[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767) › 25.7 # 大般涅槃經疏 25.7 大般涅槃經疏 25.7 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [25.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25.7) 第三番問答，問中又三：先領旨、次作難、三結。初如文。次難中，初難戒是眾行之本，有果而無因，應是真是常。涅槃居在諸行之末，有因而無果，應是無常。後偏結一邊，可見（云云）。佛答，先歎、次答。歎中為三：一歎因深、二歎持力、三誡聽。初如文。次文中善得時長釋迦日短者，以緣宜故也，例如日月燈明六十小劫，此間食頃（云云）。二佛答。初答持戒無因之問，有法、譬、合。法中為二：一唱有因、二遮無盡。初有因者，以聽法善友等為作戒因。從「信心因於聽法」下，二遮恐無窮之難，故指二法互為因果。次「譬如」下，凡舉三譬：初為遮無窮作譬。諸師多言：尼乾淨行不以瓶著地，三木為拒以支一瓶，瓶由拒立、拒藉瓶成。二梁武云：尼乾口啖牛糞、身裸穢根，有何淨行而可稱耶？拒者，今之渴烏取水者是，亦名轆轤，井上施之更互上下，即是互為因果之義。而言尼乾者，指其家有此拒。次舉十二因緣譬，若克定三世譬此不便，取輪迴不窮，更互義成。三舉小乘中八相為譬，大生直名為生、小生言生生。成論人破毘曇大小生義，解此文云：一期之壽是大生，念念生滅是小生，由一期有念念、由念念有一期。解文不了，而復不許用毘曇義。此不應然，破立適時，借譬何爽。私謂：古人以一期與念念更互相生，何以不得？然不及剎那，八相只一剎那是生是生生。故一剎那中，大相是因、小相是因因，小相是果、大相是果果，是則更互為因、更互為果。如一信心，即此信心是聽法心，即聽法心是於信心，雖同一念而更互相因，既互相因即互成果。「信心聽法」下，合譬，答前初難，明戒有因。從「是果非因」下，答後難，明涅槃是果而無因答。後又三：初唱兩章門，一是果、二非因。次「何故名果」下，釋是果章門。是出世果，故言上果。是習果故，故是沙門。婆羅門果是佛果故，故言斷生死。是絕待果故，故言無煩惱。煩惱名過過者，體是死因，一過復得苦果，故言過過。又無明能迷理，復能障智，故是過過。從「涅槃無因」下，二釋非因章門。無生滅者，無世間因。無所作者，無報因。非有為者，無生因。常不變等三句，是無相待因。三「善男子」下，結無因義。 > The third exchange of questions and answers. Within the question, there are also three parts: first, acknowledging the import; second, raising a challenge; third, concluding. The first is as in the text. Next, in raising the challenge, it first challenges: Śīla is the foundation of all practices; it has an effect but no cause, so it should be real and permanent. Nirvāṇa lies at the end of all practices; it has a cause but no effect, so it should be impermanent. Finally, it uniquely concludes on one side, which is visible (and so on). The Buddha's answer: first, praising; second, answering. Within the praise, there are three parts: first, praising the depth of the cause; second, praising the power of upholding \[śīla\]; third, admonishing \[him\] to listen. The first is as in the text. In the next text, the reason that Śāntalabdha's time was long while Śākyamuni's days were short is due to what was appropriate to conditions; for example, the sixty small kalpas of Candrasūryapradīpa were like the span of a meal here (and so on). Second, the Buddha answers. First, answering the question that upholding śīla has no cause: there are the doctrine, the analogies, and the application. In the doctrine, there are two parts: first, declaring that it has a cause; second, preventing \[the fallacy of\] infinite regress. First, 'having a cause' means taking listening to the Dharma, good friends, and so forth as the causes of śīla. From 'Faith is caused by listening to the Dharma' onward, the second part prevents the challenge of fearing infinite regress; hence it points out that the two dharmas mutually serve as cause and effect. Next, from 'For example' onward, three analogies in all are raised. The first is formulated as an analogy to prevent infinite regress. Many teachers say: The pure-living Nirgrantha does not place his vase on the ground; three pieces of wood serve as a tripod to support the single vase; the vase stands by virtue of the tripod, and the tripod is completed relying on the vase. Second, Emperor Wu of Liang said: 'The Nirgrantha eats cow dung with his mouth and exposes his defiled genitals nakedly; what pure conduct does he have that could be praised? The tripod is what is nowadays called a suction tube (ke-wu) for drawing water, also called a windlass (lu-lu); installed over a well, they alternately go up and down, which is precisely the meaning of mutually serving as cause and effect.' As for saying 'Nirgrantha', it points to the fact that his household has this tripod. Next, the twelve links of dependent origination are raised as an analogy. If one definitely specifies three time periods, using it as an analogy here is inconvenient; taking saṃsāra's endlessness, the meaning of mutual \[causation\] is established. Third, the eight characteristics in the Hīnayāna are raised as an analogy: the primary arising is simply called 'arising' (jāti), while secondary arising is called 'arising of arising' (jāti-jāti). The masters of the Tattvasiddhi Śāstra refute the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma's doctrine of primary and secondary arising, explaining this text by saying: 'The lifespan of one period is the primary arising; momentary arising and ceasing is the secondary arising. Because of one period, there are moments; because of moments, there is one period.' They do not thoroughly understand the text, and furthermore do not permit the use of the Abhidharma doctrine. This should not be so; refutation and establishment are suited to the occasion, so how can borrowing an analogy be mistaken? In my private view: The ancients took one period and moments as mutually generating each other—why should that not be acceptable? However, it does not equal the kṣaṇa; the eight characteristics are within a single kṣaṇa as both arising and the arising of arising. Therefore, within a single kṣaṇa, the primary characteristic is the cause, and the secondary characteristic is the cause of the cause; the secondary characteristic is the fruit, and the primary characteristic is the fruit of the fruit. This is precisely mutual causation and mutual fruition. Just as with a single faithful mind: this very faithful mind is the mind that listens to the Dharma, and this very mind that listens to the Dharma is the faithful mind; though they are the same single thought-moment, they are mutually causal to one another. Since they are mutually causal, they mutually accomplish the fruits. From 'Faith and listening to the Dharma' onward, it applies the analogies, answering the former first challenge and clarifying that śīla has a cause. From 'It is a fruit and not a cause' onward, it answers the latter challenge, clarifying the answer that nirvāṇa is a fruit and has no cause. The latter also has three parts: first, stating the two headings: one, it is a fruit; two, it is not a cause. Next, from 'Why is it called a fruit?' onward, it explains the heading of 'being a fruit'. Because it is a supramundane fruit, it is called a superior fruit. Because it is a fruit of cultivation, it is \[the fruit of\] a śramaṇa. Because the fruit of a brāhmaṇa is the fruit of buddhahood, it says 'severing birth and death'. Because it is an absolute fruit, it says 'free from afflictions'. Afflictions are called 'faults beyond faults' (guo-guo) because their essence is the cause of death—one fault further obtains the fruit of suffering, hence they are called 'faults beyond faults'. Furthermore, fundamental ignorance can obscure principle and can also obstruct wisdom, so it is a 'fault beyond faults'. From 'Nirvāṇa has no cause' onward, the second part explains the heading of 'not being a cause'. 'Having no arising and ceasing' means having no worldly cause. 'Having nothing done' means having no retributional cause. 'Not conditioned' means having no generative cause. The three phrases 'constant, unchanging', etc., signify having no relative cause. Third, from 'Good son' onward, it concludes the meaning of having no cause. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 25.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25.6) - [Next: 25.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25.8) - [Up: 25](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767~en-mt.25.7) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25.7) · Pramāṇa