[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767) › 24.11 # 大般涅槃經疏 24.11 大般涅槃經疏 24.11 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [24.11](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.24.11) 「爾時師子」下，第三答上第四問，為二：先申問、次正答。初申問，長有金剛力士語。正答為兩：初正答、後結歎。初正答中凡舉七譬，大為三意：初三譬，譬有而不見；中間一譬，譬平等皆有；第三三譬，譬待緣故見。三意次第而來。雖復云有而復不見，未知定有故不見？定無故不見？次一譬譬其定有。既其定有，何故不見？次答須待因緣然後乃見。初三譬，一一皆先譬、次合。初是盲人譬，譬底下凡夫如盲故不見。色譬佛性。數人解色，有二十種：青黃赤白、高下邪正方圓長短、光影明闇、烟雲塵霧。或加虛空為空一顯色，如眼膚翳。第二眼病譬，譬諸菩薩眼有少翳不得見色，譬諸菩薩有煩惱故不見佛性，不同前盲。合譬中先舉十地菩薩；後更舉四人，凡夫、二乘、十住、如來。如來全見，菩薩少見，兩全不見。「譬如初月」下，第三譬，亦譬眾生未斷惑者不見、斷惑者見。如初日月則不可見，漸漸可見。佛性亦爾，本有此理，眾生煩惱不能得見，惑稍稍盡稍稍得見。文云大悲十力等一切眾生悉有性者，舊云當有，即事未有，引下文云「破一闡提然後乃得」。地人解云：真神佛性如敝帛裏金，大慈大悲十力相好此事具有，為惑所覆；若除煩惱，即得見之，除敝帛已即得黃金。觀師云：此二解相害。若當有此經文云大悲十力四無所畏眾生有之。既言悉有，寧得言當？若言現有，如金為所覆者，夫佛性雄猛何不排惑？若執當現，便是爭論。只具此理，不可推當；修道乃得，不可言現。彼三解偏據，未會圓旨。何者？佛性非一二三，而為眾生作四門分別：或言第一義空，迦毘羅城空；或言不空者，即是智慧貧藏額珠；或言亦空亦有，如水酒瓶；或言非有非無，名為中道。欲使因四悟於不四，捨執四以求通。論人指當，此執則無。地人或覆，此執即有。觀師所說，此執亦有亦無門。今明佛性如王見象，眾師所覩全同盲觸（云云）。合最後譬中言三種破煩惱者，舊有二解。一云：二國煩惱，見思二，或是界內穢土煩惱；習氣是兩國中間淨土煩惱；無明是界外煩惱。七地菩薩斷二國中間煩惱，莊嚴所用。二解云：見諦為一煩惱，思惟為二煩惱，習氣是三煩惱。無明元品品數與習氣是同，故不別說。初地至三地斷見諦，四地至六地斷思惟，七八地者並斷習氣無明。此是開善解。又一師難此二解：文云三種破煩惱竟，不出破煩惱。意但出三種名，與經乖較。若論破意，應如《釋論》三觀治三種病，亦如《瓔珞本業》從假入空名二諦觀，從空入假名平等觀。二觀為方便，得入中道第一義諦觀，用是三觀能破煩惱。又世諦破性病，真諦破假病。此二諦但說伏為斷，若非真非有即是中道觀，雙除性假二病，名斷煩惱。今明是義不然，前二解乖經，觀師破其違經，今難其義僻。若三種破煩惱已見佛性，破見思穢土煩惱，及破中間淨土煩惱，為見性不見性？若見性者，二乘之人亦破見思，何故不見？若不見性，與經相違。開善云：破見為一、破思為二。須陀洹人乃至四果悉破見思，為見性不？若見性者，無有此義；若不見者，與經相違。又二諦觀、平等觀皆是方便，不入中道亦不見性，復與經違。世諦破性、真諦破假，是伏非斷，又不見性，此亦違經。唯非真俗斷煩惱者乃得見性。雖唱三種破煩惱名，二種破者則不見性，唯一種破得見。經稱三種破於煩惱皆見佛性，若一種破見、二破不見者，寧得相應？今明七地修方便、八地道觀雙流，破無明見佛性者，此以別接通，是一種破煩惱得見佛性。若入理般若名為住，破四住惑出生功德名十行，破塵沙惑未見佛性，十迴向伏無明，登地破無明見佛性。此是別教次第破惑，又是一種破煩惱見佛性。若圓觀法界，煩惱即菩提，初法心時便成正覺入銅輪位，登初住時破無明見佛性。三種破惑其義炳然，而皆見性，與經文會，諸德寧知？又一空一切空，三諦皆空，此觀破五住惑，能見佛性。又一假一切假，三諦皆假，此觀亦破五住惑，能見佛性。又一中一切中，三諦皆中，此觀亦破五住惑，能見佛性。如此三種，數之與義正與經合，諸德亦未能知，前三種破惑是就別意，後三種觀是約圓意。「善男子十二因緣」下，二有一譬，譬平等皆有，先譬、後合。前譬就外，今譬就內，即為四：一唱等有、二出因緣體、三明有具不具、四結等有。初明平等皆有，而言亦內亦外者，此唯在人，非謂外物。心則為內、色則為外，具有色心故云內外。又云：在胎為內、出胎為外。私謂：文中自云內外貪求及為內外事。然此文中非謂以十二緣而為觀境，但取十二以為佛性。例如十二緣支支別辨，為令眾生識於三世輪迴之相，豈可無明之時唯有無明？故知乃至老死常具十二。故下合云佛性亦爾，豈可在眾生時唯是眾生？況一切眾生一一無不念念具足十界百界依正因緣，故界界中無非佛性。故內外之言，意兼多義。「何等十二」下，二出因緣體具解十二支。過去具有因果，何以取二因而不取果？然過去之果自酬前因，是故不取。是則二因生今五果，取今三因生後二果。識支二解：一云初受胎七日為識，爾時有色，色未顯現、識義已顯，故受識名。二云但取託胎初念雖即有色，色乃未足。而名識者，識是報主，是故言識。亦至第二念即是色支。此解稍勝。入胎五分釋第四名色支，亦云五胞，二手二脚及頭。四根未具者，但有身意，未有眼耳鼻舌。言名色者，二解：一云色陰是色，四陰名名。二云：只此色與眾生之名，故言名色。次具足四根，即第五支，既具四根，六根都具，故言六入。從此已去有麁細相生，若細相生，即是胎內識心，未有想受；若麁相生，即是初出胎時，未能捉火觸毒，如一兩月小兒未別苦樂。下第六觸支，若細生相，是胎內想心未知苦樂；若麁相生，即一兩歲已能捉火觸毒而未有所知，手內有物未辨貴賤。染習一愛，第七受支，五果之後若細相生，即胎內受心。言一愛者，於一樂緣而生想著。若麁相生，即三四歲但知食愛，未知五欲。習近五欲，第八愛支，即三因之初。若細相生，即胎內行心之初。就行心為三：初名愛、中名取、後名有。若麁相生，即八九歲，稍知欲愛。內外貪求，第九支，即十餘歲稍復長大，轉能貪求，行中稍增。「為內外事」下，第十支起，即十餘歲，身成長大盡屬百年。「現在世識」下，第十一支，即未來二果之初，還同現在識支時節，即初託胎一念。「現在名色」下，第十二支，還同現在名色等時，即未來老死支。識名色六入等，並是未來二果，未來二果還是現在識名。色六入等，但轉名名之。三具不具中，約色界言無三受者，二解：一云於三受中不具苦受，故言無三。亦無苦受家想，故言無三種觸。亦無苦受家行，故言無三種愛。若色無色不具十二，云何文云亦得名為具足十二？然歌羅邏死及色無色界生，雖復不具十二，而苦輪未息。往還三界，終具十二。二解：據第四禪至無色界，無復苦樂，亦無中容之捨，故言無三受。無色既無色，不具十二。「以定得故」下，第四總結皆具十二。既未息苦輪，始終長望，故云皆具。佛性亦爾。第二合譬，六道四生皆有十二，譬諸眾生等有佛性。「雪山有草」下，第三三譬，明待緣方見。即為三。初文譬、合。合中二：先正合、次明理。明理又三：初唱九章門，門門有三句，合二十七句。第二解釋，釋中長出三事非章，所列合三十六句。後兩善男子，是第三總結（云云）。第二舉黑鐵譬、第三舉種子譬。前二譬皆先譬後合，後譬無合文。「是大涅槃」下，第二結歎，如文。 > From "At that time Siṃhanāda..." onward, the third part answers the fourth question above, which consists of two parts: first, stating the question; second, giving the direct answer. First, in stating the question, there is an extensive statement by the vajra-holding warrior. The direct answer consists of two parts: first, the direct answer; second, the concluding praise. Within the first, the direct answer, seven parables are raised in total, broadly conveying three intentions: the first three parables illustrate that \[the buddhadhātu\] exists yet is not seen; the middle single parable illustrates that it is equally possessed by all; the third set of three parables illustrates that it is seen by depending upon conditions. These three intentions follow in sequence. Although it is said to exist yet not be seen, is it unknown whether it is unseen because it definitely exists, or unseen because it definitely does not exist? The next single parable illustrates that it definitely exists. Since it definitely exists, why is it not seen? The next answers that one must await causes and conditions, and only then is it seen. In the first three parables, each first gives the parable and then the application. The first is the parable of the blind person, which illustrates that ordinary beings at the bottom are like the blind and thus do not see. Form illustrates the buddhadhātu. The Abhidharma masters explain form as having twenty kinds: blue, yellow, red, white; high, low, crooked, straight, square, round, long, short; light, shade, bright, dark; smoke, cloud, dust, fog. Some add empty space as the single revealing form of space, like a film over the eye. The second is the parable of eye disease, which illustrates that the bodhisattvas have a slight film over their eyes and cannot see form; this illustrates that the bodhisattvas, having afflictions, do not see the buddhadhātu, differing from the previously mentioned blind person. In the application of the parable, the bodhisattvas of the ten stages are first cited; afterwards, four kinds of persons are further cited: ordinary beings, the two vehicles, the ten abodes, and the Tathāgata. The Tathāgata sees completely, the bodhisattvas see partially, and two do not see at all. From "Just as the new moon..." onward, the third parable also illustrates that sentient beings who have not severed delusion do not see, while those who have severed delusion do see. Just as the moon on the first day cannot be seen, but gradually becomes visible, the buddhadhātu is also like this: this principle is fundamentally present, but the afflictions of sentient beings prevent them from seeing it; as delusion is gradually exhausted, it gradually comes to be seen. The text states that all sentient beings possess the nature of great compassion, the ten powers, and so forth. Ancient masters said that it is possessed in the future, not yet present in actuality, citing the passage below: "Only after destroying \[the nature of\] an icchantika is it obtained." Masters of the Daśabhūmika School explain: the buddhadhātu of the true spirit is like gold wrapped in dirty cloth; great friendliness, great compassion, the ten powers, and the marks and signs are completely present in reality, but obscured by delusions; if one removes the afflictions, one will see it, just as removing the dirty cloth reveals the gold. Master Guan says: these two interpretations undermine each other. If it is only possessed in the future, this sūtra text says that sentient beings possess great compassion, the ten powers, and the four fearlessnesses. Since it says all possess them, how could one say it is in the future? If one says it exists presently, like gold covered by cloth, then since the buddhadhātu is valiant, why does it not dispel delusion? Clinging either to future or present is merely contentious debate. It simply possesses this principle, so it cannot be relegated to the future; it is obtained only through cultivating the path, so it cannot be called presently actual. Those three interpretations rely on one-sided stances and do not accord with the perfect purport. Why? The buddhadhātu is not one, two, or three, yet for sentient beings it is distinguished through four gates: sometimes it is said to be paramārtha-śūnyatā, like the emptiness of Kapilavastu; sometimes it is said to be not empty, which is wisdom, like the poor storehouse and the forehead jewel; sometimes it is said to be both empty and existing, like a jar of water or wine; sometimes it is said to be neither existing nor empty, termed the middle way. The intention is to make one awaken to the non-four through the four, and abandon grasping the four in seeking comprehension. The treatise masters point to the future, so this grasping is \[the gate of\] non-existence. The Daśabhūmika masters speak of being obscured by delusion, so this grasping is \[the gate of\] existence. What Master Guan stated is the gate of grasping both existence and non-existence. Now we explain that the buddhadhātu is like the king seeing the elephant, while what the various masters saw is entirely identical to the blind touching it (and so forth). In applying the last parable, regarding the "three kinds of destroying afflictions," ancient masters held two interpretations. The first says: the afflictions of the two realms, view and thought, are afflictions of the defiled land within the triple world; habit-energy is the affliction of the pure land between the two realms; ignorance is the affliction beyond the triple world. Bodhisattvas of the seventh stage sever the afflictions between the two realms, which are utilized for adornment. The second interpretation says: \[afflictions severed by\] seeing the truth are the first affliction, \[afflictions severed by\] cultivation are the second affliction, and habit-energy is the third affliction. The original fundamental aspects of ignorance are identical in number with habit-energy, so they are not mentioned separately. From the first to the third stage, one severs view; from the fourth to the sixth stage, one severs thought; those of the seventh and eighth stages sever both habit-energy and ignorance. This is Kāishàn's interpretation. Another master challenged these two interpretations: The text completes the statement of the three kinds of destroying afflictions, but does not identify how afflictions are destroyed. It only gives three names, which contradicts the sūtra. If one discusses the intention of destruction, it should be as in the Dàzhìdù Lùn where the three contemplations remedy the three kinds of illnesses, and also like the Benye Jing where entering emptiness from provisionality is called the contemplation of the two truths, and entering provisionality from emptiness is called the contemplation of equality. Taking the two contemplations as expedients, one is able to enter the contemplation of the paramārthasatya of the middle way; using these three contemplations one can destroy afflictions. Furthermore, the conventional truth destroys the illness of inherent nature, and the ultimate truth destroys the illness of provisionality. These two truths only speak of subduing as severing; if one is neither ultimate nor existing, this is the contemplation of the middle way, which simultaneously removes both illnesses of nature and provisionality, and is termed severing afflictions. Now we explain that this meaning is not so. The previous two interpretations contradict the sūtra; Master Guan refuted their contradiction of the sūtra, but we now challenge his interpretation as biased. If after the three kinds of destroying afflictions one sees the buddhadhātu, when one destroys the defiled land afflictions of view and thought, and destroys the intermediate pure land afflictions, does one see the nature or not? If one sees the nature, people of the two vehicles also destroy view and thought, so why do they not see it? If they do not see the nature, that contradicts the sūtra. Kāishàn says: destroying views is the first, destroying thoughts is the second. Srotāpannas up to the four fruits all destroy view and thought; do they see the nature or not? If they see the nature, this is impossible; if they do not see it, that contradicts the sūtra. Furthermore, the contemplation of the two truths and the contemplation of equality are both expedients; if one does not enter the middle way, one also does not see the nature, which again contradicts the sūtra. The conventional truth destroying inherent nature and the ultimate truth destroying provisionality are subduing and not severing, and again one does not see the nature, which also contradicts the sūtra. Only those who sever afflictions through neither conventional nor ultimate see the nature. Although three kinds of destroying afflictions are named, two kinds of destruction do not see the nature, and only one kind of destruction sees it. The sūtra declares that all three kinds of destroying afflictions see the buddhadhātu; if one kind of destruction sees it and two kinds of destruction do not see it, how can they correspond? Now we clarify: when the seventh stage cultivates expedients and the eighth stage has path and contemplation flowing concurrently, destroying ignorance and seeing the buddhadhātu, this is the distinct \[teaching\] connecting the shared \[teaching\], which is one kind of destroying afflictions and seeing the buddhadhātu. If entering the prajñā of principle is called the abodes, destroying the afflictions of the four abodes to produce merit is called the ten practices, destroying dust-and-sand delusions does not yet see the buddhadhātu, the ten dedications subdue ignorance, and ascending to the stages destroys ignorance and sees the buddhadhātu. This is the gradual destruction of delusions in the distinct teaching, which is another kind of destroying afflictions and seeing the buddhadhātu. If one perfectly contemplates the dharmadhātu, afflictions are precisely bodhi; at the initial aspiration of mind, one immediately achieves right awakening and enters the rank of the bronze wheel, and when ascending the first abode, one destroys ignorance and sees the buddhadhātu. The meaning of these three kinds of destroying delusions is luminous, and all see the nature, which accords with the sūtra text; how could the various virtuous masters know this? Furthermore, when one emptiness is all emptiness, the three truths are all empty; this contemplation destroys the afflictions of the five abodes and can see the buddhadhātu. Furthermore, when one provisionality is all provisionality, the three truths are all provisional; this contemplation also destroys the afflictions of the five abodes and can see the buddhadhātu. Furthermore, when one middle is all middle, the three truths are all middle; this contemplation also destroys the afflictions of the five abodes and can see the buddhadhātu. These three kinds, both in number and meaning, precisely accord with the sūtra, which the various virtuous masters were also unable to know: the previous three kinds of destroying delusion are based on the distinct purport, while the latter three kinds of contemplation are based on the perfect purport. From "Good sons, the twelve links of dependent origination..." onward, the second part contains one parable, which illustrates that it is equally possessed by all; first the parable, then the application. The previous parable was in terms of the external, while the present parable is in terms of the internal, containing four sections: first, stating equal possession; second, identifying the essence of dependent origination; third, explaining possessed completely or not completely; fourth, concluding equal possession. First, in explaining equal possession, speaking of "both internal and external" refers only to humans, not to external objects. Mind is internal, while form is external; because both form and mind are possessed, it says internal and external. It is also said: being in the womb is internal, and exiting the womb is external. Personally, I note: the text itself speaks of internal and external covetous seeking and performing internal and external affairs. However, in this text, it is not meant that the twelve links serve as the meditative object of contemplation, but simply that the twelve are taken as the buddhadhātu. For example, the twelve links are distinguished branch by branch to enable sentient beings to recognize the aspects of transmigration across the three periods of time; how could it be that at the time of ignorance there is only ignorance? Therefore, one knows that up through old age and death, the twelve are always complete. Hence the application below states that the buddhadhātu is also like this; how could it be that when one is a sentient being, there is only a sentient being? How much more so is it that each and every sentient being in every thought completely possesses the causes and conditions of the environment and sentient beings of the ten realms and hundred realms; therefore, within each realm there is nothing that is not the buddhadhātu. Thus the words "internal and external" contain many meanings. From "What are the twelve..." onward, the second section identifies the essence of dependent origination, explaining the twelve branches in detail. Past \[existence\] completely possesses cause and effect; why are the two causes taken and not the effect? The past effect has already recompensed previous causes, therefore it is not taken. Thus the two causes produce the present five effects, and the present three causes are taken to produce the future two effects. There are two interpretations of the consciousness branch: first, the first seven days of conception in the womb are consciousness; at that time form exists, but form is not yet manifest while the function of consciousness is already manifest, hence it receives the name consciousness. Second, simply taking the first thought of entering the womb: although form is present, form is not yet complete. Yet it is named consciousness because consciousness is the master of retribution, and therefore it is called consciousness. Also, reaching the second thought is the name-and-form branch. This interpretation is slightly superior. Entering the five parts of the womb explains the fourth branch, name-and-form, also called the five vesicles: the two hands, two feet, and the head. "The four faculties not yet complete" means there are only body and mind, but not yet eye, ear, nose, or tongue. Regarding "name-and-form," there are two interpretations: first, the form aggregate is form, and the other four aggregates are named name. Second, simply this form along with the name of the sentient being, therefore it is called name-and-form. Next, being complete with the four faculties is the fifth branch; since it is complete with the four faculties, the six faculties are all complete, hence it is called the six sense bases. From this point onward, coarse and subtle aspects arise. If subtle aspects arise, it is the conscious mind within the womb, not yet having perception or feeling; if coarse aspects arise, it is when first emerging from the womb, not yet able to grasp fire or touch poison, like an infant of one or two months not distinguishing pain and pleasure. Below, the sixth branch, contact: if subtle arising aspects, it is the perceiving mind within the womb not knowing pain and pleasure; if coarse arising aspects, it is at one or two years of age, already able to grasp fire or touch poison but not yet having understanding, holding an object in hand without distinguishing precious from cheap. Habitually practicing a single craving is the seventh branch, feeling; after the five effects, if subtle aspects arise, it is the feeling mind within the womb. Speaking of "a single craving" means generating thought and attachment toward a single pleasurable condition. If coarse aspects arise, it is at three or four years of age, only knowing craving for food, not yet knowing the five desires. Habitually approaching the five desires is the eighth branch, craving, which is the beginning of the three causes. If subtle aspects arise, it is the beginning of the volitional mind within the womb. Regarding the volitional mind, there are three: the first is craving, the middle is grasping, and the last is becoming. If coarse aspects arise, it is at eight or nine years of age, gradually knowing sensual craving. Covetous seeking internally and externally is the ninth branch: at ten-odd years old, having grown a bit larger, one is increasingly able to covetously seek, and volition slightly increases. From "performing internal and external affairs" onward, the tenth branch arises: at ten-odd years old, the body grows up, spanning a full hundred years. From "consciousness in the present world" onward, the eleventh branch is the beginning of the future two effects, corresponding back to the period of the present consciousness branch, namely the single thought of first conception. From "name-and-form in the present" onward, the twelfth branch corresponds back to the time of present name-and-form and so on, namely the future branch of old age and death. Consciousness, name-and-form, six sense bases, and so on are all the future two effects; the future two effects are still the present consciousness, name-and-form, and six sense bases, but their names are changed to designate them. Regarding whether complete or incomplete, concerning the form realm lacking the three feelings, there are two interpretations: first, among the three feelings it does not have painful feeling, hence it is said to lack three. It also lacks the perception associated with painful feeling, hence it is said to lack three kinds of contact. It also lacks the volition associated with painful feeling, hence it is said to lack three kinds of craving. If the form and formless realms do not completely possess the twelve, why does the text say they can also be said to completely possess the twelve? Dying as a kalala and being born in the form or formless realms, although they do not completely possess the twelve, the wheel of suffering has not ceased. Transmigrating through the three realms, they ultimately complete the twelve. Second interpretation: based on the fourth dhyāna up to the formless realm, there is no longer suffering or pleasure, nor is there neutral equanimity, hence it is said to lack three feelings. Since the formless realm lacks form, it does not completely possess the twelve. From "Because it is definitely obtained..." onward, the fourth concludes that all completely possess the twelve. Since the wheel of suffering has not ceased, viewing it broadly from beginning to end, it is said that all completely possess them. The buddhadhātu is also like this. Second, the application of the parable: the six destinies and four modes of birth all possess the twelve links, which illustrates that all sentient beings equally possess the buddhadhātu. From "The snowy mountains have an herb..." onward, the third set of three parables explains that it is seen only upon waiting for conditions. This consists of three parts. In the first text, there are the parable and the application. Within the application, there are two parts: first, the direct application; second, explaining the principle. Explaining the principle also has three parts: first, stating nine chapter-headings, each heading having three phrases, totaling twenty-seven phrases. Second, the explanation: in the explanation, three matters are extensively introduced that are not in the headings, totaling thirty-six phrases listed. The final two instances of "good sons" form the third part, the general conclusion (and so on). The second raises the parable of black iron; the third raises the parable of the seed. The first two parables each have the parable first and then the application, while the latter parable has no text for application. From "This great nirvāṇa..." onward, the second part provides the concluding praise, as in the text. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 24.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.24.10) - [Next: 24.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.24.12) - [Up: 24](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.24) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767~en-mt.24.11) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.24.11](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.24.11) · Pramāṇa