[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767) › 27.6 # 大般涅槃經疏 27.6 大般涅槃經疏 27.6 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [27.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.27.6) 次別破為二：先以法料簡、後示圓融無方定慧。於初文中為七：一約無異、二約無有、三約無所、四約無缺、五約無動、六約無能、七約無作。初約無異破者，文為二：一論體同、次舉譬譬體同也。何者？惑者咸謂煩惱與智慧其猶水火怨賊，須修智慧故破煩惱。自別教已還莫不如此，故師子吼挾此設難，祈於異聞。佛以圓破別。何者智慧？何者煩惱？蓋是法界之解、惑，解惑同體無二無別。若惑時舉體是惑，惑外無智；若解時舉體是解，解外無惑。經言「煩惱即菩提，菩提即煩惱。」又經言「出法性外，更無有法。出外有法，即非法界。」若然，有煩惱時則無智慧，何所論破？若有智慧，無復煩惱，復何所破？而言智慧能破煩惱，故舉明時無闇、闇時無明，喻此圓法。斯理斯文彪炳灼然，不應餘解。從「誰有智慧」下，第二約無有以破，文為二：先責人法、次結無破。初文者，自三藏已上別教已還，不能法界圓融虛己忘物，二乘猶存我衣我鉢，菩薩則嚴土化人，彼我雙存智斷俱證，此則有誰不得無誰。佛以圓法責之，只此智慧是煩惱，誰以煩惱斷於煩惱？只此煩惱是智慧，誰以智慧斷於智慧？尚無煩惱斷於煩惱，何得智慧斷於智慧？是故結云如其無者則無所破。從「善男子若言智慧」下，第三約無所以破，文為二：先雙明不到到、次雙結無破。何者？智慧是法界，縱令出法界外有煩惱，用法界內智慧破外煩惱，為不到彼所能破？為到彼所能破？若不到彼所能破，凡人不到，亦應能破。若到彼所即能破者，為初念能破？後念能破？若初念不能，後亦不能。是故結云到與不到若能破者是義不然。法界之外更無復法，是故無所。從「復次毘婆」下，第四約無缺以破，文為二：先約法正破、次舉譬。初法意者，智慧是法界，圓滿具足無有缺減，智慧即是戒定等而無有異，那忽法界外而猶有伴，共破法界外之煩惱？既無伴破，獨亦不能，故舉盲譬。若獨若伴俱不見色，若獨若伴是缺減義。從「善男子如地堅性」下，第五約無動以破，文為二。先舉類破、次結破。如四大性不可動轉，更無一物改動四大令失本性。煩惱亦爾，與智同性。智性自斷，煩惱之性亦自是斷，云何以斷能斷於斷？次結文云毘婆舍那決定不能破諸煩惱。從「善男子如鹽性鹹」下，第六約無能以破，文為四：前奪、次縱、三更奪、四復縱。初舉鹽蜜轉他同己，即奪智慧不能如鹽蜜。不滅之法，智慧不能彊令其滅，此奪智慧無斷惑之功。次「若言」下，引鹽能鹹者，縱於智慧能滅他者。智慧自念念滅，豈令他滅？如溺人自沈，何得浮他？三「善男子有二種」下更奪，正以性滅奪之。智是性滅，不能令煩惱滅。四「若言智慧能滅」下，復重縱之。舉火燼斧伐，求其滅處不可得也。前一縱奪，明無常苦空及緣修等智慧自是無常，何能斷惑？歷然可見。後一縱奪，責不見能斷所斷方所，此破法界外別有於惑為智所斷。何以不見處所？如火燼、如斧痕，既無燼痕，則無惑可破。既其無惑，智慧破誰？用圓破別，文義明矣。從「善男子一切」下，第七約無作以破，亦呼此為總結於前。此中明一切諸法性自空者，誰令生滅？無造作者，那得智慧破於煩惱？ > Next, the specific refutation has two parts: first, analysing according to the Dharma; second, revealing the perfect integration of non-abiding concentration and wisdom. In the first part there are seven \[perspectives\]: first, in terms of non-difference; second, in terms of non-existence; third, in terms of no locus; fourth, in terms of non-deficiency; fifth, in terms of immutability; sixth, in terms of no agentive capability; seventh, in terms of no making. Regarding the first, the refutation in terms of non-difference, the text has two parts: first, discussing the identity of essence; next, adducing analogies to illustrate this identity of essence. Why? Those who are deluded all maintain that defilements and wisdom are like water and fire, or enemies and bandits, and that one must cultivate wisdom to destroy defilements. From the separate teaching down, none are not like this. Therefore, Siṃhanāda, holding this \[view\], formulated an objection, hoping to hear something different. The Buddha uses the perfect \[teaching\] to refute the separate \[teaching\]. What is wisdom? What is defilement? They are simply the understanding and delusion of the dharmadhātu; understanding and delusion are of the same essence, not two and not distinct. When in delusion, the entire essence is delusion, and outside delusion there is no wisdom; when in understanding, the entire essence is understanding, and outside understanding there is no delusion. The sūtra says: 'Defilement is itself bodhi; bodhi is itself defilement.' The sūtra also says: 'Outside the nature of phenomena (dharmatā), there are no further phenomena. If there were phenomena outside it, it would not be the dharmadhātu.' If so, when there are defilements, there is no wisdom—how could there be any talk of destruction? If there is wisdom, there are no longer defilements—what would there be left to destroy? Yet to say that wisdom can destroy defilements—for this reason he adduces that when it is light there is no darkness, and when it is dark there is no light, to serve as an analogy for this perfect Dharma. This principle and this text are brilliantly clear and luminous, and should not be interpreted otherwise. From 'who has wisdom' downward is the second part, refuting in terms of non-existence, which has two sections: first, reproving the person and the Dharma; next, concluding that there is no destruction. As for the first section, from the Tripiṭaka \[teaching\] upward down to the separate teaching, they are unable to realize the perfect integration of the dharmadhātu, to empty the self and forget objects: the two vehicles still retain 'my robes' and 'my alms-bowl,' and bodhisattvas purify lands and transform people; both self and other are preserved, and both wisdom and severance are realized—this posits a 'who' and cannot reach 'no who'. The Buddha reproves them with the perfect Dharma: this very wisdom is defilement—who would use defilement to sever defilement? This very defilement is wisdom—who would use wisdom to sever wisdom? When even defilements cannot sever defilements, how could wisdom sever wisdom? Therefore he concludes that if there is none, there is nothing to be severed. From 'Good son, if one says wisdom' downward is the third part, refuting in terms of no locus, which has two sections: first, jointly explaining arriving and not arriving; next, jointly concluding that there is no destruction. Why? Wisdom is the dharmadhātu. Even supposing there were defilements outside the dharmadhātu, and one used the wisdom within the dharmadhātu to destroy the defilements outside: would it destroy without arriving at that place, or would it destroy upon arriving at that place? If it could destroy without arriving at that place, then ordinary people, not having arrived there, should also be able to destroy \[them\]. If it could destroy upon arriving at that place, would it be able to destroy in the first thought-moment, or in a later thought-moment? If it cannot do so in the first thought-moment, it cannot do so in a later one either. Therefore he concludes that to say destruction occurs either by arriving or by not arriving is incorrect. Outside the dharmadhātu there is no other phenomenon; therefore, there is no locus. From 'Furthermore, vipaśyanā' downward is the fourth part, refuting in terms of non-deficiency, which has two sections: first, directly refuting according to the Dharma; next, adducing analogies. As for the meaning of the first Dharma \[passage\], wisdom is the dharmadhātu, completely fulfilled and lacking nothing; wisdom is itself discipline, concentration, and the rest without any difference—how could it suddenly have an accompaniment outside the dharmadhātu to jointly destroy defilements outside the dharmadhātu? Since there is no destruction with an accompaniment, neither can it do so alone; therefore he adduces the analogy of the blind. Whether alone or accompanied, neither sees form; 'alone or accompanied' carries the sense of deficiency. From 'Good son, just as the solid nature of earth' downward is the fifth part, refuting in terms of immutability, which has two sections: first, adducing a parallel category to refute; next, concluding the refutation. Just as the nature of the four great elements cannot be moved or altered, and no single thing can change or alter the four elements to make them lose their original nature, defilements are also like this, sharing the same nature with wisdom. The nature of wisdom is inherently severed, and the nature of defilement is also inherently severed; how could severance sever severance? Next, the concluding text states: 'Vipaśyanā definitely cannot destroy defilements.' From 'Good son, just as the salty nature of salt' downward is the sixth part, refuting in terms of no agentive capability, which has four sections: first, taking away; second, granting; third, taking away again; fourth, granting again. First, adducing salt and honey transforming others to be like themselves is to deny that wisdom can be like salt and honey. Regarding phenomena that are not extinguished, wisdom cannot forcibly extinguish them; this denies to wisdom the efficacy of severing delusion. Next, from 'if one says' downward, citing salt's ability to make things salty grants that wisdom can extinguish others. Wisdom is itself extinguished thought-moment by thought-moment; how could it cause others to be extinguished? Just as a drowning person is himself sinking, how could he keep others afloat? Third, from 'Good son, there are two kinds' downward takes it away again, directly taking it away on the grounds of inherent extinction. Wisdom is inherently extinguished and cannot cause defilements to be extinguished. Fourth, from 'if one says that wisdom can extinguish' downward grants it once more, adducing the cinders of fire and the hewing of an axe, where the locus of their extinction cannot be found. The former pairing of granting and taking away makes clear that wisdom of impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and conditional cultivation is itself impermanent—how could it sever delusion? This is distinctly apparent. The latter pairing of granting and taking away reproves \[the idea by showing\] that neither the locus of that which severs nor that which is severed can be seen; this refutes the view that outside the dharmadhātu there is a separate delusion to be severed by wisdom. Why is no locus seen? It is like the cinders of fire or the mark of an axe: since there are no cinders or marks, there is no delusion to be destroyed. Since there is no delusion, whom does wisdom destroy? The text and meaning are clear in using the perfect to refute the separate. From 'Good son, all' downward is the seventh part, refuting in terms of no making, which is also called the general summary of the preceding. Here it explains that the nature of all phenomena is intrinsically empty—who causes them to arise and cease? Since there is no maker, how could wisdom destroy defilements? > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 27.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.27.5) - [Next: 27.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.27.7) - [Up: 27](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.27) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767~en-mt.27.6) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.27.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.27.6) · Pramāṇa