[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767) › 20.9 # 大般涅槃經疏 20.9 大般涅槃經疏 20.9 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [20.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.20.9) 三釋斷疑心者，為三：標、釋、結。標如文。前利益是內證斷疑。「是外論」去，離亦稱智斷。明生暗滅雖前後互明，同顯圓證功德故。舊云是聞思功能。若小乘聞思，何曾聞思佛性之義？若大乘聞思，未見佛性，今作離斷之義，於證義便。釋文為二：初略釋離、二廣釋離。略有三番：初離名義兩疑、次離八倒之疑、三離權實之疑。初名義可見。次疑八倒云疑佛涅槃是無常倒。次明常倒理須具八，而文略，將三單對一雙，是五種（云云）。涅槃四倒，總別之殊。三「疑有三」下，離權實上疑。疑三乘是疑權，了眾生佛性是實理，須具列佛性，今但互現。「復次」下，二是廣離，又三：一離眾多疑。以無常為首者、即離實法上疑。次「復次色是我」去，即是離假名上疑。三「四重五逆」下，是離依正兩報上疑。五逆四重就正報論重惡，有佛性無佛性就正報論極善。世界有邊無邊是依報。初如文。次假名中云生死之法有始有終者，有始有終是邪外所計，內亦有之。一云生死都無終始，十二因緣輪轉無際。二云無明一念即是其始，金剛後心即是其終。三云無始而有終，經云無始無明，即是無始；佛果，即是有終。若定作三執，即是爭論，真證之時即便得離。「聽是經」下，三結，如文。 > Third, explaining "severing the doubting mind" has three parts: the presentation, the explanation, and the conclusion. The presentation is as in the text. The earlier benefit was internal realization; severing doubts \[arising from\] "these external treatises" and so on, leaving them behind is also called severing by wisdom. Although the arising of light and the destruction of darkness are mutually clarified before and after, they equally reveal the virtues of perfect realization. The older masters said this was the function of hearing and contemplation. If it were Hinayana hearing and contemplation, when did they ever hear and contemplate the meaning of the buddhadhātu? If it were Mahāyāna hearing and contemplation, they have not yet seen the buddhadhātu; now, taking it as the meaning of departure and severing accords well with the meaning of realization. The explanatory text has two parts: first, briefly explaining departure; second, extensively explaining departure. The brief explanation has three turns: first, leaving behind the two doubts concerning name and meaning; next, leaving behind the doubts concerning the eight inversions; third, leaving behind the doubts concerning the provisional and the real. The first, on name and meaning, is evident. Next, doubting the eight inversions: it says doubting whether the Buddha's nirvāṇa is the inversion of impermanence. Next, explaining the inversion of permanence: in principle there should be eight, but the text is brief, setting three singles against one pair, which makes five kinds (and so on). The four inversions regarding nirvāṇa have the distinction between general and particular. Third, from "doubting that there are three" downwards, is leaving behind doubts regarding the provisional and the real. Doubting the three vehicles is doubting the provisional; comprehending that sentient beings have the buddhadhātu is the real principle. In principle the buddhadhātu should be fully enumerated, but here they are merely shown alternately. From "further" downwards, the second part is the extensive departure, which also has three parts: first, leaving behind numerous doubts. With impermanence at the head, this leaves behind doubts regarding real dharmas. Next, from "further, form is the self" onward, this leaves behind doubts regarding provisional designations. Third, from "the four grave offenses and the five unpardonable acts" downward, is leaving behind doubts regarding the two retributions of environment and sentient beings. The five unpardonable acts and four grave offenses are discussed as extreme evil in terms of sentient beings; having or lacking the buddhadhātu is discussed as ultimate good in terms of sentient beings. The world having bounds or being boundless pertains to the environment. The first is as in the text. Next, in the section on provisional designations, it says that the dharma of saṃsāra has a beginning and an end: having a beginning and an end is posited by heterodox outsiders, but it also exists within the Buddhist teaching. First, some say saṃsāra has no end or beginning at all, the twelve links of dependent origination revolving without limit. Second, some say a single thought of fundamental ignorance is its beginning, and the final mind of vajra is its end. Third, some say it is beginningless yet has an end: the sūtra speaks of beginningless ignorance, which is beginningless; and the fruit of buddhahood, which is having an end. If one firmly holds to these three attachments, it becomes dispute; at the time of true realization, one immediately leaves them behind. From "listening to this sūtra" downward, the third part is the conclusion, as in the text. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 20.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.20.8) - [Next: 20.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.20.10) - [Up: 20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.20) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767~en-mt.20.9) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.20.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.20.9) · Pramāṇa