāgata, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha are not within the two emptinesses." The explanation states: the earlier statement that they are absent refers to arbitrary imputations outside the principle; the later statement that they are not absent refers to the correct Dharma within the principle. If one interprets internal and external emptiness as mutual absence, it is extremely incongruous; if one interprets them as mutual dependence, the meaning is easily seen. Since internal and external are mutually dependent, one can separate internal and external to make two emptinesses; since there is neither internal nor external, having neither internal nor external unites them into a single emptiness. Conditioned emptiness is like internal and external emptiness. As for unconditioned emptiness, stating that the four dharmas such as the Buddha are neither conditioned nor unconditioned is the correct Dharma of the middle way. As for beginningless emptiness: one explanation says it destroys the non-Buddhist 'primordial obscurity', hence it is called beginningless; the second says when seeking its root deeply, there is no place from which it originally came—it is not only now beginning to be empty or beginning to be destroyed, which clarifies that there is no non-existence and no beginning. As for nature emptiness: one explanation says it is spoken of as nature emptiness to destroy \[inherent\] nature; the second says the original nature is entirely empty, like an impoverished person who is empty of everything. Traditionally it was said: from "the arising and ceasing of the eye" onward, paramārtha is clarified with respect to the emptiness of dharmas; from "what..." onward, paramārtha is clarified with respect to the emptiness of persons. Kāishàn said: how could one use the shallow, proximate two emptinesses of persons and dharmas to explain the great nirvāṇa? Furthermore, every sūtra without exception clarifies the emptiness of living beings first; why does it clarify the emptiness of dharmas first here? Master \[Jí\]zàng said: when the eye arises, it comes from nowhere, which is the meaning of non-arising; when it ceases, it goes nowhere, which is the meaning of non-ceasing. This is again the meaning of the two negations in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. If the eye were existent, it should not originally be non-existent and now existent, or having existed, return to non-existence. Investigating its real nature, there is neither eye nor master; investigating all dharmas should also be like this. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 17.22](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.17.22) - [Next: 17.24](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.17.24) - [Up: 17](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.17) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767~en-mt.17.23) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [大般涅槃經](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.mahayanasutra.mahaparinirvana-mahayana*zh-t375.15.56) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.17.23](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.17.23) · Pramāṇa