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# 大般涅槃經疏 26.4

大般涅槃經疏 26.4

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [26.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.26.4)

起卷第三明縛解。眾生雖有佛性，為惑所覆不能得見，須修萬行解生惑盡，佛性理彰，故明縛解。文有五番問答。初問答中，初問為二：先領旨唱無；次「是五陰」下，生滅為難。若正性不生不滅，故無縛解。緣性念念不住，又無縛解。此惑體性即起即滅，云何此惑能縛眾生？既其無縛，即亦無解。有法、有譬、有合。答為二：初誡許；次正答，又二：初明縛、後明解。就初縛為三：一死陰、二中陰、三生陰。就初死陰中三：有法、譬、合。初法如文。次譬中云日既西沒，雖殘光東照終不歸東。人命將盡，雖有餘氣終不更生。此陰滅已彼陰續生，此乃即死明生。「眾生」下，合，又二：先正合；次如燈生闇滅，重更引譬。次「如蠟印印泥」下，第二明中陰，又二：先譬、後合。蠟譬死陰，泥譬中陰。印滅文成者，譬死陰若滅中陰即起。文非泥出者，此身非是中陰所出，又非無因，亦不餘來，藉於死陰而得現也。不可求其處所，但因緣故有。問：亦有不受中陰者不？答：通論皆受。如大理獄責定行刑，中陰亦爾，覈定善惡，惡墜、善升。若有別從猛利善惡，如五逆者徑墜、十善者徑升，𥎞矛離手遂到彼方，則不論中陰。「現在陰滅」下，第二合譬，初正合、次二眼三食。初又二：初正合、次舉譬帖合。二料簡二眼三食者，自無摶食，既是改報，寧得有飯而摶。既有想陰則有思食；有身故則有觸食；以有意故則有識食。《俱舍》中廣明中陰等，古人有四食章等，於此非要。「父母交會」下，第三明生陰。通論六道並有生陰，且就人道，初明起三煩惱、次明具四顛倒，所以為縛，不得難言念念滅故故無有縛。三煩惱者，一愛；二瞋；三謂己有，此是我見亦即是癡。

> At the opening of the third section of the fascicle, bondage and liberation are explained. Although sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu, they are covered by delusion and cannot perceive it; they must cultivate the ten thousand practices, so that understanding arises and delusion is exhausted, whereupon the principle of the buddhadhātu becomes evident. Hence bondage and liberation are explained. The text has five rounds of questions and answers. In the first round of question and answer, the initial question has two parts: first, taking up the underlying principle to proclaim that there is none; next, from "these five aggregates" downward, raising a challenge based on arising and ceasing. If the real nature is unarisen and unceasing, then there is no bondage or liberation. If the conditioned nature does not abide from thought-moment to thought-moment, there is likewise no bondage or liberation. The essential nature of this delusion arises and ceases in an instant; how could this delusion bind sentient beings? Since there is no bondage, there is likewise no liberation. There are the phenomenon, the parable, and the application. The answer has two parts: first, the admonition and permission; next, the main answer, which also has two parts: first, explaining bondage, and later, explaining liberation. As for the first, explaining bondage, there are three parts: first, the death-aggregate; second, the intermediate aggregate; third, the birth-aggregate. Under the first, the death-aggregate, there are three: the phenomenon, the parable, and the application. The initial phenomenon is as in the text. Next, in the parable, it says that once the sun has set in the west, although residual light shines eastward, it ultimately never returns to the east. When a person's life is about to end, although residual breath remains, they ultimately will not revive. When this aggregate ceases, that aggregate arises in succession; this is explaining birth right within death. From "sentient beings" downward is the application, which again has two parts: first, the direct application; next, like a lamp arising and darkness ceasing, citing another parable again. Next, from "like a wax seal stamping clay" downward is the second part, explaining the intermediate aggregate (antarābhava), which again has two parts: first the parable, and later the application. The wax is a parable for the death-aggregate; the clay is a parable for the intermediate aggregate. That "the seal is destroyed and the impression is formed" is a parable that if the death-aggregate ceases, the intermediate aggregate immediately arises. That "the impression does not come out of the clay" means that this body does not emerge from the intermediate aggregate, nor is it without a cause, nor does it come from somewhere else; it appears by relying on the death-aggregate. Its location cannot be sought; it exists solely through causes and conditions. Question: Are there also those who do not undergo the intermediate aggregate? Answer: Speaking generally, all undergo it. Just as the Court of Judicial Review determines the sentencing and executes the punishment, so too is the intermediate aggregate: it scrutinizes and determines good and evil, so that the evil fall and the good ascend. If there are those who distinctly follow fierce good or evil, such as those \[guilty of\] the five heinous offenses who fall directly, or those \[practicing\] the ten good deeds who ascend directly—just as a spear leaves the hand and instantly reaches the other side—then the intermediate aggregate is not spoken of. From "when the present aggregates cease" downward is the second part, applying the parable: first the direct application, and next the two eyes and three foods. The first again has two parts: first the direct application, and next presenting the parable to match the application. Second, as for clarifying the two eyes and three foods: there is naturally no solid food; since this is a change of retribution, how could there be cooked grain to form mouthfuls? Since there is the aggregate of ideation, there is food of volition; because there is a body, there is food of contact; and because there is mind, there is food of consciousness. In the \*Kośa\* the intermediate aggregate and so on are broadly explained, and ancient masters had treatises on the four foods and the like, which are not essential here. From "when the parents unite" downward is the third part, explaining the birth-aggregate. Speaking generally, all six destinies have the birth-aggregate; taking just the human destiny for now, it first explains the arising of the three afflictions, and next explains the endowment with the four inversions, which constitute bondage; one must not object by saying that because it ceases from thought-moment to thought-moment, there is no bondage. As for the three afflictions: first, craving; second, aversion; third, conceiving \[the self\] as possessing, which is the view of self and is also delusion.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767~en-mt.26.4) — English, machine translation

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.26.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.26.4) · Pramāṇa
