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# 大般涅槃經疏 25.14

大般涅槃經疏 25.14

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [25.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25.14)

「師子吼言」下，第二破因中無果執。既非外義，唯一番問。答問為三：一領旨、二正難、三結歎。領旨仰非者，領無果之旨，不復致疑。因中既其不得有果，眾生之中亦無佛性。此義可信，眾生即執定無為實。既其定無，不復得言一切有性，故云是義不然。不然者，豈非執無。「何以故」下，第二正難，又二：先難、次答。初文凡作七番：一據業行、二據斷善、三據發心、四據退轉不退轉、五據修萬行六度、六據退萬行、七據僧寶。初就行業為難者，人天無性，但有業緣，五戒得人、十善得天，天得作人、人得作天。菩薩亦爾，但以業緣而得成佛，非謂佛性。次就斷善作難者，若眾生有性善，不可斷墮於地獄，以佛性力應止地獄。夫佛性是常，常何可斷？既斷於善，即知無常，若無常者則無佛性。三據初發心難者，若本有性，應本發心；心既始發，知本無性。又佛性無發，發則非性。四據退不退為難者，若本有性，不應毘跋致，只應阿毘跋致，唯應不退，不應有退。既其有退，知無佛性。五據萬行難者，若本有性，何須萬行？修萬行者，知無佛性。六據退萬行為難者，佛性是常，何得有退？既見三惡而有退者，知無佛性。七據三寶為難者，如佛所說三寶是常，僧既是常只應常住，何得進修令後成佛？進修則無常，無常故無性，何故云一切眾生悉有？次「佛言」下，正答七難，但不次第。第一答第一業行問，第二答第三發心問，第三答第六退轉萬行問，第四答第二斷善問，第五答第五萬行問，第六答第七僧寶問，第七答第四退不退問。此答第一問，止有八字具答。問意舉人天由業不關佛性，亦應由業致佛不關佛性。佛答：人天不須佛性，只由於業致有往反，不關佛性。佛性常故作佛亦常，知有佛性。「汝言」下，第二，超答第三發心，先牒問、次正答。「汝言何故有退」下，第三，超答第六退轉萬行，明實無退，只是遲得謂之為退。而不答萬行，為下答可酬之。「此菩提心實非佛性」下，第四，追答第二斷善問，明菩提心非佛性。闡提不發菩提心，而佛性不斷。「善男子汝言」下，第五，答第五萬行之問，為二：一正答、二更取意難前無此言。一解云：前應有此問，翻者脫落。二解云：本無此問，直是取意。「善男子汝言僧寶」下，第六，答第七問，有四復次：初有二種和合、次十二部經和合、三十二因緣和合、四諸佛和合，皆明僧常乃是一體之僧，非今事僧。「善男子汝言眾生若有佛性」下，第七，追答第四退不退問，文為二：先牒問誡聽、次正答其難云若有佛性豈合跋致阿跋致異。答文為四：一明退轉行、二明不退願、三雙明退不退兩人、四重明不退行。佛答意者，不關佛性有退不退，只由志願彊弱不同，致退不退。雖退非失，遲得名退。初論退行，又為四：一明十三法、二明六法、三明五法、四明二法。初十三法，如文。次六法中有營世務者，出家學道經營俗法，巨有所妨。言俗法者，真修之外皆名為俗。春秋中臧文仲有三不仁，使妾編蒲席賣，為外邦所彈，曰：「汝國之大夫失德，與百姓爭利。」俗人尚誡貪，況驅馳耕販，必應休道。設使彈訶，何足以言。又句句應論觀慧，文煩不書，得意自在。夫觀解者，非但執來運斤名為俗務，坐馳五塵六欲即是世務。又專念空無相願亦是世務，又念蒼生塗炭慈悲慰拔亦是世務。若能無念念於無念，非念非無念，一心中覺，方非世務。私謂：如大師釋經，句句之中依文消竟，即句句觀解；於文非要，但為法行者隨語起觀，故處處明。二「云何」下，第二明不退之願。願作心師，有二解。一云：只是前後兩心，前心起惡後心隨流者，此非心師；前心起惡後心能止，是則心師。二解：以假人制心，不隨心作。所作假人，人是心師。今明太近，上文云諸佛所師所謂法也。心緣於法，法為心師，深淺自在。「善男子不可以」下，第三雙明退不退兩人，正酬其問，有譬、有合，如文。

> From "Siṃhanāda said" onward, the second \[part\] refutes the attachment to there being no effect within the cause. Since this is not an external doctrine, there is only a single round of question and answer. The question has three parts: first, grasping the purport; second, the main objection; and third, the concluding praise. Grasping the purport and reverently accepting it: \[Siṃhanāda\] grasps the purport that there is no effect, no longer raising doubts. Since there cannot be an effect within the cause, there is also no buddhadhātu among sentient beings. This doctrine being credible, sentient beings then attach to definite non-existence as the real. Since it is definitely non-existent, one can no longer say that all possess the nature; therefore it says, "this doctrine is not so." That it is "not so"—is this not attaching to non-existence? From "Why is that?" onward, the second part is the main objection, which again has two parts: first the objections, then the answers. The first text makes seven points altogether: (1) based on karmic practice, (2) based on cutting off goodness, (3) based on the arising of the mind \[aspiring to awakening\], (4) based on retrogressing and not retrogressing, (5) based on cultivating the myriad practices and six pāramitās, (6) based on retrogressing from the myriad practices, and (7) based on the jewel of the Saṅgha. First, the objection regarding karmic practice: humans and devas have no \[permanent\] nature, but only karmic conditions; by the five precepts one attains human \[birth\], and by the ten virtues one attains deva \[birth\]; a deva can become a human, and a human can become a deva. Bodhisattvas are also like this: they achieve buddhahood solely through karmic conditions, not on account of a buddhadhātu. Second, the objection regarding cutting off goodness: if sentient beings possessed a nature \[of goodness\], the good could not be cut off and they would not fall into the hells; through the power of buddhadhātu, they should be prevented from \[falling into\] the hells. Buddhadhātu is permanent; how could the permanent be cut off? Since goodness is cut off, one knows it is impermanent; if it is impermanent, there is no buddhadhātu. Third, the objection based on the first arising of the mind: if there were originally a nature, the mind should have arisen originally; since the mind only newly arises, one knows there was originally no nature. Moreover, buddhadhātu involves no arising; what arises is not the nature. Fourth, the objection based on retrogressing and not retrogressing: if there were originally a nature, there should be no vivartika (retrogression), but only avivartika (non-retrogression); there should only be non-retrogression, not retrogression. Since there is retrogression, one knows there is no buddhadhātu. Fifth, the objection based on the myriad practices: if there were originally a nature, what need would there be for the myriad practices? Cultivating the myriad practices shows that there is no buddhadhātu. Sixth, the objection based on retrogressing from the myriad practices: buddhadhātu is permanent; how could there be retrogression? Since seeing the three evil destinies leads to retrogression, one knows there is no buddhadhātu. Seventh, the objection based on the three jewels: as the Buddha stated that the three jewels are permanent, since the Saṅgha is permanent, it should only ever remain abiding; how could there be progressive cultivation to attain buddhahood later? Progressive cultivation means impermanence; being impermanent, it lacks the nature; why then say that all sentient beings possess it? Next, from "The Buddha said" onward, he directly answers the seven objections, though not in sequence: the first answers the first question on karmic practice; the second answers the third question on the arising of the mind; the third answers the sixth question on retrogression from the myriad practices; the fourth answers the second question on cutting off goodness; the fifth answers the fifth question on the myriad practices; the sixth answers the seventh question on the jewel of the Saṅgha; and the seventh answers the fourth question on retrogressing and not retrogressing. Here, answering the first question, there are only eight characters that completely answer it. The purport of the question was that since humans and devas depend on karma and are unrelated to buddhadhātu, achieving buddhahood should likewise depend on karma and be unrelated to buddhadhātu. The Buddha answers: humans and devas do not require buddhadhātu; it is merely due to karma that they cycle back and forth, which has nothing to do with buddhadhātu. Because buddhadhātu is permanent, becoming a buddha is also permanent; thus one knows buddhadhātu exists. From "You say" onward, the second answers out of order the third question on the arising of the mind, first reiterating the question, then giving the direct answer. From "You say, why is there retrogression?" onward, the third answers out of order the sixth question on retrogression from the myriad practices, explaining that in reality there is no retrogression; it is simply taking longer to attain that is called retrogression. It does not answer regarding the myriad practices because the answer below will address it. From "This bodhicitta is truly not the buddhadhātu" onward, the fourth belatedly answers the second question on cutting off goodness, explaining that bodhicitta is not the buddhadhātu. Icchantikas do not give rise to bodhicitta, yet their buddhadhātu is not cut off. From "Good son, as you say" onward, the fifth answers the fifth question on the myriad practices, comprising two parts: first, directly answering; second, further drawing out the meaning to challenge \[the fact that\] earlier there were no such words. One explanation says: earlier there should have been this question, but the translator omitted it. A second explanation says: originally there was no such question; it simply extracts the meaning. From "Good son, you say that the jewel of the Saṅgha" onward, the sixth answers the seventh question with four iterations: first, there are two kinds of harmony; second, harmony of the twelve divisions of scriptures; third, harmony of the twelve links of dependent origination; fourth, harmony of all buddhas. All explain that the permanence of the Saṅgha refers to the unified Saṅgha \[of the ultimate\], not the present conventional Saṅgha of phenomena. From "Good son, you say that if sentient beings have buddhadhātu" onward, the seventh belatedly answers the fourth question on retrogressing and not retrogressing. The text has two parts: first, reiterating the question to admonish them to listen; second, directly answering his objection that if they have buddhadhātu, how could there be a difference between vartika and avartika? The text of the answer has four parts: (1) explaining the practice of retrogression, (2) explaining the vow of non-retrogression, (3) explaining both persons—the retrogressing and the non-retrogressing, and (4) explaining again the practice of non-retrogression. The Buddha's intended answer is: whether there is retrogression or non-retrogression does not concern the buddhadhātu; it is solely due to the differing strength or weakness of aspiration that there comes to be retrogression or non-retrogression. Although there is retrogression, it is not a loss; taking longer to attain is called retrogression. First, in treating the practice of retrogression, there are again four parts: (1) explaining the thirteen dharmas, (2) explaining the six dharmas, (3) explaining the five dharmas, and (4) explaining the two dharmas. The first, the thirteen dharmas, is as in the text. Next, among the six dharmas, there is "engaging in worldly affairs": for one who has left home to train in the Path to engage in mundane matters is a huge impediment. As for "mundane matters", everything outside true cultivation is termed mundane. In the Spring and Autumn \[period\], Zang Wenzhong had three acts of unbenevolence; making his concubines weave and sell rush mats, he was rebuked by a neighboring state, which said: "A grand master of your state has lost his virtue, contending for profit with the common people." If mundane people still warn against greed, how much more should those who run about tilling and trading desist from the Path? Even if rebuked and censured, how could it be fully expressed? Furthermore, every single phrase should be treated in terms of contemplative wisdom; as the text would be cumbersome, it is not written down, allowing one the freedom to grasp the meaning. Now, contemplative understanding means that not only is wielding a spade or an axe called worldly affairs, but letting the mind gallop through the five dusts and six desires while seated is itself worldly affairs. Moreover, focusing exclusively on emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness is also worldly affairs; contemplating the distress of the multitude and using compassion to console and deliver them is also worldly affairs. Only when one can, without thought, be mindful of non-thought, neither thought nor non-thought, awakening within the one mind, is it truly not worldly affairs. Personally, I would say: when the Great Master interpreted the sūtras, having finished unpacking each phrase according to the text, he immediately provided a contemplative understanding for each phrase; though not essential to the \[literal\] text, it was simply so that practitioners of the Dharma might generate contemplation following the words, and thus he explained it everywhere. Second, from "How so?" onward, the second explains the vow of non-retrogression. For "vowing to be a teacher of the mind", there are two explanations. One says: it is simply the two thoughts, earlier and later; if the earlier thought gives rise to evil and the later thought drifts along with the current, this is not a teacher of the mind; if the earlier thought gives rise to evil and the later thought is able to halt it, this is a teacher of the mind. The second explanation: using a provisional person to restrain the mind, not acting in accordance with the mind. In the provisional person thus constructed, the person is the teacher of the mind. What is explained now is too superficial; the text above says that what all buddhas take as their teacher is the so-called Dharma. When the mind focuses on the Dharma, the Dharma is the teacher of the mind, deep or shallow at will. From "Good son, one cannot" onward, the third explains both persons, the retrogressing and the non-retrogressing, directly replying to his question, with similes and application, as in the text.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767~en-mt.25.14) — English, machine translation

## Linked texts (1)

- [大般涅槃經集解](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1763.56.99) — Classical Chinese

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25.14) · Pramāṇa
