[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767) › 26.7 # 大般涅槃經疏 26.7 大般涅槃經疏 26.7 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [26.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.26.7) 「師子吼言如佛說偈」下，第二正明修道，又二：初明修道、次明修道因緣。初又二：先釋、次論義。初舉偈問者，上兩句修道、下兩句得果，能修三品不退得果，三品是因，近大涅槃是果。初牒偈問、次一一請答。答中三番解釋：初番真偽對辨、次番偏為破惡、後番偏為生善。就真偽為二：先偽、次真。初偽，為三品，下下一向不能持戒，下中畏於惡道之苦是故持戒，下上為度眾生苦惱是故持戒。此三並偽，今取此人尚不可得。次真者，知諸法空而能持戒，為諸眾生而求佛果。果不可得，眾生尚無，況有佛果，名真持戒。次能破十六惡律儀者，此就滅惡更釋三品。魁膾者，舊云：是販魚肉典軍之人。又云：是行杖者。無身三昧者，空定滅色，故言無身。無邊心者，即識處定。淨聚者，即不用處。世邊者，非想，此定能知八萬劫，以此為邊。又非想在三界表，故言世邊。世斷者，八萬劫外既不能知，便謂為斷。世性者，即是冥初，是世之本性。世丈夫者，以此定力能見劫初水中丈夫，即韋紐天。非想非非想者，即是存亡觀為定體。「修習戒者為身寂靜」下，第三就生善釋三品。諸有者，即是三有、二十五有。諸界者，即是三界及十八界等。諸諦者，即二十五諦及以六諦。「師子吼言不生不滅」下，第二論義。因前修道，故見佛性、得菩提涅槃。今難涅槃及以佛性，凡七番問答：初三番難涅槃、次四番難佛性。初云若不生滅為涅槃者，只凡夫人亦不生滅，應是涅槃。凡人一期從生至老不更生故，故名不生；而復未滅，亦是不滅。此不生滅是涅槃不？又云：若以三相中生相為難，只此一念生已生故故是不生，復未滅故故是不滅。是涅槃不？答中，先印述之、後解。既非涅槃，為始終故。亦須更通上之兩解，成始終義。初生為始、命盡為終；一念三相生相亦爾，初起為始、念滅為終。「世尊」下，第二難，明生死法亦無始終。十二因緣輪轉不住，何有始終？佛答者，生死之法有因有果，十二因緣輪轉不住，過去二因、現在五果，故非涅槃。第三番難，明涅槃之中亦有因果。戒定慧等能得涅槃，豈非因果？佛答：涅槃有因而非果，又復是果而非所得。又佛性為涅槃因，復不能生涅槃之果（云云）。第二有四番問答論佛性義。初番就共有不共有為難，先標兩章門、後釋如文。佛答又二：先法、次譬。初法中言不一不二，不一故非共、不二故非各。雖爾，終是一切眾生同共有之。地人云：一切眾生同梨耶識法界體性。若爾，一人得時應多人得。成論師云：眾生各有佛性，但成佛時權智齊等同一法身，力無畏等亦復如是。若爾，佛性可數即是無常，正當此難。然佛性平等，非一非二、非共非各，亦如今之持戒修行之人，不可一、不可異，人人各修豈得是一？我解彼解、彼解我解，是故不異。又如五種佛性並不一異，眾生等有豈可異？五種不同豈可一（云云）？問：眾生於五佛性中為具幾許？答：盡有盡無。眾生無觀智之了則不能發境，發境之智既無亦無觀境。因既無因，寧別得果及以果果？既無因果，云何非因非果？盡有者，必當得故、從緣現故，故言盡有，今時雖無必當有之。次譬，如文。第二番，難忍辱草譬。若一者，一人修已，餘人亦得。佛答：佛性是一，隨多人修，各各得之，不相妨閡。第三番，問：如多人在路，於後為妨。佛性亦爾，前人修時亦妨後者。佛答者，如路橋醫並是少分，聖道之路則不如是，橋等亦然。第四難，天人六道其相非一，云何共有一佛性耶？佛答：置毒乳中，隨其五味毒能遍殺。佛性亦爾，偏一切處（云云）。 > From “Siṃhanāda said: ‘As the Buddha spoke in verse...’” onward, the second part directly clarifies cultivating the path. This has two parts: first, clarifying cultivating the path; second, clarifying the causes and conditions for cultivating the path. The first part also has two: first, an explanation; next, the debate. As for first citing the verse to ask, the first two lines concern cultivating the path, and the latter two lines concern attaining the fruit: being able to cultivate the three grades without regressing, one attains the fruit; the three grades are the cause, and approaching great nirvāṇa is the fruit. First, the verse is cited to ask; next, an answer is requested on each point. In the answer there are three rounds of explanation: the first round distinguishes the genuine from the false; the next round is specifically directed at destroying evil; the final round is specifically directed at generating the good. Regarding the genuine and the false, there are two parts: first the false, next the genuine. First, the false comprises three grades: the lowest of the low consistently cannot keep the precepts; the middle of the low keeps the precepts out of fear of the sufferings of the bad destinies; the highest of the low keeps the precepts to deliver sentient beings from suffering and affliction. These three are all false; on the present understanding, even this person cannot be apprehended. Next, as for the genuine: one who knows that all phenomena are empty and yet can keep the precepts, seeking the fruit of buddhahood for the sake of all sentient beings. The fruit cannot be apprehended, and even sentient beings do not exist, much less the fruit of buddhahood—this is called genuinely keeping the precepts. Next, as for being able to break the sixteen evil disciplines: this further explains the three grades in terms of extinguishing evil. As for “butchers” (kuíkuài), the old \[commentaries\] say: they are people who sell fish and meat or oversee troops. Another says: they are floggers. As for “body-less samādhi”: because the absorption of emptiness extinguishes physical form, it is called “body-less.” “Boundless mind” is the absorption of the sphere of consciousness. “Pure mass” is the sphere of nothingness. “World's edge” is \[the sphere of\] neither conceptualization nor non-conceptualization; because this absorption can know eighty thousand kalpas, this is taken as the edge. Moreover, because neither conceptualization nor non-conceptualization lies beyond the triple realm, it is called the “world's edge.” “World's severance”: since outside of eighty thousand kalpas one cannot know, one then takes it to be severed. “World's nature” is the primordial obscurity (pradhāna), which is the fundamental nature of the world. “World-man” (puruṣa): through the power of this absorption one can see the cosmic man in the waters at the beginning of the kalpa, that is, Viṣṇu. “Neither conceptualization nor non-conceptualization”: taking the contemplation of existence and non-existence as the essence of the absorption. From “Those who cultivate the precepts do so for bodily tranquility...” onward, the third part explains the three grades in terms of generating the good. “All realms of existence” means the three realms of existence and the twenty-five realms of existence. “All spheres” means the three realms and the eighteen dhātus, and so on. “All truths” means the twenty-five tattvas and the six categories (padārthas). From “Siṃhanāda said: ‘Unborn and unextinguished...’” onward, the second part is the debate. Due to previously cultivating the path, one sees the buddhadhātu and attains bodhi and nirvāṇa. Now he challenges \[the concepts of\] nirvāṇa and buddhadhātu in seven rounds of questions and answers in total: the first three rounds challenge nirvāṇa; the subsequent four rounds challenge the buddhadhātu. The first says: if what is unborn and unextinguished is nirvāṇa, then an ordinary person is also unborn and unextinguished, so this should be nirvāṇa. Because an ordinary person throughout a lifetime, from birth to old age, is not born again, it is called “unborn”; and because they are not yet extinguished, it is also “unextinguished.” Is this being unborn and unextinguished nirvāṇa, or not? Furthermore, it is said: if the challenge is made in terms of the characteristic of origination among the three characteristics \[of conditioned phenomena\], then in this single moment of thought, because origination has already originated, it is therefore “unborn”; and because it has not yet ceased, it is therefore “unextinguished.” Is this nirvāṇa, or not? In the answer, the Buddha first endorses it and then explains: since it is not nirvāṇa, it is because it has a beginning and an end. It is also necessary to further resolve the two explanations above to establish the meaning of beginning and end. Initial birth is the beginning, and the end of life is the end; the characteristic of origination in the three characteristics of a single thought is also like this: the initial arising is the beginning, and the cessation of the thought is the end. From “World-Honoured One...” onward, the second challenge clarifies that the phenomena of saṃsāra are also without beginning or end. Since the twelve links of dependent origination revolve without stopping, how could there be a beginning or an end? The Buddha answers: the phenomena of saṃsāra have causes and effects; the twelve links of dependent origination revolve without stopping, with the two causes of the past and the five fruits of the present, and so it is not nirvāṇa. The third round of challenge clarifies that within nirvāṇa there are also cause and effect. Since precepts, concentration, and wisdom can attain nirvāṇa, how could this not be cause and effect? The Buddha answers: nirvāṇa has a cause and is not an effect; moreover, it is an effect and is not that which is attained. Furthermore, the buddhadhātu is the cause of nirvāṇa, and yet it cannot produce the fruit of nirvāṇa (and so forth). The second section has four rounds of questions and answers debating the meaning of the buddhadhātu. The first round raises a challenge regarding whether it is shared or not shared: first marking two headings, and then explaining as in the text. The Buddha's answer also has two parts: first the principle, next the similes. In the initial principle, it is said that it is neither one nor two: because it is not one, it is not shared; because it is not two, it is not distinct. Even though it is so, in the end all sentient beings share it together. The Dilun masters say: all sentient beings share the identical essence of the ālaya-vijñāna dharmadhātu. If so, when one person attains it, many people should attain it. The Satyasiddhi masters say: each sentient being has their own buddhadhātu, but when buddhahood is achieved, their provisional wisdom is equal and they share the same dharmakāya, and the powers, fearlessnesses, and so forth are also like this. If so, if the buddhadhātu could be counted, it would be impermanent, which is directly open to this challenge. However, the buddhadhātu is impartial, neither one nor two, neither shared nor distinct. It is also like people today who maintain precepts and cultivate practice: they cannot be considered one, nor can they be considered different. Since each person cultivates individually, how could they be one? My understanding is their understanding, and their understanding is my understanding; therefore they are not different. Furthermore, just as the five kinds of buddhadhātu are neither one nor different: since sentient beings equally possess them, how could they be different? Since the five kinds are not identical, how could they be one (and so forth)? Question: Among the five buddhadhātus, how many do sentient beings possess? Answer: All of them, and none of them. If sentient beings lack the discernment of contemplative wisdom, they cannot manifest the objective realm; since the wisdom that manifests the objective realm is lacking, there is also no contemplated realm. Since the cause lacks a cause, how could they separately attain the fruit and the fruit of the fruit? Since there is neither cause nor fruit, how could there be neither-cause-nor-fruit? As for possessing all: because it must inevitably be attained, and because it manifests through conditions, it is therefore said that they possess all of them; although it is lacking at present, it will certainly be possessed. Next, the similes are as in the text. The second round challenges the simile of the kṣānti grass: if it is one, once one person cultivates it, other people should also attain it. The Buddha answers: the buddhadhātu is one, but as many people cultivate it, each person attains it without mutually obstructing one another. The third round asks: just as when many people are on a road, those in front obstruct those behind; the buddhadhātu is also like this: when the former person cultivates it, it should also obstruct the later person. The Buddha answers: roads, bridges, and physicians are only partial analogies; the path of the noble ones is not like this, and bridges and the like are also like this. The fourth challenge: the characteristics of the six destinies of devas and humans are not uniform; how can they share a single buddhadhātu? The Buddha answers: if poison is put into milk, through all five flavors the poison can kill everywhere. The buddhadhātu is also like this, pervading all places (and so forth). > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 26.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.26.6) - [Next: 26.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.26.8) - [Up: 26](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.26) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767~en-mt.26.7) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.26.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.26.7) · Pramāṇa