[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767) › 25.13 # 大般涅槃經疏 25.13 大般涅槃經疏 25.13 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [25.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25.13) 「師子吼」下，第四據正因執有，凡四問答。初番又四：一法、二譬、三合、四結。初法中言正因佛性者，即中道正性。「尼拘陀」下，舉譬，又四：一正舉譬；二旁舉瞿曇姓；三合譬；四「猶如」下，以譬帖姓為難。難意：若尼拘陀子無樹性者，云何得名尼拘陀子？應名佉陀羅子。乳無酪性亦不名乳，應別生餘事。「佛性亦復」下合。佛答為二：初舉八事不可見。尼拘陀子若有樹性，何故不見？次「若言細障」下，更破二事，又二：先總非、次「何以故」下正破。破中又二：先破細、次破障。初破細者，夫樹相甚麁，何得不見？若本細，者後不應大；後若大者，初亦應大。次破障者，若尼拘陀子障尼拘陀樹不可見者，障常應障，常不可見。第二番問答。問中還舉兩因，了因了無，正云何無耶？良以了細成大，所以可見。佛答有五重：一明本有本無皆不須了。「若尼拘陀」下，二舉非果為難，難於本無。尼拘陀子本無尼拘陀樹麁相者，亦無佉陀羅之麁相，何故不生佉陀羅樹？「若細」下，三難麁應可見。四舉燒相為並若樹。樹本有性後生樹者，亦應本有燒相，後時可燒。子性被燒，不應生樹。五更取意破其先生後滅。文舉一切法生滅一時，且就尼拘陀子生滅一時者，云何先生而後方滅？既生滅一時，遂得先生後滅，亦應先滅後生。第三番問答，舉非因為問。等是無性，何不出油？次佛云：亦得出油。壓子汁出，汁即是油。第四更問。亦應得稱為胡麻油。佛答：隨緣各異，受名不同。不得名麻油，得名尼拘陀油。眾生佛性亦爾，眾生中有佛性，草木中無佛性而有草木等性。 > From "Siṃhanāda" onward is fourth, clinging to existence based on the primary cause; in all there are four exchanges of questions and answers. The first exchange also has four parts: first, the doctrine; second, the simile; third, the correspondence; fourth, the conclusion. In the initial doctrine, the phrase "primary-cause buddhadhātu" refers to the middle way's primary nature. From "Nyagrodha" onward, adducing the simile, also has four parts: first, directly adducing the simile; second, incidentally adducing the Gautama clan; third, corresponding to the simile; fourth, from "Just as" onward, matching the simile to the clan name to raise an objection. The intent of the objection: if a nyagrodha seed lacked the tree's nature, why would it be named a nyagrodha seed? It should be called a khadira seed. If milk lacked the nature of curds, it also would not be called milk, and should produce something else entirely. From "The buddhadhātu is likewise" onward is the correspondence. The Buddha's answer has two parts: first, citing eight things that cannot be seen: if the nyagrodha seed has the tree's nature, why is it not seen? Next, from "If you say subtleness and obstruction" onward, further refutes two things, again with two parts: first, a general denial; next, from "Why is this?" onward, the direct refutation. Within the refutation are also two parts: first, refuting subtleness; next, refuting obstruction. In the first refutation of subtleness: indeed, the marks of a tree are extremely coarse, so how could they not be seen? If it were fundamentally subtle, it should not later become large; if it is large later, it should also have been large at the beginning. Next, in refuting obstruction: if the nyagrodha seed obstructs the nyagrodha tree so that it cannot be seen, the obstruction should always obstruct, and it should always be impossible to see. The second exchange of question and answer: in the question he again cites the two causes: the revealing cause reveals what is absent, so how can the primary \[cause\] be absent? Truly, because it reveals the subtle into the large, it can be seen. The Buddha's answer has five levels: first, explaining that neither fundamental existence nor fundamental non-existence requires a revealer. From "If the nyagrodha" onward is second, raising a non-fruit as an objection, objecting to fundamental non-existence: if the nyagrodha seed fundamentally lacked the coarse marks of a nyagrodha tree, it would also lack the coarse marks of a khadira, so why does it not produce a khadira tree? From "If subtle" onward is third, objecting that coarseness should be visible. Fourth, citing the mark of burning as a parallel: if the tree fundamentally possessed its nature and later produced the tree, it should also fundamentally possess the mark of burning and later be burned. Since the nature of the seed is burned, it should not produce a tree. Fifth, further taking the intent to refute its arising first and perishing later: the text cites the simultaneous arising and perishing of all phenomena; as for the simultaneous arising and perishing of the nyagrodha seed, how could it arise first and only perish later? Since arising and perishing are simultaneous, if it could arise first and perish later, it should also be able to perish first and arise later. The third exchange of question and answer raises a non-cause as a question: if they equally lack the nature, why does it not yield oil? Next, the Buddha says: it can also yield oil. When the seed is pressed, juice comes out, and the juice is simply oil. The fourth further asks: it should also be able to be called sesame oil. The Buddha answers: it varies according to conditions, and receives different names. It cannot be named sesame oil, but can be named nyagrodha oil. The buddhadhātu of sentient beings is also like this: in sentient beings there is buddhadhātu, while in grasses and trees there is no buddhadhātu, but there are natures of grasses, trees, and the like. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 25.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25.12) - [Next: 25.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25.14) - [Up: 25](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767~en-mt.25.13) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25.13) · Pramāṇa