[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767) › 25.8 # 大般涅槃經疏 25.8 大般涅槃經疏 25.8 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [25.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25.8) 次第四番問答。問為三：初領旨仰非、次舉六無為難、三結。次畢竟無，但是語勢，非是正意，正取有時無故為難。言有因者，有習因、了因；言無因者，無生因、報因。故舉有時無以之為難。如池沼之雨旱、如日月之籠散，因之有無，似同於此。少無者，以少故無，非是全無。不受無者，只是不受為無，非無彼法；不受惡亦如是，不對亦爾。後之三無，俱是互無之意。三結，如文。佛答為二：先明無因、次明有因。初答無因為三：先非五就一、次六喻併非、三結無因。初非五就一者，汝以畢竟無以為正難，尚不全是，有少分是，是故就之，況以五喻寧得會耶？次併非六喻。六是世法，不可對於出世之法而復重非畢竟無者，以其墮斷無我無我所，故與涅槃乖。涅槃有我，故重說之。三「善男子」下，結意如文。「是因非果」下，二答涅槃是因而非於果。文為二：初標章、次釋。標者，明涅槃是因，以佛性為因即是了因。復簡出非因，即非生因；標其非果，非沙門小果。前云沙門果者，指佛果為沙門婆羅門果。「因有二種」下，釋文為三：一明有生了二因、二舉三譬譬之、三三番舉法門合之。合中悉用親為生因、疏為了因。此雖明不可思議之法，略須分別。前一番事理相對，六度是事為生因、佛性是理為了因；次定散相對；後橫豎相對（云云）。而初文中云菩提者，此欲明因取果，又舉果成因。問：涅槃無因，而義說生因了因，亦應義說生了二果。答：了因所成即是了果，生因所出即是生果，何不得並別有二果？生果即是無常，了果即是於常，世人謂屈此並。此乃不思議法門，何所不得？且用首楞嚴通之，譬如術人於眾前死，得財物已而復還生。今經二鳥雙游即是其義。「近是」下，文云佛身二種，一常、二無常（云云）。「師子吼」下，第三，有一番問答，結成本宗。此問從前眼見聞見如來佛性生。夫佛性之性絕色非色，云何可見？佛答此為二者，皆悉再答，悉開兩意，故有可見、不可見，如文。 > Next is the fourth exchange of questions and answers. The question has three parts: first, acknowledging the import and respectfully demurring; second, raising the six kinds of non-existence to make a challenge; third, concluding. Next, 'absolute non-existence' is merely rhetorical momentum, not the primary intent; it primarily takes 'occasional non-existence' to make the challenge. When speaking of 'having a cause', there are the cause of cultivation (bhāvanā-hetu) and the elucidating cause (vyañjaka-hetu); when speaking of 'having no cause', there are no generative cause (janaka-hetu) and no retributional cause (vipāka-hetu). Therefore, it raises 'occasional non-existence' to make the challenge. Like rain and drought in pools and ponds, like clouds obscuring and dispersing around the sun and moon, the presence and absence of causes seems similar to this. 'Non-existence due to scarcity' means non-existent because it is scarce, not entirely non-existent. 'Non-existence due to non-acceptance' means non-existent merely because it is not received, not that the dharma itself does not exist; non-acceptance of evil is also like this, and non-confrontation is likewise so. The latter three kinds of non-existence all have the sense of mutual non-existence. Third, concluding, as in the text. The Buddha's answer has two parts: first, clarifying 'having no cause'; second, clarifying 'having a cause'. First, answering 'having no cause' has three parts: first, rejecting five to adopt one; second, rejecting all six analogies together; third, concluding 'having no cause'. First, 'rejecting five to adopt one' means: you took absolute non-existence as the primary challenge, which is not yet entirely correct but has a small portion that is correct, and therefore it is adopted; how much less could the five analogies be compatible? Next, rejecting all six analogies together: the six are worldly dharmas, which cannot be matched against supramundane dharmas; and the reason for reiterating the rejection of absolute non-existence is that it falls into nihilism, no-self, and no-mine, and thus contradicts nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa has a self, so it is stated again. Third, from 'Good son' onward, concluding the intent as in the text. From 'It is a cause and not a fruit' onward, the second part answers that nirvāṇa is a cause and not a fruit. The text has two parts: first, stating the heading; second, explaining it. Stating the heading clarifies that nirvāṇa is a cause: taking the buddhadhātu as the cause is precisely the elucidating cause. It also singles out that it is not a cause, meaning not a generative cause; and states that it is not a fruit, meaning not the minor fruit of a śramaṇa. The earlier reference to the 'fruit of a śramaṇa' pointed to the fruit of buddhahood as the fruit of a śramaṇa and brāhmaṇa. From 'Causes are of two kinds' onward, the explanatory text has three parts: first, clarifying that there are the two causes, generative and elucidating; second, raising three analogies to illustrate them; third, raising doctrinal categories in three turns to apply them. In the application, direct connection is consistently used for the generative cause, and indirect connection for the elucidating cause. Although this explains an inconceivable dharma, it is briefly necessary to make distinctions. In the previous turn, phenomena and principle were contrasted: the six pāramitās are phenomena and serve as the generative cause; the buddhadhātu is principle and serves as the elucidating cause. Next, concentration and distraction are contrasted; afterward, horizontal and vertical are contrasted (and so on). In the initial text, mentioning 'bodhi' is intended to clarify taking the fruit through the cause, and also raising the fruit to establish the cause. Question: Nirvāṇa has no cause, yet generatively and elucidatingly two causes are doctrinally spoken of; should generative and elucidating two fruits not also be doctrinally spoken of? Answer: What is accomplished by the elucidating cause is precisely the elucidated fruit; what is brought forth by the generative cause is precisely the generated fruit. Why should there not simultaneously be two distinct fruits? The generated fruit is impermanent, while the elucidated fruit is permanent. People of the world consider this pairing unacceptable. This is an inconceivable dharma-gate; what could not be acceptable? For now, let us resolve it using the Śūraṅgama: for example, a magician dies in front of the multitude, and after obtaining wealth and property, comes back to life again. The 'two birds flying together' in the present sūtra is precisely this meaning. From 'Near is...' onward, the text states that the Buddha's bodies are of two kinds: one is permanent, and two is impermanent (and so on). From 'Siṃhanāda' onward, third, there is one turn of question and answer that concludes and establishes the fundamental tenet. This question arises from the earlier seeing with the eyes and seeing by hearing the Tathāgata's buddhadhātu. As the nature of the buddhadhātu transcends form and non-form, how can it be seen? The Buddha's answers to this are two; both are answered repeatedly, and both open up two meanings; hence there are the visible and the invisible, as in the text. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 25.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25.7) - [Next: 25.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25.9) - [Up: 25](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767~en-mt.25.8) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.25.8) · Pramāṇa